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The writer and scholar A. C. Johnson insisted that  
the idea of community should include strangers.  
He said that interconnectedness is what takes place 
between the community and the stranger. One not 
only becomes a person through one’s community 
but also through the stranger. To avoid the disasters 
of the past, Johnson said, the figure of the stranger 
ought to be continually reinvented, and it is the 
specific task of the intellectual in a society to be an 
advocate for the stranger—to insist on responsibility 
for the stranger as constitutive of collectivity itself.
— antjie krog, Begging to Be Black
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adoon Derogatory word for slave
Bartire Subclan of the Darood clan family
clan Kinship unit of Somali society
cphv Center for the Prevention of Hate Violence, based in  
Portland, now closed
Dadaab Refugee camp in Kenya
Dagahalley Part of Dadaab refugee camp
Darood One of Somalia’s five major clan- families
dhhs Department of Health and Human Services
ebco Ethnic- based community or ga ni za tion
ell En glish language learner (used instead of En glish as  
a second language)
ga General Assistance
Hawiye One of Somalia’s five major clan- families
Ifo Part of Dadaab refugee camp
jareer Literally, hard hair; racialized term that preceded the  
creation of the name Somali Bantu
jileec Soft; used to describe non- jareer Somalis
Kakuma Refugee camp in northern Kenya to which Somali Bantus  
accepted for U.S. resettlement  were moved when conditions 
in Dadaab became too dangerous for them
TERMS AND ABBREVIATIONS
x • Terms and Abbreviations 
Maay Maay One of the two official languages of Somalia
Mushunguli Ethnic group and language of minorities from lower  
Jubba Valley who are descendants of enslaved Ziguas  
brought to Somalia
ngo Nongovernmental or ga ni za tion
ooji Derogatory word for slave
orr Office of Refugee Resettlement, in the U.S. State Department
Rahanweyn One of Somalia’s five major clan- families
sbyam Somali Bantu Youth Association of Maine
tanf Temporary Assistance to Needy Families
unhcr United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
volag Voluntary agency, of which eleven are federally funded to 
resettle refugees
1991 Collapse of Siad Barre’s government.
1991–93 Violence against civilians peaks in Jubba Valley region and  
villagers from Banta flee.
1992 Launch of Operation Restore Hope, a multinational 
humanitarian military intervention, followed in 1993 by 
unosom, a U.S.- led un- backed intervention.
1993 Black Hawk Down incident in Mogadishu and conclusion of 
unosom.
1995 Some refugees in Dadaab return to Jubba Valley but many 
flee again for Kenyan refugee camps because violence is still 
pervasive.
1994–97 Somali Bantu refugees in Dadaab attempt to negotiate 
resettlement in Tanzania and Mozambique.
1999 United States agrees to accept 12,000 Somali Bantus for  
resettlement as “persecuted minorities.”
2001 Reverification in Dadaab of Somali Bantu names on 
Mozambique list for U.S. p2 resettlement.
 Somali refugees already resettled in United States begin 
moving to Lewiston.
 Lewiston and Portland jointly receive an Unanticipated 
Arrivals grant (2001–5) from U.S. Office of Refugee 
Resettlement.
TIMELINE OF EVENTS
xii • Timeline of Events
2002 Reverified Somali Bantus in Dadaab trucked to Kakuma.
 Mayor Raymond writes the Letter to Lewiston’s Somali 
community.
 World Church of the Creator rallies to support Lewiston’s 
right to bar entry for immigrants.
 Many and One Rally at Bates College opposes the Letter and 
the World Church of the Creator rally.
2004 Catholic Charities volag agrees to provide ser vices to 
refugees in Lewiston through the Unanticipated Arrivals grant.
 Somali Bantus begin arriving in United States.
2005 Somali Bantu families in United States begin relocating to 
Lewiston.
 Trinity Jubilee creates after- school homework help program  
targeting children from refugee families.
2006 Catherine and Jorge reconnect with old friends in Lewiston.
 U.S. Department of Justice mandates creation of ell program 
in Lewiston public schools.
 Somali Bantu community association ebco created.
2007 Somali Bantu ebco wages campaign for self- representation 
and translation with social ser vices providers.
 Mayor Gilbert elected.
2008 Maine Department of Health and Human Ser vices assigns 
a supervisor the responsibility for overseeing refugees’  
benefits.
 Somali Bantu Youth Association of Maine created.
2009 International Clinic closed.
 Beth is hired by a local ngo to work on child development 
with ten refugee families.
 Local agency in charge of million- dollar federal 
empowerment zone grant denies all grant applications 
from refugee- based community groups but then reverses 
the denials and offers grant- writing workshops along with 
funding.
 Community collaborative subcommittee on parental 
concerns is disbanded after confrontational meeting between 
parents and school administrators.
Timeline of Events • xiii
 Lewiston High School graduates the first four Somali Bantu 
students.
 Museum la Rivers of Immigration exhibit opens.
 Local newspaper publishes article alleging Somali gang 
attacks in downtown Lewiston.
2010 Police department opens downtown substation with 
community resource officers.
 Grief counselor allowed to offer a ten- week after- school 
program with ten boys from refugee camps who lost a family 
member.
 Memo circulated to teachers and social ser vices providers 
warning about Somali gangs.
 sbyam oral history project with Somali Bantu teenagers  
and elders.
 Advice for America conference.
 First arrests of Somali Bantu youths.
 sbyam begins meetings between refugee parents, social  
ser vices workers, and police about parental concerns.
2011 Robert Macdonald elected mayor.
2013 Robert Macdonald reelected mayor.
This page intentionally left blank
Many thanks, first and foremost, for the friendship of and collaborative work 
with many refugee friends in Lewiston, Syracuse, Hartford, and elsewhere 
who so strongly encouraged this book project and who offered so much time, 
trust, and faith in me to ensure its completion. Unbounded gratitude to Rilwan 
Osman, Muhidin Libah, Abdulkadir Osman, Iman Osman, Asha Iman, Jimcoy 
Salat, Amina Caliyow, Ambiya Bulo, Jama Mohamed, Abdirisak Malin, Mo-
hamed Farah, Abdi Maalin, Ibrahim Bashir, Bashir Osman, Nur Libah, Robiye 
Nur, Abdullahi Nur, Sahara Mahamed, Shobow Saban, Abdi Abdi, Ibrahim 
Abdulle, Mohamed Negeye, Abikar Gedi Gale, Haji Adan, Abdulkadir Matan, 
Rahima Deekow, Mohamed Deekow, Fatuma Mohamed, Ali Shangole, Omar 
Hussein Mayange, Hamadi Osman Mahamba, Abdullahi Mokema Mohina, 
Mberwa Sadik, Fatuma Hussein, Ismail Ahmed, Sahal Nur, Gure Ahmed.
For teaching me about social ser vices and immigration policy in Maine 
and for sharing their work in Lewiston, thank you to Anne Kemper, Kim 
Wettlaufer, Julia Sleeper, Marc Robitaille, Craig Johnson, Bill Rousseau, Tom 
Murphy, Gillian Bourassa, Ellen Alcorn, Sherry Russell, Eileen Manglass, Gena 
Wilson, Alice Haines, Casey Nguyen, Qamar Bashir, Luke Nya, Arabella Perez, 
Mary Lafontaine, Pedro Rojas, Ben Chin, Catherine Yomoah, David Maclean, 
Holly Stover, Huda Daud, Inza Ouattara, Jeanne Hutchins, Lisa Sockabasin, Ron 
Taglienti, Noel Bonham, Danny Danforth, Rachel Degroseilleurs, Beth Stick-
ney, Elizabeth Eames, Gus Leblanc, Pamela Ericson, Shayna Malyata, Roger 
Jack, Patricia MacKinnon, Caroline Sample, Cheryl Hamilton, Phil Nadeau, 
Larry Gilbert, Steve Wessler, Nancy Mullin, Susan Martin, Sue Charron, Leon 
Levesque, and others who will remain anonymous.
AC KNOW LEDG MENTS
xvi • Ac know ledg ments
Many colleagues read part or all of the manuscript and kindly alerted me 
to oversights, weaknesses, and slippages. I am indebted to Daniel Goldstein, 
David Gordon, Rilwan Osman, Muhudin Libah, David Friedenreich, Mary 
Beth Mills, Heath Cabot, Winifred Tate, Chandra Bhimull, Ushari Mohamed, 
David Strohl, Britt Halvorson, Marnie Thompson, Erica Iverson, Dan Van 
Lehman, Sarah Shields, and two anonymous reviewers. Thanks as well to 
colleagues who talked through this project and associated papers with me, 
especially Janelle Taylor, Roger Sanjek, and Andrew Altschul. Remaining 
inaccuracies are, of course, my responsibility.
Chapter 1 is a revised version of “A Refugee Odyssey: A Story of Globaliza-
tion and Somali Bantu Refugees,” Anthropology Now 1, no. 2 (2009): 96–108.
For fellowships, residencies, and support during writing, I thank Eileen 
Gilooley and the Heyman Center of Columbia University, American Coun-
cil of Learned Societies, the John Simon Guggenheim Memorial Foundation, 
Bellagio Center of the Rocke fel ler Foundation, John Torpey and the cuny 
Graduate Center, Colby College, Maine Humanities Council, Suzanne Cusick, 
and the Princess. (And for the 1980s fieldwork and archival work I acknowledge 
with gratitude Sigma Xi, School of Advanced Research, National Endowment 
for the Humanities, American Philosophical Society, Wenner Gren Foundation, 
and the Land Tenure Center at the University of Wisconsin.)
Thanks to audiences at Colby College, Bates College, Bowdoin College, 
Tufts, Harvard, Columbia, cuny Graduate Center, University of Washing-
ton, University of California at Berkeley, American University, University of 
Tennessee, St. Mary’s, Bellagio Center, University of Colorado, School of Ad-
vanced Research, University of California– Irvine, Syracuse University, and 
Middlebury College, whose comments and questions prompted rethinking, 
revising, clarifying, or tossing out bad ideas altogether.
My family has been intimately involved in this book project in a multi-
tude of ways. The love and support from the Besteman/Lauderbaugh/Pike/
Wagenheim crowd is extraordinary. Jorge Acero, Gabriela Acero, and Darien 
Acero, who live in my heart, make this work possible.
Introduction
Somalia, 1988
As Ibrahim and I walked back to the small village of Banta on a narrow foot-
path through fields tall with corn, a low growl silenced our chatter about the 
weather and the possibility of rain. We instantly fell silent and slowly turned 
to see an adult male lion stepping out of the corn onto the path about a dozen 
feet behind us, assessing us with what we hoped was little interest. We froze, 
panicked, understanding the real possibility of attack and the futility of at-
tempting to run away. After looking us over, the lion tossed his head and 
crossed the path into another cornfield, disappearing from view but leaving us 
trembling with our hearts in our throats. Shocked, we exchanged astonished 
glances and quietly agreed to move as quickly as possible without running to-
ward the village. Ten minutes later we came upon a village farmer in her field 
and breathlessly described to her our adventure. Her kids ran ahead with the 
news and by the time we reached the village our neighbors  were gathering to 
hear all about our encounter with the lion. Xassan, the government- appointed 
head of the village and the patriarch of the family compound where I lived, 
was distinctly displeased and demanded that I stay within the confines of the 
village until the lion had left the area. We learned that the lion had already 
killed a camel and damaged several farms before our late afternoon face- to- 















I N D I A N  O C E A N
Map 1  Map of Somalia. Prepared by Manny Gimond.
Everyone recognized that my year- long presence in his village caused him 
enough stress without having to explain to the government how he had al-
lowed the resident foreign anthropologist and her field assistant to be mauled 
by a lion.
That eve ning, our neighbors Caliyow Isaaq, Cali Osman, and Cabdulle 
Cabdi came by to hear our story. Abdiya, who sometimes cooked our eve ning 
corn porridge when we  were out all day, offered her comments on our adven-
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ture. Within a few days the lion moved out of the area and I was once again 
allowed to roam through the farmlands and bush areas outside the village. 
Often my neighbors’ children, who normally spent their days playing in the vil-
lage and helping their parents in the fields, tagged along. Since the village had 
no school, the kids led fairly unstructured lives and put their time to good use 
making up games and songs, and poking holes through the walls of my mud 
hut to see what I was doing inside.
With my photographer husband, Jorge Acero, I lived in Banta, on the banks 
of the Jubba River in southern Somalia, as an anthropologist in 1987–88 and 
later published two books about life there.1 The books relied heavily on what 
I learned from village elders: my friends Caliyow Isaaq, Cali Osman, Sheikh 
Axmed Nur, and those even older like the great historian Idow Roble and the 
delightful storyteller and poet Daliya. When my husband and I left Banta in 
1988 to return to the United States, we promised we would revisit Banta in the 
years ahead to see how the children had grown, to find out who had married 
whom, and to meet the new children and grandchildren. We never had the 
chance because within three years the village was consumed by civil war.
Lewiston, Maine, 2010
Just over twenty years later, I attended an emergency meeting in a small dingy 
conference room in an ugly building in downtown Lewiston, Maine, to dis-
cuss claims in the local newspaper that violent gangs had formed in the city’s 
figure I.1  Banta, 1988. Photograph by Catherine Besteman.
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downtown and public housing neighborhoods. Sitting around the table  were 
a Lewiston police officer, several social workers, and my old neighbors from 
Banta, whose children  were those accused of forming the gangs. Abdiya, 
who married Idow Roble’s son and now has seven kids, sat on my right. Cali-
yow Isaaq’s daughter Aliyah, who now has four sons, was on my left. Daliya’s 
daughter, a mother of five, was next to Abdiya, and Abdiya’s sister- in- law, 
mother of seven, was next to her. Other parents from villages near Banta  were 
on the other side of the table. Cali Osman’s son Idris, the community youth 
leader, had or ga nized the meeting.2
The parents, distressed,  were at the edge of their understanding about what 
was happening to their children. Their frustrations with navigating Ameri-
can society, their awareness that their children  were stigmatized in Lewiston, 
and their fears about the impact on their children of the grotesque aspects of 
American culture filled the room. Sitting there, I  couldn’t help but reflect on 
the strange and unexpected journey that had brought Banta’s war survivors to 
Lewiston, turned subsistence farmers into accused gang members, and unex-
pectedly reconnected Banta’s refugees with their former ethnographer twenty 
years after they lost contact.
In January 1991, as Somalia’s president- dictator Siad Barre fled the capital 
in a tank to escape from advancing oppositional militias, villagers in Banta 
did not realize that the collapse of the Somali government would bring mur-
der, rape, starvation, kidnapping, and torture to their village. They did not 
realize that within a year they would be fleeing for their lives across hundreds 
of miles of desert to Kenya. They did not realize that, after enduring a de cade 
and half in refugee camps, some of them would end up trying to rebuild their 
lives in the United States. The war arrived in Banta in the form of weapons 
acquired by some and used against others, of small bands of armed militias 
entering the village and demanding food, abducting youths, and raping and 
forcing girls into involuntary “marriages.” The war made farming risky and 
food production insecure because of the possibility of attack in distant fields. 
It collapsed family coherence as militia members carted off daughters, killed 
fathers in front of their children, and raped mothers. It brought destruction 
to closely knit communities, extended family networks, subsistence farming 
based in generations of deep environmental knowledge, and a social order 
based on family, faith, and coresidence.
How do people whose entire way of life has been destroyed and who wit-
nessed horrible abuses against loved ones construct a new future? How do 
people who have survived the ravages of war and displacement rebuild their 




Since its collapse into civil war in 1991, Somalia has become the poster child 
for every bad keyword in the contemporary po liti cal lexicon: failed state, 
tribalism, mission creep, civil war, warlordism, Islamic fundamentalism, ter-
rorism, refugees, piracy. From the 1990s through the second de cade of the 
twenty- first century, Somalia has regularly appeared in the news as the worst 
humanitarian crisis in the world. The 1993 Black Hawk Down debacle, when 
eigh teen U.S. troops  were killed in a street fight in downtown Mogadishu by 
supporters of the warlord they  were seeking, was a defining moment in shap-
ing a more cautious future for American military intervention in complex 
po liti cal, military, and humanitarian emergencies. A de cade and a half later, 
Somalia still capped the list of humanitarian disasters. Veteran po liti cal sci-
entist Kenneth Menkhaus noted that during 2007–8 Somalia was the most 
dangerous area in the world for humanitarian workers, while Human Rights 
Watch identified Somalia as the “most ignored tragedy in the world.” In 2008 
and again in 2009, Foreign Policy magazine declared Somalia “The #1 Failed 
State” in its Failed States Index, a label echoed in a 2009 New Yorker article 
on Somalia called “The Most Failed State.” Two de cades after the collapse of 
Somalia’s government, the advocacy group Refugees International and the 
Center for Strategic and International Studies continued to call Somalia “the 
worst humanitarian disaster in the world,” and journalist James Fergusson 
labeled Somalia “the world’s most dangerous place.”3 Out of a very competi-
tive field of collapsed states, civil wars, refugee crises, and centers of terrorism, 
Somalia has topped everyone’s list of humanitarian disasters since its civil war 
began in 1991.
Just a few years before Somalia’s collapse, Jorge Acero and I arrived in Banta 
to begin our year of residence while I conducted the fieldwork that I hoped 
would result in my dissertation and PhD in anthropology. We  were recently 
married and Jorge had agreed to come with me to rural Somalia for a year so 
long as we could squeeze in a side trip to Mt. Kilimanjaro and the Seychelles. 
Deal. We took up residence in two small mud huts included in the ring of small 
mud huts that formed the family compound of Xassan Isaaq, the head of the 
village. Our compound included Xassan’s two wives, their three sons and a 
baby daughter, one daughter- in- law, and a granddaughter. Occasionally an-
other daughter or grandchild or two would move into the compound for a few 
weeks or months as well. Because Xassan was the village head, he made it clear 
that we  were living in his compound so he could monitor who had access to our 
dwelling and attempt to ensure our safety. It was a busy compound, as much 
village business took place in our courtyard and people regularly streamed in 
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and out to discuss their troubles, feuds, and gossip. The village committee of 
elders held their meetings in the courtyard, and the rare visiting government 
official was received there. While living in Xassan’s compound enabled him to 
monitor my activities, it also ensured I stayed current with village events.
Village life adhered to the rhythm of the seasons, farming, and religious 
practice. Banta’s five hundred residents lived in an assortment of small round 
and rectangular huts made of grass and mud. Separated into two neighbor-
hoods by a central grassy field where kids played, the village overlooked the 
Jubba River, high and swift in the rainy season and low and muddy in the 
dry season. The river provided water for drinking, cooking, and bathing, and 
its annual floods fertilized the small farming fields, although flood season 
also brought the dangers of wandering crocodiles and hippos. As is typical in 
many African farming villages, extended families shared living spaces, food, 
cooking, child care, work, and the few material possessions owned by each 
family. Women hauled water from the river, made charcoal from branches 
gathered from the bush to fuel the fire for cooking pots, and wove the beauti-
ful palm mats that adorned most huts. Men and women farmed their small 
plots by hand, built their homes from local materials, and bartered their 
produce for meat and milk with nomadic livestock herders. Healers made 
medicinal treatments from local flora, and men carved the wooden vessels 
villagers used for drinking and storing water, used alongside the ubiquitous 
brightly colored plastic jerry cans imported from China. Small children wore 
figure I.2  Xassan’s compound, Banta, 1987. Photograph by Jorge Acero.
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shorts or T- shirts or loose frocks; adults had one or two outfits that they wore 
to shreds. Every  house hold had a few short- handled hoes, the primary piece 
of farming equipment used by villagers, as well as a few cooking and eating 
utensils. Everyone subsisted on what they grew on their small farms, which 
produced a modest and sometimes insufficient diet of cornmeal porridge, 
corn kernels fried in sesame oil, corn kernels boiled with beans and served with 
oil and sugar, cornmeal biscuits baked in underground ovens, wild greens and 
volunteer cherry tomatoes sautéed in oil, and bartered camel and cow milk as 
well as the occasional roasted camel, cow, chicken, or goat meat consumed at 
feasts and ritual events.
As the resident anthropologist and photographer, Jorge and I did our best 
to adapt to local life, conforming to village norms, eating a steady diet of corn 
prepared in a variety of ways, drinking and bathing in the water hauled from 
the muddy Jubba River, and cultivating our own tiny garden. Every week we 
would drive into Bu’aale, the local town and provincial capital, for provisions 
like oil, sugar, pasta, rice, and coffee, usually bringing along a car full of villagers 
doing the same thing. Everywhere we went, small gangs of kids followed us, 
since we  were the only local oddities and undoubtedly offered comic appeal 
with our novelty and awkwardness. Whereas the villagers’ lives followed the 
demands of subsistence farming, ours followed the requirements of anthropo-
logical inquiry. Jorge documented village life through his camera lens, gaining 
minor celebrity status as the area’s sole photographer and producing a large 
collection of formal portraits, taken at the request of villagers, in addition to 
hundreds of photographs of village life. I spent my days walking the farmlands 
to map land use patterns, interviewing elders to chronicle local history of the 
Jubba Valley, and chatting with neighbors to grasp local customs and social 
relations.
A primary goal of anthropological fieldwork is to gain an understanding of 
how those being studied make sense of their world. My year in Banta taught 
me a great deal about how a small community dependent on subsistence farm-
ing engages their environment and relies on networks of mutual care and sup-
port to weather the droughts and celebrate the times of plenty, how people 
marginalized by poverty, history, and identity navigate the power hierarchies 
that constrain their lives, and how people who live at the edge of material 
destitution find much to value, celebrate, love, and enjoy in their daily lives. I 
learned about the power of kinship, the joy of religious belief and practice, and 
the humiliation of racism. Most presciently, however, I learned how people 
manage in a social and physical environment defined by profound insecurity.
During my stay, a brutal climate and total dependence on seasonal rains 
for cultivation made food production, and thus nutrition, insecure; a system 
figure I.3  Handwoven 
mats at Sheikh Axmed  
Nur’s compound for Xawo’s 
wedding, 1988. Photograph 
by Jorge Acero.
figure I.4  Pastoralist girl 
bartering milk, Banta, 1987. 
Photograph by Jorge Acero.
figure I.5  The anthropolo-
gist in her kitchen, Banta, 
1987. Photograph by Jorge 
Acero.
figure I.6  Jorge Acero 
 taking portraits in Banta, 
1987. Photograph by  
Catherine Besteman.
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of medical care dependent on local traditional healers and prayer made 
childbirth and recovery from everyday illnesses like malaria, gastrointestinal 
troubles, and respiratory diseases insecure; a predatory military and urban 
elite made self- sufficiency insecure; and the perilous creatures with whom 
villagers shared their landscape— hippos, crocodiles, lions, pythons— made 
mundane tasks like drawing water, bathing, weeding, and walking to the dis-
tant farms insecure. But these insecurities did not emerge from the barrel of 
a gun. The invasion of the village by armed militiamen in 1991 destroyed the 
fine balance of self- reliance and reciprocity that had long sustained village life.
Jorge and I  were living in New Mexico when Somalia fell apart. As I was 
finishing my doctoral dissertation about life in the Jubba Valley, we watched 
from afar in 1990–91 as the government collapsed in the face of growing op-
position and armed militias claimed control over large swaths of territory 
throughout the country. Our only personal source of news about Banta’s fate 
came in letters from the few international humanitarian workers who re-
mained in the area during the first few months of the war. The final letter 
we received before the relief workers evacuated reported that almost all the 
children under the age of five in Banta had died from starvation, and that our 
field assistant Ibrahim had been shot trying to reach the relief center, which 
had promised to evacuate him. He had not arrived at the relief center by the 
time the final relief workers left. After we lost our last local contact, we fol-
lowed the reports from 1992 to 1994 by human rights groups on the patterns 
of genocidal violence in Jubba Valley villages by militias and the flight of tens 
of thousands of survivors across the border into Kenya.
Unable to track what was happening in Banta and uncertain about how to 
translate my intimate knowledge of life in the valley into anything useful in 
the face of war’s wrenching violence, I wrote furiously for a de cade, pouring 
my knowledge into publications about the structures of in e qual ity and rac-
ism that made the Jubba Valley villagers particularly vulnerable in the war 
for territorial control that followed the collapse of the government.4 I could 
not imagine how I might reconnect with the survivors from Banta. Searching 
the huge refugee camps for people I knew seemed voy eur is tic and pointless, 
as I had no ability to offer meaningful assistance or support. Writing became 
my form of activism and engagement, although it remained unclear whether 
anyone cared or how my accounts might benefit those fleeing for their lives.
In early 2001, after I had published my research on Somalia, taken up a 
teaching position at Colby College in Maine, and temporarily relocated to 
South Africa to begin a new research project on reconciliation and postapart-
heid transformation, a researcher and former un staffer named Dan Van 
Lehman contacted me with the information that the United States had decided 
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to accept 12,000 Somali Bantus for resettlement. Since my publications had 
been useful in making the case for their resettlement, he asked if I would con-
sult on a background report he and his colleague Omar Eno  were writing to 
educate the American refugee resettlement agencies that would be managing 
the resettlement pro cess.5 I was initially mystified by the name “Somali Bantu” 
until Dan explained that this was the new name for the former farmers from 
the Jubba Valley, created in the refugee camp for the pro cess of managing 
their resettlement pro cess. This was stunning news, as I belatedly learned that 
after a de cade in refugee camps, Jubba Valley farmers who had fled the war 
 were coming to the United States under a brand new name! After returning to 
Maine in 2004, I provided consultancy ser vices for several different resettle-
ment agencies across the country, hoping that these connections might help 
me locate survivors from Banta, but to no avail.
Lewiston, Maine, 2006
Every year for Martin Luther King Day, Bates College in Lewiston, Maine, 
just an hour from where I live, organizes panel pre sen ta tions and other events 
on diversity for the broader community. In anticipation of the 2006 MLK 
celebration, Bates College anthropologist Elizabeth Eames phoned to ask if I 
would join a panel of Lewiston’s newest immigrants, Somali Bantu refugees 
who  were just starting to arrive in town, augmenting the large population 
of Somali refugees who had begun moving to Lewiston in 2001. My role on 
the panel would be to provide a bit of historical information about Somalia’s 
civil war, after which several of the newly arrived refugees would share parts 
of their stories. I eagerly agreed, hoping the new arrivals might bring news of 
villagers from Banta, although a familiar feeling of bitterness complicated my 
anticipation of the panel. I knew from the human rights reports about the 
horrors committed by Somali militias against Jubba Valley farmers and sus-
pected it was extremely unlikely that I would ever again encounter anyone I 
knew from the middle valley, where Banta was located. The reports from the 
resettlement agencies that contacted me in 2004–5 for background informa-
tion about the Jubba Valley suggested that the majority of the 12,000 Somali 
Bantu refugees accepted for resettlement came from the lower Jubba Valley, 
so I assumed few refugees from the middle valley, where Banta was located, 
would be among them. While I wished to offer what I could to Somali Bantus 
now living in the United States, I expected a familiar pang of resentment that 
the people I had known would not be among them.
On MLK Day I arrived early at Bates and went to the designated classroom 
to wait for the appointed time, thinking over my commentary and steeling 
myself to remain in control of my emotions. Danny Danforth from the Bates 
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Anthropology Department found me sitting there alone and invited me out 
to the building’s large atrium, where the other panelists  were assembled. I 
introduced myself to the four men and asked one— Sadiq, who had the best 
English— where he was from in Somalia. “Bu’aale,” he answered, to my as-
tonishment. Bu’aale, a dozen kilometers away from Banta and the regional 
capital of the middle Jubba Valley, was the destination for our weekly shop-
ping trip for extra provisions during our stay in Banta. “Do you know Banta?” 
I asked. “Of course!” he responded. “I used to live in Banta.” Another of the 
panelists excitedly said, “You know Banta? I’m from Banta! I lived there my 
entire life!” I explained that I knew Banta because I had once lived there too, 
in the late 1980s. The men scrutinized me dubiously and said, “We don’t know 
you, but we knew Katrine and Horay and we are waiting to find them.” “But 
I’m Katrine!” I exclaimed. Words came tumbling out as we clarified who we 
 were. The men had been teenagers when we lived in Banta: Jorge and I had 
helped the mother of one of the men, who was ill during our stay. The man 
from Bu’aale had been part of that small group of boys who used to follow 
us around town when we did our shopping. They protested that I looked so 
much older— I now wear glasses! They had never seen my hair, which had 
always been covered with a headscarf in Banta. And, distressingly, they point-
edly noted how much weight I had gained. Within minutes it was time for our 
panel pre sen ta tion.
The pre sen ta tion passed in a daze. I introduced some Somali history and 
the history of  U.S.- Somali relations, and then each panelist spoke briefly 
about his experiences during the war. The stories  were horrible, of attacks 
by militias and raiders, who separated the women and girls from the men in 
order to assault them; of families being separated as they ran through the bush 
to escape from attacks; of parents, siblings, children being murdered before 
their eyes for no reason; of the long, terrifying trek to the Kenyan border. The 
packed room was captivated as each man told his harrowing tale and spoke of 
the challenges of establishing a sustainable life in the United States with lim-
ited En glish language and literacy skills. Driving home, I was almost numb. 
It seemed cosmic that refugees from Banta should end up an hour away from 
me, in central Maine.
The phone calls began the next day. Abkow, the panelist from Banta, and 
Sadiq, the man from Bu’aale, told me about all the other families from Banta 
now relocating to Lewiston. Cali Osman’s wife Isha had recently arrived in 
Lewiston with her youn gest son, Idris, and several other children. When they 
heard the news that Jorge and I  were also living in Maine, Isha said, “I knew 
we would find Katrine!” Abdulkadir, who had worked for me in Banta as a 
field researcher, was in Lewiston with his wife and children. Everyone was 
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asking about the baby I was carry ing when I left Banta in 1988. They had heard 
rumors that it was a girl called Faduma Banta. “Bring her to Lewiston!” Isha 
commanded through Sadiq. “I want to see that child!”
The coincidence of this reunion brought me back into a new relationship 
with the people from Banta, 7,000 miles and twenty years away from where 
we first met, and led to the work toward this book. Over the past de cade I have 
traversed the United States reconnecting with Banta villagers and others from 
the middle Jubba Valley in their new homes in Hartford, Syracuse, Seattle, 
and Portland, Oregon. In Lewiston I have spent countless hours with Sadiq, 
Isha, and especially her son Idris, Abdulkadir, and others, learning about what 
happened to them in Banta during the war and in the camps after they fled. I 
have been reminded of Somali cultural practices like extraordinarily demo-
cratic community gatherings where people get to talk for as long as they 
want about what ever is most important to them, and everyone listens with 
respect— one dimension among many of a profound orientation toward com-
munal life that is under siege in a country known for individualism. I have 
witnessed countless struggles over the transformation of communal practices 
and values: the bewilderment of parents bringing up children American 
Style in a context of extreme consumerism, the concerns over transforming 
gender roles as women gain in de pen dence from male control and men’s un-
derstanding of their roles begins to falter, the new identity associations that 
result from being black in America, and the shifting of authority from elders 
to youths because of the latter’s vastly superior En glish language and literacy 
competency.
My research has also made me a witness to the struggles and efforts of 
many non- Somali people in Lewiston who now orient their lives toward 
working with refugees, including doctors, social ser vices workers, and teach-
ers, as well as community police officers who, in the words of one of their 
leaders, strive to “police from the heart.” Their belief that the future of refu-
gees in Lewiston is the future of Lewiston contrasts with the stolid insistence 
by some in positions of power that they will not change their institutions to 
accommodate refugees because of their view that refugees must follow a path 
of conformity and assimilation. My research reveals that assimilation is not a 
one- sided affair, however, and that the refugees in Lewiston are changing all 
aspects of the city for everyone.
“The Armpit of Maine”
Lewiston, Maine, seems like an unlikely destination for African refugees. A 
postindustrial city, eco nom ically ravaged by the closure of mills that a century 
ago drew tens of thousands of French Canadians to the area for work, Lewiston 
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has a recent history of population loss and economic depression. People leave 
Lewiston rather than move there. Yet, beginning in 2001, thousands of Somali 
refugees looking for safety, a low cost of living, financial support, and a way 
to re- create community support structures chose to move to Lewiston of their 
own accord, dramatically transforming the city over the next de cade. Their 
arrival provoked furious debates about the cost of poor immigrants to Lewis-
ton’s precarious economy and the impact of cultural and racial difference on 
the city’s proud Franco- American identity. Before the 2001 arrival of Somalis, 
Lewiston was 96 percent white and “the most Franco city in the U.S.”6 By the 
end of the de cade, Somalis had become about 15 percent of the population, 
and the changes they brought to the city  were everywhere in evidence, from 
the school hallways to the city’s main street.
Lewiston was totally unprepared for the influx of Somali refugees since 
city leaders had never indicated to anyone that the city wanted to become a 
resettlement site for new immigrants. But after arriving in the United States, 
refugees are as free as anyone  else to move where they wish. When So-
mali refugees decided to move to Lewiston, arriving weekly between 2001 
and  2006, their presence provoked massive controversy about economic 
security, charity, moral responsibility, difference, and the boundaries of com-
munity, debates fueled in intensity by the bright lights of major media cov-
erage about the apparent incongruity of Africans in Maine. That Lewiston 
should become home to thousands of Somali refugees struck many observers 
as incredible and astonishing, bringing the spotlight of national and interna-
tional media attention to a city unused to being the object of interest. Journal-
ists from major news magazines such as the Economist, Newsweek, the New 
Yorker, and Mother Jones, as well as from leading newspapers, tv news pro-
grams, and National Public Radio programs, regularly showed up in Lewiston 
to see the social experiment for themselves.
The city of about 35,000 is an old mill town built largely by Catholic French 
Canadians who came to work low- paid, physically demanding jobs in the tex-
tile and shoe mills over a century ago. Settling into an ethnic enclave of tene-
ment buildings that now form the core of Lewiston’s downtown, the French 
Canadian immigrants held the lowest- paid jobs, occupied the lowest economic 
strata, and experienced per sis tent economic insecurity, discrimination, and 
exclusion from the local hospitals and schools that  were dominated by the city’s 
more prosperous Protestant population.7 Since the late 1880s, Lewiston has 
been burdened by hostile and denigrating attitudes toward its mill- working 
citizenry because of its relative poverty and the perceived ethnic insularity of 
its Catholic Franco- American population. When the late twentieth- century 
wave of deindustrialization closed the mills, Lewiston started losing its youth 
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to more prosperous places, and few immigrants chose Lewiston as their new 
home, leading to de cades of population loss (a 15 percent drop between 1970 
and 2000),8 a rise in apartment vacancies, a flat- lining of the economy, and 
the identification of Lewiston’s downtown area as the poorest census tract in 
Maine, with a poverty rate of 46 percent.9 Prior to 2000, the city held the 
dubious distinction of having the lowest family and per capita income in 
the state. The arrival of thousands of refugees beginning in 2001 thus could 
be viewed as an assault on an already struggling city or as a force of renewal.
Despite the city’s waning fortunes, the people who lived there continued to 
share a stubborn, tough pride about their community and its hardscrabble 
history. During his tenure as the first Franco- American governor of Maine, 
Paul LePage often recounted his hard childhood as a boy living on the streets 
of downtown Lewiston to escape his abusive mill- worker father, whose 
drunken rages became regular assaults on his wife and eigh teen children. In 
LePage’s account, his survival depended on the kindness of Lewiston’s prosti-
tutes, strippers, tavern keepers, and others living on the edge, reinforcing the 
image of Lewiston as a place of rough living, marginal lives, and a dysfunc-
tional Franco- American underclass while at the same time offering a model of 
Franco- American assimilation and upward mobility through determination 
and hard work. A teacher in Lewiston who  doesn’t live there shared her view, 
which I also heard from many others, that downtown Lewiston has always 
been a place of poverty, insularity, and expectations of failure, suspicious of 
outsiders, anti- intellectual, and resistant to ideas coming from the outside, a 
pattern reinforced generation after generation and becoming the city’s ste-
reo type. Describing the experiences of her Somali ju nior high students who 
come to school with tales of drunken fights, domestic assaults, and middle- 
of- the- night police raids in the downtown apartments of their non- Somali 
neighbors, she worries that the historic cycle of downtown violence and fail-
ure will also engulf them. The principal of a downtown elementary school 
tells me that Lewiston’s downtown has always had a terrible reputation for 
“groups involved with drugs, having fights, in the news. It’s always the down-
town. Those ‘downtown families’ have always been in the media as an image 
of disgrace and deviance.” The schoolteacher wonders if the arrival of a large 
Somali population might be the wedge that breaks the cycle, or if the new-
comers will be absorbed by old patterns of poverty, insularity, and failure.
Lewiston’s strip malls tell the contemporary economic story of the city, an-
chored by Save- A- Lot, Chapter 11 Buy- Back Store, Dollar Tree, Dollar Store, 
Family Dollar, Big Lots, Big Bargains, and the Goodwill Store. Next to the 
Save- A- Lot mall at the crest of the hill overlooking the downtown, the view 
of the city is dominated by the huge cathedral, rising above the multitude of 
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 houses like a gray anchor. A river weaves around downtown, giving the pan-
orama a serene New En gland feel. Continuing down the hill toward down-
town, one passes the Italian Bakery on the left and Maillot’s Sausage Factory 
on the right, incongruously stuck between the school bus yard and a new 
mosque. Lewiston’s downtown tenements begin after you pass Head Start and 
the Tri- County Mental Health building, evoking historic visions of industrial 
workers crowded into derelict four- and five- story walk- ups. Rows upon rows 
of tenements are squeezed together, with listing front porches and yards hold-
ing assorted broken toys, frayed and dirty blankets, and garbage. Every few 
blocks one or two tenements are boarded up as uninhabitable because of high 
lead levels or massive disrepair, and vacant lots bear evidence of tenements 
burned to the ground in recent arson attacks. In the morning or early after-
noon, streams of kids walking to or from school hold up traffic, sometimes 
walking alongside adults heading to Adult Education, which shares the build-
ing with the downtown neighborhood’s elementary school.
The large park in the middle of the downtown neighborhood offers basket-
ball courts where lots of Somali and non- Somali kids play, a skate park where 
no Somali kids play, and large grassy areas where groups of moms and kids 
or men lounge in the warmer months. Trinity Jubilee, the downtown soup 
kitchen, food pantry, help center, and day shelter, sits at one corner of the park, 
its muddy courtyard filled with men and women smoking and hanging out 
because they have no place  else to be. Some of the city’s most derelict housing 
neighbors Trinity, with filthy windows, broken front doors, perilously dipping 
porches. The city’s police station borders another side of the park, ensuring a 
constant police presence in the densely settled neighborhood. In addition to 
the two large public housing projects on the outskirts of the city, Hillview and 
Tall Pines, the downtown neighborhood has the highest concentration in the 
city of immigrant refugees and is the place where the newest refugees usually 
settle while waiting for an opening in the nicer outlying housing projects.
After I began to spend several days a week in Lewiston following the MLK 
reunion to reconnect with old friends from Banta and begin the research 
for this book, acquaintances elsewhere in Maine offered a number of pithy 
descriptions of my new field site, the city colloquially called “the armpit of 
Maine” by people who don’t live there. One incredulous colleague, shaking her 
head at my plan to undertake a long- term study in Lewiston, warned, “Lewis-
ton is a snakepit.” Holding his hands together in a tight ball, another colleague 
reminded me, “Lewiston is like this. It’s always been this totally closed place, 
where people don’t want anything to do with outsiders. They want to keep 
people out. It’s a place with a strong Franco history, very insular, self- isolating. 
They don’t want anything to do with the rest of the world. It’s like a little world 
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unto itself.” Friends offered condolences that I had to spend so much time 
there. But for Somali and Somali Bantu refugees looking to create a new com-
munity in an affordable place unmolested by the crime they experienced in 
the large city public housing projects where they first landed after arriving in 
the United States, Lewiston seemed to offer what they wanted.
By 2010, Lewiston’s main downtown street, Lisbon Street, offered a strik-
ing portrait of a city in the midst of transformation. Entering downtown, one 
passes the Adult Bookstore, ironically located directly across from the po-
lice station, and then a clothing store for outdoorsmen before reaching the 
first of the business blocks, beginning with Smart Interpreters, which offers 
English- Somali language translation ser vices, followed by the Safari Coffee 
Shop and the African Immigrants Association office. The Mogadishu Store, 
the Barawaka Store, and a dozen more Somali- owned stores take up the next 
few blocks, their entrances and sidewalks always filled with men chatting in 
Somali. My favorite store, Aliyow’s, carries products available in many of the 
nearly two dozen Somali- owned shops: coffee with ginger, samosas, spices, 
fabrics, colognes, halaal meat, and lots of packaged foods labeled in Arabic. 
Across from Aliyow’s, one of the Somali cafés does a bustling business, scent-
ing the street with roasting vegetables and spices. Interspersed between the 
Somali stores are older stores and offices: lawyers’ offices, the Lewiston- Auburn 
figure I.7  Downtown Lewiston, 2008. Photograph by Caroline Turnbull.
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arts collaborative, (former) U.S. congressman Mike Michaud’s office, a pawn 
shop, a Subway shop, Doucette Insurance, Twin Variety, New Beginnings Youth 
Outreach office, and Labor Ready training center. A large empty lot breaks 
up the blocks of shops, adjoining a tall skinny building that  houses all sorts 
of community organizations and lawyers’ offices, including the Somali Bantu 
community association.
The corner in front of the public library, across from the vacant lot, is filled 
every afternoon with boisterous high school kids— mostly girls in hijab spar-
kling with sequins and bright colors— making their way to their after- school 
homework help sessions. The library is always full of people, as it is one of the 
only places in town that intentionally embraced Somali newcomers with af-
ternoon programming and a Somali- speaking outreach coordinator. All along 
Lisbon Street women in sandals, long dresses, henna tattoos, and headscarves 
figure I.8  Lisbon Street, Lewiston, 2014. Photograph by Jorge Acero.
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stroll along calling out to each other, chatting or snapping at the men gathered 
in front of every Somali store.
At the far end of the street, past the Indian restaurant, the bank, the district 
court, more lawyers’ offices, and several empty storefronts, is the fanciest res-
taurant in town, next to the Somali mosque. White lawyers in business suits 
pass Somali girls in hijab and white teenagers in tattered clothes and multiple 
piercings, while bank workers in sensible pumps and raincoats walk alongside 
men in sarongs or floor- length garments on their way to the mosque. There are 
always lots of vans of Somali shoppers maneuvering the narrow street to reach 
their destinations. Lisbon Street feels like the active main street of a small city, 
with everyone going about their business in the midst of conversations and 
playing kids, like any town anywhere in America.
Reunions
After the MLK panel reunion, I asked Abkow and Sadiq if the Banta families 
living in Lewiston would like to see some of the slides and photographs Jorge 
had taken during our year in Banta. Our collection of photographs included 
hundreds of elegantly posed formal portraits, many in black and white, that 
the villagers had requested of themselves during our stay, but also hundreds 
of candid shots of villagers farming, cooking, playing, building homes and 
furniture, getting married, celebrating, shelling, pounding and grinding corn 
and sesame, and more. We had scores of photos of other midvalley villages, 
shots of the river and farm fields in different seasons and of local flora and 
fauna, and images of the local pastoralists who migrated through the bush 
outside Banta, bringing into the village their milk to trade for corn or their 
animals to access the river. We also had tape recordings of the wedding music 
for the marriage of Caliyow Isaaq’s son to Sheikh Axmed Nur’s daughter, as 
well as recordings of Cali Osman reciting poetry and playing his flute.
Abkow and Sadiq responded that the Banta families in Lewiston wanted to 
arrange the slide show as soon as possible. After Anne Kemper, the coordina-
tor of the Adult Learning Center in Lewiston, offered the large gymnasium 
in Lewiston’s Multipurpose Center for the gathering, a date was chosen and 
announcements went out to the Somali Bantu population in Lewiston. Jorge 
and I spent every eve ning for the next two weeks reviewing our slides from 
Banta to compile our show, remembering names, places, family networks, and 
the mundane rhythms of daily life in a small farming village. As the day of the 
event approached, I became increasingly ner vous about what emotions the 
photographs might provoke. Would people become overwhelmed by seeing 
what they had lost? Or would the photographs provide joyful remembrance of 
happy moments and loved ones no longer alive? What if seeing the photographs 
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provoked trauma and people broke down during the event? We  were uncer-
tain about how to plan for such a possibility.
I phoned Abkow and Sadiq with my concerns, but they responded that ev-
eryone wanted to see the photographs, even though some of those featured 
might be dead, stressing that the photographs of their past lives would not 
add any more trauma to what people had already endured. Rather, every-
one was eager to see the photographs and to remember their lives before 
the war. As we prepared our slide show, our anxiety mounted as we won-
dered whether we would be able to remember everyone accurately, whether 
people might come whom we  were not expecting, whether there would be 
rage, tears, despair. I no longer had any aptitude in the Somali language and 
was chagrined and embarrassed that I could no longer speak to people I used 
to communicate with. On the day before the event, I finally unearthed my 
census data from Banta and typed up the names of everyone by  house hold 
who was living there in 1987–88. The eve ning was devoted to making large 
display posters of the census, along with mounted prints of black- and- white 
portraits of Banta residents.
On the day of the event, over a hundred people streamed into the gym-
nasium. As people arrived and we found mutual recognition in each other’s 
aged faces, it was a shock to realize how short everyone was; in my memories 
they  were all tall and strong and dignified. When I embraced Isha, her head 
barely reached my chest. She immediately asked to see the child I was carry-
ing in Banta, now a nearly adult eighteen- year- old, whom she hugged hard 
and long. I  couldn’t keep my eyes dry. Isha was with a large group of children 
and grandchildren, depending on her youn gest son, Idris, for translation. He 
was four when we lived in Banta and I remember him as a quiet, shy child, 
but standing before me was an obviously bright, thoughtful, competent young 
man speaking excellent En glish. An older man arrived, catching my eye over 
the crowd— Axmed Baraki, who was married to Binti, one of my first friends 
in Banta. Our poster included a photograph of Binti and their son; both are 
now dead. The nephew of Sheikh Axmed Nur arrived, and I showed him the 
elegant black- and- white portrait of his uncle. The nephew gave us the news 
that Sheikh Axmed Nur was still living in the refugee camp in Kenya, hoping 
that his family reunification application would one day allow him to join his 
children in the United States.
The son of our neighbor and dear friend Cabdulle Cabdi was one of the 
first through the door. Iman was just a baby when we lived in Banta and had 
no memory of his parents, who died when he was a toddler. Nor did he re-
member his dead grandfather, caught in a stately pose by Jorge’s camera. Iman 
examined their photos, searching for his likeness in their faces.
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Daliya’s daughter arrived and burst into tears upon discovering our por-
trait of her dead mother sifting corn. Everyone started naming those captured 
in the portraits: Ganuun is dead. Although Caliyow Isaaq is dead, his only 
surviving wife, Jimcoy, is in Maine. One of his other wives, Amina, is dead, 
but their daughter Binti, caught on camera as a delightfully happy baby, now 
lives in the United States. Matan Garad is dead but his son Abdulkadir, who 
as a teenager worked as my field assistant collecting harvest information and 
mea sur ing farms, now lives in Lewiston as a married father of eight. Khalar! 
Our old friend Khalar is still alive but living in extreme poverty outside Banta. 
As the names from the census  were read aloud for those who could not 
read, people started calling out their fates. People continued arriving as the 
tape of wedding music played in the background, and someone informed us 
that the wedding couple, Mohammed and Xawo, now lived in Hartford. Because 
so many women  were weeping openly as they listened, I asked if we should 
turn off the music. No! they protested, insisting they wanted to hear it to enjoy 
the memory of marriage rituals in the village.
figure I.9  Sheikh Axmed 
Nur, Banta, 1988. Photograph 
by Jorge Acero.
figure I.10  Iman Osman as a 
baby in his mother’s arms in Banta, 
1987. Photograph by Jorge Acero.
figure I.11  Iman Osman as a 
teenager in Lewiston, 2008.  
Photograph by Elizabeth Milliken.
figure I.12  Daliya sifting corn, 
Banta, 1988. Photograph by Jorge 
Acero.
figure I.13  Amina Cabdulle and 
Binti Caliyow Isaaq, Banta, 1988. 
Photograph by Jorge Acero.
figure I.14  Abdulkadir 
Matan Garad with his niece 
and nephew, Banta, 1988. 
Photograph by Jorge Acero.
figure I.15  Abdulkadir 
Matan Garad in his Lewiston 
apartment with some of his 
children, looking at a copy 
of the photograph in figure 
i.14, 2009. Photograph by 
Catherine Besteman.
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Finally it was time to begin the slide show and the audience quieted, en-
grossed, as they struggled to make sense of the photographs and the faces 
frozen as they  were eigh teen years before. I recalled when we first offered 
photographs as gifts during our stay in Banta and discovered that people had 
no idea what they  were seeing; making sense of the small images was chal-
lenging to many who  were unaccustomed to likenesses of any kind. Jorge re-
minded me that people  were often disturbed by photographs that didn’t show 
the entire body or that had funny angles that distorted people’s bodies, such as 
a photograph— which we thought was beautiful—of Iman’s cousin, our young 
neighbor Marian, weaving a mat, that everyone derided as making her look 
like an ant because of the angle.
As people got used to what they  were seeing, they asked to repeat the 
entire show a second time, this time calling out names to identify those ap-
pearing on the screen. The photograph of Abshirow, stylishly dressed in his 
velvet jacket, standing with his wife Muslimo and baby son, evoked shrieks: 
“Look how dressed up he looks, standing in front of his mundul [round 
 house made of mud and grass],” someone yelled out. Abshirow and his fam-
ily  were resettled in Texas, but, like many other survivors from Banta, later 
moved to Lewiston. A photograph of Axmed Baraki, now el derly and seated 
figure I.16  Mohamed Caliyow Isaaq and Xawo Sheikh Axmed Nur, Hartford, 2009. 
Photograph by Catherine Besteman.
26 • Introduction
in the audience, provoked cries of delight. In the photograph he appears young 
and very strong, wearing shorts and a large wrap on his head while working 
with a group of men to construct a frame for the room of a new mundul. 
Axmed Baraki himself got far more excited about a photograph of one of his 
farms, calling out the name of its location. Several women exclaimed with 
satisfaction at the beauty of the nicely tilled farms that appeared in several 
photographs.
We followed the second showing of the slides with a tape of Cali Osman’s 
poetry recitation and flute per for mance, which everyone asked to hear a sec-
ond time, and then a third time. Then everyone wanted to watch the entire 
slide show again, identifying still more people, including Sahara Mahamed, 
now living in Lewiston but unable to attend because she was about to give 
birth. Forthright and confident as a young girl, she stands in the photo as 
if she owns the world. I asked about her parents, who  were good people and 
friends. The answer, of course, was that they  were dead.
The photographs of young children guarding fields of sesame against the 
predations of birds and monkeys elicited lots of comments, as did the photo-
graphs of people in the unsteady village canoe crossing the Jubba River. The 
third time through the slide show, people recognized the images of religious 
and ritual activities, commenting in excitement on their old festivals. Slides of 
hoes, machetes, and other long- lost farm tools evoked lots of chatter.
figure I.17  Marian Cabdi Dhaqane, Banta, 1988. Photograph by Jorge Acero.
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As the festivities wound down, everyone asked for copies of photos and 
cds of the music. Sadiq and Abkow remained to help clean up after people 
dispersed, sharing more information about what actually happened in Banta 
and beginning the long pro cess of recounting Banta’s history since our depar-
ture. We learned that several of those who appeared in the photographs had 
become perpetrators of violence during the war— killing, kidnapping, and 
ransoming. Over the next two years, as I reconnected with Banta’s survivors 
in Lewiston, Syracuse, and Hartford, I pieced together the story of what hap-
pened in Banta, recounted in the following three chapters.
My first visit to a Somali Bantu home in Lewiston occurred a few weeks 
after the Bates MLK panel, when Jorge and I went to visit Sahara, who as a 
young girl had stood guard over me as I wrote my field notes each eve ning, 
shooing away other villagers who might disturb my concentration, and who 
now, as a married mother, had given birth to her sixth child the day after 
the slide show. Sahara’s downtown tenement building was a creaky old four- 
story walk-up, listing slightly to the right. We climbed to the top floor up the 
narrow twisting stairs through thick dust, cigarette butts, and garbage to a 
door with “Sahara Mahamed” scrawled in pencil. Inside, the apartment was 
transformed from grimy Lewiston tenement to lively Somali space. Colorful 
woven plastic mats covered the floor, brightly patterned nylon drapes flowed 
along the walls from ceiling to floor, and bunches of plastic flowers dangled 
figure I.18  Iman’s brother guarding stacks of sesame on his father’s farm, Banta, 1988. 
Photograph by Jorge Acero.
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from the corners. A cascade of plastic flowers woven into a garland hung to 
the floor from a ceiling hook in the middle of the room, making a gay cen-
terpiece. The aesthetic was a modernist rendering of the beautifully colored 
woven palm frond mats that used to grace the walls, beds, and floors of Banta’s 
small huts, a new style that has since become very familiar to me. Sahara’s 
six children assembled to meet us: six- year- old twins Xassan and Xussein, 
born in Dagahallay (in Dadaab) refugee camp, Gamana and Khadija, born in 
Kakuma refugee camp, giggly toddler Yasmin, born in Georgia, and the tiny 
newborn Lewiston native Sahel, sleeping in the center of a bare mattress. In 
addition to the single mattress, an old tv on a small side table completed the 
room’s furnishings. An adjoining bedroom held another single mattress atop 
more floor mats. As we talked, the kids rolled around on the mattresses and 
the mats— lacking toys or books, there seemed to be little  else for them to do 
but watch tv and wrestle. Jorge and I exchanged a look of concern, sharing a 
mutual reaction to the reality of seven people in a one- bedroom apartment 
with a long trek down four flights of stairs to get to the street. Sahara had re-
cently relocated to Lewiston from Atlanta, where debts had overwhelmed the 
struggling family shortly after their arrival in the United States. Her husband 
remained in Georgia to pay off the bills before joining his family. As I was to 
learn, Sahara’s apartment was just like the apartments of most newly resettled 
Somali Bantus: hardly any furniture other than an old donated mattress or 
two; life lived on the floor, where everyone ate, slept, played, and talked; 
all windows and walls covered with bright curtains; and lots of bright plastic 
flowers everywhere. A phone and an old donated vcr completed the standard 
furnishings in most homes.
When her tenement building burned down a few months after our visit, 
another large refugee family from Banta took Sahara’s family into their small 
two- bedroom apartment while she waited for a new apartment to become 
available. Such strong community support structures remained firmly in place 
despite the repeated ruptures experienced by refugees in the resettlement 
pro cess, making visible the kinds of communitarian practices typical of the 
refugee community that many of Lewiston’s poorer residents lacked. Indeed, 
seven years later, when arson destroyed several tenement buildings down-
town and left two hundred people homeless, all the Somali Bantu families 
found housing with friends and relatives while their non- Somali neighbors 
had to move into public facilities or short- term hotel rooms provided by the 
city until they could find somewhere  else to go. To re- create their structures 
of mutual support was precisely why Somali Bantu refugees chose to leave 
their sites of initial resettlement throughout the United States to live together 
again in Maine.
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The Argument of the Book
Drawing on oral history interviews with war survivors from the Jubba Valley; 
published reports about the Kenyan refugee camps; seven years of advocacy 
work, collaborative projects, and ethnographic fieldwork in the United States; 
and extensive engagement with social ser vices providers and others in Lewis-
ton, this book develops an understanding of the lives of resettled refugees that 
contradicts some of the most consistent claims in the media about refugees and 
their resettlement. One is the assumption that refugees are apo liti cal, docile, 
dependent recipients who benefit enormously from humanitarian intervention. 
Another is the claim that immigrants to America share a common trajectory 
of assimilation.
Policies involving immigrants and refugees will be one of the most press-
ing issues of the twenty- first century. Although the language of emergency 
used by the United Nations High Commissioner on Refugees (unhcr) defines 
refugees as a crisis situation rather than the norm,10 those who have lived in 
refugee camps for generations know differently. In numbers that currently 
exceed fifteen million, refugees are staying in camps for longer periods of 
time than ever before, and many live in camps that have existed for de cades.11 
Grandparents are raising grandchildren in camps where they themselves grew 
up. Refugees appear to have become a permanent part of the contemporary 
global landscape, the state of exception that has become normal. “They are at 
the heart of the definition of the world order and the debates it raises.”12
Containing and constraining the mobility of refugees, who as border cross-
ers are dangerous and mistrusted by the states that take them in as well as by the 
states that try to keep them out, is a major global enterprise, as manifested in 
the construction of massive refugee camps where humanitarians  house and care 
for those displaced by war or disaster. Because, despite all evidence to the 
contrary, refugee camps are envisioned as temporary solutions to short- term 
crises, less than 1 percent of those who live in them are referred for resettle-
ment to a third country. What is supposed to happen to the rest? As Zygmunt 
Bauman and many others argue, refugees are a product of our current world 
order; their numbers are not going to diminish; and their per sis tent presence 
is a reality the world must confront.13 The vast number of refugees, especially 
those who have lived for de cades in “temporary” camps, begs the question: 
what kind of world do we want to live in? Is a safe, secure world one in which 
millions of people are stashed in temporary refugee camps for a lifetime?
With a focus on their experiences as recounted to me by Somali Bantu ref-
ugees, part I asks what humanitarianism feels like to those who are its objects. 
What expectations and burdens accompany the extension of aid in the form 
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of refugee camps and resettlement opportunities? We will see how humani-
tarianism in the form of refugee camps feels constraining and debilitating to 
refugees who are working to retain agency over their lives and how refugees 
learn to navigate within and push back against the constraints on their free-
dom imposed by humanitarians and the states whose interests they represent.
Anthropologists recognize that memories play tricks, that current experi-
ences reshape recollections of past events, and that stories are told with an 
eye to their possible future significance. Refugees, in par tic u lar, learn to tell 
stories about their experiences in par tic u lar ways because of the requirements 
imposed on them by refugee camp administrators, as I discuss in chapter 3. 
While I have no way to verify the particulars of the stories I retell  here, the 
version of events recounted in the first three chapters reflects the things I 
heard over and over again as I crossed the country to reconnect with Banta’s 
survivors. Chapter 1 begins in 1988, our final year of residence in the village, 
sweeps back to the early twentieth century, and then follows the events precipi-
tated by the arrival of armed militias in Banta in 1991. Chapters 2 and 3 follow 
my old neighbors as they fled the Jubba Valley for Kenyan refugee camps, 
where they lived for the next de cade and a half.
Part II of the book takes up the question of what happens when refugees 
move in next door; when dependent objects of humanitarian charity become 
neighbors with rights. U.S. media and the unhcr promoted the U.S. offer of 
refuge through resettlement to Somali Bantu refugees as a purely humanitar-
ian act to rescue a displaced, persecuted minority group from an uncertain fu-
ture. But what does the offer of refuge actually mean? How is refuge envisioned 
and actually enacted? What happens when a town that did not invite refugees 
finds itself unwittingly becoming their place of refuge? Part II reviews the 
competing and contradictory responses by Lewiston’s residents to the unex-
pected arrival of thousands of refugees, exploring the debates about economic 
responsibility, moral responsibility, security, and community that immigration 
provokes.
Part III takes up the question of immigrant integration. The favored melt-
ing pot image of America acknowledges the country as a nation of immi-
grants, but the “land of opportunity” in the pop u lar national narrative rests 
on the assumption that immigrants assimilate to mainstream American 
culture as they follow the trajectory of upward mobility blazed by previous 
generations of immigrants. But what does integration actually mean? Even 
though the idea of the melting pot has long captured the national imagina-
tion, the iconic image of the current era is perhaps more one of crashes and 
clashes, manifest in fears about immigrants and the differences they bring. 
Samuel Huntington’s article “The Clash of Civilizations” and his book Who 
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Are We?, Robert Kaplan’s article “The Coming Anarchy,” the film Crash, and 
many other pop u lar narratives warn of the dangers of culture clashes, violence, 
and destruction precipitated by immigration.14 Those fearful of insecurities 
introduced by immigration argue that clashing and crashing is what happens 
when integration fails and such fears animate reactionary mea sures such as 
laws making En glish the official language. When immigrants are black and 
Muslim in addition to non– English speaking, what is integration to the Euro- 
American white mainstream supposed to look like?
This book contains crashes and clashes: Somali Bantu villages are crashed 
and destroyed by Somali militias; Somali Bantus and I crash into each other 
after twenty years; Somalis and Somali Bantus crash Maine and clash with 
Mainers. But much more interesting than the clashes and crashes are the stories 
that are left out of such narratives: the seepages, mutual transformations, and 
slow border crossings of all kinds (linguistic, cultural, ideological, philosophical, 
cultural) that accompany human mobility. While Lewiston’s story has its share 
of racists and xenophobes, a far more accurate portrait of the experience and 
impact of migration captures how refugee immigrants and locals negotiate 
coresidence, creating arenas of care, solidarity, collaboration, and mutuality 
as people from very different backgrounds work out ways to live together, 
create community, and envision a collective future. This pro cess is not with-
out struggle, of course, but integration works both ways: immigrants adapt to 
their new society but their neighbors also adapt to the new ways of being- in- 
the- world that immigrants bring. This books shows how and why.
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chapter 1
Becoming Refugees
In a world of globalization disengagement from 
Africa’s violence is no longer an option.
— Paul Richards, Fighting for the Rain Forest
In 1988, Cali Osman lived behind our dwelling in Banta in a row of neat mud 
 houses with his three wives, ten children, divorced sister, several nephews, 
and el derly widowed aunt. Caliyow Isaaq and his large family— three wives, 
twelve children— lived across the path from our compound; his wife Amina 
(pictured in the introduction, fig. i.13) was a frequent guest in our  house. 
Sheikh Axmed Nur (pictured in the introduction, fig. i.9) lived across the 
village from us with his two wives and six children. Although each family lived 
at the barest subsistence level, surviving on what they grew on their farms and 
sold for a few hundred dollars each year, each was considered wealthy in fam-
ily and by reputation. Cali Osman was a nationally recognized poet in a coun-
try where poetry is revered, viewed by his community as an intelligent and 
wise elder often sought for his mediation and oratory skills.1 We spent many 
happy eve nings tucked into a circle with other villagers listening to his po-
etry as a bonfire roared. Caliyow Isaaq was a master carpenter and head chef 
for the village feasts, often called on for his surgical abilities as well. Sheikh 
Axmed Nur, a powerful healer and religious leader, was known far and wide 
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for his curing skills and the ability to communicate with the spiritual domain. 
As my mentors in village life in 1987–88, these men and their families spent 
countless hours with me, so the survivors from these families  were among 
the first people from Banta with whom I sought to reconnect. Recounting the 
experiences of these three families reveals how war arrived in Banta, how the 
farmers became refugees, and how Somalia’s civil war is a global story.
From their photographs, one could imagine Cali Osman, Caliyow Isaaq, 
and Sheikh Axmed Nur as peasant- everymen living at the very edges of the 
world: remote, isolated Banta was hundreds of miles from any paved roads, 
inaccessible for half the year during the rainy season, and lacking in electricity, 
running water, and any electronic form of communication with the outside 
world except Caliyow Isaaq’s battery- powered radio. The women in their fami-
lies typically owned one dress each; their children worked in the fields since 
there was no local school. It might seem logical to conclude that families like 
these in a village like Banta lived more or less off the global grid— unaffected 
by global events, by larger po liti cal and economic currents sweeping the globe.
figure 1.1  Cali Osman 
making furniture, Banta, 
1987. Photograph by Jorge 
Acero.
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In fact, quite the opposite is true. As many anthropological accounts dem-
onstrate, people in villages like Banta are profoundly affected by global pro-
cesses and decisions made by elite world leaders. The roots of the conflict 
that tore apart Banta stretch back to the Indian Ocean slave trade (which was 
stimulated, in part, by the transatlantic slave trade), weave through the colo-
nial era with the imposition of Eu ro pean domination that reshaped African 
borders and identities,  were nurtured through the po liti cal alignments de-
manded by global superpowers during the Cold War, shifted again with the 
imposition of “development” initiatives by the world’s wealthier countries to 
remake the world’s poorer countries through capitalist interventions, and ex-
ploded with the fall of the Berlin Wall. The stories of what happened during 
the war to the families of Cali Osman, Caliyow Isaaq, and Sheikh Axmed Nur 
are simultaneously global and local; their fates  were shaped at the intersection 
of global and local politics.
Race and Ancestry
In contexts of civil war, violence often absorbs and makes harmfully mean-
ingful historically shaped ethnic, racial, kin- based, or religious differences.2 
The same is true in Somalia, where race and ancestry became vital identity 
markers when Somalia’s civil war spread to the Jubba Valley. Our story begins 
a century ago, when the parents of Cali Osman and Sheikh Axmed Nur  were 
born in the upper Shabelle Valley, located in the border region where Ethiopia 
figure 1.2  Rainy season travel in the Jubba Valley, 1988. Photograph by Jorge Acero.
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and Somalia now meet, a geo graph i cal area contested by the Somalis who 
lived there, Ethiopians, Italian and British colonial militaries, and anticolonial 
Somali dervish militias.3 The families of Cali Osman and Sheikh Axmed Nur 
 were members of one of Somalia’s ethnic minority groups who came under 
the authority of one of Somalia’s prominent clans. Their ancestors probably 
preceded the arrival of Somali speakers in the region centuries ago; linguists 
and historians suggest that after Somali speakers moved into the Horn, au-
tochthonous groups like those along the upper Shabelle converted to Islam 
and adopted one of the Somali languages, accepting a client status in relation 
to the more recently arrived Somali pastoralist clans.
The constant violence and conflict created by the international po liti cal 
actors trying to carve out colonies both under and in de pen dent of Eu ro pean 
control at the turn of the twentieth century produced a flow of refugees out 
of the upper Shabelle region, which included the parents of both Cali Osman 
and Sheikh Axmed Nur. As members of a Somali- speaking ethnic minority 
group, both families migrated into the Jubba River valley, where other ethnic 
minorities already lived, to settle in a farming village on the banks of the river.
Detailed oral histories and early colonial documents describe how the 
Jubba Valley had been settled by people whose parents and grandparents had 
been slaves in Somalia. A robust Indian Ocean slave trade operated in the 
nineteenth century, bringing tens of thousands of slaves from the east coast of 
Africa up to Somalia, where they  were put to work on Somali- owned planta-
tions stretching south along the coast from Mogadishu. The plantations pro-
duced food for the Somali plantation own ers but also for trade to the Arabian 
Peninsula and beyond.4 Slaves who eventually escaped or  were manumitted, 
like Caliyow Isaaq’s grandparents, fled into southern Somalia’s Jubba River 
valley to form in de pen dent farming villages, where they  were later joined by 
refugees from the violence along the upper Shabelle, including the families of 
Cali Osman and Sheikh Axmed Nur.
By the mid- twentieth century, slavery had officially ended under British 
and Italian colonization, and population movements had settled into a pat-
tern: free farmers of slave or non- Somali ancestry lived in small sedentary 
villages along the river, and Somali pastoralists maintained a nomadic lifestyle 
on the plains stretching to either side of the river valley. Everyone in southern 
Somalia knew the status differences that separated those living in Jubba Val-
ley farming villages from everyone  else because of their stigmatized slave (or 
non- Somali) ancestry, linguistically recorded in the derogatory terms used 
to identify them, such as ooji and adoon.5 Riverine farmers  were considered 
more “African,” in contrast to the purported Arabic ancestry of ethnic So-
malis, a difference recognized in the widespread use of mutually exclusive 
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physical terms to define the two groups: jareer, which means “hard hair,” 
described those of slave or non- Somali ancestry, and jileec, which means “soft,” 
described those identified as ethnic Somalis.6 Although many Jubba Valley 
farmers shared languages, religion, and many cultural practices with other 
Somalis, a ban on intermarriage between the two groups maintained the for-
mer’s inferior status, as did Italian colonial labor policies that targeted farm-
ers, but not pastoralists, for forced labor requirements.
During my stay in Banta, I carefully documented the ways in which local 
residents mediated and managed the tensions provoked by Somali under-
standings of hierarchy and in e qual ity that prized those of jileec status and 
subjugated those identified as jareer. Despite their non- Somali ancestry, every-
one in Banta claimed membership in a Somali clan, either on the basis of 
the clan identity of the person who had originally enslaved their ancestors, 
or through an ancestor’s later adoption into a clan for protection and iden-
tity within Somali society. Scholars describe Somali kinship as a segmentary 
lineage structure, in which every Somali is a member of one of five major 
clan families (Darood, Dir, Isaaq, Rahanweyn, and Hawiye), each of which 
encompasses large groups of lineages in a cascading set of lineage- based kin-
ship groups determined patrilineally.7 Every Somali claims membership in a 
par tic u lar lineage of a par tic u lar clan, and can identify his or her relationship 
to every other Somali through tracing his or her connections through the 
figure 1.3  Somali pastoralists migrating outside Banta, 1988. Photograph by  
Jorge Acero.
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overarching kinship system. The lineage and clan structure provided the basis 
for social and po liti cal life, including knowing one’s enemies and allies when 
conflict occurred.8
Banta included families who claimed membership in three of Somalia’s five 
major clans (Darood, Rahanweyn, and Hawiye), although the connections 
between families of different clan membership far outweighed the distinctions 
among them.9 In Banta, people married and shared friendships across clan 
lines, and when compensation had to be paid for a crime committed by a 
villager against someone from outside the village, all of Banta’s families con-
tributed rather than just the offender’s clan relatives. In short, lineage and 
clan membership was far more important for claiming membership within 
broader Somali society than it was for structuring life within the village.
The jareer villagers in Banta used their membership in Somali clans to 
negotiate their relationships with the jileec Somali pastoralists who lived on 
the plains stretching away from the riverbanks: the Darood to the west and the 
Rahanweyn and Hawiye to the east. Because of their social status above those 
farmers identified as jareer, Somali (jileec) pastoralists who entered Jubba 
Valley villages seeking water or food felt entitled to assault, harass, and in-
timidate local farmers with relative impunity. My field notes are filled with 
stories about pastoralists grazing their animals on farmers’ ripening crops and 
assaulting those who attempted to defend their fields against invading hun-
gry cows. My Banta neighbors usually explained this abuse as the behavior of 
particularly aggressive Somali individuals rather than as an expression of col-
lective discrimination by pastoralist (jileec) Somalis against minority (jareer) 
farmers, and they attempted time and again to use the language of clan to seek 
compensation and mediation for their injuries.
While the majority of Banta villagers claimed to be affiliated with jileec 
Somali clans who lived to the east of the Jubba River valley, several Banta 
families maintained close ties with jileec Somali pastoralist families of the 
Darood clan, whose territory stretched to the west of the Jubba Valley. Xassan, 
the head of the village in whose compound I lived, had a close relationship 
with a Darood pastoralist family because his wife, Hamara, claimed Darood 
clan membership. Hamara’s father, Bilaal, was a locally powerful elder from 
Kakole, a village near Banta also on the west bank of the Jubba River, which 
was almost entirely populated by his extended family, all of whom claimed 
Darood clan membership.10 During my year in Banta I spent dozens of hours 
interviewing Bilaal about local history, including the history of slavery that 
his family shared with most villagers in the Jubba Valley. His grandfather, 
captured in Tanzania for enslavement in Somalia, had assumed Darood clan 
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identity after gaining his freedom, and his offspring continued to claim that 
identity, seeking solidarity with the Darood pastoralists who lived in the 
bush to the west of Banta and Kakole.
In addition to the kinship and trading ties that many village families main-
tained with pastoralists living in the bush outside Banta, several former pas-
toralist Darood families had settled in Banta after losing their livestock to 
drought and disease, maintaining a neighborly but guarded relationship with 
other villagers. Maxamed Gedi, his brother Said, Xussein, and other Darood 
arrivals joined the village after receiving land grants from village elders. Al-
though the male Darood village residents  were recognized as rather severe and 
hostile personalities, they never caused any outright trouble within the village 
during my stay.
Despite the villagers’ efforts to claim a foothold in Somalia’s system of clans, 
I soon learned that the Darood pastoralist families with whom they traded 
in the bush outside Banta did not share their perception of membership in 
Somali society. After witnessing numerous instances of abuse by pastoralists 
against villagers, followed by mediation by clan and village elders to determine 
compensation, I began interviewing Darood pastoralist leaders from the bush 
surrounding Banta about their perception of shared clan allegiances with the 
villagers. In our interviews, they scoffed at the efforts of middle valley farmers 
to seek membership in Somali kin groups. One local Darood leader explained 
that the Jubba Valley farmers could never be treated as equal lineage members 
and avoided reenslavement by his clan only because of national laws against 
slavery. Siad Barre had in fact outlawed the entire clan system in Somalia, 
making clan- and slave- based hierarchies and distinctions illegal. Although 
it is hard to describe the dictator as a protector of human rights, the Somali 
Darood clan leaders living outside of Banta insisted that Barre’s antislavery 
laws  were the only thing keeping them from reenslaving Jubba Valley farmers.
So in 1987–88, a détente based on a mutually recognized in e qual ity between 
jareer and jileec residents characterized life in the middle valley. While sta-
tus differences gave jileec pastoralists the upper hand in compensation nego-
tiations when they harmed villagers, shared clan membership between some 
pastoralist and farmer families provided a language to seek mediation and 
compensation, even if it was usually paltry and begrudging. Within the village, 
jileec former pastoralists of the Darood clan held no special power because 
they  were so clearly in the minority and received land for farming only through 
the good graces of the jareer village elders. Banta farmers held allegiances to 
both their village and their clans; having never been forced to choose sides, 
they could maintain an imagined balance of clan and village associations that 
42 • Chapter 1
allowed them to navigate the status differences between jileec and jareer as 
best they could. No one in Banta realized how murderously meaningful the 
status hierarchy separating jareer from jileec would become.
The Cold War Comes to the Jubba Valley
When in de pen dence from colonial control arrived in 1960, the parents of Cali 
Osman, Caliyow Isaaq, and Sheikh Axmed Nur had survived the forced labor 
campaigns of the Italian colonizers in the Jubba Valley as well as the British- 
Italian skirmishes that passed control over the Jubba Valley back and forth 
between the British and the Italians until in de pen dence in 1960. The colonial- 
era conflict in the upper Shabelle region had come to an unquiet conclusion 
in the mid- twentieth century when international powers ultimately settled on 
a border between Somalia and Ethiopia that granted to Ethiopia a large chunk 
of Somali- inhabited territory. Somalis  were understandably outraged, and a 
discourse of irredentism— a desire to re unite within one nation- state all the 
territory occupied by Somali speakers— pervaded nationalist Somali rhetoric 
after in de pen dence in 1960.
Siad Barre came to power as Somalia’s president in a coup in 1969, ad-
vocating a po liti cal platform he called scientific socialism. He initially allied 
himself with the Soviet Union, from whom he received weaponry, military 
assistance, and economic support. Seeking to fulfill his irredentist goals, Barre 
launched an attack against Ethiopia in 1977 to reclaim the Somali- inhabited 
territory ceded to Ethiopia de cades earlier. But when the Soviet Union chose to 
back Ethiopia, their other client in the Horn of Africa, Siad Barre expelled the 
Soviets from Somalia and turned to the United States for patronage, offering 
access to Somalia for military bases in return for massive foreign aid. In the 
context of Cold War geopolitics, the United States saw Somalia as a strategic 
prize because of its location on the Indian Ocean and its proximity to the Per-
sian Gulf. During the 1980s, the United States made Somalia its second largest 
recipient of foreign aid in Africa, granting Barre hundreds upon hundreds of 
millions of dollars in military and economic aid. Analysts estimate that Barre 
received over a billion dollars in foreign aid from international sources during 
the 1980s, an astounding figure for a lightly populated, arid country with few 
natural resources.11
Barre put the money to good use, employing the familiar pattern of patri-
monial politics to consolidate power in the hands of his closest relatives and 
trusted advisors, particularly those of the Darood clan living in the south. 
Barre skillfully manipulated the clan system to privilege some clans at the ex-
pense of others, leading commentators like British anthropologist I. M. Lewis 
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to conclude that Somalia’s civil war represented a victory of clan politics over 
state building. Other observers, including me, emphasized how the wealth 
flowing into Somalia from foreign aid enabled the growth of an elite, urban- 
based class of politicians and businessmen with close government connections. 
Class- based in e qual ity had arrived in Somalia, joining hierarchies of race and 
ancestry created previously through the slave trade and migration.12
However one understands the manipulations of Barre’s rule, several things 
are clear: his alliances with the United States (and formerly the Soviet Union) 
weaponized the country and maintained his regime; he used massive state re-
sources gained from foreign aid to bolster his bases of support, primarily in 
the south, against northern clans and communities that protested against their 
exclusion from his largesse; and his practice of patrimonial politics enabled 
urban- based po liti cal and business elites from Mogadishu to use the instru-
ments of the state to enrich themselves at the expense of their fellow citizens.
What did foreign aid and the patrimonialism it funded mean for Cali Osman, 
Caliyow Isaaq, and Sheikh Axmed Nur, living in Banta in the distant Jubba 
Valley? Despite the massive amount of aid flowing into the country under 
Barre’s dictatorship, villages like Banta received no benefits from it. There 
 were no schools, medical facilities, infrastructure, roads, policing, or state sup-
port structures. The only way that Banta experienced the foreign aid flowing 
into the country was that foreign and multilateral development agencies in-
volved in shaping Somalia’s postsocialist economy identified the Jubba Valley 
as ripe for capitalist transformation. The World Bank planned to build the 
second largest dam in all of Africa on the upper Jubba Valley; the U.S. Agency 
for International Development (usaid) and Eu ro pean development agencies 
planned to build paved roads and commercial irrigation projects throughout 
the valley, and usaid planned and funded a land reform program to privatize 
all land own ership. In 1988, when I scrutinized the official land registry for 
Banta in the Ministry of Agriculture, I discovered that all the land in Banta 
had been legally claimed by businessmen and politicians from Mogadishu 
who had never lived there, but who  were waiting to exercise their new own-
ership rights until the foreign development agencies completed their proj-
ects.13 One eve ning after this discovery, as I sat with Banta villagers around a 
bonfire discussing their future, Cali Osman predicted they would all end up 
as landless, impoverished wage laborers on commercial plantations owned 
by wealthy urban businessmen. We never imagined a worse fate was in store 
for them. The takeover by city overlords might have dismantled the delicate, 
if unequal, balance between jareer and jileec residents in the Jubba Valley in 
a way that was harmful to both groups if the war hadn’t changed everything.
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Civil War
Just after our departure from Somalia the Berlin Wall fell, and the reverber-
ations of this globally momentous event reached all the way to Banta. The 
dictator Siad Barre— ally of the United States, kept in power largely by U.S. 
aid— suddenly became a pariah in the new global order, in which alliances 
and enemies  were no longer defined by the “free” world versus the communist 
world. In the new world order that emerged after the fall of the Berlin Wall, 
people like Siad Barre  were expendable to the United States, and Barre was 
very quickly redefined in speeches in the U.S. Congress as a human rights 
abuser. Although Barre’s government had regularly imprisoned and tortured 
its dissenters, the regime’s heinous actions became important to U.S. politicians 
only after communism collapsed and it was difficult to justify U.S. support for 
such a dictator any longer. As insurgencies against Barre’s totalitarian rule 
mounted within Somalia, Barre struggled to maintain control by bombing 
and strafing villages in the north in retaliation for insurrection by northern- 
based po liti cal opponents. The United States dramatically cut aid to Somalia 
in 1990, and within a year Barre’s government collapsed under pressure from 
armed antigovernment groups that had joined forces to oust him.
Although life under Siad Barre had not been easy for Jubba Valley farm-
ers, what happened after his government collapsed was horrific.14 Fleeing 
 Mogadishu for Kenya in 1991, Barre and his militia came through the Jubba 
Valley, pursued by opposing militias chasing him out of the country. As his 
supporters made their way up the valley, they distributed weapons and mili-
tary vehicles to his Darood clan allies, the Somali pastoralists who inhabited 
the plains to the west of the valley, admonishing them to maintain control 
of the valley and not cede it to the incoming Hawiye militias who  were pursu-
ing him from the east. These livestock herders– turned– militiamen began a 
cross- river campaign to push back the incoming militias arriving from the 
east. The unarmed farming villages got caught in the crossfire, to their pro-
found devastation.15
In the confusing weeks following Siad Barre’s flight up the valley, Bu’aale 
was one of the first towns in the middle valley to experience deadly violence 
when a Darood militiaman opened fire in the marketplace, killing three farmers 
he suspected of trying to buy weapons.16 Darood pastoralists- turned- militia 
began turning their guns against local farmers in order to assert control over the 
valley, killing those who resisted. About a dozen men of Duqiyo, a small village 
between Banta and Bu’aale, disobeyed an order issued by a militiaman not to 
leave the village; for punishment they  were marched to a large mango tree, 
tied to its base, and shot to death. They had been trying to sneak into Bu’aale 
Becoming Refugees • 45
for provisions. Their bodies  were left to rot, spied upon by small children from 
Bu’aale who came to investigate. Refugees from Duqiyo and Bu’aale began ar-
riving in Banta, looking for security with their relatives.
But within Banta, families from the Darood clan that had settled in the vil-
lage as farmers, including Maxamed Gedi, his brother Said, Xussein, and a few 
others, had obtained guns from their relatives in the bush and used them to 
take over Banta. They compiled a list of the names of everyone in the village 
and began to police everyone’s movements in and out of the village, trying to 
assert demographic control and to hinder possible interactions with Hawiye 
militias. Calling themselves a “committee,” Maxamed Gedi and his group kept 
accounts of the villagers’ crop production, requiring each family to report to 
the committee on their farm’s production and claiming a portion of everyone’s 
harvest as a residential tax, which they redistributed to their pastoralist Darood 
clan relatives in the bush. Some of their relatives from the bush even moved 
into the village to join them, living off the work of the unarmed farmers.
Kidnapping and ransom, the fund- raising method used by criminals 
throughout the world, became their primary strategy for obtaining food. 
Initially they targeted the new arrivals seeking refuge in Banta after fleeing 
violence in other communities. Maxamed Gedi and his contingent would 
imprison newcomers until their village relatives paid their “entry tax.” Sadiq, 
who fled to Banta from Bu’aale after witnessing the massacred Duqiyo men, 
remembers such abductions as a rite of passage, even joking that they  were 
like immigration control. But Maxamed Gedi and the others soon turned on 
their long- time neighbors, beating them up, imprisoning them, and then de-
manding a ransom from their families as a tool of control and humiliation, 
particularly against the village elders.
Sitting on the floor mats in her tiny Lewiston apartment while her grand-
children listened with rapt attention, Cali Osman’s wife Isha recounted the 
Darood men’s stranglehold on the village, describing how Maxamed Gedi 
captured her son, Ciise, tied him to a tree, and beat him until she and Cali 
Osman ransomed him with their harvest, thus imperiling their other chil-
dren’s food security for the season. Her enduring fury and rage  were apparent 
as she described the escalating assaults by the Darood men against their Banta 
neighbors.
“Were you surprised your neighbors could turn on you like that?” I asked.
“I was surprised!” she responded, emphatically. Echoing the ethic that 
dominated village life during my stay in Banta, Sadiq added, “Before the war 
we all lived together. We helped each other. If there was a funeral or a wed-
ding, we all worked together and helped each other. So it was really surprising 
that this could happen.”
figure 1.4  Ciise Cali Osman, 
Banta, 1988. Photograph by Jorge 
Acero.
figure 1.5  Isha Iman, wife of Cali 
Osman and mother of Ciise, in  
center looking over her shoulder at 
the camera, Banta, 1988. Photograph 
by Jorge Acero.
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With trepidation, I asked about our old friend and mentor Bilaal, the 
Darood- affiliated elder of Kakole and great historian, father to Hamara, in 
whose compound we lived during our stay. Isha became animated with dis-
gust. “They  were the worst! He was with them! He took over! He was one of 
the Darood who carried weapons and attacked and violated everyone. His 
family was the cause of the biggest problems. His son killed at least a hundred 
people. His Banta wife fled to Kakole, and they all participated in the attack-
ing and looting of the other surrounding villages. It was like they wanted to 
take over and control everything and everybody.” She described how Bilaal 
and his sons used their weapons to control the neighboring villages, assisting 
the pastoralist Darood occupiers in their rapacious demands for food. Isha 
concluded her appalling tale about Bilaal’s collusion with the occupiers, shak-
ing her head: “He had totally changed.”
Weapons enabled militiamen to make claims on women. Armed Darood 
militiamen demanded marriages with village women of their choice, includ-
ing women who  were already married. The dissolution of social bonds forged 
through marriage rituals, which are always accompanied by exchanges of gifts 
and food between the couple’s families, struck a blow at the very basis of vil-
lage life. Bilaal’s militia forced his Banta granddaughters (the daughters of my 
former landlords) to divorce their husbands and move in with Darood militia-
men. One refused and fled the village for refuge in Kenya with her husband. 
“Those with guns could do what ever they wanted— they demanded what ever 
they wanted,” Isha remembered. Maxamed Gedi and Saïd appropriated their 
neighbors’ belongings at gunpoint, including Caliyow Isaaq’s radio and the 
jacket Jorge had given him as a parting gift. Moving on from simply demand-
ing food, they began taking clothes, raping women, and terrorizing the village.
The burden of handing over their harvest as a “tax” or as ransom meant 
constant and increasing hunger. “Every farmer supported three extra people!” 
Sadiq explained as he emphasized the toll on Banta farmers of supporting 
the armed pastoralist invaders and their relatives. Those with weapons not 
only demanded the lion’s share of the harvest but also required the farmers to 
transport their harvest into the bush to the families of the occupying militia. 
Caliyow Isaaq’s brother was ordered to carry the goods for two families, but as 
it was too much for him, he took one load, intending to return for the second. 
In fury, the man whose goods would be the second load shot him in the legs 
for his failure to cart the entire burden at once. Axmed Baraki recounted how 
the armed occupiers used villagers as target practice, mimicking one occupier 
who, he claimed, had said, as he took aim at a farmer- turned- porter, “Let’s see 
if I can shoot him from this far away.”
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After initially focusing on new arrivals in Banta, Maxamed Gedi and his 
gang turned their attention to the village elders in order to disempower them, 
particularly Sheikh Axmed Nur in retaliation for his refusal to hand over his 
precious bow and arrow to the militia committee. One of his sons, Cabdul-
lahi, recounted his family’s story as we sat surrounded by photographs from 
Banta in Sadiq’s Lewiston apartment. Cabdullahi was visiting Lewiston for a 
wedding from his new home in Syracuse, but before heading to the wed-
ding feast we sat for several hours remembering prewar life in the village and 
talking about what had happened to his family during the war. As his stories 
about the war unfolded, his cell phone rang constantly with calls from his 
relatives from Lewiston, Hartford, Springfield, and even Kenya, who wanted 
to add their memories to our conversation. Studying the photographs and the 
1988 census I had created of Banta residents, his eyes brimmed with tears. “All 
those people,” he said, shaking his head. “So many dead.”
His was the first family in Banta to experience murder. After Sheikh Axmed 
Nur’s son Kahiye failed to return from his farm one day, a group of elders, in-
cluding Sheikh Axmed Nur, Cali Osman, and Caliyow Isaaq, went searching 
for him, accompanied by militia members Maxamed Gedi and Said. After 
three days of searching, his body was finally located hidden in the bush, with 
three bullet holes in his neck and upper back. Caliyow Isaaq extracted a bul-
let, matched to an ak-47, the make of gun used by Maxamed Gedi and his 
cohort. Cali Osman’s eldest daughter, Rabaca, overcame her fear and reported 
that she had seen Kahiye pass by her on the day he disappeared as she was 
collecting firewood, followed by Maxamed Gedi and Said. Shortly thereafter 
three shots rang out. Upon hearing this news, Caliyow Isaaq flew at Maxamed 
Gedi in such a rage that his children, in fear for his life, had to forcibly restrain 
him. Maxamed Gedi denied the ensuing accusation of murder, retaliating 
against the elders by arresting them and their sons for ransom. Over the next 
few months, Maxamed Gedi and his gang repeatedly abducted, tied up, and 
beat the elders and their adult sons, demanding payments of money, sesame 
oil, and corn for their release. Sheikh Axmed Nur’s second son, Ahmadey, 
was told he was the next target for assassination, but with only two bullets this 
time. He immediately fled the area. The turn toward assassination signaled a 
transformation in life; the transition from demanding food to killing neighbors 
marked a point of no return.
A brief respite arrived when the Hawiye militia from the east side of the 
Jubba River valley managed to push the war front across the valley and take 
control of the west bank of the Jubba, occupying Banta. The Darood occupiers 
retreated to the west, and Cali Osman composed a poem savagely mocking 
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their behavior and praising the incoming Hawiye occupiers. But their relief 
was short lived as the Darood militias managed to push back the Hawiye of-
fensive, returning to retake Banta with enormous fury over the humiliating 
and widely repeated poem. In Somalia, poetry has long held tremendous 
po liti cal power, used as a weapon of war, broadcast over the radio and shared 
through recitations in camel camps and farming villages at night. Although 
the returning militia raided the village to kill Cali Osman, they only succeeded 
in killing two other village farmers while Cali Osman and his family escaped, 
spending the next several months living on the run in the bush. Cali Osman’s 
sons remember how they stole into villages at night to get food to augment 
their dependence on wild foods they could scavenge and how the family 
members arranged themselves across the treetops at night to sleep in order 
to escape militia patrols. In one funny story, Cali Osman’s son Cabdulkadir 
recounted a night he passed hiding in a warthog hole, desperately trying not 
to disturb the resident warthog. Cabdulkadir recalled how fear and constant 
movement exhausted the family, forcing Cali Osman to negotiate with the 
Darood occupiers to rewrite his poem in their honor, which they accepted 
in return for allowing him to return to Banta. Cabdulkadir and Idris believe 
he agreed to this compromise in order to plan his escape to Kenya along the 
route that began in Banta.
The family returned to an utterly polarized village. The Darood militia had 
successfully enlisted several non- Darood village men as their foot soldiers, 
including our old friend Adan, a village elder who claimed an affiliation to a 
clan not shared with any other villagers. Initially Adan had attempted to play 
the role of negotiator between the occupying Darood militia and the other 
villagers. In my conversations with Banta’s survivors in the United States, we 
puzzled for hours over the behavior of prominent former Banta elders like 
Adan, my landlord Xassan, and other village men who assisted the occupying 
militia, finally concluding that they must have felt they had little choice; they 
 were also threatened by those with guns. While they did not participate in any 
killings or beatings, their negotiations between the occupiers and their Banta 
neighbors rarely helped the latter. Over time, Adan’s mediation efforts shifted 
toward collusion with the militia as he began reporting on the villagers’ move-
ments and harvests, assisting the Darood occupiers in determining whom to 
kidnap and for how much. Eventually his compound, right next to the com-
pound of Sheikh Axmed Nur, became a store house of weapons for the Da-
rood and part of their Banta militia base for attacking other villages. He even 
threw out his daughter’s husband and allowed a Darood militiaman to marry 
her and take control of her former husband’s home, clothing, and farms. “Can 
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you imagine?” Sadiq asked incredulously. “The new husband walked around 
wearing the first husband’s clothes!”
Becoming Refugees
Shortly after their return from life on the run, Cali Osman’s family joined to-
gether with Caliyow Isaaq’s family in a group of about two hundred people to 
flee the village in a daring midnight escape. Amazingly, they managed to keep 
their plans a total secret from everyone  else, to ensure the militia members 
could not block their departure or kill them for their disobedience. Sadiq re-
calls, “We woke up one morning and all those people  were gone!” The militia-
men  were furious— they had just lost an army of food producers.
The trek to Kenya through hundreds of miles of desert was challenging, 
and one of Cali Osman’s wives died of starvation along the way. The journey, 
while grueling, benefited from the help of Somali pastoralists near the Kenyan 
border who, along with the International Committee of the Red Cross (icrc), 
offered assistance and support to the fleeing refugees. Identifying the refugees 
as starving farmers with nothing left to steal, the mosques broadcast messages 
asking people to refrain from attacking them. The local pastoralists benefited 
from the presence of the icrc, which was operating in the area to support 
fleeing civilians, and understood that it was to their advantage to offer sup-
port for the refugees.
figure 1.6  The road to Kenya from Banta, 1988. Photograph by Catherine Besteman.
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Arriving at the Kenyan border, Isha recalls, “We all just fell down and 
 couldn’t get up.” They  were met by unhcr workers who transported them to 
the refugee camp at Dadaab. In a cruel twist of fate, many in their group 
immediately fell terribly ill and died by the score from prolonged diarrhea, 
including two of Caliyow Isaaq’s three wives, Faduma and Amina, along with 
three of Amina’s daughters. Caliyow Isaaq himself died soon thereafter. Out 
of the sixteen members of Caliyow Isaaq’s family who survived the trek from 
Somalia, seven died from diarrhea and vomiting shortly after arriving at the 
camp. Caliyow Isaaq’s only surviving wife, Jimcoy, and eldest son, Mohamed 
(who married Sheikh Axmed Nur’s daughter Xawo), took over the responsi-
bility of caring for all six of the children left orphaned.
A few weeks after the flight of Cali Osman and Caliyow Isaaq’s group, Sheikh 
Axmed Nur led another secret midnight escape of a large group of about one 
hundred from Banta to the Kenyan border. This group included Sadiq and 
Maliya, a married daughter of Cali Osman and Isha. They set out late at night, 
separating into two groups when some of the members wanted to rest, but 
Darood militiamen caught the resting group after pursuing them through the 
bush. The militiamen poured out all their water and confiscated their food and 
other belongings in an effort to force them to return to Banta. Maliya man-
aged to escape the attack and ran ahead to alert the traveling group, which 
included Sheikh Axmed Nur, a central target of the pursuing militiamen, to 
forge ahead. The second group decided to continue as well, even though they 
knew this choice would mean death for many. Maliya made it to the refugee 
camp, where she also succumbed to the deadly diarrheal disease, becoming 
the first of Cali Osman’s children to die.
The families of Cali Osman, Caliyow Isaaq, and Sheikh Axmed Nur  were 
among the tens of thousands of famers from the Jubba Valley streaming to-
ward the Kenyan border in 1992. As the fighting between various armed mili-
tia groups raged back and forth across the Jubba Valley, militias targeted valley 
farmers because they lacked protection— none of their jileec Somali clan allies 
came to their defense— and as farmers they  were food producers and thus  were 
attacked for their food reserves by hungry but non- food- producing militias. 
Tens of thousands of farmers  were killed throughout the valley in 1991–92 de-
fending their food reserves. Human rights organizations like Amnesty Interna-
tional, Human Rights Watch, and Africa Watch reported the appalling levels of 
violence directed against Jubba Valley villagers in the first years of the war. As 
Cali Osman, Caliyow Isaaq, and Sheikh Axmed Nur  were escaping with their 
families from Banta, an Oxfam official called the valley “one big graveyard.”17
The refugee camps offered little relief. The three families had lost many 
members and friends to starvation during the long trek from Banta and to 
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the diarrhea that overcame them so soon after their arrival in the camps. 
The abuse at the hands of Somalis they experienced in Banta persisted in the 
camps, where jareer Somalis  were constantly harassed, assaulted, and insulted. 
For women the situation was extreme: in one of our conversations about the 
camps, Isha closed her eyes, remembering: “The rapes. So many rapes.” In our 
conversations over the years, many of my Banta friends mentioned the daily 
rapes, a horrific aspect of camp life repeatedly noted in reports by humanitarian 
and human rights agencies.
After several years in the refugee camps, news came of a un and U.S. peace-
keeping mission in Somalia, and the unhcr, who ran the refugee camps, fa-
cilitated the repatriation of Somali Bantus to Somalia.18 Cali Osman was eager 
to return. His sons remember his frustration at his enforced dependence and 
subjugation in the camps and his decision that he would rather die in his own 
village than live on handouts as a refugee. Remembering the threats against 
his surviving sons, Sheikh Axmed Nur chose to remain in the camps until he 
felt more certain about the prospects for peace.
figure 1.7  Maliya Cali 
Osman, Banta, 1988.  
Photograph by Jorge Acero.
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Cali Osman’s entire family except for the eldest children, son Ciise and 
daughter Rabaca, returned to the village in 1995, but discovered that “it was 
worse than ever,” according to Isha. A few days after their return, their fifteen- 
year- old daughter, Ambiya, was stolen by a Darood man— Xussein’s brother— 
who pointed a gun at Isha and forced her daughter away with him to another 
village. “I  couldn’t protect my daughter,” Isha lamented, her face crumpling as 
she recounted her helplessness.
The much- publicized international peacekeeping mission had the con-
tradictory effect of enhancing violence in the valley rather than reducing it, 
as different militias jockeyed to consolidate their control over territory. As 
those with weapons became increasingly murderous against villagers, Cali 
Osman’s family debated whether they should risk another flight through 
the desert to Kenya when Isha announced her intention to flee once again. 
After losing Ambiya at gunpoint, it was the only way she believed she could 
protect her remaining children. Her chance came when a Darood woman 
drawing water from the river in the center of Banta was attacked by a croco-
dile. In the ensuing hysteria, the woman’s armed relatives demanded that 
all the village men and boys run into the river to save her. Isha grabbed her 
youn gest sons and fled the village. Remembering that moment, Isha’s son 
Idris recounted how Maxamed Gedi ran after Isha, shooting at her, “But she 
was faster!” Another son hid in the bushes, while Cali Osman was forced to 
figure 1.8  Ambiya Cali Osman, center, and friends, Banta, 1988. Photograph by  
Jorge Acero.
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enter the river with the other village men. Isha and her youn gest children 
united with the son who hid in the bushes, and made it all the way back to 
Kenya, although this trip was far worse than the previous journey because 
no nongovernmental organizations or pastoralists offered assistance this 
time. Idris shuddered as he recalled the murky, urine- filled cattle ponds that 
offered rare and brief respite from their terrible thirst on the brutal three- 
week trek. This time they  were refused entry at the border, in contravention 
to international protocol, but after several days of hiding at the border they 
managed to sneak across and walk all the way back to Dagahalley, one of the 
refugee camps at Dadaab.
Although Isha had lost two of her children, she had managed to save five, 
including her orphaned nephew whom she was raising as her son. But she 
soon learned that she had lost her husband as well: Cali Osman did not make 
it out of Banta. His family never saw him again. Refugees arriving at the camps 
brought them the news that he had perished.
figure 1.9  Cali Osman on 
the banks of the Jubba River, 
Banta, 1988. Photograph by 
Jorge Acero.
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Somalia’s Civil War Is a Global Story
Civil war is always a global story. It is a story of how po liti cal divisions that be-
come weaponized through engagements with global forces convert the nuanced 
differences characteristic of local life into deadly antagonisms. It is a story 
about how war, fostered by transnational networks, arms suppliers, external 
funding support, and global geopo liti cal connections, colonizes local inequal-
ities and makes them murderous. It is a story about how status differences that 
neighbors manage and endure as part of daily life can become lethal in the 
context of uncertainty and violence. War arrived in Banta because a foreign- 
supported dictator used his access to U.S. and Eu ro pean foreign aid, granted 
because of Cold War interests, to arm local pastoralists, who then turned the 
weapons against their marginalized and stigmatized farmer- neighbors to ac-
quire food, enslave labor, steal women, and claim rights to land made valuable 
through the expectation that international donors would return to resume 
their massive development projects. Somalia’s civil war is indeed complicated, 
but the support of the U.S. government for a merciless dictator who armed his 
country and fostered discord among his citizens is a reminder that while the 
ultimate responsibility for war and peace lies with local people, behind every 
story of civil war is a story of connections and influences that span the globe.
Somalia’s civil war is also a story about how terrible things have to be for 
farmers to abandon their land. Cali Osman, Caliyow Isaaq, and Sheikh Axmed 
Nur farmed the same plots their parents had farmed, harvesting enough to be 
able to marry several wives and support many children and grandchildren. 
Each man had earned a strong local reputation for prowess in valued skills— 
poetry and music, carpentry, healing and religion—in addition to wisdom, yet 
the men decided, together with their wives, to abandon their homes and risk 
a brutal journey with their children and grandchildren through the desert to 
Kenya, a flight that cost each family beloved members and that ultimately re-
sulted in the dispersal of survivors between Somalia, Kenyan refugee camps, 
and throughout the United States.
Finally, Somalia’s civil war is a story of the contemporary responsibilities 
and forms of mutuality wrought by the hierarchical historical engagements of 
the slave trade, colonization, and foreign aid. The connections and confron-
tations among the international actors who built, shaped, or profited from 
slavery, colonialism, Cold War patronage, and war time intervention provoke 
contemporary questions about the relationships between Somali slave de-
scendants and their pastoralist neighbors and between all Somalis and their 
former colonizers and Cold War patrons. If disengagement from Africa’s vio-
lence is no longer an option in a globalized world, as Paul Richards argues in 
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this chapter’s epigraph, that is because Africa’s violence is produced through 
its global entanglements. If localized violence has global origins, how is re-
sponsibility for the consequences of violence to be managed?
Writing about the refusal of French intellectuals to engage moral post-
colonial questions of identity and difference because of their unwillingness 
to acknowledge the deep and profoundly complex connections of colonial-
ism, Achille Mbembe cautions that, through slavery and colonialism, “the 
inhabitants of the earth  were juxtaposed or brought together in a unity that 
is both emblematic and problematic. We are thus compelled, through these 
events, to pursue the question of all possible conditions of an authentic 
human  encounter. . . .  This encounter must begin through reciprocal disori-
entation.”19 “Reciprocal disorientation” is a scholarly phrase, perhaps, but an 
apt description of the de cades following the flight of Somalis and Somali Ban-
tus from Somalia to Kenya to Lewiston, as they re united under very different 
circumstances in places of refuge, and as their dislocations brought them into 
close and intimate encounters with the American citizens whose taxes helped 
to fund American Cold War patronage, development schemes, and military 
interventions that destabilized their homeland. The following chapters follow 
them on their journey.
chapter 2
The Humanitarian Condition
Physical movement is the natural, normal given of 
human social life; what is abnormal, changeable, 
and historically constructed is the idea that human 
societies need to construct po liti cal borders and 
institutions that define and constrain spatial mobility 
in par tic u lar, regularized ways, such that immobility 
becomes the norm.
— Noel Salazar and Alan Smart, “Anthropological 
Takes on ‘(Im)Mobility’ ”
After their second flight from Somalia to Kenya, Isha and her remaining chil-
dren rejoined the survivors from Caliyow Isaaq’s family and Sheikh Axmed 
Nur’s family in the Dadaab refugee camps, where they became “official refu-
gees,” a legal category that exists in the contemporary world to manage and 
contain people out of place. Before returning to their story in chapter 3,  here 
we examine what it means to be a refugee in the contemporary world.
Refugees are distinguished from other diasporic, mobile, transnational, 
and displaced people by law and by policy. A specific set of international and 
national laws defines the category of refugee, and a specific set of policies 
directs the administration and legal movement of people who are formally 
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recognized as belonging to this legally defined category. To many Americans, 
the figure of the refugee is one of pathos: a person stripped of an identity, a 
country, and a culture, dependent upon the largesse of humanitarian agencies 
and the wealthy donor countries that fund them for sustenance and care. 
Anthropologist Michel Agier describes the refugee as living “at the outer limits 
of life— physical, social, po liti cal and economic— almost dropping out of the 
common space that should naturally connect all human beings.”1 The refugee’s 
life, he says, is “a form of no longer being in the world, for a certain time 
or forever.”2 Philosophical and social science scholarship on refugees locates 
their exclusion from the international order of state structures as the basis 
for their liminal status, an apo liti cal existence theorized most influentially 
by Giorgio Agamben as the quintessential example of “bare life.” Agamben ar-
gues that the origin of state power rests on the ancient Roman category of homo 
sacer, the figure whose expulsion from po liti cal life makes clear the po liti cal 
structures of belonging. Agamben’s description of homo sacer— the person 
stripped of community, belonging, sociality, and identity, and reduced to bare 
life— offered a striking and useful image for a generation of scholars writing 
about contemporary refugees.3
While such an image departs from the actual experiences of many refu-
gees in ways I explore later, the conceptual reduction of refugees to icons of 
bare humanity serves several purposes in the contemporary world. In a series 
of groundbreaking publications, anthropologist Liisa Malkki demonstrated 
how the treatment of refugees as people out of place affirms the legitimacy 
of an international order of nation- states in which everyone must belong 
somewhere.4 Because their forced border crossing renders refugees effectively 
stateless and thus threatening to territorial sovereignty, the world’s po liti cal 
powers define them as people who must be contained and managed, a prob-
lem to be solved by international institutions whose function it is to maintain 
the global order of nation- states.5 The result is the creation of an “interna-
tional refugee regime” consisting of an interconnected set of humanitarian 
institutions, policies, protocols, and practices that direct the management of 
people who, through forced displacement across an international border, 
are no longer nationally rooted as citizens.6
The image of refugees as bare humanity stripped of an identity and a home 
provokes concerns about moral responsibility for their care, a task often un-
derstood as based on an ethic of a shared humanity and undertaken by the 
humanitarian institutions that support the international refugee regime.7 
About half of the world’s refugees are cared for, administered, and contained 
in refugee camps— the central node in the refugee regime— until they can 
return home or are accepted for resettlement in another country. As places 
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that both sustain and constrain people out of place, refugee camps enact the 
tension between repression and compassion, as anthropologist Didier Fassin 
has noted, based in a moral economy “oscillating between sentiments of sym-
pathy on the one hand and concern for order on the other hand, between a 
politics of pity and policies of control.”8 Refugee camps provide food and rudi-
mentary shelter, as well as basic health care and sometimes education, but deny 
residents the right to self- determination, mobility, economic activity outside 
the camp, and participation in demo cratic decision making or self- governance. 
To the contrary, the humanitarian institutions that manage refugee camps 
desire their charges to remain passive, silent, apo liti cal, grateful, and depen-
dent, while in turn benefiting from the repre sen ta tion of refugees as hapless 
victims because such an image is useful for attracting the charitable support 
of donors.9 Refugees carry an iconography of destitution that inspires moral 
questions about the relationship between shared humanity and charity, an im-
agery unprovoked by other kinds of immigrants (such as tourists and guest 
workers). Thus refugees are a particularly compelling and confounding object 
of humanitarianism: they are simultaneously threatening and pitied, feared and 
revered as figures of base humanity, subject to judgments about their legiti-
macy as innocent victims and their worthiness for humanitarian charity and 
rescue.
The story of how Somali Bantus living in Kenyan refugee camps navigated 
the international refugee regime to gain resettlement in the United States 
demonstrates the limitations and condescending assumptions built into the 
portrayal of refugees as passive recipients of charity who have lost their place 
in the world. While the decision by the United States to accept almost 12,000 
Somali Bantus for resettlement was heralded as a triumph of the humani-
tarian ethic of rescue and care by the unhcr, the U.S. government, and the 
American media, in their own accounts Somali Bantus claim to be authors of 
their fate and creative strategists of their life trajectory. Their story challenges 
presumptions that African refugees in refugee camps are highly dependent 
on humanitarian largesse and “lacking a capacity for enterprise.”10 But, as we 
shall see, their ability to craft a path toward resettlement required careful nav-
igation of the multiple, competing, and overlapping tensions of refugee iden-
tity. This chapter reviews the assessment by the U.S. government and unhcr 
of Somali Bantus as worthy humanitarian subjects. Chapter 3 juxtaposes the 
image of Somali Bantus as dependent victims promoted by unhcr and the 
United States with the version of their “rescue” told by my Somali Bantu in-
terlocutors.11 The contradictions in these accounts raise uncomfortable and 
difficult questions about the nature of humanitarianism and the role allotted 
to refugees in tales of global humanitarianism.
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The International Refugee Regime
Contemporary scholarship on the history of the refugee as a figure of pathos, 
fear, or rescue identifies the post– World War II demographic upheaval in 
Eu rope as the foundational moment for the emergence of an interlinked 
international bureaucratic apparatus for identifying and controlling refu-
gees. Although sociologist Saskia Sassen suggests that prior to the twentieth 
century, population movements within Eu rope followed a pattern defined 
primarily by labor migration and the term “refugee” only referred to French 
Huguenots who fled France after the revocation of the Edict of Nantes in 1685, 
historian Peter Gatrell traces the massive population movements in Eu rope 
that accompanied war and conflict between Eu ro pean empires prior to World 
War I.12 Small nongovernmental organizations (ngos) and humanitarian or-
ganizations addressed the needs of certain Eu ro pean refugee groups prior to 
World War I, but the large- scale movement of people in Eu rope did not 
immediately precipitate an international crisis because so many Eu ro pe ans 
found new homes in America. Between 1881 and 1930, 27.6 million people, 
mostly from Eu rope, arrived in the United States.13 America’s liberal immi-
gration policy until the early twentieth century offered free entry to anyone in 
good health, an open- door policy that narrowed only with the Chinese Exclu-
sion Act of 1882, making Chinese the first ethnic group subject to immigration 
restrictions in the United States.14
“World War I marks the beginning of a period when the modern Eu ro-
pean state and its politico- military project create the setting for massive refu-
gee movements on a scale hitherto not seen,” writes Sassen.15 Eu ro pean states 
 were consolidating nationalist identities during this era, exchanging popu-
lations in a bid for nationalist homogeneity and pushing out those viewed 
as undesirable or not belonging, especially Jews.16 Hannah Arendt famously 
labeled those forced from their homes by totalitarian movements during this 
era, most especially Jews, “the scum of the earth,” arguing that “they  were 
received as the scum of the earth everywhere” because of the power of totali-
tarian movements to disintegrate the concept of inalienable human rights ev-
erywhere.17 The corresponding growth in anti- Semitism in the United States 
meant barriers to entry for Jews in the years leading up to and during World 
War II.18 Engaged in its own pro cess of national consolidation around a par-
tic u lar identity based on a specific construction of whiteness, the U.S. govern-
ment implemented increased restrictions on immigration in the 1920s that 
privileged northern and western Eu ro pe ans through an assignment of quotas 
by national origin for immigrant admissions, precipitating an even greater 
crisis in Eu rope as eastern and southern Eu ro pe ans faced new barriers against 
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their admission to the United States.19 These barriers meant that many Jews 
attempting to escape Eu rope during World War II  were refused admission.
Post– World War II Eu rope was a landscape of displaced people; millions 
of Eu ro pe ans had been uprooted from their homes and had no place to 
go. President Truman committed to the creation of the International Refugee 
Or ga ni za tion in 1946 to manage the situation of Eu rope’s displaced popula-
tion, precipitating a po liti cal battle in the United States about the country’s 
responsibility to assist and offer entry to Eu rope’s displaced people.20 While 
the initial focus of refugee relief organizations operating in Eu rope was repa-
triation, growing Cold War concerns shifted attention to protecting and 
resettling rather than repatriating people fleeing communism. Despite the 
anti- Semitism and anti- immigrant sentiment that characterized American 
views of refugees during and after World War II, the United States accepted 
about 350,000 refugees from 1945 to 1950.21 Scholars suggest guilt about the 
Holocaust and the efforts of the American Jewish lobby confronted Ameri-
can anti- Semitism and concerns about Jewish links to po liti cal subversives, 
eventually tipping the American refugee debate in favor of a more welcoming 
policy for those fleeing communist countries, including Jews.22
The creation of the unhcr in 1949–50 replaced the International Refugee 
Or ga ni za tion and was followed by the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status 
of Refugees, an attempt to codify a definition of and protections for refugees. 
Signatories to the 1951 convention could limit the definition of a refugee to 
people in Eu rope, thus excluding groups like Palestinians who  were displaced 
in the 1948 war.23 The United States initially refused to contribute funds to the 
unhcr or to sign the convention because it did not want to be held account-
able for helping refugees,24 although it did ultimately sign the 1967 Protocol 
Relating to the Status of Refugees, which expanded the protocol for refugees to 
the global arena and which became the basis for refugee admittance policy in 
the United States until 1980. The familiar language of the convention defines a 
refugee as a person who, “owing to well- founded fear of being persecuted for 
reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a par tic u lar social group 
or po liti cal opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable 
or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that 
country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his 
former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such 
fear, is unwilling to return to it.” A key feature of the convention and protocol 
was the principle of nonrefoulement, an agreement that refugees could not 
be forced to return to the places they had fled in order to escape persecution.
The creation of these instruments for managing people forced to flee their 
home countries left in place a profound contradiction that continues to this 
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day to constrain the ability for self- determination of people escaping persecu-
tion. The mandate of the unhcr was simply to offer protection to people who 
had fled their home countries (in accordance with the convention definition) 
through granting a formal designation of refugee status, which protects those 
so labeled from being forcibly returned to the place from which they fled. It 
is an administrative designation, intended to categorize and identify people 
out of place and to offer refugees protection in a way that would minimize 
their presence as a problem for states. (The preamble to the convention makes 
this last point clearly in “expressing the wish that all States, recognizing the 
social and humanitarian nature of the problem of refugees, will do everything 
within their power to prevent this problem from becoming a cause of tension 
between States.”) At its inception, the unhcr provided no logistical support 
to refugees; this was the purview of other ngos, which had taken over the 
management of refugee populations in Eu rope after World War II from the Al-
lied military forces.25 Only gradually did the unhcr mandate grow to include 
responsibility for setting up and managing refugee camps.
Refugee camps exist because the principle of nonrefoulement is not 
matched by a legal right to asylum for those officially designated as refugees; 
refugees cannot be forced to return to their home countries, but no other 
county is obligated to take them in.26 Camps, as ware houses for those in refu-
gee limbo, thus exist to care for, contain, and monitor people designated as ref-
ugees and to ensure that they do not attempt to settle or assimilate into other 
countries outside of legal channels for immigration. The emergence of the 
international refugee regime after World War II is thus most fundamentally 
about protecting the global system of national sovereignty by containing and 
monitoring people out of place because they have fled across an international 
border. It is not about supporting the rights of refugees to self- determination. 
Emphasizing this point, anthropologist Shahram Khosravi, who himself lived 
in refugee camps after fleeing Iran, wryly observes, “Refugee camps constitute 
the most significant characteristic of the modern nation- state.”27
It is worth noting that the creation of the international refugee regime as 
a form of protection for national sovereignty accompanied decolonization 
and the postcolonial consolidation of newly in de pen dent countries firmly 
within the nation- state model. Thus, at the very moment that former colonies 
 were transitioning to in de pen dence, former colonizers  were working to en-
sure the hegemony of an international structure to control population move-
ment, enforce the nation- state as the only form of internationally recognized 
po liti cal belonging, and make certain that they could retain supreme author-
ity over who crossed their borders. Like the “murderous humanitarianism” that 
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colonial powers employed in the age of colonialism, the contemporary inter-
national refugee regime can be recognized as a postcolonial continuation of 
colonial policies of containing, boundary making, and control.28 Historian 
Peter Gatrell notes that by the turn of the twenty- first century, over half the 
world’s refugees  were located in Africa, where anticolonial struggles, Cold 
War proxy wars, and struggles over control of resources produced massive 
refugee flows following the end of colonial rule. “The experiences of count-
less refugees in the African continent have been bound up with the refugee 
camp,” he writes, arguing that the bureaucratic approach to containment and 
control by humanitarian institutions that is the hallmark of the contempo-
rary international refugee regime emerged in postcolonial African refugee 
camps.29
Following Malkki’s ethnographic and theoretical work on the emergence of 
the international refugee regime to manage people dangerously out of place, 
more recent ethnographic research on refugee camps offers a sharply critical 
view of their purpose and role in the contemporary world and the treatment 
of those who live there. Critics argue that the international refugee regime exists 
to protect the wealthier countries in the global north, which fund the hu-
manitarian agencies that manage the camps, from the movement of people in 
the global south, where the majority of refugees originate and the majority of 
refugee camps are located.30 As of 2012, four- fifths of the world’s refugees live 
in poorer countries in the global south, with Pakistan, Demo cratic Republic of 
the Congo, and Kenya hosting the most refugees per gross domestic product. 
Although scholars argue that the movement of refugees across borders in the 
global south is often linked to po liti cal and economic practices of wealthier, 
powerful countries in the global north (such as Cold War– era support for 
abusive leaders, structural adjustment policies mandated by donor govern-
ments that enabled land alienation from poor farmers, support for multina-
tional corporations that use violence against local populations, or conflicts fu-
eled by the extraction of resources valued by the global north), governments 
in the global north desire what geographer Jennifer Hyndman calls “strategies 
of containment”: practices that humanitarian agencies utilize to keep refugees 
away from the borders of donor nations in the north and close to the bor-
ders of the countries in the global south from which they have fled.31 Critical 
scholars thus argue that the international refugee regime and its humanitar-
ian practices are based on a fundamental in e qual ity that grants power to the 
global north (and the staff employed by humanitarian agencies funded by a 
few countries in the global north) over people in the global south who are 
fleeing persecution, war, or disaster.32
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Currently, the overwhelming orientation of the international refugee re-
gime is to ware house and repatriate refugees rather than to enable permanent 
resettlement outside the refugee camp in another country. Rising neoliberal 
concerns in donor countries in the 1980s about welfare de pen dency resulted 
in an emphasis on repatriation rather than third- country resettlement, pro-
ducing a new context where, according to law professor and former deputy 
high commissioner of unhcr T. Alexander Aleinikoff, “refugee law has become 
immigration law, emphasizing protection of borders rather than protection of 
persons.”33 For the past two de cades, the unhcr has requested resettlement for 
only about 1 percent of the total number of refugees administered in unhcr 
refugee camps, while the number of refugees living in such camps for over ten 
years continues to grow.
Although initially envisioned as a temporary mea sure to protect and con-
tain people who have fled their home countries, refugee camps now appear to 
be a permanent fixture of the global landscape. Like those at Dadaab, many 
camps  house people whose families have lived in them for three generations. 
Yet the humanitarian management of refugee camps continues to rely on the 
logic of camps controlled by humanitarian agencies as temporary responses to 
crises, rather than permanent residential locations where residents participate 
in governance, have free mobility, and have universal opportunities for educa-
tion and economic activity. Despite their longevity and size, refugee camps do 
not appear on maps, are not factored into population statistics of host coun-
tries, and are treated as zones of exclusion within rather than as part of the 
countries in which they are located. This fallacy is a collective form of denial 
and fantasy that only serves the interests of countries who do not wish to allow 
refugees to cross their borders.
Describing the international refuge regime in such harsh terms challenges 
the conventional and pop u lar perception of humanitarianism as motivated by 
a charitable impulse to help people in need on the basis of a sense of a shared 
humanity. Certainly, many who choose to work for the humanitarian agencies 
that manage refugee camps do so from an altruistic ethic of mutual humanity 
and genuine care and bring an enormous personal commitment and ideology 
of hope to their jobs. The point is not that they are confused or misinformed; it 
is, rather, that the broader system is set up to maintain in e qual ity, disempower 
refugees, and protect the borders of the global north, in addition to providing 
care for displaced people while global powers determine where they will be 
allowed to go. As po liti cal scientist Jenny Edkins says, “The role of humanitar-
ian intervention can be seen as a tightening of a global structure of authority 
and control.”34
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Somali Refugees, Dadaab
When Somalis began arriving in large numbers in Kenya after 1991, the Ke-
nyan government provided land for refugee camps but, at the insistence of 
unhcr, ceded to it responsibility for camp management, which, in turn, sub-
contracted to other ngos for ser vices in the camps (such as care, Medécins 
Sans Frontières, and others).35 The unhcr holds sole authority for recogniz-
ing and registering refugees (although this task was also subcontracted to 
other ngos under the management of unhcr). New arrivals are interviewed 
in order to distinguish between “legitimate” refugees, who are granted admis-
sion to the camp and ration cards for food, and “fakers,” who are denied ration 
cards and the right to live in the camp. Camp policy forbids Somali refugees 
with ration cards from leaving the camp boundaries to travel or engage in 
economic activities outside the camps and requires their participation in reg-
ular head- count exercises within the camps designed to ensure control over 
the distribution of ration cards. Originally built in 1991–92 to  house 90,000 
refugees, by 2012 Dadaab was home to over 460,000 refugees, including some 
who had been there since its inception.
Anthropologists and other scholars working in refugee camps describe 
them as “space(s) of exception” that offer “a unique setting for the arbitrary 
exercise of power” where refugees, as recipients of charity, have no rights or 
legal claims, and “everything is possible for the people in control.”36 Ethnogra-
phers describe the refugee camps at Dadaab as a zone of “supreme power” 
wielded by unhcr and other humanitarian agencies whose staff actively 
reduce resident refugees to life in its barest form.37 Detailed, on- the- ground 
ethnographic studies of the Dadaab camps provide ample evidence of these 
claims, documenting the ways in which camp policies and practices disem-
power refugees, who are often treated with contempt and condescension and 
denied any voice in demo cratic decision- making pro cesses. Camp adminis-
trators offered researchers explicitly antidemo cratic explanations about their 
re sis tance to refugee participation in the governance of the camp.38 Jenni-
fer Hyndman, who worked in the Dadaab camps in the 1990s, describes her 
shock at the neo co lo nial hierarchy of camp life, where expatriate administra-
tors lived separately from the camp in an exclusive, well- guarded compound 
where they  were served by poorly or uncompensated refugees, while local 
staff lived on- site in small dwellings and had unchecked authority. She de-
scribes the specter of foreign camp administrators carry ing out head counts 
in ways that camp residents resisted, and how the power hierarchy between 
them allowed the former to label the latter (namely the Sudanese and Somali 
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resident refugees who objected to the administration and management of 
such forms of ordering and labeling) as uncooperative and difficult. Based on 
her two years of research in the Dadaab camps in 1999–2001, anthropologist 
Cindy Horst reported that camp management was characterized by corrup-
tion, a lack of accountability, and a condescending view of refugee aid as char-
ity that allowed camp staff to distribute ration cards and other ser vices in an 
authoritative, demeaning way.39
Refugee studies scholars and activists Guglielmo Verdirame and Barbara 
Harrell- Bond conducted a detailed review in 1997 of the conditions of unhcr 
refugee camps in Kenya and Uganda, and their published exposé offers a dev-
astating portrait of unhcr management of the Kenyan refugee camps that 
 housed Somalis, charging unhcr and its subcontractors with allowing dis-
crimination against Somali Bantus, exploiting refugee employees by paying 
them minimal incentives rather than salaries, withholding food as a form 
of control, engaging in humiliating, degrading practices toward refugees by 
treating them as potential liars and cheats, utilizing various strategies to keep 
refugees from being able to get ration cards in order to minimize the number 
of people with refugee status, withholding information about asylum applica-
tions and procedures to which refugees are legally entitled, and denying any 
right of appeal for administrative decisions about refugee status or asylum 
applications.40 Echoing Philip Gourevitch’s charge in his New Yorker article 
about the humanitarian industry that “humanitarians . . .  enjoy total impu-
nity,” Verdirame and Harrell- Bond conclude that “camps are spaces that are 
virtually beyond the rule of law and in which the life of refugees ends up being 
governed by a highly oppressive blend of rules laid down by the humanitarian 
agencies and the customary practices of the various refugee communities” 
(such as Somali racism against Somali Bantus).41
Scholars’ complaints about the management of the Dadaab camps  were not 
just about administrative corruption, authoritarianism, and condescension 
but also took note of the extreme insecurity that pervaded the camps. Banditry, 
assault, and rape occurred frequently both inside the camp and outside the 
perimeter of the camp where refugees had to travel to get water or firewood 
or to move between the camps that made up Dadaab. Jeff Crisp’s 1999 report 
on Dadaab’s rampant insecurity acknowledges a few policies introduced by 
unhcr in an attempt to better protect the people living there, but Cindy 
Horst’s 2006 ethnography concludes, “The Dadaab camps do not naturally 
provide economic and physical security to the refugees who live there. On the 
contrary, the camp or ga ni za tion itself serves to exacerbate feelings of uncer-
tainty and insecurity.”42
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Somali Bantu friends now living in Lewiston, Syracuse, and Hartford hold 
profoundly unhappy memories of life in the Dadaab camps. Some, like Sheikh 
Axmed Nur’s son, could not find words to describe life there. Abshirow, whose 
photograph in the velvet dinner jacket so delighted the slide show audience, 
told me, simply, “It was so horrible that it is undiscussable. No one should 
have to be in such a place.” My former research assistant Abdulkadir described 
how he lived on the perimeter of the camp with his wife and children for years 
after they  were denied the right to live inside before finally being granted refu-
gee status because a bbc report exposed the appalling living conditions of 
 Abdulkadir’s family and others, who lived in makeshift dwellings made of tree 
branches, dependent on begging food from camp residents. Many of the 
memories people shared mentioned the sexual abuse of women, the almost 
arbitrary decision- making power of camp administrators, and their ill treat-
ment as ethnic minorities by their fellow Somali refugees.
The racism experienced by jareer minorities in Somalia persisted in the 
camps. Isha’s son Iman recalled the taunts of “adoon!” from jileec camp resi-
dents he endured every week when he visited the camp market, his family 
obligation as the youn gest child. The first Somali Bantu man to graduate from 
high school in the camp recalls arriving at school one day to find his desk 
defaced by graffiti in black marker with the phrase “jareer but smart.” The 
teacher told the culprit to clean it up, which he did with a razor, permanently 
destroying the desk surface. The young jareer men who determined to use 
their time in the camp to study, like Sadiq, recall their fury at how they  were 
treated by their fellow Somalis, who barred them from the paying camp jobs 
controlled by Somali camp staff, mocked them in public, and belittled their 
academic accomplishments. Somali Bantus in the United States say that while 
unhcr and its contracted agencies administered the camp, the few Somali 
staff employed by the agencies acted as gatekeepers for the limited number 
of paying jobs available to qualified refugees. Revealing a small arena of refu-
gee control, one Somali Bantu told me, “The whites [running the camps] just 
worked their jobs. They just make their money but they don’t know anything. 
They hired whomever their Somali employees said to hire.” When one Somali 
Bantu friend received the highest score on a qualifying exam for a paying camp 
position to register deaths, Somali applicants who scored lower told the author-
ities he would be killed if he was awarded the job. Although the authorities 
offered the position to him at his own risk, he declined it. Researchers and 
Somali Bantus alike describe how racism against Somali Bantus continued 
unabated in the Dadaab camps.
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U.S. Resettlement
Although warehousing and repatriating refugees remains the priority for 
unhcr and its primary funders, unhcr will facilitate resettlement applica-
tions for selected groups and individuals.43 Countries can choose to accept 
refugees for resettlement according to what ever principles they wish, and thus 
the history of refugee resettlement in the United States has been closely tied 
to U.S. po liti cal interests. From 1945 to the mid-1980s, the United States ac-
cepted more than 2 million refugees, over 90 percent of whom came from 
communist countries because the U.S. government used the offer of refuge, 
through presidential parole power, as a po liti cal tool against communism.44 
Those accepted included 40,000 Hungarians after the 1956 Soviet invasion, 
nearly 800,000 Cubans after the Cuban revolution, 100,000 Soviet Jews in the 
1970s, and, after the fall of Saigon, 1.5 million Viet nam ese and Cambodians.45 
Refugees fleeing authoritarian regimes supported by the United States dur-
ing this era, such as those of several Central American countries,  were rarely 
admitted through official channels.
The large number of Indochinese and Soviet Jewish refugees admitted into 
the United States from 1975 to 1979 precipitated a restructuring of Ameri-
can refugee admittance policy, resulting in the 1979 creation of the Office of 
the U.S. Coordinator of Refugee Affairs and the passage of the Refugee Act of 
1980. The act replaced the presidential ad hoc practice for admitting refugees 
with a baseline quota for refugees, initially set at 50,000 per year, and gave 
Congress a role in identifying refugees for admittance. Most significantly, the 
act extended the definition of a refugee beyond someone fleeing from com-
munism and laid out a formal system for greater coordination among the 
unhcr, State Department, Department of Justice, and the court system for 
deciding which refugees to accept.
While many refugee activists heralded the 1980 Refugee Act as a victory for 
humanitarianism because refugee admissions  were no longer to be exclusively 
tied to American po liti cal interests, a combination of factors soured American 
enthusiasm for admitting refugees after the passage of the act.46 Hundreds of 
thousands of Cubans, Haitians, and Indochinese arrived in 1980, their num-
bers augmented by other immigrants from many countries, and American 
host communities  were uncertain about and increasingly unwilling to com-
mit to supporting more new arrivals.47 Concurrent with the passage of the 
act, when President Reagan assumed office in 1980 he dropped the number 
of refugee admissions from 234,000 in 1980 to 173,000 in 1981, to 70,000 in 
1985–86. The concerns about welfare de pen dency that characterized po liti cal 
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rhetoric during the early 1980s extended to include refugees as well, stoking 
the anti- immigrant/antirefugee sentiments that remain powerful today.
During the heyday of U.S. refugee resettlement (1945–80), hardly any of 
those admitted  were African (in 1980, Africans constituted less than 2 per-
cent of admitted refugees48), a pattern that continued into the 1990s as overall 
refugee admissions continued to shrink while refugee flows in Africa grew. By 
the late 1990s, members of the Congressional Black Caucus, some of whom 
participated in ngo- hosted trips to African refugee camps during the 1990s, 
stepped up their lobbying efforts to raise the ceiling on African refugees ac-
cepted for resettlement.49 In the 1970s the caucus had protested the virtual 
open- door policy offered to Cubans while hundreds of thousands of Haitians 
 were deported, suggesting a racist refugee policy was in effect. In the 1990s, 
when caucus members protested the generous admittance policy for those 
fleeing the Balkan wars while keeping the door closed for Africans, the U.S. 
government responded to this embarrassing criticism by asking the unhcr 
to identify a discrete group of Africans who might qualify for resettlement.50
The unhcr identified two African groups as resettlement priorities: the 
Sudanese “Lost Boys” and the “Somali Bantus,” describing both as extremely 
vulnerable groups who could not be returned to their home countries. In 1999 
the United States offered both groups p2 status, a resettlement designation 
given only to groups “of special humanitarian concern.”51 As plans got under-
way to bring the Somali Bantus to the United States, the resettlement program 
announcements in unhcr publications and the American media introduced 
them as a “persecuted minority” with a history of slavery who had no other 
place to go. Somali Bantus seemed to offer a perfect profile of innocent vic-
tims whose history resonated with American shame about slavery and pride 
about the civil rights era, a point noted in an issue of unhcr’s Refugees maga-
zine devoted to the Somali Bantu resettlement program in advance of their ar-
rival in the United States: “Ironically, their existence had many parallels with 
former slaves in America’s deep south until that country’s 1960’s civil rights 
movement changed history.”52
The Somali Bantu issue of Refugees described their history of ill treatment 
and subjugation in Somalia, their persecution during the war, and their lack 
of resettlement alternatives: “For a de cade the U.N. refugee agency tried to 
find a new country for approximately 12,000 so- called Somali Bantu, a group 
whose ancestors  were seized by Arab slavers from their ancestral homelands, 
who continued to be widely discriminated against and victimized in their 
‘new’ home in Somalia prior to the war and who vowed they would not re-
turn to that country even if peace is restored.”53 The magazine described failed 
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unhcr efforts to resettle the Somali Bantus in their “ancestral homeland” in 
Tanzania in 1993 and Mozambique in 1997, efforts thwarted by the bud get 
constraints of those governments. According to the magazine, the rejections 
left the Bantus dispirited and without hope, until news arrived of the U.S. offer 
to accept the group, initiating “a breathtaking journey from a semi- slave past 
to a future of unlimited freedom and choice.”54
Refugee activists heralded the announcement of the Somali Bantu re-
settlement program as a triumph for humanitarianism. In her review of the 
decision- making pro cess to offer p2 resettlement to the two African groups, 
legal scholar Heidi Boas argues that the resettlement offer demonstrated that 
the power of interest groups and the ethic of humanitarianism had at last 
become more significant than foreign policy objectives in the decision about 
who would receive refuge in the United States.55 Boas suggests that a humani-
tarian ethic, rather than national self- interest, must have motivated the reset-
tlement offer because the Somali Bantus brought no relevant skills, education, 
resources, family ties, or international significance to the United States and 
would need “round the clock help in navigating through a culture so differ-
ent from their own” after their arrival.56 Lamenting this same conclusion, the 
Center for Immigration Studies, a partisan anti- immigrant or ga ni za tion, crit-
icized the offer of refuge to Somali Bantus as indicative of a shift from foreign 
policy and national interest to a “global human rights agenda” as the guiding 
force of U.S. refugee resettlement.57
Affirming the humanitarian theme, news reports across the United States 
promoted an image of American benevolence in choosing the Somali Bantus 
for resettlement. Newspaper accounts described the Somali Bantus as utter 
victims in desperate need of rescue: the New York Times described the Bantus 
as living at the very bottom of the bottom of the barrel in Dadaab, while the 
Somali Bantu issue of Refugees described them as submissive, intimidated, and 
charmingly naive and a unhcr source told the Washington Post, “The Somali 
Bantus are the closest thing you will find to a people who are stateless.”58 News 
reports described their mistreatment and extreme discrimination by Soma-
lis, emphasizing their darker complexion as compared to ethnic Somalis, a 
theme repeated in other reports as well despite its inaccuracy.59 Descriptions 
such as “Africa’s lost tribe” (New York Times) and “among the most persecuted 
people on earth” (National Geographic) highlighted the group’s vulnerability 
and history of exploitation as descendants of slaves.60 The news article titles 
affirm the humanitarian impulse: “Somali Bantu, Trapped in Kenya, Seek a 
Home” (New York Times); “US Opens Arms to Bantu Somalis” (Christian Sci-
ence Monitor); “Following Freedom’s Trail” (Newsweek).61
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Because of their illiteracy, lack of education, rural background, and history 
of persecution, Somali Bantus  were widely described as particularly needy and 
unprepared for modern life. News accounts revealed acute fascination with a 
primitive- meets- modern theme, demonstrated in the repeated contrast between 
Somali Bantu prewar life and the life that awaited them in the United States. 
“Most have never seen a light switch or telephone, or even a building that  wasn’t 
made of mud,” reported Newsweek. Refugees magazine explained, “They are 
sturdy farmworkers with few other skills, who have never turned on an electric 
light switch, used a flush toilet, crossed a busy street, ridden in a car or on an 
elevator, seen snow or experienced air conditioning.” The New York Times de-
scribed them as “almost completely untouched by modern life. . . .  They mea sure 
time by watching the sun rise and fall over their green fields and mud huts.”62
A Horatio Alger undercurrent accompanied their characterization as con-
temporary primitives. The Somali Bantu issue of Refugees called them “a lucky 
few” and a New York Times article lauded the United States as “A Place of 
Miracles” for the refugees, while the Center for Immigration Studies com-
plained that Somali Bantu refugees won “the jackpot” with the “dazzling” op-
portunity to come to America.63 While celebrating the “dazzling” opportunity 
afforded by the resettlement plan, news accounts and policy documents nev-
ertheless predicted that, because of their backwardness and lack of exposure 
to modern technology, the transition to life in the United States would be dif-
ficult and challenging for resettled Somali Bantus. Reporting on the plans to 
prepare Somali Bantus for their journey to the United States, Refugees maga-
zine said they would receive a crash course in cultural orientation and basic 
survival skills for adapting to American life, although the Newsweek article 
cautioned, “What happens next is surprisingly unclear. . . .  Some relief offi-
cials worry that the government isn’t doing enough to ready the Bantus for life 
in America, and that those who are unable to find jobs will wind up trading 
one kind of poverty for another.” The article ends with a quote from a Somali 
Bantu man: “ ‘I hear the government lets you keep a cow wherever you want 
in America,’ he says with obvious plea sure. ‘I need a cow, because I need fresh 
milk.’ ” The reporter concludes, “Imagine his surprise.”64
Security Is the Top Concern
Despite the abundant accolades celebrating the humanitarian basis for the 
Somali Bantu resettlement program, security protocol remained the top con-
cern in its management. Assuaging any doubts about the legitimacy of Somali 
Bantu refugees as worthy recipients of humanitarian charity in the post-9/11 
age of suspicion, U.S. news reports confirmed that upon their arrival, Somali 
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Bantus would be “one of the most heavily screened groups of prospective im-
migrants to the US.”65
In Kenya’s refugee camps, unhcr (and its subcontractors) have absolute 
authority over which cases are referred and then approved for resettlement, 
an assessment of legitimacy determined through interviews by administra-
tive and contracted staff. As the number of refugees seeking resettlement has 
grown while the desire of potential host countries to accept refugees for re-
settlement has shrunk, the unhcr interview pro cess has become saturated 
with suspicion and an orientation toward rejecting resettlement applica-
tions. Verdirame and Harrell- Bond reported that according to an authority in 
Dadaab at the time of their study in 1997, the unhcr had denied 75 percent of 
the resettlement applications of refugees living there.
After the 1999 U.S. State Department announcement of the Somali Bantu 
resettlement plan,66 interviews to confirm the legitimate claim to refugee sta-
tus and persecution of Somali Bantus living in Dadaab got under way. Even 
though Somali Bantus  were given a p2 group designation for resettlement, 
refugee resettlement protocol still required validation of every single person 
included in the group resettlement plan. Somali Bantu applicants had to pass 
a series of tests to be accepted as part of the resettlement program, after which 
they  were transferred to another refugee camp in northern Kenya, Kakuma, 
for further pro cessing. To the consternation of refugee activists and humani-
tarians in the United States, as well as the refugees themselves, the pro cess 
ended up taking five years because of repeated delays prompted by security 
concerns.
The repeated post-9/11 suspensions of the Somali Bantu resettlement pro-
cess provoked angry denunciations of the U.S. government’s commitment to 
humanitarianism by refugee activists who argued that the case for resettle-
ment for this group had already been made and that the refugees selected for 
resettlement had already been verified and confirmed. Bill Frelick, director of 
policy for the U.S. Committee on Refugees, argues that U.S. refugee resettle-
ment post-9/11 dramatically shifted away from the humanitarian ethic that 
was supposed to guide the offer of resettlement following the 1980 Refugee 
Act to a new “security model” in which “refugees often came to be regarded 
with deep suspicion, sometimes seen as being terrorists themselves or as being 
the sea in which the terrorist fish could hide and swim. Fear of terrorism often 
exacerbated preexisting xenophobic and racist tendencies.”67 Whereas dur-
ing the Cold War years refugees  were viewed as heroic, freedom loving, and 
po liti cally valuable, Frelick says post-9/11 refugees are suspected of collud-
ing with terrorists: “Under the security paradigm, refugees are devalued to 
the point where providing asylum or intervening to provide source- country 
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solutions are trumped by the desire to keep terrorists out.”68 In his Febru-
ary  12, 2002, testimony to the Senate Judiciary Immigration Subcommittee 
about the post-9/11 suspension of refugee resettlement, Frelick expressed his 
frustration: “I will hasten to add that very few of the groups that I would men-
tion would be ones that would [be] unfamiliar to the State Department. We 
have been in discussions with them for years on some of these groups, Somali 
Bantu in Kenya, for example, or the Baku Armenians in Moscow, and I’d have 
to say that the response has often been bureaucratic, passive, and at times 
downright uncaring and cynical.”69
In the same Senate hearing, Leonard Glickman of the Hebrew Immigrant 
Aid Society added that the State Department had appeared to be reforming 
the resettlement pro cess, then said,
It sort of ground to a halt this end of the summer, this past fall, and noth-
ing has happened, and I think one of the most startling examples of that is 
the Somali Bantu. I mean, it was clearly identified as a group that  were in 
need of resettlement, in need of the protection of the United States. Every-
body was on the same page, including prm [U.S. State Department Bureau 
of Population, Refugees, and Migration], that this was a group that— and 
unhcr, that this was a group that needed our ser vices, and not a single 
Somali Bantu has arrived in the United States. It’s outrageous.70
Defending the resettlement policy and reminding the activists that Somali 
Bantu resettlement depends on U.S. generosity, Gene Dewey, the newly minted 
director of prm, cautioned the Senate subcommittee, “Perhaps only in America 
are the people and its leaders capable of waging a major military campaign 
while keeping the imperatives of humanity both in assistance and refugee 
admissions at the top of the national agenda.”71 In fact, refugee admissions 
 were not a priority that year, when the United States filled far less than half 
of the 70,000 slots designated for refugees. Despite the fact that the Somali 
Bantu had already been accepted and screened for resettlement, they  were 
given none of the 2002 slots and only 803 of the 70,000 slots in 2003.72
A U.S. State Department document with the subtitle “Case Study of Pro-
cessing Complexity and Unforeseen Delays” confirms that security concerns 
caused the repeated delays in the Somali Bantu resettlement pro cess.73 The 
first planned visit to Kakuma refugee camp by Department of Homeland 
Security officers for reverification was canceled because of ongoing post-9/11 
fears of insecurity for U.S. personnel in the camp, and then pro cessing was 
further delayed by a corruption scandal involving camp staff and adminis-
trators who  were accused of selling slots in the Somali Bantu resettlement 
program to Somalis. About the repeated delays, the State Department report 
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explained, with no hint of irony, “This lag necessitated a new round of security 
and medical clearances, because such clearances are good only for a limited 
period.” New security concerns, and then flooding, further delayed the review 
of new cases until 2004, by which time the pro cessing of most Somali Bantu 
had taken five years.74
The penultimate step in the resettlement pro cess was a final interview in 
Nairobi, after which Somali Bantus either boarded a plane to the United States 
or  were rejected and sent back to Kakuma refugee camp with no right to ap-
peal their rejection. By the time a person reached the interview in Nairobi, he 
or she had already been verified by unhcr staff as a member of the Somali 
Bantu “persecuted minority group,” reverified by a special unhcr reverifica-
tion team in 2001, rescreened by the International Office of Migration for the 
transfer to Kakuma refugee camp, cleared by U.S. Department of Homeland 
Security staff in Kakuma for the trip to Nairobi, and approved by an fbi back-
ground check and a health screening, becoming the most heavily screened 
immigrants in American history.
Conclusion
The humanitarian lens focuses on refugees as innocent victims of po liti cal 
struggles not of their making, reduced to bare humanity, dependent on char-
ity. During the Cold War, the American offer of refuge was a po liti cal act 
wrapped in a discourse of moral responsibility for those fleeing communism, 
including Southeast Asians abandoned by the U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam. 
As the Cold War drew to a close, refugee activists hoped an apo liti cal form of 
charitable humanitarianism would replace the old po liti cal calculus, iden-
tifying the offer of refuge to Sudanese Lost Boys and Somali Bantus as an 
indication of such an orientation.
As the number of refugees continues to grow, and as security concerns per-
vade the  U.S. refugee resettlement pro cess, refugee activists and scholars 
debate the criteria that should be used for determining resettlement priorities. 
Some, like anthropologist David Haines, criticize the withering American 
commitment to accepting refugees, betraying what he chidingly calls an “on- 
the- run morality,” a concern shared by many scholars arguing for an expan-
sion in American refugee admissions.75 Other writers attempt to define a new 
ethics of resettlement humanitarianism in a world complicated by mobility 
of all kinds, seeking to draw clear lines between those eligible for resettle-
ment because they are fleeing physical persecution and those ineligible be-
cause they are fleeing starvation resulting from economic policies or disasters 
that have destroyed their livelihoods.76 Those who advocate for the rights of 
people to move in search of safety or a better life for any reason at all reject 
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such a distinction, while noting that those most at risk for starvation after an 
economic or environmental disaster are usually those most marginalized by 
their governments.77 Anthropologists studying shifting trends of asylum in 
Eu rope ascertain the rise of a new moral discourse reshaping resettlement bu-
reaucracy, suspecting a new hierarchy of suffering and rescue is taking shape 
that prioritizes the ill as most worthy of asylum, while barriers to other asylum 
applications continue to grow.78
Imagining refugees as problems to be solved because they are people tem-
porarily out of place whose liminality threatens international order, whose 
dependence requires charitable support, and whose lack of citizenship means 
they lack po liti cal rights and claims obscures the fact that refugees are always 
going to be active po liti cal agents intricately connected to and engaged in in-
ternational affairs. Anthropological studies that critically deconstruct humani-
tarian practice reveal its basis as a technology of power wielded by powerful 
sovereign nations against the mobile, reliant on inaccurate assumptions, images, 
and moral discourses. As mobility increases because of the forces of modern-
ization and globalization, and as new generations continue to come of age in 
refugee camps, it seems clear that the mobility associated with seeking refuge 
is no longer an aberration to be reconciled with international order, but rather 
may be remaking international order. Sociologist Zygmunt Bauman calls refu-
gees “the waste of globalization,” but they are also icons of globalization. Hu-
manitarianism, as a technology for managing people out of place, thus loses 
its discursive luster as charity based on compassion and becomes recognized, 
instead, as a po liti cal act of control and domination.79
Somali Bantus appeared to fit the image of the perfect refugee, described 
in unhcr publications and American news reports as apo liti cal victims living 
in a premodern state of feudal serfdom. Yet, as the previous and next chapters 
show, this image is a fabrication, crafted out of the image of innocent vic-
timhood required by the international refugee regime and the savvy po liti cal 
foresight of the Somali Bantus themselves. Despite the New York Times’ claim 
that the Somali Bantus are “almost completely untouched by modern life,” 
their history is shaped by forces associated with modernity. Colonial battles 
and the slave trade brought their ancestors to the Jubba Valley early in the past 
century, after which the history of U.S. and Eu ro pean involvement in Somalia 
helped to define their valley as an object of international development inter-
est, to support and fund a land reform program that would disenfranchise the 
farmers living there, to maintain as a Cold War ally a regime that engaged in 
significant human rights abuses and held little pop u lar support, to support 
the massive weaponization of the country, and then to topple that regime. 
Theirs is a story of entanglements with very modern phenomena, and their 
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liminality as refugees in Kenya is tied to the par tic u lar history of Somalia’s 
engagements with its foreign donors.
In chapter  3 we turn to the story Somali Bantus tell of their journey to 
America. This story is far, far more complicated than a simple tale of humani-
tarian generosity extended to helpless, dependent victims.
chapter 3
Becoming Somali Bantus
The misplaced assumption that high de pen dency 
ratios in camps or among self- settled refugees 
deprived them of a capacity for enterprise is belied 
by the historical evidence, although this is not to 
overlook the fact that refugees might emphasize 
their vulnerability for tactical reasons, such as to 
improve access to resources. . . .  Refugee life in camps 
has, so to say, never stood still.
— Peter Gatrell, The Making of the Modern Refugee
Describing what happened when the armed Somalis took over Banta, my for-
mer field assistant Garad explained, “Before the fighting started I thought I 
was Somali, but after the Somalis pushed us aside I understood I was different. 
Before that all I knew was I was Somali, same culture, same religion, but when 
they took over Banta and ordered everyone around and called us adoon I real-
ized I was different. After we escaped to Kenya was the time we understood 
we had another name, Somali Bantu.”
Even though middle Jubba residents had been loath to speak about their 
experiences of abuse during my residency in Banta, at the Bates MLK Day panel 
the panelists departed dramatically from their previous script, speaking 
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passionately about the significance of the Somali Bantu identity and how this 
identity as a racially stigmatized minority targeted them for abuse and ex-
ploitation in Somalia and in the camps. They described how their history 
of enslavement and minority status led to their marginalization, poverty, il-
literacy, lack of education, and assaults they regularly experienced guarding 
their fields against encroaching pastoralists in prewar Somalia, as well as 
the rapes, theft, and humiliation that characterized their lives in the refugee 
camps. Although their unequal status was patently obvious during my year 
in Banta, and although I had written extensively on the jileec- jareer prewar 
hierarchy, I had never heard any Jubba Valley farmers talk so publicly like this 
before the war. To the contrary, as noted in chapter 1, whenever Somali pasto-
ralists assaulted or abused villagers the matter was handled through clan me-
diators, who attributed any violence to individual malevolent personalities, 
while middle valley villagers resisted the idea that they shared an overarching 
identity around which they could unite. But in their 2006 MLK Day panel pre-
sen ta tion, each speaker claimed a deeply felt sense of historic injustice on 
the basis of this group identity, making it clear that a new overarching identity 
based in the collective experience of racism had emerged from the violence 
of Somalia’s war and the farmers’ experiences in the Kenyan refugee camps. 
The emergence of Somali Bantu identity is a remarkable story of how cultural 
creativity, bureaucratic mandates, and social entrepreneurship combined to 
produce a new identity out of ethnic ambiguity and injustice.
Not only had the Somali Bantus found a collective voice with which to 
articulate their historical grievances, they also claimed an active role in nego-
tiating a future free from injustice. As I visited friends from Banta in their new 
homes in Lewiston, Hartford, and Syracuse, I realized that their version of 
their resettlement story departed considerably from the pop u lar story of their 
utter victimization and rescue by unhcr and the U.S. media recounted in 
chapter 2. In place of describing themselves as apo liti cal, dependent, premodern 
victims, Somali Bantus in the United States recall their leaders as architects of 
their group resettlement who actively pursued resettlement options, crafting 
an identity that met with unhcr approval, partnering with unhcr staff to 
delineate who could participate in the resettlement program, and introducing 
the various criteria for evaluating the legitimacy of Somali Bantu applicants. 
Their story is one in which they created an essentialized identity in collabo-
ration with unhcr’s need for clear definitions to determine refugee legiti-
macy and worthiness. In the pro cess, they embraced the Somali Bantu label as 
personally meaningful, claimed precolonial tribal and linguistic associations 
that  were required of Somali Bantu identity, crafted a narrative of suffering 
that matched unhcr’s desire for victimization, and reconfigured families to 
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conform to U.S. family forms. In their version, which is nevertheless replete 
with instances of failure and compromise, they  were the planners, strategists, 
and actors, and unhcr was a reluctant but powerful collaborator.
Refugee camp administrators see like a state, so to speak.1 They count, name, 
categorize, ration, assign id cards, and require stable identities, stable camp 
residence, and respect for borders. Refugees behave like (many) citizens, evad-
ing state surveillance, strategizing to maximize their opportunities, negotiating 
relationships to access resources, moving for better opportunities, superim-
posing their models of kinship on top of official (camp) models of kinship, 
shifting their identity registers to match the context, and agitating for civil 
rights. These are all forms of refugee agency, even if they often get identified 
as noncompliance or fraud by humanitarian agencies and are ignored in the 
scholarly and pop u lar focus on bare life and disempowerment.
Departing from the focus on the international refugee regime as a technol-
ogy of power, this chapter flips the lens to view humanitarianism from the 
vantage point of refugees, who figure out how to navigate top- down bureau-
cratic structures of decision making in ways beneficial to them.2 This chapter 
contributes to a new focus on refugee agency in the scholarship on humani-
tarianism, a focus that explores how refugees find and create spaces for action, 
collaborate with activists to elude and challenge structures of control, and 
articulate an alternative politics of identity and self- determination beyond 
their identity as exemplars of bare life. Attending to the po liti cal strategies 
pursued by refugees requires a multilayered approach that takes into account 
how refugees conjoin local currents, such as cultural discourses and regional 
politics, to what is happening globally as diasporic refugee and global activist 
networks articulate new forms of po liti cal subjectivity.3 Adopting this perspec-
tive, this chapter tries to see like a refugee.
The “Weird Name Bantu”
In his discussion of Somali Bantu ethnicity, po liti cal scientist Kenneth 
Menkhaus observed that the rapid creation of Somali Bantu identity after 1991 
is particularly remarkable “because the community possesses almost none of 
the features typically associated with a cohesive ethnic group.”4 Prior to the 
onset of Somalia’s civil war, the Jubba Valley villagers who carried the jareer 
label did not speak a common dialect, share a common kinship system, or even 
subscribe to a common history. Many villagers in the lower Jubba River val-
ley continued to identify with their preenslavement East African ethnicities 
such as Yao and Makua. One group who lived in the lower Jubba Valley, the 
Mushunguli, still spoke Zigua over a century after their Zigua ancestors from 
Tanzania had arrived as slaves in Somalia. In contrast, farmers in the middle 
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valley claimed no relationship with their ancestors’ pre- Somali ethnicities. 
Jareer members of Somali clans in the interriverine area felt strong affiliations 
with their Somali clan identity, not their connections to other jareer. Scholars 
and Somali Bantus agree that prior to the civil war, those identified as jareer 
perceived no common identity and no one used the term “Somali Bantu.”
Italian colonial authorities may have been the first to use the term “Bantu” 
to describe villagers in the Jubba Valley. As with colonial regimes elsewhere 
in Africa, Italian colonial authorities treated the Jubba Valley villagers as free 
labor for colonial projects. Beginning in 1935, the Italian colonial government 
required all Jubba villages to send a quota of men and women to work on co-
lonial plantations on a rotating basis, a practice bitterly remembered during 
my stay in Banta by el derly villagers as the kolonya and the teen. The colonial 
authorities used the term “Bantu” to distinguish the riverine farmers (encom-
passing the range of ethnic identities then recognized in the valley, such as 
“Shabelle, Shidle, Makanne, Eyle, Elay Baydabo, Shanbara, Zigula, Gosha, 
Mushunguli”5) whose labor could be commandeered for colonial projects, 
from the pastoralist (jileec) Somalis, who  were not required to provide free 
labor. Colonial authorities eager to claim the labor of riverine farmers thus 
reinforced the jareer- jileec distinction by introducing administrative catego-
ries to clearly distinguish between farmers as jareer- Bantu, who  were subject 
to coerced labor campaigns, and the pastoralists as jileec– ethnic Somalis, who 
 were not.6 Recounting the multiple abuses suffered by his father’s generation 
during the era of Italian colonialism, one elder from Banta now living in Lew-
iston reflected, “The Italians  were only colonizing the jareer, not the Somalis.”
But while the jareer- jileec distinction clarified status in social encounters 
and identified those subject to colonial labor expropriation, it did not create an 
overarching ethnic identity among those recognized as jareer, nor did it intro-
duce the word “Bantu” into pop u lar Somali discourse. For most of the twen-
tieth century, riverine identities remained diverse, localized, and, in many 
regions, as in Banta, negotiated in relation to surrounding Somali pastoralist 
groups. Although everyone knew that many of the ancestors of valley farmers 
 were slaves, during my stay in Banta, middle valley farmers  were unwilling to 
speak of themselves as holding a unified group identity on this basis. As the 
great Banta historian Iidow Roble had told me during the first of our many in-
terviews in 1987 about valley history, “Everyone  here is descended from slaves, 
but no one talks about it.”
The term “Bantu” reappeared after 1991 during the civil war when foreign 
humanitarian workers struggling to ensure the delivery of emergency food 
rations to riverine farmers adopted it as a catchall term for the farming pop-
ulations along the Jubba and Shabelle Rivers targeted by Somali militias.7 
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Menkhaus, who worked with the un peacekeeping effort in the early years of 
the civil war, notes that Western relief workers  were appalled at the indiffer-
ence of Somalis to the plight of the jareer because the relief workers did not 
immediately understand that the Somalis did not consider the jareer part of 
their society. “This point is critical,” Menkhaus writes, “because it suggests 
that the virtual holocaust visited upon low- status groups such as the jareer in 
1991 and 1992 was not just a tragic result of warlords and young gunmen run 
amok; it was also the result of conscious decisions by clan elders and militia 
leaders over who lived and who died, an ‘allocation of pain’ which reflected 
the ethics and logic of the existing social order in crisis, and which betrayed 
the fact that low status members of the clan simply did not matter enough to 
live.”8 Menkhaus explains that humanitarian workers revived the use of the 
term “Bantu” to describe the jareer populations who  were suffering so much 
during the early years of the war. When the media picked up on the term in 
1992, “In the eyes of the external world, if not yet inside Somalia, a new ethnic 
category was taking shape.”9
The widespread violence against jareer Somalis in 1991–92 precipitated a 
growing po liti cal consciousness among jareer people that began to grow within 
Somalia and the refugee camps in Kenya over the next few years. Somali 
Bantus now living in the United States recall that a unosom (United Nations 
Operation in Somalia) officer from southern Africa stationed in Mogadishu 
with the un peacekeeping force from 1992 to 1995 encouraged the use of 
the term “Bantu” to describe jareer Somalis.10 When Somali minorities com-
plained to him about their treatment by other Somalis, he reportedly sug-
gested that they should self- identify as Bantu. The few educated Bantu started 
using the term “Bantu,” and Somali Bantu activist Omar Eno recalls that 
the term quickly gained currency with educated minority po liti cal elites who 
founded the Somali African muki po liti cal or ga ni za tion to represent minority 
interests on the national scene.11 Omar Eno and his brother Mohamed, both 
academics, became outspoken advocates of the rights of Somalia’s jareer mi-
norities, per sis tently campaigning for recognition and international support.
Their flight across the Kenyan border into the refugee camps in 1992–93 
brought together jareer from across southern Somalia and across Somali clan 
affiliations for the first time.12 One elder in Lewiston explained,
In earlier times, jareer in Baay [interriverine] and Kalafo [Ethiopia] areas 
didn’t ever have the chance to encounter each other. . . .  Baay jareer and the 
Gosha [Jubba Valley] jareer lived too far away to intermarry, but once they 
encountered each other in the camps it is no problem for them to marry. 
But they cannot marry Somalis because the Somalis considered themselves 
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superior and called them adoon. They would tell their daughters and sons 
that jareer  were inferior, with a nose as big as a heel, idiots, and if they mar-
ried one no one would cry for them when they died.
Jareer Somalis quickly learned they would be on the bottom of camp hier-
archy. Somalis within the camps who had access to funds from remittances or 
camp administration jobs hired jareer Somalis, who lacked such connections, 
as the camp’s manual laborers to work as porters, to dig and clean latrines, to 
gather wood (a perilous occupation due to attacks and rapes), and as domes-
tic servants and builders. In my interviews with Somali Bantus about their 
memories of Dadaab, I repeatedly heard, “You’ll never find a Somali man dig-
ging a latrine!” One Somali Bantu refugee in Lewiston related his memories of 
assaults suffered by so many Somali Bantus in the refugee camps:
The land [in the camps] was for the Somalis and they controlled everything. 
They sexually abused the women and beat brutally the men because they 
claimed control of the land, and if they caught Somali Bantus gathering 
wood they attacked. The Kenyan government believed the land was for 
Somalis, so no one policed it. They had permission from the government 
to do what they  were doing. The men’s job was to gather building materials, 
women’s to gather firewood. They paid Somalis to get access to the wood 
for building. The women  wouldn’t negotiate—if they got caught they’d start 
running. The men would negotiate. They’d take money with them and if 
they got caught they’d try to negotiate payment. The women would go in 
groups and if they got caught they’d all start running and whoever was 
grabbed would get sexually assaulted. They’d keep her hostage, beat and 
rape her, and then let her go and her community would take her to the 
hospital to tend to her injuries and to the police to file a report. It happened 
weekly. We had no way to protect the women. Women have much worse 
memories than men.
Furthermore, as noted in chapter 2, Somalis  were put in charge of the few 
key positions in the camp staff structure available to refugees, which ensured 
that access to paid jobs within the camps remained limited to Somalis and 
was not extended to jareer camp residents, thus further enabling the ongo-
ing hierarchy of jileec and jareer Somalis. Somali Bantu elders living in the 
United States told me that as jareer Somalis began to grasp how their experi-
ences of subjugation in Somalia and in the camps extended across all Somali 
clans, their leaders began articulating a common experience of subjugation 
based on their separate ancestry and history of discrimination by Somalis. 
The leaders of one of the most or ga nized jareer minority groups in the camps, 
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the Mushunguli,  were among the first to advance a request to resettle on the 
basis of their ancestral and linguistic connections in Tanzania, which is where 
the ancestors of the Mushunguli originated before being sold into slavery in 
Somalia.
One of the oldest Somali Bantu leaders in the United States, a Hartford 
resident I’ll call Abdulle, described to me how in 1992 the Mushunguli leaders 
decided that every block in the refugee camps where Mushunguli lived should 
elect a leader who would represent the minority residents of the block. The 
leaders met to discuss their options, deciding to appeal to Tanzania on the basis 
of ancestral connections, which had been sustained through the movement 
of people traveling back and forth between the lower Jubba and Tanzania in 
earlier years. The Mushunguli leaders sent representatives from the camps to 
Tanzania to pursue the possibility of an official resettlement program there 
and asked unhcr to invite an official Tanzanian delegation to the camps 
to meet the refugees, who  were asked to perform traditional dances to prove 
their cultural connections. Dan Van Lehman, the un field officer in Dagahal-
ley (one of the Dadaab camps) who had witnessed their exploitation in the 
camps and supported their efforts to seek a resettlement solution for them-
selves, remembers the Mushunguli leaders as “the drivers of the pro cess.”13 
Van Lehman learned about the minority community after witnessing an alter-
cation in Dagahalley camp one morning in early 1992 at the water pump when 
an ethnic Somali woman attempted to bar a Mushunguli woman from ac-
cessing water. When he intervened, Van Lehman was startled to discover the 
Mushunguli woman spoke Swahili and Zigua. Because of his fluency in Swa-
hili he was able to forge relationships with the Mushunguli leaders who spoke 
Swahili, including the Mushunguli leader in the Dadaab camps, Mberwa Haji. 
He learned of their marginalization in Somalia and in the camps, and, furious 
that such racism persisted in the camp he was running, determined to assist 
their efforts to find a resettlement solution. Van Lehman explained to me that 
he and the Mushunguli leaders decided to use the term “Mushunguli”
to encompass all native Zigua and all native Maay Maay– speaking Bantu 
as long as they  were the descendants of people originally from Tanzania, 
Malawi, Mozambique, and Kenya. . . .  The slave ancestry of the Mushun-
guli seemed to put them at a distinct social and security disadvantage com-
pared to the other Bantu from farther up the Jubba River and even those 
from the Shabelle River Valley. The Mushunguli refugees had already began 
[sic] migrating “illegally” to Tanzania when their leaders approached me 
for help. I recognized [that] the slave ancestry of the Mushunguli, pos-
sibly for the first time in their history, could possibly be used to their 
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advantage by appealing to the Tanzanian, Mozambican, and international 
diplomatic communities to do the right thing to help these descendants 
of slavery finally gain their human and civil rights through intra- African 
resettlement. . . .  The Mushunguli— loosely defined as the descendants of 
the East African slave trade who either retained their ancestral language, 
culture, or both— recognized the potential of their historical story and or-
ga nized themselves according to their East African ethnic group.14
When the delegation from Tanzania arrived in Dadaab in response to the 
invitation from the Mushunguli leaders and Van Lehman, they recognized 
and affirmed the historic ties between Mushungulis from Somali and Zeguas 
in Tanzania. Ultimately, however, the Tanzanian government decided the 
country could not afford to accept more refugees for permanent resettlement, 
a decision Van Lehman blames on unhcr ineptitude and unwillingness to 
support the refugees’ initiative. Van Lehman claims that even though several 
donor nations indicated their desire to contribute funds to support the re-
settlement pro cess, the unhcr response was “brutally diplomatic” and slow. 
He told me, “The Tanzanians  were willing to welcome the Mushunguli, but the 
unhcr dragged its feet on guaranteeing financial and diplomatic support. 
The Tanzanians only rescinded their offer after Rwanda blew up.”15
Despite Tanzania’s refusal to officially accept Mushunguli refugees, Mus-
hunguli and other jareer refugees started an “underground railroad” to Tan-
zania, through which Van Lehman estimates about 5,000–10,000 refugees 
relocated to Tanzania, some to Mkuyo refugee camp and others into the gen-
eral population.16 Van Lehman, Mberwa Haji, and other Mushunguli lead-
ers continued to discuss other possible African resettlement sites, deciding in 
1994 that Mozambique might be a good fit, a possibility Van Lehman pursued 
when he left the un that year to return to graduate school at Cornell. His mas-
ter’s thesis analyzed the failed Tanzanian resettlement effort, argued that the 
un was hobbled by an institutional and cultural bias toward Eu ro pean and U.S. 
resettlement based on an incorrect assumption that African countries are 
bureaucratically incapable of managing refugee resettlement, and developed 
a plan for how to successfully engineer an inter- African refugee resettlement 
program.17
In 1996 Van Lehman returned to East Africa in a series of jobs with care 
that he thought might help him pursue a plan for Mushunguli resettlement 
in Mozambique. The Mushunguli elders performed cultural dances for Van 
Lehman’s video camera, which he used to make their case to Mozambican 
politicians and unhcr officials in Maputo, returning to Dadaab in 1996 to 
keep the Mushunguli informed about his efforts on their behalf. After a debate 
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in the Mozambican Parliament, a delegation was sent to Dadaab to interview 
the Mushunguli leaders.
Abdulle remembers the delegation from Mozambique arriving in the ref-
ugee camps to meet with the Mushunguli leaders, once again asking for a 
per for mance of cultural dances “to see if [they]  were authentic.” In prepara-
tion for their visit, the Mushunguli leaders from each of Dadaab’s three camps 
laboriously compiled handwritten lists of jareer refugees who would qualify 
for resettlement in Mozambique on the basis of ancestral ethnic connections, 
although many jareer did not sign up because they feared relocating to a non- 
Muslim country,  were suspicious of the resettlement plan,  were away from the 
camps during the time period when the lists  were being created, or because 
they  weren’t entirely sure they qualified under the Mushunguli ethnic label. 
Sheikh Ahmed Nur refused to sign up for resettlement in Mozambique because, 
according to his children who eventually resettled in the United States, he 
was uncertain whether the list would be used to benefit those who signed up 
and he held out hope that he could return to his farms in Somalia. His adult 
children disagreed and put their names on the list. Isha, Cali Osman’s wife, 
also refused to sign up for resettlement because she was wary of relocating 
to a non- Muslim country, but her daughter Rabaca stole Isha’s identity docu-
ments one day while she was away from her  house and registered Isha along 
with Isha’s other children, whom Rabaca believed would have an opportu-
nity for education only if they left the camps. Caliyow Isaaq’s surviving family 
members all added their names to the list. The final set of handwritten lists 
included about 10,000 names.
In 1998, Mozambique responded that as a poor country struggling with the 
aftermath of devastating floods and a long, brutal civil war, they could not ac-
cept refugees. The Mushunguli leaders felt deflated and Van Lehman was furi-
ous with unhcr for refusing to offer greater assistance. After years of work 
on the Tanzanian and Mozambican resettlement efforts, Van Lehman says he 
finally realized “the un just didn’t want to do it” because of its biased view 
that only Eu rope and America are appropriate locations for third- country 
refugee resettlement. But the years of active attempts at resettlement by the 
Mushungulis and Van Lehman, in addition to the lobbying by Eno and other 
educated Bantus for the recognition of Somali minorities by the international 
community, raised their profile for unhcr administrators, who responded by 
designating the Mushunguli as a vulnerable population in need of a resettle-
ment solution. They had made themselves visible as a group with a coherent 
ethnic identity and a history of exploitation, and they fit the profile sought by 
the United States in response to the Congressional Black Caucus’s charge of 
racist resettlement priorities.
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Although Van Lehman recalls that he and the Mushunguli leaders decided 
to use Mushunguli rather than Bantu or jareer as the basis for inclusion on 
the 1997 list because they thought the latter terms would be too broad, jar-
eer leaders  were beginning to articulate a shared identity that included more 
than those who claimed the more specific Mushunguli identity associated 
with farmers from only the lower Jubba Valley. Jareer leaders from throughout 
the Jubba Valley viewed the resettlement effort on the basis of minority sta-
tus as relevant to them as well because of their shared jareer status, and thus 
many non- Mushunguli minorities also signed up for possible resettlement 
in Mozambique. That the term “Mushunguli” initially became an umbrella 
ethnic term was not as significant as the emerging recognition by jareer 
Somalis that they had experienced similar patterns of discrimination and 
violence specifically because of their jareer identities, patterns that continued 
to dominate their lives in the camps through hierarchies in access to camp 
jobs, cultural broker positions, food rations, remittances, and the experience 
of constant, everyday acts of racism. The efforts of the Mushunguli leaders 
and Van Lehman led to the eventual ac cep tance of “the weird name Bantu,” as 
one elder in Lewiston amusingly put it, by most jareer Somalis in the camps.18
Recalling the impact of the Mushunguli leadership in the refugee camps to 
enlist other jareer Somalis in their efforts to find a third- country resettlement, 
Sadiq explained:
Mushungulis  were the ones convincing us to use the term. They spoke the 
language of Tanzania and northern Malawi so they  were having this nice 
connection. They would go back and forth and convince us what to do 
next. They didn’t want to go back to Somalia because they  were killed 
the most. They  were not integrated with the Somali tribes [clans] like we 
 were [e.g., jareer from the middle Jubba Valley] and  were brutally killed 
because of it. They tried to convince us not to return. They did a lot of work 
to convince us. Sometimes they brought someone who lived in Tanzania 
and had lived in Somalia a long time ago to convince us. Somalis also tried 
to convince us that Tanzania and Mozambique would enslave us. But we 
didn’t believe them.
Alongside the efforts of Mushunguli leaders to generate a broader con-
sciousness among jareer Somalis in the camps, non- Mushunguli jareer lead-
ers prompted by the po liti cal efforts of Mushunguli leaders also pursued 
connections among jareer refugees. During our conversation in his Hartford 
home, Abdulle showed me an elaborate, hand- drawn map he created in 1993–
94 in the refugee camp in order to document the shared experiences of jareer 
all over southern Somalia. From painstaking research involving hundreds of 
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interviews in which he asked jareer Somalis to name their village and the next 
villages to the north and south as far as they had traveled, he drew a color- 
coded map depicting the location of every jareer village in the Jubba Valley 
from which refugees fled to Kenya. He drew another color- coded map of the 
entire country to show the location of other jareer communities as well as 
the origins of the militia groups who attacked them, so he could show other 
jareer “where those who killed us came from.” These maps provided his fel-
low jareer refugees with a visual image of their collectivity and helped them 
understand their shared victimization as jareer under attack from Somalis 
from throughout the country.19 He believes his map was important for con-
solidating a group identity among jareer refugees, and indeed I heard about 
the influence of his map from numerous Somali Bantus in other U.S. cities. 
A major incident in 1998 further confirmed the distinction between Somalis 
and Somali minorities in Dadaab. Because of their suspicions of rampant ra-
tion card fraud, camp administrators mandated that all resident refugees had 
to surrender their ration cards and be issued new ones, an exercise rejected 
by Somali refugee leaders, who demanded a boycott of the pro cess. But when 
Somali Bantu refugees refused to comply with the boycott and lined up to be 
reverified, Somalis attacked them and in the ensuing violence, which lasted 
for three days, the camp was shut down. Several Somali Bantus  were killed and 
scores wounded. Many Somali Bantus told me that this event solidified any 
remaining uncertainty about Somali Bantu identity among jareer camp resi-
dents. As a Somali Bantu man in Seattle explained, “If you fought with the 
Somali Bantus and tried to reregister, you  were a Somali Bantu. If you didn’t, 
you  were a Somali Somali.”
While the elders claim their leadership produced a broad understanding 
of a shared identity among Somalia’s diverse jareer population, young adult 
Somali Bantus in Lewiston, Hartford, and Syracuse lay their own claim to the 
Somali Bantu label, recalling that they learned the term from their Kenyan 
teachers and security guards in the refugee camps who told them they looked 
Bantu, like other Kenyans, rather than Somali. Their school textbooks taught 
them about the Bantu migrations and the distinction between Bantus, Cush-
ites, and Nilotes, offering a connection to Bantus elsewhere in Africa and to 
their teachers that made the label appealing to jareer teenagers, who experi-
enced camp life as profoundly racist. Abdirisak remembers the taunts of his 
Somali schoolmates about his participation in school: “Wow, the world has 
changed. Now you can see ooji wearing a uniform, going to school!” Sadiq, 
one of the first young jareer Somalis to pass the high school entrance exam 
in the camps, remembers a fellow Somali student pointing to him in order to 
mock other Somali students who failed the high school entrance exam, saying, 
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“Even monkeys can pass the exam to go to high school!” Their success in the 
camp schools emboldened young Somali Bantus, for whom the Bantu label 
offered a positive self- identity that allied them with their Kenyan teachers. I 
heard from numerous young adult Somali Bantus that their generation intro-
duced the term “Somali Bantu” to their elders, who adopted it as an English- 
friendly moniker for jareer people. The U.S. government adopted the term 
“Somali Bantu” in the announcement of the special resettlement program.
When the U.S. government decided to grant Somali Bantus p2 status, a 1999 
State Department cable sent to all African diplomatic posts announcing the 
decision to accept the Somali Bantu included a point of clarification: “Note 
on nomenclature: This group is sometimes loosely referred to as ‘Mushunguli.’ 
However, that name is sometimes used more restrictively for a single subgroup 
of the larger group ‘Somali Bantu,’ which is the term employed  here. It must 
be stressed that not all Somali Bantu are part of the p-2 designation, but only 
those whose names are on the lists provided to the department by unhcr.”20
The list provided by unhcr was the 1997 list compiled for the failed Mozam-
bique resettlement. Since the final list of those to be included for p2 resettlement 
identified Somali Bantu rather than only Mushunguli as the target population 
and since several years had passed since the creation of the original list, the 
figure 3.1  Abdulle, Catherine Besteman, and Haji Adan pointing to the middle Jubba 
region on Ibrahim’s hand- drawn map. Photographer unknown.
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authorities faced the significant challenge of reverifying who qualified. Fol-
lowing the announcement of the U.S. resettlement program, Van Lehman re-
calls, “All of a sudden, everyone was a Somali Bantu,” and Somalis as well as 
Somali Bantus not initially included on the list began jockeying and strategiz-
ing to be included. The result was confusion and ambiguity on the part of the 
administrators (all non- Somali) who  were charged with reverifying the names 
on the list although they had no clear idea about who actually  qualified.
Self- Essentializing, the “Anticorruption Committee,” and  
Family Restructuring
Somali Bantus recall the reverification procedures as a test of wits as much as 
of legitimacy. As word of the U.S. resettlement program spread throughout 
the camps, refugees whose names  were on the Mozambique list had to find a 
way to prove that they still belonged, jareer refugees whose names did not ap-
pear on the list had to convince the interviewers that they should belong, and 
non- jareer Somali refugees who wished to claim a spot tried to reinvent them-
selves as Somali Bantus. Although the interview and screening procedures 
 were controlled by foreign staff and ethnic Somalis employed by international 
organizations and later by U.S. immigration authorities with Somali transla-
tors, Somali Bantus nevertheless attempted to assert control over what ever 
aspects of the screening pro cess they could access. Because of the slippage be-
tween the terms “Mushunguli” and “Somali Bantu,” the jareer leaders attempted 
to control the definition of Somali Bantu to ensure those with historically 
legitimate claims to jareer identity would be included while excluding those 
they defined as ethnic Somalis.
A special reverification team was brought in by unhcr, headed by a man 
named Andrew Hopkins, to review each claim, a pro cess that initially rejected 
10,000 new claimants. Of those remaining, the team interviewed 14,000 in-
dividuals, rejecting another 2,000 as illegitimate. The initial reverification re-
view concluded in December 2001, but because the Dadaab refugee camps 
 were deemed too dangerous for U.S. personnel to visit for the final screening 
due to heightened post-9/11 security concerns, in 2002 the agencies involved 
in the resettlement pro cess decided to truck all 11,860 reverified Somali Bantu 
over 900 miles to the distant Kakuma refugee camp in the northwestern cor-
ner of Kenya at a cost of U.S. $2.7 million, a task managed by the International 
Office of Migration (iom). In a wry aside describing the experiences of Somali 
Bantus in this pro cess, the Economist commented, “They have been through a 
lot— persecution in their homeland, civil war, a de cade languishing in refugee 
camps, and the tragi- comic experience of being trucked across Kenya to meet 
American officials who dared not visit them.”21
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Somali Bantus recount how their leadership worked closely with the 
unhcr reverification team to ferret out fakers: Somalis masquerading as So-
mali Bantus by changing their names or physical appearance or claiming kin-
ship connection with someone on the 1997 list, efforts sometimes facilitated 
by complicit or corrupt Somali interpreters, or even by Somali Bantus who 
desperately needed the money they could gain by selling a spot in their fam-
ily to a non– Somali Bantu. Somali Bantu leaders offered a list of ste reo typical 
physical features to guide the non- Somali reverification staff in how to recog-
nize and distinguish Somali Bantus, including markers like hard curly hair, 
broad flat noses, and short muscular bodies.
Ethnographic descriptions of the asylum interview pro cess across a range 
of settings— refugee camps, unhcr offices,  U.S. Department of Homeland 
Security (or the former Immigration and Naturalization Ser vice), U.K. Home 
Office, French National Court of Asylum— reveal a set of confrontational in-
terview strategies used by refugee admissions interviewers intended to trip 
up applicants by repeatedly asking confusing questions about chronology in 
order to find inconsistencies.22 Ethnographic accounts report that interview-
ers presume applicants are not telling the truth and demand from them a 
coherent life story rooted in “a place, a culture, a language, and a religion”;23 
that interviewers focus on questions about language, ethnicity, identity, in-
digeneity, and culture that often make no sense to applicants; and that inter-
viewers expect applicants to use par tic u lar terms and discourses to describe 
their victimization (such as genocide, rape,  etc.) that may not be familiar to 
applicants or may not be the words they would use to describe what happened 
to them and their families.24
These practices characterized the Somali Bantu reverification pro cess as 
well, where jareer Somalis quickly learned that they had to adhere to a very 
narrow set of criteria to claim an identity as a legitimate Somali Bantu. In 
addition to the physical criteria noted above, a confluence of tribal, linguis-
tic, and geographic markers emerged during the reverification pro cess as de-
finitive indications of legitimate Somali Bantu identity. All applicants had to 
claim to speak either Mushunguli or the Jubba Valley regional dialect of Maay 
Maay, and all had to claim membership in one of the five East African tribes 
from which the enslaved ancestors of the jareer Somalis who had settled in the 
lower Jubba Valley originated, even though jareer Somalis from elsewhere no 
longer recognized these ancestral associations. (As one former Banta resident 
now living in Lewiston cheerfully told me, “Now we are all Yao and Makua!”) 
Finally, because their collective status as a persecuted minority group was the 
basis for preferential treatment for Somali Bantus, Somali Bantu applicants 
understood that a narrative of victimization was a required part of the inter-
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view pro cess. Somali Bantus learned to narrate personal stories of abuse and 
attack by Somali militias, and  were asked to repeat these stories for verifica-
tion at different points in the resettlement interview pro cess. “We all have our 
story,” one man told me, as he recounted his version of the personal trauma 
narrative he was asked to recite for each interview during the resettlement 
pro cess, “even if the things we had to describe aren’t exactly what happened.” 
In a conversation with a friend from Banta about the resettlement pro cess, he 
said, “My mother was killed. My father died. I was left alone.” “Really?” I asked, 
upset to hear this news. “No!” he responded, realizing I had missed his point. 
“That’s what I had to tell the interviewers. That’s not what really happened.”
In their study of the emergence of trauma as a trope of contemporary life, 
Fassin and Rechtman observe, “Trauma offers a language in which to speak of 
the wounds of the past—of slavery, colonization, or apartheid. Claimed by the 
protagonists themselves, trauma becomes once again an argument in strug-
gles for recognition of the plurality of memory— even if this violates historical 
reality.”25 Condensing a general experience of marginalization into a personal 
narrative of individual trauma is a strategy used by asylum seekers every-
where to conform to the requirements for personal victimization desired by 
resettlement authorities. As the Somali Bantu experience shows, such shape- 
shifting of facts is not illegitimate, for everyone applying for resettlement 
suffered numerous losses of various kinds—of immediate or extended family 
members, of homes and land, of a way of life, of security— whether or not 
they themselves experienced intimate forms of violence against their persons.
By working with the unhcr representatives to develop a set of criteria 
for determining Somali Bantu legitimacy, Somali Bantu leaders helped craft a 
coherent identity of ethnic uniformity where none had existed before. The 
mirage of uniformity came at a high price for those whose physical features or 
narratives did not conform closely enough to the model adopted by the for-
eign staff of interviewers, however. Many Somali Bantus in Lewiston remem-
ber the pencil test, for example, used to distinguish between those with “hard 
hair” and those with “soft hair,” although many legitimate jareer failed the test 
and  were rejected.26 Sadiq recalls the anxiety he felt after being asked to walk 
across the interview room, since the interviewers  were told that the gait 
of Somali Bantus differed from that of ethnic Somalis. Other Somali Bantus 
recall interviewers scrutinizing the shape and size of their noses and hands, 
since Somali Bantu noses are supposed to be flat and broad and their hands 
short and thick.27
Although the reverification pro cess in Dadaab for boarding the buses to 
Kakuma was, by all accounts, messy, confusing, and complicated by the ig-
norance of foreign interviewers, the ambivalent role of Somali interpreters, 
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and the efforts of ethnic Somalis to find a way to be included, Somali Bantus 
claimed it gave their leaders another opportunity to assert some control over 
who got to continue in the resettlement program. I heard about the Somali 
Bantu anticorruption committee that developed an elaborate system of dots 
and stars to identify fakers on the unhcr registration lists for those reveri-
fied for the bus trip to Kakuma, which would allow Somali Bantu leaders to 
identify interlopers as they lined up to board the buses. Recalling how some 
Somalis attempted to pass as Somali Bantus by rubbing dirt in their hair to 
make it “harder” and dressing in shabby clothing, the Somali Bantus working 
with Andrew Hopkins’s verification team pointed out the “infiltrators,” who 
would be pulled out of the line at the last minute to ensure that those who 
identified them would not suffer retribution in the camps.
Although the decision to relocate the final stages of the Somali Bantu resettle-
ment program to Kakuma was intended to minimize opportunities for infil-
tration by ethnic Somalis and to protect Somali Bantus from the per sis tent 
efforts by Somalis to claim resettlement spots through threatening or bribing 
Somali Bantus into accepting non– Somali Bantus as family members, in 
Kakuma the Somali Bantu community itself was riven by accusations that 
some of its leaders  were selling resettlement slots to ethnic Somalis and that 
some people  were identifying others as fakers in retribution for personal ven-
dettas.28 After Dan Van Lehman learned in 2001 of the U.S. resettlement plan 
for Somali Bantus, he visited Kakuma with activist Omar Eno in 2002 after 
hearing about the accusations of fraud, eventually exposing the corruption in an 
international scandal that shook up the administering agencies and resulted 
in the firing of staff and the hiring of more Somali Bantu staff and interpreters. 
Van Lehman recalls,
The Heads of the US government, the unhcr, and the iom dealing with 
the Somali Bantu in Kenya— usually all having little or no knowledge of 
Somalia, the Somali Bantu, or even any African language, ran the registra-
tion pro cess. These heads, mostly foreigners, depended on the translation 
and guidance of more literate and educated dominant clan Somalis. To say 
the least, it was a big mess with lots of corruption and even a unhcr scan-
dal with Eu ro pean and African unhcr staff caught for taking bribes from 
the Somali Somalis who  were trying to get to the USA as Bantu refugees. We 
think that anywhere from 5–15% of all Bantu resettled, especially early on, 
 were not Somali Bantu.29
Accusations of corruption resulted in more stringent criteria in the next 
stage of reverification, during which several of my Banta friends  were rejected. 
When Isha’s daughter Rabaca appeared for her final verification interview in 
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Kakuma with her husband of twenty years, the American interviewer scruti-
nized their physical features and announced that he did not believe Rabaca’s 
husband was really a Somali Bantu. He applied the pencil test, which Rabaca 
passed but her husband failed (the pencil stuck in her hair, but moved more 
easily through his hair). While she was accepted for resettlement, the inter-
viewer rejected her husband and seven children, giving her the choice of con-
tinuing in the asylum pro cess alone or remaining with her husband and kids 
in the camp and giving up the opportunity for resettlement. She gave it up.
Isha’s oldest son, Ciise— the son who had been one of the first kidnapped 
in Banta— was also rejected, along with his family. The interviewer studied his 
face and decided he was not a real Somali Bantu, rejecting him on the spot. 
Isha faced the horrible choice of continuing the resettlement pro cess with her 
youn gest kids and leaving behind her two oldest children, or consigning all 
her children to life in a refugee camp. At the urging of her children, she ulti-
mately chose to continue the pro cess.
Sadiq’s story had a better ending. At the conclusion of their final reverifica-
tion interview in Kakuma, the interviewer asked Sadiq’s small daughter, “Do 
you like video games?” His daughter had no idea. She’d never heard of them. 
Through this question, Sadiq learned they  were accepted for resettlement in 
the United States.
In addition to creating and conforming to a coherent ethnic identity and 
repeating a narrative of personal victimization, Somali Bantu refugees also 
learned how to reshape their families to match American kinship criteria. The 
fact that so many  house holds had different members than when they had first 
signed up for resettlement in 1997 created a dilemma in the reverification pro-
cess. Although once identified as a bona fide refugee and awarded a ration 
card, refugees are supposed to remain inside the confines of the camp and 
not engage in economic activity across its boundaries, in fact refugee camps 
are dynamic places and refugees can be highly mobile; they move between 
the camp and outside towns looking for economic opportunities; they move 
(illicitly) back and forth across borders to get news from home or to visit 
family members in other countries; they move between  house holds as people 
marry, divorce, foster, and adopt. House holds expand as new refugees arrive 
in the camps. Probably most of the  house holds on the 1997 list had changed 
a great deal by the time of the reverification pro cess in 2001, and everyone 
was scrambling to present a portrait of the  house hold that conformed to the 
expectations of the interviewers.
In the calculus of resettlement, the American standard of economic depen-
dents defines who can count as part of a family. Juvenile children ages seventeen 
and under are considered economic dependents and parents can thus include 
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them in their family unit for resettlement. Children eigh teen and older, even 
if unmarried, even if living in the same  house hold, are not economic depen-
dents and thus must be considered separately. Siblings and cousins occupy 
the same relational category for Somali Bantus, but not for American inter-
viewers, for whom one’s children are one’s economic dependents but one’s 
nieces and nephews are not. After they grasped the family model being used 
to manage the resettlement pro cess, refugee families figured out ways to turn 
extended families into nuclear families while trying to avoid having to lop off 
those family members who could not fit into the new model.
For example, one friend who signed up for resettlement in 1997 later took in 
a girl who was not on the 1997 list for resettlement because she had no family 
and no one had signed her up. My friend presented her at the resettlement 
interview as a new, still juvenile, daughter- in- law. This came as a surprise to 
my friend’s sixteen- year- old son who, during the interview, suddenly became 
a husband. It was the only way to include the girl in the family resettlement, or 
she would have been left behind. Additionally, my friend was raising several 
orphaned nephews as her own children in conformity with the Somali under-
standing of kinship. My friend, all her children, and the new daughter- in- law 
 were all reverified.
In addition to turning nieces, nephews, and orphans into one’s children, 
families also turned their children into orphans to enhance their chances for 
resettlement. A friend’s eldest son, Jamal, was unmarried but over the age of 
eigh teen, and since young men in that demographic category are often treated 
with par tic u lar suspicion by American interviewers, the family reconfigured 
itself to improve his story in the resettlement interview. Some of Jamal’s adult 
siblings had already been rejected for resettlement although his parents had 
been accepted, so the family decided to present Jamal with one of his young 
cousins as a family unit of orphaned brothers in which eighteen- year- old Jamal 
was the caretaker for his sixteen- year- old cousin. Everyone traded names to 
make this pre sen ta tion of the family unit work, and they  were approved.
In similar and creative ways, families successfully and unsuccessfully strate-
gized to turn cousins into siblings, nieces and nephews into children, orphans 
into family members, and family members into orphans in order to present 
family structures that  were legible and desirable to American interviewers 
while also being as inclusive as possible. Polygynous  house holds faced a par-
tic u lar challenge. Since polygynous marriages are forbidden in the United 
States, all polygynous  house holds accepted during the reverification inter-
view  were dissolved. Polygynously married men had to choose one wife with 
whom to be resettled, leaving their other wives to resettle separately as single- 
parent  house holds in an enforced separation that was often a great hardship 
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for cowives who depended on each other for support and for children who 
 were separated from their father and siblings. Abdiya was settled separately 
from her husband and cowife, becoming a single mother of five juvenile chil-
dren. Her eldest, beloved son, Abdullahi, was rejected.
The married children of Sheikh Axmed Nur and Caliyow Isaaq, Xawo and 
Mohamed, also passed all the reverification tests for resettlement. They had 
taken into their family all of Mohamed’s half siblings when Mohamed’s fa-
ther Caliyow Isaaq and two of Caliyow’s three wives died from the diarrheal 
disease, thus presenting themselves for reverification as a nuclear family of 
two parents and six children. Since Sheikh Axmed Nur had never signed up 
for resettlement, he remained in Dadaab refugee camp after Xawo and Mo-
hamed and all their dependents  were taken to Kakuma. Wanting to see their 
daughter one last time before her departure for America, Sheik Axmed Nur 
and Habiba, Xawo’s mother, traveled three days by bus to Kakuma, arriving 
just hours after Xawo and her family boarded a bus to Nairobi to begin her 
journey to the United States. They never had the chance for a farewell.
After years of waiting in Kakuma, those who had passed all the reverifica-
tion tests  were subject to yet one more final screening in Nairobi before being 
allowed to board the airplane for the United States. If they failed their screen-
ing in Nairobi, they  were sent back to Kakuma and prohibited from appealing 
the decision or reapplying. If they passed, they had to sign a promise to pay 
back the cost of their airfare and then boarded the plane.
Many Somali Bantus describe the final predeparture Nairobi interview as 
the most terrifying moment in their long journey of interviews and back-
ground checks. Knowing that they  were on the cusp of departure, and that any 
small mistake would cost them their opportunity to resettle, Somali Bantu 
families carefully took note of the errors that had destroyed the resettlement 
chances of those ahead of them. In contrast to the earlier stages of the resettle-
ment pro cess, I heard no stories of Somali Bantu control or effective inter-
vention in the final verification screening in Nairobi, in which interviewers 
seemed to have absolute authority over the fates of the applicants. Abdirisak’s 
parents  were rejected because the translator misunderstood the term used 
by the husband for his wife, translating their relationship as clan based rather 
than a marriage. Because of this one translation error, they  were rejected from 
the resettlement pro cess and returned to the camps. Another family was split 
after the interviewer questioned the family members separately about their 
breakfast that morning. While the mother said she had rice with camel meat, 
her teenage sons reported rice with goat meat. The interviewer decided that 
the children  were not actual family members and gave the mother the choice 
of boarding the plane for the United States with only her four younger children 
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or returning with her teenage sons to Kakuma with no chance to appeal their 
rejection. The mother chose to board the plane with her four other children 
and leave her two teenage sons behind, hoping to be able to apply for family 
reunification for her sons after arriving in the United States.30 A news report 
from the Los Angeles Times tells of a fourteen- year- old boy returned alone to 
Kakuma after his responses to interview questions in Nairobi differed from 
those of his family members, who  were allowed to board the plane: “Hussein 
is one of scores of Somali Bantu refugees who say their dreams of relocating 
to the United States  were shattered when immigration officials broke up their 
families, sending some to America and others back to Kakuma. Husbands 
have been separated from wives, children from parents, brothers from sis-
ters.” The article reports that because of new interview procedures introduced 
in August 2004, between August and October 2004, 305 of 5,407 applicants 
interviewed in Nairobi  were sent back to Kakuma. In 103 cases, the rest of the 
family decided to continue to the United States, but in 96 cases they decided 
to give up the opportunity for resettlement and returned to Kakuma with no 
right of appeal.31
A friend from Banta was luckier. He knew many families had been sent 
back to Kakuma after failing their Nairobi interview because different family 
members had given different answers to questions, or because the interviewer 
decided they  were lying about their family composition. Since the 1997 reg-
istration and the 2001 reverification, he had added to his family an orphaned 
relative who was not on the original list. For the final interview, he claimed 
the relative as his wife’s brother and their juvenile dependent. Because the 
relative was a new addition to the roster, the interviewer compared every 
feature— the shape of his eyes, nose, ears— with my friend’s wife, who cried 
throughout the interview, distraught with worry, saying, “He is my brother! 
He is my brother!” My friend had instructed his kids to stay completely silent 
during the interview. Two days after their interview, they learned they had 
passed and would be leaving that night, after promising to repay the $3,200 
cost of their airfare. When I asked why he was willing to put his family and his 
dreams of education at risk for a relative who was not an actual brother in the 
American sense, my friend shrugged and responded, “My relative’s family was 
dead and he had been left alone. When he got to the camps he lived with us. 
He became part of our family. There was no way we could leave him.”
Conclusion
What is remarkable about this account is the insistence by my Somali Bantu 
interlocutors on their involvement in almost every step of the resettlement 
pro cess. As I argued in chapter 2, the Eurocentric discourse of humanitarian-
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ism imagines refugees as people who through their territorial displacement 
and violent loss are stripped of agency, reduced to a bare life of simple survival 
and dependence on charitable intervention. The figure of the refugee simul-
taneously carries the stigma of destitute humanity, a person out of place, and 
an implication of moral responsibility. The offer of refuge is thus imagined as 
a reprieve to their state of bare survival: an act of humanitarian charity and a 
gift of renewed life so they can (re)attain a qualified life— but only if they are 
judged to be truly worthy.
From the vantage point of refugees, however, the space of refuge is clearly a 
landscape of mistrust, suspicion, and militaristic control. Ethnographic accounts 
reveal that almost no one involved in the management of refugee camps actu-
ally sees camp space as a pacific refuge or believes the refugees  housed there 
are uniformly apo liti cal innocent victims. Refugee camp administrators do 
not see refugees as destitute victims, as evidenced by their efforts to contain ref-
ugee po liti cal agency, constrain refugee mobility, reject refugee efforts toward 
demo cratic camp decision making, and exert rigid control over the interview 
pro cess for determining resettlement candidates. Resettlement administra-
tors do not see refugees as innocent victims, but rather understand refugees 
to be strategic and manipulative, as evidenced by the insistence on stringent 
reverification practices and resettlement officers’ suspicions of refugee fraud. 
Host country citizens who live outside refugee camps do not see their neigh-
bors living inside the camps as suffering victims stripped of agency, but rather 
often see them as competitors (for resources, money), as consumers (for small 
businesses), as po liti cal threats, and as warriors. A more thoroughly grounded 
ethnographic portrait of those who continue to subscribe to the refugee- 
as- hapless- victim image, which I imagine is limited to certain Eu ro pean and 
American publics, would help reveal how this image is used to bolster a global 
humanitarian regime dependent on charitable funding from those publics.32
The evidence suggests that the bulk of those who know, engage with, and 
control refugees do not see refugees as hapless, pathetic people reduced to bare 
survival, but rather fully understand refugees to be agents who use mobility, 
narrative, competition, voice, and tactics to construct strategic subjectivities 
in their places of refuge, whether in refugee camps, cities where they live illegally, 
or third- country resettlement sites. Hosts, administrators, and refugees si-
multaneously view refugees as strategists, competitors, entrepreneurs, mobile 
agents, possible frauds, and perpetrators of violence, in addition to victims, 
dependents, and charity recipients. The tension between, on the one hand, the 
suspicion of refugees as po liti cal and economic agents who strategize and 
conspire, and, on the other, the humanitarian discourse that defines the grant-
ing of refuge as moral responsibility and charity means the space of refuge is 
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contested, tense, and a site of struggle. Refugees in this space work out ways to 
be active agents in constructing their lives while simultaneously adhering to a 
regime of rules, policies, and attitudes that expect them to behave like docile, 
grateful subjects.
The story of how jareer became Somali Bantus is a case in point. The argu-
ment  here is not that the creation of Somali Bantu identity was a fraudulent 
pro cess, but rather that it was a necessary pro cess within the demands of the 
international refugee regime, a bureaucratic apparatus that insists on a par tic-
u lar narrative of trauma and persecution told in terms of essentialized identi-
ties in which culture, race, and place are inextricably linked. Not everyone 
who was resettled as a Somali Bantu suffered to the same extent, but the Somali 
Bantu label gave a name to their suffering of historical injustices as a group. 
It coalesced under one label a history of slavery, colonization, and apartheid; 
it provided a language for group recognition of a shared past of discrimina-
tion and degradation. The particulars— whether one really identified as Yao 
or Makua, whether one really spoke Mushunguli or Maay Maay, whether one 
really witnessed one’s father being killed or mother being raped— seemed less 
significant than the historical fact of subjugation and the certainty of future 
persecution in Somalia. Those who chose to self- identify as Somali Bantus 
 were given certain pa ram e ters to work within and, wishing to take charge of 
fashioning their future, used them to craft identities, life narratives, and fam-
ily structures to find a home within a global system that mandates member-
ship in a state, somewhere.
One of anthropology’s signature strengths is its ability to recognize and 
demonstrate human creativity and agency continually to make new social worlds 
in even the most extraordinarily dehumanizing circumstances. Refugees see 
their lives as constrained, of course, but also see themselves as creatively ex-
ercising their capacity to remake their world anew, to strategize, manipulate, 
redefine, and engage with the categories and boundaries drawn around them. 
Nuancing Agamben’s portrait of the utterly excluded, Somali Bantu refugees 
actively worked the systems that excluded them to find a spot defined by them 
in the international order. They did so by creating an identity that would gain 
traction, lobbying for resettlement in countries they selected, cultivating sup-
port from relief agency staff, playing the category for resettlement made avail-
able to them, taking on new family configurations, and accepting as their own 
generalized stories of suffering.
As resettled refugees in the United States, Somali Bantus are offered the 
possibility of citizenship (although only after many hurdles), but they continue 
to play with and redefine their po liti cal and social identities in ways that tran-
scend and even repudiate the nation- state model of citizenship and belonging. 
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One might accept a new identity as Mohamed, child of Nassir and Fatuma, 
legal resident of the United States, while simultaneously holding an identity 
as Axmed, child of Jamal and Nurta, residents of a refugee camp. Unlike un-
documented immigrants, they hold a legal identity, but, in a way, it is a dop-
pelgänger identity because so many have transformed their personal narrative 
in conformity with the requirements for refugee identity. Such transforma-
tions do not mean their new identities are not real; rather, they are simultane-
ous and coexistent with their pre- resettlement identity. All resettled refugees I 
know share this social and po liti cal condition of identity doubles. (Many years 
after their resettlement, when my Somali Bantu friends began gaining U.S. citi-
zenship, one of the first things many did before obtaining a passport was to 
change their names back to their pre- resettlement names. Birthdates  were im-
possible to change, even though the birthday of every single adult I know 
is recorded as January 1, reflecting the uncreative efficiency of resettlement 
interviewers charged with filling out paperwork for people who do not record 
their birthdates. I heard how the universal January 1 birthday presents problems 
with authorities who become suspicious when they see that the same birthday 
is recorded on everyone’s driver’s license. “It’s embarrassing!” one man tells me.)
The story of Somali Bantu resettlement thus has three concurrent themes: 
humanitarian rescue as narrated by unhcr, ngos, the media, and the U.S. gov-
ernment; cruelty and humiliation, as evidenced by the experiences of families 
broken apart by the resettlement pro cess, accusatory interview styles, and the 
insistence that indigent refugees cover the cost of their airfare to the United 
States, ensuring they arrive in their new home already deeply in debt; and 
refugee bravery, courage, tireless self- advocacy, and tactical manipulation of a 
system of exclusionary and constraining rules. All are true. Which we tell de-
pends on our agenda: the first offers self- congratulations and benefits donors 
but positions refugees in ways that are condescending and belittling. The sec-
ond offers an indictment of the entire pro cess, calling for policy reforms and 
systemic overhaul, but also overlooks the role refugees themselves play in work-
ing the system to their advantage. The third applauds as a success the story of 
refugee initiative and self- help but downplays the enormous barriers to their 
self- determination put in place by a system almost totally stacked against them.
Although almost 12,000 Somali Bantus  were eventually resettled in the 
United States, almost every family who came was forced to leave behind some-
one precious: a child, a spouse, a parent, a sibling. Upon arrival, most families 
immediately filed p3 family reunification requests for their family members 
left behind. Isha’s son Idris filed for his sister Rabaca and her family and his 
brother Ciise and his family. Xawo and her brother filed for their parents, 
Sheikh Axmed Nur and Habiba. Abdiya filed for her son Abdullahi. But soon 
100 • Chapter 3
thereafter the  U.S. State Department decided that Somali family reunifica-
tion appeals  were too fraudulent for the system to manage and suspended the 
program, even for family members who could demonstrate conclusively their 
relationship through expensive dna tests or the testimony and photographs 
of an anthropologist.
One afternoon in 2008 as I sat with several refugees from Banta discussing 
the p3 applications, Sadiq’s phone rang. It was news from Kakuma: Sheikh 
Axmed Nur’s wife Habiba had died that morning. A couple years later, an-
other phone call reported that Isha’s daughter Rabaca, mother of seven, at the 
age of forty suddenly and inexplicably died one morning as she stepped out of 
her hut in the refugee camp. The next year Sheikh Axmed Nur’s second wife 
died, leaving him a widower with numerous young children. In November 
2013, Sheik Axmed Nur died, after twenty- two years in Kakuma refugee camp. 
Ciise and his family still remain in Kakuma, beginning their third de cade of 
life in a refugee camp. Funerals are held monthly in Lewiston for those long- 
separated family members who die in the refugee camps, separated from their 
loved ones in the United States by an ocean, a continent, and the borders 
against refugee mobility that condemn refugees to die in refugee camps.
PART II  Lewiston
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Introduction
Arrival Surprises
After passing the final interview and promising to pay back the $3,200 loan 
for their airfare, Isha’s family finally began their journey to the United States 
in 2005 when they  were sent to Atlanta. Their recollections of their airport 
arrivals buzz with uncertainty about how to navigate the new setting. Deplan-
ing along with everyone  else, the family walked through the airport to board 
a small train. But because they could not read or understand En glish and no 
one helped them, they remained on the train circling the airport over and 
over before finally figuring out where to exit, even though the escalator sty-
mied them until they felt bold enough to step on after carefully watching how 
others navigated the moving stairs.1
Isha’s sons Iman and Cabdulkadir, who left Kenya together a few months 
after Isha’s voyage, did not realize their destination was Atlanta until they ar-
rived. After deplaning they  were immediately whisked away by armed immi-
gration and police officers, who marched them to a locked room where they 
 were guarded by white men with guns, so frightening fifteen- year- old Iman 
that he forgot all of his hard- earned En glish language skills. He thought that 
they  were taking them away to kill them, a not unrealistic possibility in the 
experience of a young war survivor. Eventually the brothers  were released, 
but since they had been kept so long in custody the caseworker sent from the 
resettlement agency to pick them up at the airport had given up and gone 
home. Iman was allowed to phone Isha, who was thrilled because no one had 
informed her that they  were arriving in Atlanta. Another relative, Ahmed, 
remembers stepping outside the airport into the February eve ning in his 
T- shirt to wait for his  ride and realizing that his body was beginning to shake 
uncontrollably. “I didn’t know what was happening!” he recalls. “I thought I 
was becoming really sick.” Only later did he learn that he was freezing. He had 
never experienced cold before.
Refugee resettlement in the United States is managed by eleven federally 
approved voluntary agencies, called volags, that are contracted by the federal 
government to provide arriving refugees with modest assistance during their 
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first weeks in the United States. The agencies, which are mostly faith- based 
nationwide organizations such as Catholic Charities, Lutheran Immigration 
and Refugee Ser vices, and Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society, bid on contracts 
with the U.S. State Department to resettle refugees in the cities where they 
have offices. The volags are responsible for meeting arriving refugees at the 
airport, providing some cultural orientation training, settling them in hous-
ing, and enrolling children in school and non- English- speaking adults in En-
glish language classes, a welcome that ends when the ninety- day resettlement 
contract between volags and the U.S. government concludes. As a volag 
manager in Maine told me, “The ultimate goal of the reception and place-
ment program is that clients will be self- sufficient within ninety days.” When 
I expressed astonishment about this expectation for illiterate, non- English- 
speaking refugees to the director of the volag in Syracuse, he shrugged and 
said, “Well, that’s what they pay us for. After ninety days we move on to the 
next group of arrivals.”
The volags are not responsible for placing resettled refugees in jobs, al-
though they often attempt to connect their clients with job training and career 
ser vices programs. The Office of Refugee Resettlement (orr) offers a modest 
reprieve for some refugees struggling to attain self- sufficiency: during their 
first eight months in the United States, those who fail to find employment and 
who do not qualify for Temporary Assistance for Needy Families may apply 
for additional assistance ($230 per adult per month in 2010) through the federal 
Refugee Cash Assistance Program. But orr is quite clear that by their eighth 
month, when this assistance ends, “Self- sufficiency must be achieved without 
accessing [further] public cash assistance.”2 Whereas Hmong refugees, who 
arrived in the 1970s and  1980s with a similar background as non- English- 
speaking illiterate farmers, received up to three years of direct federal support 
as well as greater support for En glish language classes, how Somali Bantus 
 were to become immediately eco nom ically self- sufficient was unclear to ev-
eryone. Although the news accounts mentioned in chapter 3 had warned that 
Somali Bantu refugees  were poorly prepared for life in the United States, such 
warnings did not translate into greater assistance for their transition; to the 
contrary, they arrived on the heels of deep bud get cuts for economic support 
during their adjustment, including intensive En glish classes, job training pro-
grams, and child care and transport for adults in programs. Their experience 
reveals an ironic contradiction of the refugee resettlement program: the very 
people who must present themselves as dependent recipients of charity in 
order to gain resettlement must, within the space of a few weeks, become eco-
nom ically in de pen dent and productive residents who make no demands on 
their American host communities.
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The refugees from the Banta- Bu’aale area  were resettled by volags all over 
the United States, finding themselves in Atlanta, Columbus, Syracuse, Tucson, 
Portland (Oregon), Houston, Dallas, Denver, Hartford, Springfield (Connect-
icut), and other places. Their stories about their first weeks, while retold with 
humor, reveal just how unprepared they  were to become self- sufficient within 
ninety days. Before arriving in the United States, refugees attend a few cul-
tural orientation classes in the refugee camp to prepare them for the expected 
rapid transition to American life. Friends from Banta recall learning about 
new technologies (light switches, elevators, toilets, electric and gas stoves, 
refrigerators, thermostats) and new rules for family life, but nothing about 
the racism and discrimination they would experience in their new host com-
munities or in the workplace.
As it turned out, the lessons on technology offered inadequate preparation 
because they  were either inaccurate or incomprehensible in the context of the 
refugee camp. Sadiq remembers the emphasis on cleanliness and abundance: 
“The stoves  were white and clean and beautiful. We  were all amazed by how 
clean everything was. And we learned there was plenty of food. They showed 
us an open fridge, and it was full of food!” Iman had heard that everyone 
uses computers in the United States, so with remittances from Isha of $20 per 
month he paid for a privately run computer course in the refugee camp so he 
would arrive prepared. The course, which ran for five weeks, taught him how 
to turn the computer on and off and use the keyboard, but neglected to teach 
him about the Internet, printing, or word pro cessing because the teachers in 
the refugee camp had procured no Internet connection, paper, or software. 
People tell funny stories of living in the dark for days after their arrival be-
fore relearning how to use light switches, or sweltering in apartments where 
the thermostat was accidentally set at 90 degrees because they  couldn’t re-
member how to control the heat, or racking up hundreds of dollars in long- 
distance phone charges from calling their relatives all over the country before 
learning that long distance calls cost extra.
After their early mistakes, resettled Somali Bantus shared their stories to 
help each other adjust, and within a few months many adults  were adept at 
 house hold technology, learned to shop at Walmart (“We know which aisle is 
the one with the foods we recognize,” explained one woman), and use public 
transport. Sadiq arrived in Syracuse determined to find the local community 
college, so after dropping his children off at school during his first week he 
boarded the first bus he saw because someone had told him the college was 
at the end of the bus line. “I rode the bus to the end of the line, but there was 
no college!” he recounted, laughing. The kind driver realized he was lost and 
explained to him that Syracuse had many bus lines that went many different 
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places in the city. For the next few weeks Sadiq rode the buses every day after 
taking his kids to school so he could learn all the routes.
Far more challenging and surprising than learning about technology and 
transport was the structure of education and the growing realization that they 
would be living in poverty in the land of opportunity. Cultural orientation 
classes in the camps had stressed that living in the United States meant hav-
ing a job and the opportunity to attend school, but had failed to clarify that 
barriers to both would be very high, that the kinds of jobs available to Somali 
Bantus would not cover their living expenses, that education would not be 
accessible to everyone, and that the expectation of a job took priority over the 
opportunity for education.
Although the promise of education was a huge draw for those who signed 
up for resettlement, the reality after arrival was a crushing disappointment for 
many. As the second Somali Bantu to graduate from high school in the refu-
gee camp, Sadiq could hardly wait to enroll in college after resettling in Syra-
cuse, but he also went to work right away as was expected of him, at Stickley 
Furniture, where he milled trees into lumber while wearing earplugs, breath-
ing filters, and big goggles. He worked from 5 am to 3:30 pm, heading straight 
to Onondaga Community College after work, where he took classes until 9 pm. 
Returning home at 10 pm, he slept from 11 pm until 3:30 am before rising to 
get to work on time. He rarely saw his wife and children when they  were all 
awake. His job, which required him to work fifty- five hours a week, Monday 
to Saturday, paid him $420 per week, which was not enough to support his 
family. He soon realized that coming to America did not really mean getting 
an education. It meant manual labor and poverty.3
Many Somali Bantu refugees did not initially realize that students in the 
United States are assigned to educational levels on the basis of age rather than 
ability, which meant that refugee students  were placed in grade levels far 
above their abilities, producing terrible frustration and humiliation as they 
flailed and failed year after year. The expectation that a fifteen- year- old who 
had never been to school must be placed in tenth grade, even if that would 
only ensure his failure, simply made no sense to the resettled refugees, who un-
derstood that such a system would doom their older children and offer noth-
ing to young adults. They had thought that all who wished would be able to 
attend school, entering what ever grade level was appropriate for their reading, 
writing, and speaking ability, as was the case in the refugee camp schools. The 
principal of Lewiston’s high school sympathized with their dilemma, telling 
me that it is ridiculous and harmful to expect a teenager with no educational 
background to be able to achieve enough quickly enough to graduate within 
the mandated time frame. He said, “It just won’t happen. They won’t graduate, 
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but the expectation that they should is terrible for everyone,” by which he 
meant that not only are the students and their parents horribly disappointed, 
but their failure also counts against the school’s graduation statistics. “It’s a 
rotten system,” he concluded. Even young adults arriving in the United States 
from the refugee camps expected to be able to progress through elementary 
school to high school to college. As a forty- year- old non- English- speaking man 
from Banta lamented when he realized that education would never be an option 
for him in the United States and that his lack of education would doom his 
prospects for a decent job, “It is over for us [adults]  here. This place is for our 
children.”
Because all resettled refugees over the age of sixteen are expected to seek 
work, even if attending school, many high school students faced additional 
barriers to educational success. Caliyow Isaaq’s sixteen- year- old son, Musle, 
had been greatly excited to attend high school when he arrived in the United 
States with Mohamed and Xawo, but his resettlement caseworker refused to 
enroll him in high school because of his age. After months of arguing with 
the resettlement agency, he finally appealed to school authorities, begging to 
be allowed to enroll in high school. Although he ultimately won the right to 
attend school, he could barely pass his courses because he was placed in 
ninth grade after only completing third grade in the refugee camp. One day 
he showed me his coursework, which included, for his social studies class, 
pages and pages in his careful neat lettering of the assigned phrases, “I want to 
be an American Citizen,” and “I am patriotic.” Almost all of the young Somali 
Bantu refugees who came to the United States as teenagers failed to graduate 
from high school.
In short, Somali Bantus faced nearly insurmountable barriers in achieving 
economic self- sufficiency through employment and education, the two things 
they had been promised as opportunities available to them in the United States, 
learning, instead, that their illiteracy, lack of En glish, lack of education, and 
subsistence farming skills  were a poor fit for life in America, that fears of their 
foreignness constrained their access to employment and school, and that no 
one had a plan for closing that yawning gap. They  were, in the words of a 2010 
report about the refugee resettlement program prepared for the U.S. Senate 
Committee on Foreign Relations, “Abandoned upon Arrival.”4 Four years after 
the Somali Bantus began arriving in the United States, orr sponsored a national 
conference of Somali Bantu refugee immigrants to assess their resettlement 
successes and experiences. Somali Bantu representatives from all over the 
country attended, where they listened to speakers, participated in workshops 
on subjects ranging from jobs to education, networked to form a national So-
mali Bantu or ga ni za tion, and had the opportunity to ask questions of orr staff. 
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After a panel called “Somali Experiences in Somalia and the Diaspora,” audi-
ence members talked about their initial challenges with sky- high utility and 
telephone bills and other financial and educational issues. One man stood 
up to ask, “I am wondering about the fact that we came from the poorest 
country to the poorest refugee camp to the poorest towns where our children 
 were placed in the poorest schools where other children  were  already fail-
ing. I am wondering why this is.” Many resettled refugees wondered the same 
thing; why  were they brought to America only to be poor? Why  were they 
brought to America to be placed in impoverished, dangerous housing projects 
and failing schools? Why  were they brought to this country and abandoned? 
As David Haines observes in his review of refugee experience in America, 
spare support for resettled refugees struggling to make ends meet means poor 
housing, dangerous neighborhoods, poor transport, and poor schools: “It is 
‘welcome to the other America.’ ”5
Choosing Lewiston
Isha’s family had a rough start in Atlanta. Iman was attacked several times on 
his way home from ju nior high school by young men in their public hous-
ing project; Isha was abused by their neighbors; and the family struggled fi-
nancially on the meager assistance they received. Frightened and intimidated 
by their African American neighbors, they decided within a few months of 
their arrival to relocate to Lewiston, which had been identified by other re-
settled Somali and Somali Bantu refugees as an affordable and livable small 
city with good public housing, safe schools, a very affordable cost of living, 
more financial support than in other cities, and the familiarity of a growing 
Somali community. That Somalis and Somali Bantus would choose to move to 
one of the whitest states in the country made perfect sense to those refugees 
who wished to distinguish themselves from the African Americans they met 
in public housing projects in large cities, reflecting a broader pattern among 
black immigrants from Africa and the Ca rib be an.6
When Isha’s family decided to move to Lewiston, their volag caseworker 
in Atlanta arranged for someone to drive them in a minibus all the way to Lew-
iston, where they  were dropped off at the apartment of friends. Within a few 
weeks, Isha moved her family into a tiny downtown apartment within walk-
ing distance of the downtown shops, park, high school, police station, Adult 
Education, International Health Clinic, and Trinity Jubilee Center, where Isha 
joined hundreds of other people every Thursday for the food pantry. Iman 
enrolled in high school and her grandson Abshir enrolled in grade school, but 
Isha gave up on the effort to learn En glish at adult education classes, having 
spent several unsuccessful months in adult En glish language learner classes in 
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Atlanta. “I’m an old woman,” she explained, “and my mind is back in Africa, 
with my other children I had to leave there.” Iman found an after- school job 
at L.L.Bean working 4 pm to midnight; no time for homework. Idris, adept at 
En glish from studying hard in the refugee camp, joined an interpreting agency 
as a translator, while Isha continued her community work as a spiritual healer, 
cared for her grandchildren, cooked and kept  house, and mediated family 
disputes in her community.
Isha’s apartment in an old downtown tenement building sits between the 
upstairs apartment of her nephew (Cali Osman’s sister’s son) and his wife and 
five children, the downstairs apartment of her other nephew (my former 
field assistant Garad) and his wife and nine children, and a neighboring apart-
ment housing her son, Cabdulkadir, and his family. In all, thirty members of 
her extended family moved into the building to live together again. Despite 
its location in a dilapidated building with peeling paint and listing porches, 
Isha’s home is filled with reminders of the family life I remember from Banta: 
a large extended family compound, segregated gender roles, a matriarchal pres-
ence watching over grandchildren, a constant stream of visitors, an olfac-
tory aura of frankincense, cardamom, and tea mixed with roasted meats and 
boiled corn, an incense dish used for healing rituals always present and ready. 
Isha’s parlor is always busy as she serves tea and snacks to family and friends 
in a room draped with brightly printed nylon wall coverings and lined with 
colorful plastic woven floor mats. Isha’s two dozen grandchildren from all 
four apartments constantly dart in and out to play and greet visitors. When 
the kids get too rambunctious, Isha silences them with a quick word or move-
ment. The rooms initially held little more than floor mats and a tv, but grad-
ually the family acquired mattresses, bed frames, and, finally, a huge wrap- 
around velour sofa in a style pop u lar with Somali families.
The apartment connects memories of Somalia to other places— the spiritual 
world, the diaspora world, Kenya, and, of course, America. The tv is usually 
blaring a video of a wedding in Somalia, the refugee camp, or elsewhere in the 
diaspora— the ubiquitous entertainment in Somali homes. Loud, modernized 
new versions of classical Somali music from the video compete for sensory 
awareness with the goat meat and corn porridge often bubbling on the elec-
tric stove. Isha  doesn’t keep much in her cupboards because she is too short 
to reach above the first shelf, so although her kitchen is typically American, 
life in this room is still lived on the floor, where everyone sits, plays, prepares 
food, and rests.
Isha and her extended family had joined a flow of Somali Bantu refugees 
from Syracuse, Dallas, Houston, Denver, Columbus, Springfield, Atlanta, 
Hartford, and elsewhere who began moving to Lewiston in 2005 after 
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learning about Lewiston’s amenities from Somalis they had known in the 
refugee camps, who had themselves resettled in Lewiston from 2001 to 2004, 
making the city a gathering place for former neighbors seeking once again to 
live near each other and for families and polygynous marriages separated by 
the resettlement pro cess to reconstitute themselves. Many Somalis and So-
mali Bantus joined the migration to Lewiston because they found they could 
not possibly support themselves in their new cities on minimum wage jobs 
or welfare support and they hoped the lower cost of living in Maine and the 
ability to re- create community support structures based on sharing resources 
would make life more manageable. Given that their bid for resettlement was 
predicated on their ethnic distinctiveness from and abuse by other Somalis, 
the choice by resettled Somali Bantus to join a Somali community in the di-
aspora points to the tensions inherent to Somali Bantu identity as racially 
marked but still culturally, linguistically, and religiously Somali. These ten-
sions would find expression in Lewiston as well.
Outlining Lewiston’s Stories
The arrival in Lewiston of so many poor, uneducated, illiterate, and unexpected 
residents sent a shock wave through a city already struggling with years of 
economic decline following the closure of the mills that had employed 70 per-
cent of the city’s workforce a century earlier.7 The national conversation about 
immigrants, focused so intently on their economic and cultural impact, is 
reproduced in the different versions of Lewiston’s story about the first de cade 
of Somali refugee immigration told by residents. Since the federal govern-
ment tries to achieve refugee economic self- sufficiency by cutting off financial 
support to resettled refugees within a few weeks of their arrival, the details of 
their longer- term economic sustainability are left to local communities to sort 
out. “Integration” is a muddy term, stretched between visions of assimilation 
that many Euro- Americans believe characterized the experiences of their im-
migrant ancestors and hopes for a multiculturalism that includes economic 
assimilation to property own ership, wage- paying employment, and capitalist 
values alongside the celebration of cultural traditions like dances, songs, and 
special foods. Concerns about economic sustainability and integration play 
out in different versions of Lewiston’s story. The next three chapters each tell 
a different version of Lewiston’s story of the first de cade (2001–12) of Somali 
and Somali Bantu immigration from the vantage point of different groups of 
residents.
In the first version, city officials highlight the financial burden on the city 
of accommodating unexpected impoverished refugees in the context of a re-
treating welfare state, emphasizing the pressure they faced to develop pro-
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grams for refugees that conformed to federal legal requirements for accom-
modating diversity in the absence of outside financial support, local refugee 
resettlement agencies willing to apply for grants, and any previous experi-
ence with managing refugees and cultural difference, all while responding to 
the concerns of Lewiston’s citizens about the cost to the city of meeting the 
needs of refugees. Since the refugees chose Lewiston and not the other way 
around, Lewiston’s city officials emphasize how the city has tolerated their 
presence while adopting a business- as- usual approach to minimize their po-
tential disruption to the city’s coffers and its way of life. Praise for Lewiston’s 
generosity in accommodating difference and addressing the challenges posed 
by the unexpected arrival of so many refugees anchors this version, which 
honors the hard work of city and social ser vices administrators who found 
themselves scrambling in 2001–6 to build programs for refugees from scratch 
in an environment of severe economic constraints and social hostility in a 
way that would not negatively impact the city’s native residents. Chapter 4 
introduces this “tolerant, business- as- usual” version, a story of legitimate self- 
congratulations that begins to crack when one reads the local newspaper or 
listens in on conversations between Lewiston’s residents who are unhappy 
about their city’s transformation.8
A second version characterizes Somali refugees as an uninvited, unwelcome, 
and dangerous intrusion into city life. In this xenophobic version, presented 
in chapter 5, refugees are bearers of economic, physical, and cultural insecurity 
who bring with them the uncivilized customs of their warring homeland, the 
threat of different moralities, and the danger of economic penury. Chapter 5 
reviews anti- immigrant/refugee sentiment during Lewiston’s first de cade of 
Somali immigration in the form of ten insidious myths reiterated in editorial 
commentary and blogs in the local newspapers, by two of Lewiston’s mayors 
during the first de cade of Somali immigration, and circulated in public and 
private commentary by citizens who cite the blogs and mayoral pronounce-
ments as the basis of their anti- immigrant views. I include a small selection of 
quotes from blogs and editorials to provide the flavor of the online commentary 
that paralleled and was often quoted in daily conversations about refugees. 
Although editorials  were signed, blog comments  were usually anonymous, 
but nevertheless infected and inflected private conversation, at least until 
one newspaper decided to shut down the possibility of anonymity late in the 
de cade because of concerns about the public impact of per sis tently vitriolic 
anonymous commentary. The myths’ tenacity reflects predominant Ameri-
can concerns about resettling refugees (and accepting immigrants) in “our” 
midst, concerns that trouble the idea of charity toward refugees with hostility 
to cultural difference and economic costs and raise questions about how to 
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define community and collective moral responsibility in a globalized world 
characterized by mobility.
The third version, the communitarian story presented in chapter 6, pushes 
back against such hostile views by insisting on an expansive definition of 
community and a delight about the possibilities for social transformation 
that arriving refugees brought to Lewiston, while also betraying disappoint-
ment, disgust, and even rage about poor institutional support for indigent and 
marginalized immigrants, gatekeeping efforts to contain refugee agency and 
engagement in city life, and the hostility of colleagues and friends toward refu-
gees. The people in this category, sometimes derided as out- of- touch liberals, 
social worker types, or even, in the colorful words of the current mayor, “boo- 
hoo white do- gooders and their carpetbagger friends,”9 express frustration 
at the narrow, tolerance- based approach to building programs for refugees 
taken by institutional leaders, marked by an unwillingness to look to models 
from other cities that had more experience with diversity, refugees, or both. 
Chapter 6 profiles social workers, teachers, and community activists and ad-
vocates who see the future of the refugees as the future of Lewiston, who have 
found personal renewal and transformation through their work, and who ad-
vocate communitarianism rather than tolerance.
The Somali Bantu refugees’ views of their first de cade in Lewiston opens 
part III, which, in contrast to these three versions, highlights their hard work 
to make Lewiston their home by fighting for and negotiating their place and 
their rights. This “refugee agency” version speaks of their efforts to create life 
anew in Lewiston, access available resources, adjust to American cultural 
practices, and construct a new life designed by them. In this version, the refu-
gees are the protagonists in creating their own refuge and the architects of 
their lives in Lewiston. As we shall see, their perspectives on self- sufficiency 
and integration vary considerably from the story of conformist assimilation 
that anchors the mainstream American view of Euro- American immigrants.
The versions contain different perspectives about the economic costs of 
refugees and the insecurity provoked by difference. The first (tolerance) ver-
sion (chapter 4) emphasizes how Lewiston successfully accommodated differ-
ent cultural practices within an overall framework of assimilation, becoming 
a model for other cities faced with large numbers of new immigrants while 
keeping a careful lid on costs. The second (xenophobia) version (chapter 5) 
blames refugees for Lewiston’s ongoing economic ills, claiming that economic 
resources spent on assisting foreign refugees are starving deserving local com-
munity members of the help they have earned as hard- working citizens. The 
third (communitarian) version (chapter 6) promotes an expansive, inclusive 
definition of community and sees the refugees as a redemptive force for an 
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ailing city, even while expressing anxiety about what the future holds for Lew-
iston’s refugee population because of the impact of racism on Somali youth 
identity. This version reflects a belief that diversity and expanded support for 
the poor are desirable and that the city, state, and federal governments should 
expend more resources to support the refugee community. The version that 
opens part III shows how refuge is created by the refugees themselves rather 
than provided by the host country, through their hard work to build com-
munity support structures, negotiate among themselves about changing prac-
tices of self- governance and intracommunity support, and demand equality 
and respect from their new neighbors.
All of these versions simultaneously are true and they have uneasily jostled 
against each other during Lewiston’s first de cade of Somali immigration. Lew-
iston’s three mayors during the first de cade of Somali settlement personified 
the different viewpoints: Mayor Raymond gained notoriety in 2002 for writ-
ing a letter against Somali immigration that sparked a neo- Nazi rally. Mayor 
Gilbert (2007–11) used his newspaper column as a bully pulpit to denounce 
anti- immigrant myths and celebrate the renewing potential of new immi-
grants to Lewiston. Mayor Macdonald was elected in 2011 (and reelected in 
2013) on an explicitly anti- immigrant platform that promoted condescending 
caricatures of Somali immigrants. The radically different viewpoints about 
Somali immigration held by the mayors reflect the profound contradictions 
that Lewistonians, old and new, experience every day as the city continues its 
dramatic transformation and these narratives compete for ascendancy.
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chapter 4
We Have Responded Valiantly
“February 2001!” exclaimed Sue Charron, the director of Lewiston’s General 
Assistance (ga) office, when I asked in 2010 if she could clearly remember 
back to the early days of Somali immigration to Lewiston. “It’s really clear. We 
didn’t have time to even think about what was happening. We just handled it. 
At the same time we  were doing this we  were also educating everyone  else. 
We  were educating dhhs [Department of Health and Human Ser vices], who 
 were denying people [benefits] because they didn’t know they  were eligible 
for assistance!” Like other city officials reminiscing about the shock of Somali 
immigration, Sue emphasized how unprepared they  were to support refugees 
arriving with no place to stay, no jobs, and no En glish skills: “Never in my 
wildest dreams did I ever imagine we’d be doing this kind of work.”
Refugees from Banta arrived in Lewiston right in the middle of roiling de-
bates about the city’s responsibilities and obligations toward uninvited refugee 
immigrants precipitated by the unexpected arrival in 2001 of the first thousand 
Somalis.1 This chapter begins with recollections about the impact of that first 
wave by city administrators whose job descriptions placed them in key positions 
of engagement (staff in the ga and mayor’s office, schools, and hospitals). The 
city’s experience demonstrates how a neoliberal definition of refuge— such 
as the offer of refuge, but with scant economic, educational, or employment 
support— leaves local host communities responsible for supporting refugees 
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whether or not they invited them. Lewiston’s city officials promote Lewiston’s 
first de cade of Somali immigration as a success story, not because refugees at-
tained “economic self- sufficiency” and “integration,” but because violence was 
averted and federal mandates for accommodating diversity met. Accommoda-
tion to the law, however, can come with its own limitations.
“What Is Supposed to Happen if the City Is Unprepared  
to Work with Refugees?”
One of the shocks for the city of Lewiston was that the sole volag in Maine 
initially refused to provide any assistance to the new arrivals because they did 
not have a government contract to help secondary migrants (refugees, like 
Lewiston’s Somali immigrants, who voluntarily leave their first resettlement 
site to relocate to another town within three years of their arrival), and the 
agency feared a hostile backlash from Lewiston’s citizens. After resettling in 
the United States, refugees are free to move wherever they wish, just like any-
one  else, although volags retain no enduring commitment to those they re-
settle, and the funds they receive to assist newly arriving refugees remain with 
the volag in the place of initial resettlement and do not follow the refugees 
if they move. Funds allocated to local volags to help resettle Somali refugees 
thus did not follow the refugees when they moved to Lewiston, where the 
local volag did not offer assistance because they lacked a federal contract to 
work with the new arrivals.
Unexpectedly, city staff had to become de facto resettlement workers even 
though the city had little institutional infrastructure in place for providing 
assistance to newly arriving refugees. Although Lewiston was not an officially 
designated refugee resettlement site for Somali refugees, the city of Portland, 
a few dozen miles to the south, was. In the 1990s some Somali families un-
happy with their first resettlement site came to Portland to visit their relatives 
and decided to stay. Word circulated about Maine’s quiet lifestyle, low cost 
of living, low crime rate, and the availability of immediate short- term assis-
tance through ga funds, and Somali refugee families began moving to Maine 
as secondary migrants whose original volags  were no longer responsible for 
assisting them.2 By early 2001, public housing in Portland was full and city 
staff drove a few Somali families further north to Lewiston to be  housed with 
assistance by Lewiston’s ga office. Deciding Lewiston was a fine place to live, 
those families invited their relatives from across the country to join them, and 
within a few months several hundred more arrived, shocking the local schools 
when their doors opened in September and scores of new students unable to 
speak En glish showed up. Within a year the Somali population had grown to 
about a thousand.
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Because many of the immigrants arrived with few resources, Lewiston’s 
ga office became their primary point of entry. In the absence of an involved 
volag, the ga staff helped new Somali arrivals locate housing and provided 
vouchers for food, diapers, utilities, and other goods for their first weeks 
in Maine. The year 2001 was particularly challenging because the arrival of a 
thousand Somalis coincided with a 50 percent reduction in the ga bud get, a 
cut made before the city realized it would be extending support to so many 
new residents.
Sue Charron recalled the sense of bewilderment about how to help the 
newly arriving refugees in a context of no preparation or assistance from the 
state’s sole volag or any state agencies: “It was a brand new experience for 
us. It was incredible. You learn everything you can on the fly. There was no one 
willing to help us.” Shaking her head, Sue said, “We had no idea what an i-94 
[the official arrival- departure record used by U.S. Citizenship and Immigra-
tion Ser vices] was. We had no idea what an ead [Employment Authorization 
Document] was. We knew nothing! And it  wasn’t fun. We felt like we  were 
an island. We didn’t know what we  were doing and yet we had to tell every-
one  else what to do.” Another staff member who worked with new arrivals 
during this period recalled, “It took two years before Catholic Charities [the 
local volag] was willing to provide some assistance, but even then only in 
carefully constrained ways, and even then their assistance was offered with-
out Catholic support. Churches, the Catholic community, was not at all sup-
portive of working with black Muslims in Maine. Not at all. [A close family 
relative] who works with priests refused when I asked him to get Catholic net-
works to help. And when they are the only volag, and faith- based, account-
able to their own leadership [as opposed to the host community], there are no 
other options.” In addition to the lack of volag support, the office of the state 
refugee coordinator was vacant during the early years of Somali immigration, 
which meant that the key position in the state that should have been able to 
offer assistance was also absent. The person quoted above echoes the senti-
ments I heard from many city administrators that Sue Charron, as the first 
stop for secondary migrants arriving in Lewiston, “was absolutely amazing.”
Sue and her small staff had to learn on the job about how to help the refu-
gees who  were arriving daily get settled into housing and referred to school, 
job training, En glish courses, and dhhs to see if they qualified for Temporary 
Assistance to Needy Families and food stamps. One staff member remem-
bered, “We’d show up to work on Monday morning wondering how many 
people would be sitting in the waiting room needing help.” Sometimes several 
families would arrive each day. Pro cessing each family for ga took hours, 
as did the constant stream of phone calls to potential landlords, hospitals, 
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schools, dhhs, Adult Education, the local office of the state CareerCenter, and 
the Portland- based nonprofit Immigrant Legal Advocacy Project for ques-
tions about legal status and eligibility for assistance. In 2001, half the ga bud-
get went to helping new refugee arrivals.
Echoing Sue’s description of the impact on her office of the massive and 
unexpected arrival of so many Somalis seeking assistance, the coordinator of 
the city’s adult En glish Language Learner (ell) program told me, “Those  were 
the worst years of my life,” because of the scramble to provide En glish lan-
guage and literacy classes on a constrained bud get with no funding for child 
care or transport and a very small staff. Her funding had been cut just as the 
first Somali immigrants began to arrive, and her program had no models in 
place for teaching En glish to people illiterate in their own language. Manag-
ing on a razor- thin bud get, the courses  were soon swamped by new students.
In the absence of volag support, at the end of 2001 Lewiston and Portland 
collaborated on a $1.2 million “Unanticipated Arrivals” grant from the U.S. Of-
fice of Refugee Resettlement to support additional staff for case management, 
cultural orientation programs, and community outreach for the two cities 
from 2001 to 2005. Their grant was the first to cities rather than a nonprofit 
or volag, a fact many administrators note with pride. Lewiston- Auburn na-
tive Cheryl Hamilton, a recent college graduate, returned to her hometown to 
join the staff funded by the grant, excited to be part of the pro cess of chang-
ing and diversifying her native city. Working with Sue and other staff hired 
through the grant, Cheryl coordinated cultural orientation classes for new 
arrivals and community outreach efforts to engage Lewiston’s other residents 
in positive educational programs about their new neighbors. It was not an 
easy undertaking. Cheryl recalled how few models she could find for com-
munity outreach programs because such initiatives  were not typically part of 
a volag’s contractual responsibilities, which focused on providing specific 
ser vices to refugees and not general ser vices, like community outreach, to host 
communities.
Some of Cheryl’s efforts in the early years, such as panel pre sen ta tions and 
community conversations,  were aimed at confronting the mistrust and hos-
tility from Lewiston’s residents who  were worried about the impact on their 
home city of so many Somalis. Sue recalled fielding constant phone calls and 
comments from citizens upset and concerned that in a context of shrinking 
financial resources and widespread poverty the refugees would take away 
resources from needy Maine citizens: “We had phone calls every day—ya 
ya ya. People complaining. Everybody thinks it’s just a free  ride. I explain, 
‘They have to do exactly the same things everyone  else had to do [to get city 
support].’ The ignorance has been the hardest thing for me, other than almost 
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dying from the workload.” While Cheryl, like Sue, remains proud of the 
community- building efforts she initiated, her memories also are clouded by 
the strain of constantly fighting against antagonistic community members. 
One public forum at the local Armory in 2002 brought hundreds of citizens 
who lined up at the microphone, one after another, to denounce the Somali 
presence. Cheryl recalls, “The worst thing we did was the public forum at 
the Armory with our ‘who’s who’ panel. It was terrible. Lots of angry people 
came. . . .  People stood at the microphone and said terrible things. My music 
teacher said terrible things. I sat there watching my town break my heart.”
She acknowledges they made mistakes in managing some of the open fo-
rums that went awry with overwhelming hostility and complaints, but echoes 
Sue’s recollection that everyone who was working to help resettle the new ar-
rivals and facilitate public education programs had no blueprint for action and 
worked under the stress of constant community antagonism. “To be a local dur-
ing that time was awful,” Cheryl remembers. “You  were never not defending 
Somalis wherever you went. You  were never able to turn off your job.” Family 
gatherings, local bars, friends’  houses for dinner became contexts for demands 
that she explain and defend the presence of Somalis. Sue admits to becoming 
fed up with constantly having to educate her friends, sometimes just shutting 
down rather than engaging: “It’s the weekend. Someone makes a stupid igno-
rant remark, pushes me about the burden of the refugees, and sometimes I just 
say”— she heaves a heavy sigh— ‘It’s the weekend. Leave me alone on that.’ ”
Cheryl explained her growing frustration with the entire refugee resettle-
ment system, which in her view relies on volags that are not accountable 
to the host communities and provide no support or assistance to host com-
munities who may be unprepared to welcome new refugee arrivals. While 
refugee success is defined as self- sufficiency and integration, there is no way 
to hold refugee resettlement agencies accountable. The only way that volags 
account for their work is statistical, by recording how many refugees attended 
their programs or received caseworker assistance. Broad community- oriented 
programs like community outreach and integration initiatives are not part of 
a volag’s responsibilities, which is why she attempted to pioneer such pro-
grams through her job with the city. “But what does accountability mean?” 
she asks. “If we  were held accountable for refugee integration ‘success,’ we’d 
have failed most days. If we  were to be held accountable for no homelessness, 
then we won most days.” And if no volag is active in the city (as was the case 
in the initial years of Somali immigration to Lewiston), she continues, “What 
is supposed to happen if the city is unprepared to work with refugees? What 
about preparing cities and employers so they are willing to hire refugees? There 
is no allowance for things like fear, racism, discrimination, and insecurity. 
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Local education is left up to local volags, but what if they’re not active or not 
capable due to limited resources?”3
In interviews and publications, Phil Nadeau, Lewiston’s acting city admin-
istrator in 2000–2002, shared the frustrated view of other city officials that 
community, religious, and civic organizations avoided any initial engagement 
with the growing Somali community and any confrontation with the swirling 
rumors about how the Somali influx would harm Lewiston, leaving belea-
guered city staff on their own to manage the influx and negative rumors.4 Even 
the director of the downtown community or ga ni za tion that had received a 
$1 million grant from the federal Empowerment Zone program for highly 
distressed urban and rural communities called him to complain about po-
tential problems from all the new Somali arrivals. The grant targeted the very 
neighborhood that was filling up with Somali immigrants, and the director 
wanted to know what the city was going to do about it. Phil recalled telling 
him, “What are you doing to help? You’ve got this big federal grant to do com-
munity work [in the neighborhood where the Somalis  were living] and you’re 
not doing anything!” Phil also maligned the state for its lack of support, which 
he attributed to Maine’s lack of historical engagement with diversity, a senti-
ment he expressed more diplomatically in one of his published articles: 
“The state took a minimalist approach to ser vices beyond Portland’s bor-
ders. The state was certainly aware of immigrant populations in other parts 
of Maine, but its lack of any tangible assistance for Lewiston’s Somalis in 2001 
came as one of many surprises to Lewiston officials.”5
The local hospitals and schools initially responded to the new arrivals with 
a determined attitude of business as usual: the refugees would just have to fit 
in and should not take away resources from Lewiston’s other citizens. Treating 
the extension of ser vices to Somali immigrants as additions to core programs 
already in place meant balancing the legal responsibility of providing welfare, 
health care, and education to Somali immigrants against the desire to ensure 
that such programs for Lewiston’s other residents would not be compromised. 
Confusion about available federal assistance for supporting diversity meant 
hostility to offering things like translation ser vices at the hospitals or addi-
tional ell classes at the schools. Laughing in hindsight about the disastrous 
public meeting at the Armory, Sue Charron recalled, “Medical providers. Oh 
my God! ‘We  can’t offer this! We  can’t offer that! We  can’t pay for interpreters!’ 
‘Wait! MaineCare pays for interpreters!’ ‘What!?’ That [was the] huge meet-
ing at the Armory where doctors  were yelling about costs [without realizing 
that the costs of translation would be borne by the state and federal govern-
ment].” Just as the hospitals lacked a plan for providing adequate translation 
ser vices, the school system had no plan for how to develop a comprehensive 
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En glish language program for such a large number of new students, allowing 
non- English- speaking students to languish in poorly structured, marginal-
ized classes for  years.
Neo- Nazis Come to Town
Facing an onslaught of complaints by city residents about city assistance to the 
new arrivals, by 2002 city staff felt administratively, eco nom ically, and socially 
overwhelmed by the continuing influx of Somalis despite the city’s lack of prep-
aration, financial support from the state, and support programs from the local 
volag and other nonprofits. In a po liti cally clumsy move, Mayor Raymond at-
tempted to address the matter by writing an open letter in October 2002 to the 
Somali community asking them to stop moving to Lewiston, suggesting they 
had emptied the city’s coffers and taxed the city to a breaking point:
For some number of months, I have observed the continued movement of a 
substantial number of Somalis into the downtown area of our Community. 
I have applauded the efforts of our City staff in making available the existing 
ser vices and the local citizenry for accepting and dealing with the influx.
I assumed that it would become obvious to the new arrivals the effect 
the large numbers of new residents has had upon the existing Staff and 
City finances and that this would bring about a voluntary reduction of the 
number of new arrivals—it being evident that the burden has been, for the 
most part, cheerfully accepted, and every effort has been made to accom-
modate it.
Our Department of Human Ser vices has recently reported that the 
number of Somali families arriving into the City during the month of Sep-
tember is below the approximate monthly average that we have seen over 
the last year or so. It may be premature to assume that this may serve as a 
signal for future relocation activity, but the decline is welcome relief given 
increasing demands on city and school ser vices.
I feel that recent relocation activity over the summer has necessitated 
that I communicate directly with the Somali elders and leaders regard-
ing our newest residents. If recent declining arrival numbers are the result 
of your outreach efforts to discourage relocation into the City, I applaud 
those efforts. If they are the product of other unrelated random events, I 
would ask that the Somali leadership make every effort to communicate 
my concerns on city and school ser vice impacts with other friends and 
extended family who are considering a move to this community.
To date, we have found the funds to accommodate the situation. A con-
tinued increased demand will tax the City’s finances.
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This large number of new arrivals cannot continue without negative re-
sults for all. The Somali community must exercise some discipline and re-
duce the stress on our limited finances and our generosity. I am well aware 
of the legal right of a U.S. resident to move anywhere he/she pleases, but it 
is time for the Somali community to exercise this discipline in view of the 
effort that has been made on its behalf.
We will continue to accommodate the present residents as best as we 
can, but we need self- discipline and cooperation from everyone.
Only with your help will we be successful in the future— please pass 
the word: We have been overwhelmed and have responded valiantly. Now 
we need breathing room. Our city is maxed- out financially, physically and 
emotionally.
I look forward to your cooperation.
Laurier T. Raymond, Jr.
Mayor, City of Lewiston, Maine6
The major news media, already fascinated by the apparent incongruity of 
so many Africans in Lewiston, contributed to the controversy through sto-
ries about the Letter by abc News, Time magazine, the New York Times, the 
Chicago Tribune, the Washington Post, the Los Angeles Times, and elsewhere.7 
While many of Lewiston’s residents applauded the mayor for finally speak-
ing “the truth,” Somali community members asked why the mayor had never 
asked to meet with them directly before making such a public statement 
against their community, and some appalled members of Lewiston’s city staff 
rejected the implication that the city had run out of funds because of overuse 
by Somalis.8
National media coverage of the Letter caught the attention of the World 
Church of the Creator, a Midwestern neo- Nazi white supremacist group, 
whose members descended on Lewiston to rally in defense of the city’s right 
to bar the door against black Muslim refugees. Their arrival shocked and upset 
many Lewistonians, who perceived the mayor’s letter not as racist but rather 
as driven by bud getary concerns. Embarrassed activist and church groups 
in Lewiston responded by or ga niz ing a prodiversity Many and One Rally at 
Bates College, which drew about 4,000 people from throughout the state to 
show their support for diversity, including both of Maine’s senators and the 
governor, but not the mayor, who had fled town on vacation. Several Somali 
friends told me that when news of the Letter and the white supremacist rally 
reached the international arena, their concerned relatives began phoning 
from Dadaab refugee camp to ask if they  were safe and to suggest they should 
move elsewhere or return to Kenya. Other than some leading activists in the 
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Somali community, many Somalis chose to stay home during the rally, fearful 
of what the day might bring.
Then– acting city administrator Phil Nadeau believed the media coverage 
and neo- Nazi show of solidarity for the Letter “changed everything” because 
it provoked a greater engagement with refugee support from civic and com-
munity organizations that had been previously reluctant to become involved. 
He told me, “As difficult a situation as it was for the community to get through 
that [the fallout from the Letter],  we’re fortunate that if we had to pick the thing 
to galvanize the community it was a letter [and not a violent act]. The Letter 
got people talking to each other, talking about the issues.”9 He noted as evi-
dence that despite its initial reluctance, Catholic Charities finally joined the 
city in providing case management ser vices (after the city had been awarded 
the Unanticipated Arrivals grant), local agencies began to educate themselves 
about language access policies, and the local school system and hospitals fi-
nally expanded and professionalized their programs for non- English speak-
ers. “We all had to play catch-up,” he acknowledged. “Hell,  we’re the poster 
child for Sudden Ethnic Diversification!”10
Somali Bantus Come to Town
When Somali Bantu families began arriving in Lewiston in 2005, the city had 
weathered the neo- Nazi rally and the counter- rally show of support for diver-
sity. The Unanticipated Arrivals grant brought Catholic Charities on board to 
offer case management ser vices to secondary migrants by newly hired Somali- 
speaking caseworkers; the city’s ga office had a functioning model for settling 
new arrivals into housing and signing them up for job training and/or En glish 
classes; and dhhs had begun to figure out the complicated benefits eligibility 
for resettled refugees. But whereas some Somali immigrants in 2001–4  were 
literate En glish speakers with professional skills, the Somali Bantus presented 
a brand new challenge because of their nearly universal background as illiter-
ate non- English- speaking farmers completely dependent on the intervention 
of interpreters and cultural brokers to navigate life in the United States.
When I first met formally with Somali Bantu elders following the slide 
show in February 2006, their community in Lewiston had grown to around 
500 people, and the elders had a list of priorities for which they  were seek-
ing my assistance. Jammed into a small apartment for a meeting that lasted 
for hours, the elders articulated their top goals: to learn En glish and become 
literate; to obtain jobs, because only four Somali Bantus had thus far obtained 
employment; to develop extended day or after- school programs for their 
children because they  were so far behind their American peers; to advocate 
for better public transport, because everyone was trying to share cars to get 
124 • Chapter 4
to shopping centers, adult ed classes, dhhs, and the distant CareerCenter; 
to rent an office for community meetings; and to ensure that Somali Bantus 
could use their own translators in meetings with city institutions, hospitals, 
and schools rather than relying on Somali translators. They explained that 
their community of 500 people included nine adult En glish speakers whom 
they wished to use as translators, which I later learned was a dramatic exag-
geration because many of the nine had only modest En glish skills. No one 
had a college degree, and only a few had a high school degree from the refugee 
camps. Driving home from our meeting, I pulled off the highway in tears, 
feeling almost undone as I considered the reality of 500 people depending on 
five En glish speakers and four people with paid jobs.
Many of Lewiston’s authorities felt the same way. As the size of the Somali 
Bantu community doubled and then doubled again over the next two years, 
officials and social ser vices providers uniformly remarked on how much help 
the Somali Bantus required because of the nearly universal lack of En glish 
language, literacy, and education among the adults and the high number of 
large families headed by illiterate single mothers, which constituted about a 
third of the population.11 Everyone with whom I spoke, from staff at the hospi-
tals to schools, remarked on the additional set of major challenges their arrival 
brought to public institutions struggling to accommodate the newcomers.
Learning to Swim with Sharks
Phil Nadeau is right that many city institutions had to play catch-up. Local 
hospitals, schools, and other organizations have long experience with Lewis-
ton’s history of English- French bilingualism and a clear understanding of the 
cultural and economic challenges faced by preceding generations of minor-
ity Franco- Americans, and many of those organizations are now staffed with 
people whose parents and grandparents  were French- speaking immigrants. 
But the new arrivals— black Muslim war refugees who spoke Somali and 
Maay Maay— offered a novel and utterly foreign presence that challenged the 
ability of local institutions to accommodate new forms of difference. Initially 
only a few organizations in addition to the ga office and Adult Education 
wholly opened their doors to the new arrivals. The public library began offer-
ing after- school homework help sessions, as did Trinity Jubilee, a downtown 
day shelter that provides a daily free lunch, a weekly food pantry, and case-
worker support for anyone who needs help. When the Somali Bantus began 
moving into the downtown neighborhood served by Trinity, the director 
hired Somali- and Maay Maay– speaking staff to help them with everything 
from reading mail to intervening with landlords, paying bills, supporting 
parents in school interactions, connecting refugees with ser vices, and more, 
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making Trinity the primary location for refugee assistance in the city after the 
ga office. Their after- school homework help program for elementary school 
children grew to accommodate up to a hundred, mostly Somali Bantu, stu-
dents each day. Trinity received a trickle of grant funding from the city and 
from other nonprofits, but primarily relied on donations, volunteers, and its 
tiny but energetic staff to run its programs.12
But other city institutions took a slower approach to including Somalis and 
Somali Bantus in their programs or developing ways to engage with the refu-
gee population. Despite the confusion about refugees’ entitlements to benefits 
and the repeated intervention of the nonprofit Immigrant Legal Advocacy 
Project to educate about refugees’ rights, the local dhhs office only assigned 
a supervisor to pay par tic u lar attention to refugees’ entitlement to benefits 
in 2008 (although the agency had hired three Somali speakers earlier in the 
de cade, who comprised about 2 percent of the staff). The downtown develop-
ment project supported by a million- dollar federal grant (whose first director 
had complained to Phil Nadeau about the new downtown residents) initially 
denied all the grant applications by Somali Bantu community groups until 
complaints by activists forced them to reconsider. (Under the leadership of 
a new director, they did, first meeting in 2009 with the rejected applicants to 
review their grant applications before funding several and offering workshops 
to Somali Bantu community groups on grant writing and project design.) 
Under pressure from a couple of activist physicians, the local hospitals agreed 
to open an International Clinic one day a week in the downtown community 
clinic specifically for the new arrivals, but unfortunately the doctors’ hopes 
 were undermined by a staff unhappy about having to work with refugees and 
resentful of the “special treatment” provided to refugees in the weekly clinic. 
The physicians felt that the staff bullied the Somali cultural brokers and trans-
lators, denied them access to the computers, failed to include them in office 
birthday celebrations, and revolted when the physicians tried to re orient the 
annual Christmas party into a holiday party. Attitudes toward Somali staff and 
clients became so hostile that the doctors feared a breach in medical protocol. 
After battling with the hospital administration for a contract that affirmed 
the existence of the International Clinic and for better staffing and training, 
both doctors resigned in frustration, and the hospital closed the clinic in 2009 
after only a few years in existence. A friend who attended the decisive meeting 
reported that one hospital administrator told another, “Now we can get back 
to serving the people  we’re supposed to be serving.” Reflecting on this experi-
ence, one of the physicians told me, “Now I know what institutional racism 
means, but I don’t know what to do about it. How do you make someone less 
racist?”
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The public schools faced a special challenge, because their ell offerings in 
2001  were minimal and the school system did not expand the ell program 
quickly or comprehensively enough to accommodate the large number of new 
non- English speakers in a manner that met federal and state requirements. 
From 2001 to 2007, the number of children enrolled in ell classes grew from 
around 20 to 702.13 As had happened in other cities, a complaint filed in 
2006 against the school department for its failure to develop an appropriate 
ell program brought in the U.S. Department of Justice to mandate its cre-
ation, which began with the hiring of a local former school principal to build 
a program that would comply with state and federal requirements.14 While 
the school system was expanding its ell programs, school leaders faced an 
onslaught of complaints from parents and community members about add-
ing anything that looked like special programming or privileges for refugees, 
making the administration extremely sensitive to public scrutiny.
In an interview, the school superintendent recalled the first years of Somali 
settlement as “chaotic” since, as he explained, the schools “had no one to pre- 
warn them, help them, or provide them with background information about 
the new arrivals.” “When you have a teaching staff and suddenly demograph-
ics change overnight, it’s a trauma for them!” he explained to me.15 Shaking 
his head dismissively when I asked if he sought help from the federal Office of 
Refugee Resettlement, the state refugee coordinator, or other refugee support 
organizations or information clearing houses, he emphasized that the priority 
was networking within local institutions, like the hospitals to assess public 
health risks, the local Department of Labor to help with adult education, the 
Portland- based Center for the Prevention of Hate Violence to help with in- 
school fighting, and leaders in the Lewiston community. Like many of the city 
administrators with whom I spoke, he stressed how the challenge to accom-
modate Somali immigrants forced local institutions to transcend territoriality 
and their historic silo pattern of management. Public schools are a par tic u-
lar site of community struggles over identity and values, and it was clear in 
our conversation that the superintendent felt that every action he took was 
under a microscope, including scrutiny by people and anti- immigrant activist 
groups beyond Lewiston who read blogs and news reports “ready to dive in 
whenever they read or hear something they don’t like.”
A refusal to bend the rules or loosen the standards to accommodate So-
mali newcomers emerged as a regular theme in my conversations with the su-
perintendent and school leaders, who uniformly explained that “unlike other 
schools,” Lewiston holds non- and limited En glish speakers to high standards 
of achievement, does not grant credit toward graduation for ell classes except 
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as electives after students have reached a certain level, and strictly monitors 
student progress with frequent testing to ensure students only pass to the next 
grade once they have demonstrated competency.16 They want to make sure 
to confront possible perceptions that Somali newcomers are passed through 
the system for the sake of school statistics or because of a soft spot for diver-
sity. One school principal, while expressing pride about their high standards, 
nevertheless acknowledged that the system is stacked against Somali Bantu 
children, telling me, “They come to us having never been in schools before, 
with no socialization and no understanding of school, and they don’t have the 
skills to be in school. Now we live in a society with a razor blade at the throat 
of education and these kids— the new arrivals— are walking into a combat 
zone.” It was a war that most Somali Bantu students lost during their first de-
cade because so few managed to graduate from high school.
While maintaining standards, the superintendent also felt pressure to en-
sure that schools  were not perceived as offering extras or special treatment 
to Somalis, refusing requests from Somali parents for a prayer room, the re-
moval of pork from the school cafeteria, or an early departure on Friday for 
prayers. Remarking on a public flap about a student who claimed she was not 
allowed to pray in school, he noted that he “could easily get about twenty- five, 
thirty e- mails, phone calls a day, from all over the country from watchdog 
bloggers contacting me to say,  we’re with you! Stand firm!” Reporters with tv 
cameras arrived to cover the story about the prayer room request for Mus-
lim students, followed by letters of outraged support from Christian groups 
in the South. He even received a call from someone who told him, “If you’re 
going to [allow Muslims to have a prayer room,] then I want a prayer room 
for Satan!” Shaking his head about the vigilance of national anti- immigrant 
activists, he said, “It’s out there. I’m sitting on a keg. I’ve got to learn to swim 
with the sharks.”17 (Remarking on the fear of Muslim prayer in schools, an ell 
teacher dryly observed, “but  we’ve long had a Christian Bible study group.”) 
The schools overcame initial protests against head scarves while adhering to 
a school- wide rule against headwear that might be construed as gang related 
by defining head scarves as religious, like the yarmulkes that Jewish students 
would be allowed to wear. Although the schools refused to provide dedicated 
rooms for prayer, they allowed students to pray during the day, and the cafete-
rias began clearly labeling pork products. (Because U.S. government subsidies 
make pork products cheap, pork is a ubiquitous menu item in school cafete-
rias in poor communities.)
But such indications of tolerance and accommodation did not extend to 
anything that might be regarded as special or extra programming for Somali 
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students. School administrators would not support new programs that tar-
geted only refugee children. Noting the poverty indicators for children in the 
school district (e.g., the very high enrollments in the free lunch program), 
school authorities emphasized their commitment to providing programs that 
would benefit all students, not just the refugees, such as free summer school, 
free sports participation for everyone (rather than a pay- to- play model), and 
a free after- school homework help program. But using designated funding 
for underachieving students to pay for free summer school for everyone 
came at the expense of one- on- one tutoring with ell students (an alternative 
option fundable through the earmarked grant); the free sports program did 
not include the majority of ell students, who are prohibited by school policy 
from joining sports teams because most of their ell courses do not count 
toward graduation; and the free after- school homework help program was a 
generalized program that did not offer targeted ell help. The insistence on 
prioritizing programs for everyone meant a reluctance or refusal to pursue 
funding for programs that would specifically target non- English speakers or 
refugees, to the disappointment of some (including many of the refugee par-
ents), who believed that since the refugee children arrived in the United States 
so poorly prepared, they needed and deserved extra assistance.
Writing about the significance of racial difference in a different context, ed-
ucation scholar Mica Pollock argues that using the language of “everyone” (she 
uses the term “all”) allows a diversion away from identifying those students 
who struggle the most, but whose par tic u lar needs are not distinguished or 
identified in ways that would enable more specific targeting and interven-
tion. The discourse of “everyone” becomes a way to avoid having to engage 
the thorny issue of how and why race matters in student achievement, be-
cause the talk of “everyone” papers over racial differences in per for mance. 
Ignoring the salience of race and refusing to orient interventions specifically 
toward those students who are most often struggling and most often racially 
marked thus has an implicitly racist outcome.18 As we shall see in detail in 
chapter  6, in Lewiston the insistence that any new programming had to be 
developed for all students meant that school authorities consistently rejected 
appeals or proposals from Somali and Somali Bantu parents and ell teachers 
to develop programs specifically for the (racially and linguistically marked) 
ell students (such as special tutoring sessions, extended- day ell programs, 
special parent- teacher committees for ell students, culturally competent 
mental health and counseling ser vices, and networking with other nonprofit 
agencies to apply for grants to target Somali- speaking children). Part III details 
the consequences.
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Managing Diversity
Recognizing that Somali- speaking children faced par tic u lar and acute chal-
lenges that the school system would not fully address as it worked to expand 
and systemize its ell program, a group of social ser vices providers formed 
a collaborative to brainstorm and network about how to support the “New 
Mainers,” particularly in the area of cultural competency for mental health 
and social ser vices. The fluid group met monthly to report news and share 
suggestions for action. From 2008 to 2010, many monthly discussions focused 
on the experiences of Somali- speaking students in local schools.
Several ell teachers, social workers, and immigrant caseworkers in the 
collaborative suggested the creation of a subcommittee specifically to deal 
with parent- school interactions, hoping, for example, to encourage the school 
system to create an ell parent- teacher or parent advisory group. Defining 
its role as that of cultural broker and mediator, the subcommittee began by 
holding open meetings during 2009 with refugee parents to learn about their 
concerns. The meetings with parents  were well attended, vibrant but calm, 
and generated widespread agreement about a few issues of significant con-
cern (e.g., concerns about how long their children stayed in ell before being 
moved into mainstream classes, their children’s boredom in ell classes with 
material that was too simple, the forced departure of a favorite teacher whom 
the parents and children trusted, the high rate of suspension for Somali and 
Somali Bantu children that left them further behind their peers, and the fact 
that not a single Somali Bantu student had graduated from high school in their 
five years in the city). Recognizing that many parents  were frustrated that they 
had been expressing the same concerns for years but  were seeing no prog-
ress, the group understood that the meetings would have to produce concrete 
results. The plan was to follow the initial small meetings with a larger open 
meeting where immigrant parents of ell students could meet with school 
administrators to discuss their concerns and ask questions.
The open meeting between Somali and Somali Bantu parents and school 
administrators went badly off script, however. A few parents became increas-
ingly upset as they felt their concerns  were deflected by school officials, who 
refused to discuss personnel policies and talked about the ell structure in 
highly technical language that parents found difficult to understand. When 
a couple of immigrant parents started shouting, the school officials became 
defensive and shut down discussion about the parents’ allegations and ques-
tions. Chaos erupted as some school administrators began packing up to walk 
out while some parents continued yelling, other parents tried to calm the agi-
tators, interpreters tried to intervene, and the meeting organizers conferred 
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about what to do. One brave teacher tried to quell the growing commotion 
with a forceful intervention, telling the parents that the ell teachers cared 
deeply about their children and parental concerns, but her words of solidar-
ity got lost in the parents’ frustrations with the lack of a satisfactory response 
from her supervisors. As some of the school administrators announced that 
the meeting was over, one of the interpreters protested in vain, “It’s not our 
culture to limit discussion! You can say 5 to 7, but we stay until  we’re done. You 
 can’t just stop the discussion at 7 pm!”
Immediately following the meeting (which resulted in negative coverage 
of the parents’ behavior in the local newspaper), the school authorities asked 
that all the participating teachers resign from the collaborative subcommit-
tee. The social ser vices staff member who chaired the subcommittee was also 
asked to resign, out of concern that her involvement in a committee that gen-
erated criticism of the school district would reflect negatively on her ser vice 
or ga ni za tion. Other subcommittee members  were told by school authorities 
never to participate in such an event again, not an idle threat for those ser vice 
providers who depended on city funding for their programs. This experience 
clarified to everyone in the collaborative the scant opportunity for public and 
social ser vices employees to engage in advocacy or critique and how threat-
ened the school felt by angry Somali- speaking parents. One social ser vices 
provider wryly observed that everyone would have supported the parents’ 
right to yell and scream if the issue was a fired pop u lar ice hockey coach. 
But because the meeting was about the concerns of ell kids, refugee parents 
 were supposed to be grateful, take what was offered, and not complain. Refu-
gee parents yelling about school policy  were unacceptable.
In the wake of their public loss of control over parents, school officials de-
termined to avoid such forums in the future, steadfastly blocking the efforts of 
ell teachers to build solidarity with parents through teacher- parent support 
groups or parent advisory committees. Administrative staff cited fears about 
unpredictable outcomes and demanding parents, and that such bodies could 
become sites of Somali tribal conflict. Uncertainty about how to contain un-
ruly refugee parents gave pause as well to local social ser vices agencies consid-
ering how to extend their programs to include the new immigrants. By 2010, 
only a few local organizations other than Trinity, the public library, a farming 
project that enabled refugees to access farming land, and Adult Education 
had begun to cautiously extend themselves to the refugee community by de-
veloping small, targeted programs for Somali speakers mediated by a Somali 
cultural broker or translator. An agency dedicated to supporting children 
assigned a staff member to work one- on- one with twelve toddlers in large 
Somali families to prepare them for attending school, while another or ga ni-
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za tion created a nurturing program for five Somali mothers with infants. An-
other nonprofit hired a part- time family advocate to work as a home- school 
intermediary for three Somali families with children in the local school sys-
tem. At the end of the de cade, the school district allowed a staff member from 
a social ser vices agency to invite ten boys who had lost a loved one in the 
refugee camp to participate in an after- school program oriented toward emo-
tional development that met for one hour a week for ten weeks. Many local 
organizations offered no specific outreach to the refugee community at all, al-
though refugee friends believe that most grant- seeking organizations in the city 
habitually mentioned the large refugee population in their grant proposals to 
ensure that their description of the context in which they worked sounded 
dire and challenging. Refugees are good for raising money, says one activist 
friend, even if the grants are not used to extend programming to them.
Accommodation Is about Containment
While the predominant narrative from Lewiston city officials rightfully empha-
sizes their hard work and dedication to accommodate the Somali immigrants 
and their success at averting the potential for violence, voices of dissent 
argue that accommodation can also include re sis tance to change, take the 
form of “othering,” and feel profoundly undemo cratic to those being accom-
modated. Those of this opinion ask, for example, why Lewiston’s institutions, 
like schools and hospitals, initially seemed so unwilling to develop programs 
specifically for Somali speakers and to hire Somalis for jobs other than as 
cultural brokers and translators. They note the re sis tance of school officials to 
support ell parent outreach or advisory groups or to develop additional pro-
grams directed at ell children, that the hospital failed to support the fledg-
ling International Clinic, and that city and nonprofit agencies who received 
funding for programs targeting refugees failed to train and promote Somali 
cultural brokers and translators. They point out that although Somalis are 
nearly 20 percent of the school body, there are no Somali teachers or admin-
istrators. One frustrated Somali activist asks, “Why are Somalis not receiving 
higher- level jobs, supervisors, managers, administrators? No refugees, after 
ten years, are in a position of authority! Why not?” Indeed, I was astonished 
to discover in 2010 that the web page for the Lewiston public school system 
did not even include the names of any of the district’s Somali employees who 
worked as translators, tutors, and parent outreach coordinators, supporting the 
ell program and the 1,000 Somali- speaking students in the district (an over-
sight that has since been corrected). The activist is angry that the official story 
of Lewiston’s success ignores the role of Somalis themselves in making their 
lives in Lewiston, and that many of the local institutions that emphasize their 
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success at accommodating Somalis have failed to hire Somalis into positions 
of authority or to engage in internal transformations beyond hiring translators 
and cultural brokers. Translators and brokers are mediators who are employed 
to manage outreach to the Somali population, but they are not treated as inte-
gral to the internal functioning, decision making, or priorities of the organiza-
tions that employ them. These critics lament the silencing of critical discussion, 
as we saw in the outcome of the large parent meeting with school administra-
tors, and the ways in which accommodation feels like containment.
I return to these par tic u lar points again in later chapters, but  here want to 
highlight one criticism in par tic u lar: that a reactive approach of accommoda-
tion without transformation—of treating diversity, multiculturalism, and out-
reach to foreign immigrants as add- ons rather than integral to institutional 
culture— silenced other approaches that might have introduced reforms or 
transformations of local institutions. People frustrated with the slow pace of 
change berated Lewiston’s approach as guarded, self- protective, insular, and 
parochial, especially in comparison with cities like Portland, where numer-
ous strong advocacy groups for refugees and immigrants had formed, whose 
public school system quickly developed a robust multicultural program, and 
whose citizens  were discussing the extension of voting rights to resident non-
citizens (a ballot proposal ultimately rejected in 2010 by a vote of 52 to 48 per-
cent). By comparison, critics note that institutions like hospitals and schools 
in Lewiston added translation ser vices and ell programs as their effort to-
ward diversity, but did not transform their normal operating culture, allowing 
staff who subscribed to the anti- Somali myths detailed in chapter 5 to remain 
hostile and resistant to Somali patients, students, and staff. Bringing the pro-
vision of social ser vices, medical care, and schools in line with bureaucratic 
mandates for language access did not mean changing institutional culture, 
and critics suggest the result has been an outward appearance of accommoda-
tion while, as we will see in chapter 5, racism and hostility rage within.
Discussing the re sis tance in Lewiston to adapting or learning from models 
developed in other cities for embracing multiculturalism and refugee outreach, 
a woman from Lewiston who is heavily involved in refugee resettlement 
initiatives explained the attitude of her colleagues: “They don’t want people 
from Portland to come tell them what to do. They don’t want intellectual out-
siders to come in.” People in Lewiston, she suggested, “don’t want to ask for 
help because that might reveal ignorance or lack of capacity. Lewiston fears it’s 
unqualified and lacks the intellectual resources to make things work. Doing 
the right thing might mean the person supposed to be doing it is unqualified 
and someone  else should actually be doing it.” Like the activist quoted above 
and others, it is frustrating to her that throughout the city’s first de cade of 
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Somali settlement, many of the major public institutions remained staffed by 
people hostile to refugees, unwilling to learn from well- functioning models 
elsewhere of refugee outreach (whether through language access and inter-
pretation ser vices, new school models for ell and multiculturalism, or new 
multicultural approaches to physical and mental health care), and closed to 
the upward mobility of Somali cultural brokers and professionals. Another 
woman who has a long history in education and health care administration 
in the city described to me her frustrations with her colleagues’ conservative, 
constrained orientation toward change: “Portland has so many innovative 
programs [for immigrants], but the attitude of Lewiston’s ser vice providers 
is, ‘We aren’t Portland! We don’t want to be Portland! Don’t talk to us about 
Portland!’ ” She continued in a tone of exasperation, “If Portland has devel-
oped a program, then Lewiston wants nothing to do with it. They won’t even 
learn about it!” She’s anxious about Lewiston’s refusal to innovate because she 
thinks the city is “sitting on a time bomb” because the approach to contain-
ing and managing the new immigrants rather than integrating them through 
innovative programs that will transform public institutions like schools will 
end badly, as immigrant kids become increasingly alienated. These con-
cerns escalated in 2009–10 when police began arresting Somali Bantu kids 
for criminal activities and city officials became concerned that Somali im-
migrant youths  were forming criminal gangs. A frustrated social studies 
teacher who quit her job to move to a more innovative and dynamic school 
district in Portland summed up her experience with initiatives to expand 
multicultural programming and social justice initiatives that would support 
alienated immigrant youths in the schools: “No one in Lewiston is on board 
with anything.”
The critics are frustrated that tolerance and accommodation in Lewiston 
during the city’s first de cade of Somali immigration took the form of meeting 
legal requirements for managing diversity rather than intercultural collabora-
tion and institutional transformation. Writing about the dangers of “tolerance” 
as a foundation of multiculturalism, po liti cal scientist Wendy Brown argues 
that tolerance is also often about superiority, “the marking of subjects of toler-
ance as inferior, deviant, or marginal vis- à- vis those practicing tolerance.”19 
She continues, “Moreover, since tolerance requires that the tolerated refrain 
from demands or incursions on public or po liti cal life that issue from their 
‘difference,’ the subject of tolerance is tolerated only so long as it does not 
make a po liti cal claim, that is, so long as it lives and practices its ‘difference’ in 
a depoliticized or private fashion.”20 In the first de cade of Somali immigra-
tion, tolerance as accommodation meant policing the boundaries of Somali 
involvement in decision making about their lives in Lewiston to ensure their 
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inclusion in city institutions met the letter of the law but did not change insti-
tutional practice or culture.
Lewiston as a Model for America
And yet, as one ell teacher, who herself has many complaints about the man-
agement of non- English speakers in the school system, observed to me, “I 
don’t think Lewiston gets enough credit for how well it has done.” Assessing 
Lewiston’s successes and failures in adopting a proactive approach to embrac-
ing refugees depends on one’s expectations about the general American atti-
tude toward diversity and bilingualism. While one white woman rages about 
blocked parental involvement in ell programs and the absence of Somalis in 
positions of authority in city institutions— “This is the twenty- first century! 
It’s just totally unacceptable for any town in America to be unprepared for 
multiculturalism!”— others note that many towns in America are insular and 
unversed in accommodating difference and that, in fact, Lewiston has done 
quite well in terms of a low incidence of violence and a strong voice of sup-
port for refugees by activists and some city leaders. As one Somali culture 
broker acknowledged, “Things have really improved  here since the Many and 
One Rally.” Condemning Lewiston for its failures to be even more proactive 
seems to some like just a continuation of the long- standing jokes across the 
state about Franco- American Lewiston being poor, parochial, and backward.
As befits a city administrator, Phil Nadeau clearly wants to emphasize Lew-
iston’s success at valiantly and generously managing the unexpected arrival 
of thousands of Somalis in the absence of directed state and federal support. 
Praising the efforts of the local schools, hospitals, and social ser vices agencies 
for expanding their programming to refugees, Nadeau acknowledges, “They 
 weren’t quite where they needed to be in the early days. Now they’re on top 
of things. It’s a complete waste of time to criticize these people.” He is proud 
that he has been contacted by other city administrators in the United States 
and abroad who have heard Lewiston’s story for advice about how to manage 
the arrival of immigrants. He also wishes to undermine the claims in several 
national news stories, such as a 2009 Newsweek article called “The Refugees 
Who Saved Lewiston,” that celebrate the revitalizing energy of immigrants in 
rejuvenating a dying town rather than the generosity of Lewiston’s resident- 
hosts in accommodating uninvited refugees.21
Mayor Larry Gilbert, a strong voice of support for immigrants during 
his tenure (2007–11), echoes the story of Lewiston’s success at welcoming ref-
ugees in his public pre sen ta tions, and publicity about Lewiston as a success 
story has entered the national arena at conferences and workshops about im-
migrant integration. When I give public talks about Lewiston’s experience, I 
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inevitably meet people in the world of refugee resettlement who tell me how 
fascinated they are by Lewiston’s successful story of immigration integration.22
Other organizations also sought to market the story of Lewiston’s success 
in accommodating difference. Maine’s (now defunct) nonprofit Center for the 
Prevention of Hate Violence (cphv) won a large orr grant to take Lewiston’s 
story to a national audience, beginning with a well- publicized 2010 conference 
in Lewiston called “Advice for America: What Lewiston– Auburn Has Learned 
since 2000 about Fostering Relationships between Residents and Newcomers.” 
The cphv had held “conversation groups” early in the de cade to bring together 
Somali immigrants and non- Somali locals, offered workplace workshops on di-
versity, and worked in Lewiston’s schools to confront youth racism and violence, 
culminating their efforts in a national tour to promote Lewiston as a model of 
immigrant integration. Cheryl Hamilton, who led the cphv projects after leav-
ing her job with the city, hoped the conference would remove “the blot” on the 
city’s name left by the Letter incident, which she believes continued to hinder 
the ability of city organizations to attract national funding for refugee assistance 
because of the media portrayal of Lewiston as “refugee resettlement gone wrong.” 
The Advice for America conference aimed to summarize everything that went 
right in Lewiston, helping to promote the emerging new narrative about Lew-
iston’s success at accommodating thousands of uninvited refugee immigrants.
Conclusion
The feelings held by many of Lewiston’s leaders and citizens that they valiantly 
adapted to the arrival of a large number of illiterate, black, Muslim people 
who needed or  were entitled to benefits and ser vices that did not previously 
exist (such as a full- fledged ell program and translation ser vices) reflect the 
fact that host communities shoulder the economic and cultural responsibility 
of welcoming and accommodating resettled refugees whom they did not invite. 
Yet this is the very heart of the humanitarian basis of the U.S. refugee resettle-
ment program, which states that the objectives of refugee resettlement are rapid 
achievement of economic self- sufficiency and integration while leaving the 
details up to host communities and refugee self- help groups.
So what, exactly, does refugee resettlement as a form of humanitarianism 
mean in this context? If it means allocating public resources to support and 
welcome strangers, people in Lewiston feel like they got caught holding the hu-
manitarian bag, so to speak, in which humanitarianism toward strangers com-
petes with commitments to citizens in a context of economic decline for all. The 
paramount concerns of Lewiston city officials  were to minimize the financial 
burden to the city of uninvited indigent refugees in the absence of sufficient 
federal funding, to meet legal mandates for how public institutions and hospitals 
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are to serve non- English speakers, and to manage Lewiston’s public image and 
citizens’ criticisms of city assistance to refugees. While they  were gravely con-
cerned about the ability of refugees to become eco nom ically self- sufficient, they 
felt their only recourse was to ensure refugees could access benefits to which 
they  were entitled and to plead for state and federal support for job- training pro-
grams. For many of the city’s organizations and citizens, integration also meant 
ensuring that refugee claims to benefits did not compromise or displace the 
rights and entitlements of citizens, which meant the slow, cautious, uncertain, 
and sometimes grudging extension of social ser vices to refugees.
The practical effects of refugee resettlement appear to suggest that humani-
tarianism is actually defined only by geography, to the concept of refuge in a 
physical sense: that the United States will provide a relatively safe physical en-
vironment within which refugees can attempt, with little assistance, to create 
a new future. Providing refuge is a form of humanitarianism fundamentally 
based on exclusion and exclusivity; the decision to take in refugees is the excep-
tion to the normal practice of exclusion and containment. In this way hu-
manitarianism toward refugees is simply exceptionalism, a choice to violate 
national integrity by allowing in people who do not belong. When such ex-
ceptions move to a town whose citizens already feel forgotten and marginal-
ized by their own history of struggle and economic disintegration, expecting 
a clear route to economic self- sufficiency and integration for newly arrived 
refugees seems like little more than a bad- faith demand.
The United States has a complicated orientation toward refugees, as noted 
in chapter 2, because of the competing meanings of refuge, especially in the 
context of heightened security fears post-9/11. While the concept of refuge has 
an ancient history as protection offered by religious communities to escap-
ing slaves or those cast out of their own communities, today’s offer of refuge 
by governments ensures that refugee resettlement accords with reigning ide-
ologies about the obligations of citizens, which in the United States means a 
dominant orientation toward neoliberal values such as self- help, individual 
responsibility, and spare government support for the unemployed.23 Refuge, 
for Somali Bantus, meant paying for their airfare to the United States, rede-
fining their identities and family relationships to meet American criteria for 
resettlement, leaving behind family members who failed to meet the criteria, 
and, for everyone over the age of sixteen, subverting the dream of education 
to the demands of low- wage, undesirable, dead- end jobs. (In the Orwellian 
words of one resettled Somali Bantu woman, “There is freedom  here. But you 
need a job to be free.”)24 That refuge might include support for the enormous 
life transformation resettled refugees experience and to ensure that refugees 
have adequate time to develop language and job skills is absent because the 
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United States lacks a developed public discourse that refuge should include 
anything other than the opportunity for legal border crossing. An educated 
Somali caseworker who helped settle Somali Bantus in the United States told 
me in exasperation, “Now I see how marginalization works. I see the impact 
it has on people. Somali Bantus  were brought  here and there’s no support! 
There’s no support for them  here!” Eloquently summarizing the confound-
ing experience of people who wonder why they  were brought to the United 
States to be abandoned, he asked, on their behalf, “What is the basic reason 
that you bring me to an ocean and then tell me to go swim by myself?” The 
sink- or- swim attitude is a neoliberal definition of refuge, steeped in economic 
rationalities and valuations.
Lewiston’s experience reads like an object lesson in abandonment, where 
“economies of abandonment,” to borrow Elizabeth Povinelli’s useful phrase,25 
are everywhere in abundance: a town abandoned by industry, inhabited by cit-
izens who feel abandoned by the economy they helped to build, taking in refu-
gees who have been abandoned by the government that admitted them, and 
then feeling abandoned by that government in their effort to provide support 
for those refugees. The city leaders have to adhere to federal mandates for the 
accommodation of diversity (through medical translation and ell programs 
in public schools)—an accommodation resisted by many residents— but, cru-
elly, support for bewildered refugees who fail in school and are rejected over 
and over by employers is absent. Instead, federal and state programs that fund 
support for refugees are facing cuts because of the neoliberal logic that claims 
economic support inhibits refugee self- help and integration.26 To city authori-
ties who are wedged between federal mandates to accommodate diversity, the 
lack of economic assistance to support indigent refugees while they become 
settled, the reality of the extreme poverty of refugees, and citizen hostility to 
the provision of support to refugees, the entire system of refugee resettlement 
feels like a bad- faith effort of humanitarian rescue. That they define success as 
the absence of violence reflects an austere American definition of refuge as legal 
border crossing rather than intentional life enhancement, care, or opportunity.
A city abandoned by economic growth unexpectedly and valiantly absorb-
ing foreigners abandoned by the government that brought them to American 
shores is indeed an American success story of perseverance, hard work, and 
responsibility. But the costs of a sink- or- swim attitude means some people are 
left to sink, many people live in fear of sinking, and everyone wonders how far 
their responsibility to save those who are sinking extends. Such insecurities 
strike at the heart of community life, nurturing the rumors and myths about 
the dangerous insecurities brought by indigent foreign refugees that I explore 
in chapter 5.
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chapter 5
Strangers in Our Midst
Herein lies their radical difference, the demonstra-
tion that they have never been, and never will be, a 
part of us.
— Achille Mbembe, “Provincializing France?”
While the city representatives quoted in chapter 4 are eager to champion a 
positive image of Lewiston’s management of difference that can be exported to 
other cities, a very loud background conversation circulated in local newspa-
pers and private conversations asserting that Somali refugees  were deepening 
Lewiston’s economic insecurity and weakening the city’s cultural integrity.1 In 
a blistering editorial, the managing editor of the city newspaper challenged 
the 2010 Advice for America conference repre sen ta tion of multicultural suc-
cess, suggesting that “the social workers and educators” in attendance  were 
deaf to the broader and much more pervasive antagonistic feelings about 
refugees in Lewiston:
I have a little news for advice- givers who attended last week’s Advice for 
America conference hosted by the Center for Preventing Hate. They may 
believe the Somali integration post-2006  here has been a success worthy 
of national model, but that view is not wholly shared in the Twin Cities 
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[Lewiston and Auburn]. . . .  I hear negative comments every day. Every. 
Day. . . .  I saw with great clarity a gap in how this group perceives the cli-
mate of ac cep tance in Lewiston and what that climate actually is in mul-
tiple corners of this city. . . .  Any advice coming out of Lewiston should be 
viewed as through a kaleidoscope of distorted views.2
A set of powerful myths (by which I mean shared beliefs) about the refugees 
that capture “what the climate actually is” reveals the ways in which unhappy 
Lewistonians felt that their city was under economic and cultural siege. The 
myths rest on the assertion that, in contrast to the Somali refugees, the ear-
lier French Canadian immigrants  were a model of determined economic self- 
sufficiency and integration, the two pillars of the refugee resettlement model. 
Commentary on this point became especially heated in response to articles in 
Mother Jones (2004) and Newsweek (2009) suggesting that the refugees  were 
rescuing Lewiston, a view that contradicted the perception held by many that 
the city of hardworking residents was draining its coffers to provide for eco-
nom ically dependent refugees, as the mayor’s 2002 letter had suggested.3 The 
Newsweek article alone generated over 150 pages of mostly vituperative blog 
comments railing against the article’s suggestion that refugees saved Lewiston 
by bringing economic and cultural revitalization to a dying mill town. A few 
typical examples, with original spelling, set the tone:
Revived my ass! They have done nothing good for our city! We have lost 
jobs. People who actually need state assistance  can’t get it because them 
and their ten kids have used up what little there was to begin with. Areas 
that used to be decent to live in are now infested with them. Seriously, find 
twenty people in Lewiston who are glad they are  here. I know I can’t.— 
domnemmasmama, January 30, 2009
Am I disgruntled that federal and state dollars are being used to supply immi-
grants with housing food clothes and vehicles? your damn straight.— 
Dee In Maine, January 30, 2009
They [Somali refugees] are human leaches brought her to suck off the lib-
eral maine system. . . .  When did maine become the welfare state to  house 
and feed the worlds misfits.— Megalito, January 30, 2009
The Somalis over- populated Lewiston, drained it’s money and resources, and 
cried discrimination constantly. . . .  They are at dhhs [Department of Health 
and Human Ser vices] requesting welfare daily. The majority of Somalis are 
unemployed. Our schools are overcrowded with children who don’t speak 
En glish. Lewiston . . .  is down the tubes.— cojr, January 26, 20094
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During my research in Lewiston I constantly encountered these myths, 
which circulated despite news articles and op- eds challenging their veracity, 
as well as the dialogues sponsored by cphv early in the de cade and ongoing 
community meetings and panel pre sen ta tions throughout the de cade offered 
by refugees at myriad events and institutions to teach people about their back-
ground.5 Although these events offered opportunities for Lewiston’s residents 
to confront ste reo types about their new Somali neighbors, the myths’ stub-
born per sis tence from 2006 to 2011 indicates they speak to deeply held suspi-
cions about charity for illegitimate recipients, fears of cultural difference, and 
the danger of the resident foreigner for American civic life.
This chapter draws on conversations, interviews, editorials, and letters 
to the editor in the daily Lewiston Sun Journal and the conservative- leaning 
local weekly Twin City Times, and, most obnoxiously and extremely, the on-
line comments that accompanied every news story about the refugees (until 
the Sun Journal closed off the ability to make anonymous comments), to ex-
plore the most widespread myths and analyze their peculiar potency.6 The 
discussion of each myth also offers contrary empirical evidence from research 
I conducted with Ismail Ahmed and Rilwan Osman, as well as ethnographic 
observations about the quotidian experience of these myths for Somalis and 
Somali Bantus in Lewiston. Because most of the myths are not par tic u lar to 
Lewiston but echo nationwide allegations about how immigrants introduce 
financial and cultural insecurity into American communities, I conclude with 
a reflective analysis of the insecurities contained in American mythologies of 
immigrant foreigners, situating the material presented  here within broader 
American nativist and racist discourses against immigrants.7
Free Cars and Apartments! Chickens in the Cupboards!
On June 24, 2010, Rilwan Osman e- mailed me a copy of a letter to the editor 
from a local resident that appeared in the Twin City Times. The letter read:
The Somalis received more money than they deserved upon setting foot 
 here, and most never pay a cent into the system. It makes me sick that 
we are supporting them and seeing them living a better life than most of 
us. Some lie to receive money when they go for help. . . .  Most of them 
claim that they don’t speak En glish, but they can all say “City pays.” . . . 
Besides food stamps, why do they receive vouchers for car repairs and 
other things? . . .  Why is it so easy for them to start up in a business while 
on welfare? . . .  Do they pay taxes on the money they make, or is that an-
other thing being kept secret? And most of their stores refuse to serve white 
people (not that I’d ever go there). . . .  I think it’s time someone puts them 
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in their place. I would put them on a ship back to their uncivilized country 
because I don’t trust them as far as I can throw them.
Fed up with the constant repetition of such allegations, Rilwan wanted us to 
draft a response. Together with Somali activist Ismail Ahmed, we generated a 
list of the claims we heard most often, and then gathered evidence to attempt 
to debunk them. Our response, “The Top Ten Myths about Somalis and Why 
They Are Wrong,” appeared in the local newspaper and was circulated in gov-
ernment and social ser vices offices and posted online by Catholic Charities. 
Ismail and I also collaborated on a publicly circulated financial study about 
the economic impact on Lewiston of the Somali presence, demonstrating that 
the influx of Somalis brought economic advantages rather than distress.8
Here are the top ten myths.
1 . SOMAL IS  GOT A FREE   R IDE  TO COME TO AMER IC A .
The basis of this complaint is that Somali refugees have not earned the right 
to live in America, an assertion that is sometimes accompanied by a reminder 
about the young soldier from the Lewiston area who was killed in Mogadi-
shu during the Black Hawk Down debacle.9 Obviously this myth refers most 
generally to concerns about giving foreigners the right to cross America’s 
borders— suspicion about the wisdom of the exception noted in chapter 4— 
but it also reveals a belief that Somalis (the very people who killed Maine sol-
diers ostensibly sent to help them) received easy access to America, unlike the 
ancestors of Lewiston’s residents whose immigrant struggles are memorial-
ized in family stories and the exhibitions of the local Museum la. The differ-
ence between the two waves of immigrants to Lewiston rests on the claim that 
whereas French Canadians came to work, Somalis came for security, which 
makes the latter’s presence in the community less legitimate because it is not 
based on a commitment to economic productivity.
In 2009, the Museum la, whose mission is to tell “the story of work and 
community in Lewiston- Auburn,” agreed to mount a collaborative exhibit on 
the history of immigration to Lewiston, using as its core the exhibition The 
Somali Bantu Experience: From East Africa to Maine, created by Somali Bantu 
community members, my students, and myself for the Colby College Mu-
seum of Art. The exhibition for the Museum la, called Rivers of Immigration: 
From the Jubba to the Androscoggin, included immigrant stories from other 
newcomers as well as Somalis and an immigration timeline that charted the 
history of foreign arrivals in Lewiston over the past two centuries. For mu-
seum staff, the goal was visibly to place the Somali arrivals within a single 
timeline of immigration to Lewiston that included the earlier wave of French 
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Canadians, a risky move for the museum because some Lewiston residents 
found it offensive to place the Somali immigrant experience alongside the ex-
periences of their hardworking parents and grandparents. As Mayor Macdon-
ald explained in one of his editorials, “equating safety- seeking Somalis with 
job- seeking French Canadians . . .  so outraged Lewiston’s established com-
munity that even today this statement is held against the Somali population.”10
When the exhibition was announced, staff members received complaints 
from the museum’s regular visitors that their museum was showcasing the So-
mali arrivals. (One of the staff members mimicked a common response: “Too 
much Somalis! Everything’s about the Somalis!”) At the close of the year- long 
show, the museum director reflected that the exhibit successfully challenged 
the myth that Somalis, as refugees, had an easy and direct trip to the United 
States, where everything was arranged for their care. After acknowledging that 
although she continues to hear “the same shpiel, that they’re taking all the wel-
fare meant for our people” from her Franco- American neighbors and family, 
she said,
Those who have gone through the exhibit have learned from it. I gave a 
tour to a group who said, “Wow, we didn’t realize they’d been through so 
much.” They don’t know. No one’s ever explained it to them. . . .  [Our mu-
seum visitors] didn’t have any idea they spent time in refugee camps and 
how horrible it was. They didn’t know about the war, about the loss, the 
horror. . . .  Viewers never realized how hard they had it in their country 
and why they had to leave. Genocide was never on their radar. Rape was 
never on their radar.
Her staff assistant interjected, “All the stories about walking for hundreds of 
miles. They thought they just got on a plane and came straight  here! Having to 
stay in refugee camps for years, people didn’t know that. That was a big learn-
ing curve. People don’t know. They don’t know that story. The news  doesn’t 
tell them. The news just says, 2,000 Somalis arrived. They didn’t know they 
went somewhere  else first and didn’t just come  here directly.”11 And almost 
no one realized that Somali refugees must repay the full cost of their airfare 
(with mandatory travel on American carriers). Many thus arrive in the United 
States already thousands of dollars in debt, paying off their travel loan for 
years and years after resettlement.
Criticizing the border crossing into America of Somalis in search of secu-
rity raises a fundamental question about the basis of humanitarianism. Under 
debate  here is the question of who has the right to mobility and who has the 
right to residence in the United States. It is difficult not to interpret these de-
bates within a broader racialized, imperialist frame that positions Somalia as a 
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chaotic African country of uncivilized, irresponsible people, as implied in the 
quote that opened this section, who destroyed their own country and killed 
the Americans sent to rescue them. The racialized imperialist lens thus sees 
Somalis as illegitimate invaders whose mobility is not motivated by the values 
of hard work and personal sacrifice that Lewiston’s citizens believe defined 
the earlier generation of French Canadian immigrants. The obvious result is 
myths 2–5, which insist that Somalis are accessing resources to which they 
should not be entitled.
2 . SOMAL IS  ARE  DRAINING THE WELFARE COFFERS .
In the words of “liam,” in his online post in response to a January 30, 2010, 
Sun Journal article about Lewiston’s experience with refugees, “My family 
came  here without a dime in their pocket. There was no welfare system to 
leech off. They had to make it work and they did. They made Lewiston/Au-
burn what it is today. They didn’t do it so refugees could rape our system till 
it’s dry.” Liam’s comment is so commonly expressed by Lewiston’s residents 
that local newspapers have published several articles investigating the use of 
welfare by Somalis, the most recent of which included a link to the economic 
impact study I did with Ismail Ahmed in which we used Freedom of Infor-
mation Act requests to estimate how much money Somalis in Lewiston  were 
actually receiving in welfare payments (including ga, Temporary Assistance 
to Needy Families or tanf, and food stamps) in comparison with the rest of 
the population.12
Allegations about Somali use of welfare condenses two common argu-
ments: that Somalis are moving to Maine because it has more generous welfare 
benefits (a sentiment endorsed by Governor LePage and Mayor Macdonald) 
and that Somalis are taking welfare resources away “from our people, the ones 
who really need it.” Since everyone but Somalis seems to find it incredible that 
Africans would choose to move to Maine, a cunning effort to access welfare 
benefits offers a more likely sounding reason and places Lewiston’s newest im-
migrants in contrast to the previous wave of Franco- Americans, who moved 
to the city to work rather than to receive welfare. Sadiq has become increas-
ingly annoyed by the question he most consistently receives: “Why did you 
come to Maine?” “No matter what you say,” he tells me, “there is only one 
right answer.” In one conversation I overheard with a hostile administrator of 
a doctor’s office with whom he was negotiating for Somali Bantu translators, 
Sadiq showed his frustration to the standard question by asking the admin-
istrator, testily, “Why are you asking me this question when you have already 
decided the answer?” Next to myth no. 1, this claim was the most frequent 
criticism I heard about Somalis during my years of research, many of whom 
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cited the bloggers who post online comments to newspaper articles when I 
asked for verification of their claims.
The data (obtained through Freedom of Information Act requests and rec-
ords maintained by the city of Lewiston) reveal that after heavy use of ga 
funds in the early years of their migration to Lewiston, by 2010 Somalis drew 
welfare at lower rates than the rest of the population. During 2001, the first 
year of refugee arrivals in Lewiston, refugees accounted for half the ga bud get 
(which, as noted earlier, had been cut in half that year from the previous year), 
then 40 percent of the next year’s bud get, and 35 percent of the following year’s 
bud get before dropping over the rest of the de cade to 16 percent in 2009. City 
officials state that no one who qualified for assistance from the city was ever 
turned away, or, in other words, that Somalis are not taking all the available 
resources for emergency support. In 2009, noncitizens (who are mostly adult 
refugees) received 6.8  percent of tanf expenditures in Lewiston- Auburn, 
and  5.4  percent of tanf expenditures in Androscoggin County, as well as 
3 percent of the food stamp bud get in Lewiston- Auburn and 2.1 percent of the 
food stamp bud get for Androscoggin County. Recognizing that children of 
Somali refugees are citizens and thus not counted as noncitizens, these statis-
tics suggest that Somali families draw assistance more or less in proportion to 
their demographic repre sen ta tion.13 While Somalis do acknowledge that im-
mediate access to assistance through the ga office enabled their resettlement 
in Lewiston, the facts indicate that claims about their long- term dependence 
on welfare are wildly exaggerated.
To confront the per sis tent distortion of the facts by private citizens as well 
as public figures, Maine’s dhhs prepared a document, “The Real Facts,” that 
reported the following in 2010:
• Maine’s maximum tanf benefit is $485 a month, which is the lowest in 
New En gland. When combined with food stamps, recipients reach only 
65 percent of the federal poverty level.
• Over 70 percent of Mainers who receive tanf do so for less than a year, 
and 85 percent receive tanf for less than two years. Only 4 percent of 
recipients have received tanf for over five years, most of whom are 
permanently disabled.
• Over a five- year period, five times more recipients left Maine each 
month than the number who arrived and received benefits.14
The dhhs point person for refugee benefits in Lewiston is clear that everyone 
receives benefits according to their eligibility: “I know what the guidelines 
are and I know the verification pro cess and I know people are not coming 
in  here getting benefits they are not entitled to. Only those who are eligible 
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are getting assistance.” When non- Somali clients whose tanf benefits are re-
duced or denied because of  house hold changes blame Somalis for their loss 
of benefits, he patiently explains that “everyone is getting exactly what they’re 
eligible for and Somalis don’t get any more than anyone  else.” He is frustrated 
by the accusations that somehow Somali eligibility impacts the eligibility of 
other Mainers, and when I suggest it may reflect a perception of a zero- sum 
game— the more they get, the less there is for me—he replies, “It’s not about 
the division of resources. It’s about prejudice.” The anger derives not only 
from a belief that Somalis are using up welfare benefits not meant for them, 
but also about the fact that Somali immigrants have the right to be eligible for 
benefits in the first place.
Whether or not they draw welfare, many of my Somali friends are embar-
rassed by the perception that they are dependent on welfare and that their use 
of welfare is somehow illegitimate. In a 2010 conversation with Somali Bantu 
teenagers about what they most enjoyed and most disliked in Lewiston, many 
participants mentioned their shame about the perception of Somalis as wel-
fare cheats. Some students had even demanded that their parents stop using 
food stamps because they  were being attacked at school as welfare users with 
taunts like, “My dad bought you those shoes!” In 2012, a Somali Bantu college 
student recounted his humiliation in a high school government class when 
the teacher staged a debate about welfare. Students lined up to denounce wel-
fare as an unfair entitlement program for lazy people. My friend, the eldest of 
five boys raised by a single, illiterate, non- English- speaking refugee mother 
who fed her family with food stamps and lived in subsidized housing, was 
shocked and mortified at their hostility. When the teacher asked if anyone in 
class was willing to mount a defense of welfare, my normally gregarious and 
confident young friend stared at the floor in mute shame. “How can they not 
understand what it’s like for people with no income? What are they supposed 
to do if there are no jobs?” he asked me. We discussed the sentiment that 
people who work and pay taxes are angry that their tax money supports oth-
ers who don’t work. “So, if they cut welfare will people pay less taxes?” he asks, 
and I admit that a reduction in welfare would probably only translate into a 
minuscule tax decrease, if any. He was incredulous that anyone would want to 
“just cut off a struggling family with no job and say, ‘Too bad!’ ”
The myth about Somali welfare dependence is coupled with per sis tent 
claims that people see Somalis leaving stores with carts full of food they have 
been given for free. Even the superintendent of schools mentioned to me that 
Somalis “overbuying” in the supermarket was one of the common complaints 
he heard from local parents. Somali families often pool money to buy grocer-
ies in bulk, leaving local residents to speculate that people (presumably) on 
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welfare who can afford carts full of food must be receiving enormous welfare 
payments. Police officer Bill Rousseau, a member of Lewiston’s downtown 
Community Resource Unit, laughed as he recounted police efforts to track 
down this rumor:
It’s just like those ste reo types about the police. You know the story of the 
guy pulled up at the red light, and a police car drives up alongside him and 
puts on his lights, drives through the intersection, and turns into Dunkin’ 
Donuts? When different groups come in there’s a newness, an unknown, 
and the rumors start. You heard about that lady with the cart filled with 
food in the store? She said the government was giving her the food for 
free and they let her leave the store with all the food. Everyone saw it! 
Everyone was in the store that day! Everyone you talk to saw that happen! 
There must have been a huge line at the store that day! We looked into this 
story. It never happened! It’s a bunch of crap! It’s an urban legend. I arm 
myself with the facts. Less than 15 percent of the Somali population is on 
welfare. If you look at old Mainers, more of them are on welfare! We’re see-
ing second- and even third- generation Mainers who are on welfare!
Like myths 4 and 5 below, the claims that Somalis live on welfare and some-
how get more of it than local people encapsulate several sentiments about 
growing economic insecurity: that local people who worked hard their entire 
lives are being abandoned by their government as the local economy con-
tracts and that instead of honoring its commitments to hardworking citizens 
the government is funding foreign nonproductive interlopers who should 
not have the right to receive assistance because they are not members of the 
community.
3 . SOMAL IS  REFUSE  TO WORK AND ARE NOT SEEK ING JOBS .
A 2008 Maine Department of Labor (dol) report estimated that the unem-
ployment rate for Somalis in Maine was around 50 percent, setting off a fire-
storm of accusations that Lewiston’s high poverty level resulted from Somalis 
unwilling to look for jobs because of their happy dependence on welfare.15 
Since employment is seen as the path to economic self- sufficiency, city of-
ficials have been particularly concerned about how to employ Somalis with 
limited En glish and literacy skills, a concern that became acute in midde cade 
when state officials inexplicably missed a deadline for providing information 
to the federal government that would have allowed the city to apply for special 
federal funds for refugee- targeted job skills training programs.16
Lewiston’s challenging economic environment means that concerns about 
jobs resonate powerfully. As Mary LaFontaine, the director of Lewiston’s 
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CareerCenter, suggested to me, an unemployment rate of 50 percent is prob-
ably accurate for the downtown population more generally, not just the So-
malis, due to a regional lack of low- skilled jobs: “We do not have [enough] 
low- skilled or unskilled labor jobs  here. All our jobs are computer- based and 
high- tech jobs. Even Walmart uses computers in the ware house to manage 
the goods. . . .  We don’t have a meat manufacturer. There is no garment sewing 
industry. We don’t have jobs that can be easily shown with visual cues. This 
is putting our population at risk.”17 The dol report also acknowledged that 
employed Somalis receive lower wages than other workers, contributing to the 
perception that the Somali presence accentuates unemployment levels by 
ensuring more competition for the lowest- skilled jobs.
Complaints about Somalis in the job market even extend into school 
classrooms. During a visit to The Somali Bantu Experience museum exhibit 
at Colby College Museum of Art by Lewiston’s ju nior high school, I over-
heard a teacher say, sotto voce in a roomful of Somali students looking at a 
photograph of a smiling Somali Bantu parent at his post in L.L.Bean’s order 
fulfillment center, “He took a job away from our people.” The child of a Somali 
friend reported to her mom that her fifth grade teacher says she should not 
have been allowed to come to America because her parents are taking jobs 
and resources away from “real Americans.” While the child is confused about 
what it means to be a real American, the adults in the room have all heard this 
complaint many times. In a no- win assessment that echoes American com-
plaints about immigrants more generally, residents decry Somali use of wel-
fare because of a supposed aversion to work while simultaneously accusing 
Somalis of taking away jobs from local citizens.
Evidence from Somali enrollment in job training programs, use of the city’s 
CareerCenter, the rush to seasonal work, the large number of new Somali- 
owned businesses, and the constant requests at Aliyow’s, the store I frequent, 
for help with job applications indicate that refugee community members are 
eager to find jobs. One of the most common complaints from the ell adult 
education teachers is the inconsistency in attendance of their students because 
their classes empty as students flock to short- term seasonal jobs at L.L.Bean, 
a wreath- making company, coastal hotels, and to the Cultivating Community 
nonprofit farming project.18 While seasonal jobs cut into the ability of Somalis 
to attend ell classes consistently, refugees with limited En glish also tend to 
get the most demanding, physically grueling jobs, which often leave them too 
exhausted to attend En glish classes. A vicious cycle ensues, as limited En glish 
translates into limited job opportunities, ensuring that refugees with limited 
En glish will only be able to get short- term, arduous work.19
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Abdiya is typical of many women: she attends adult ed ell classes to im-
prove her En glish, applies for every seasonal job available even when a suc-
cessful application means suspending her En glish classes, joined an intensive 
job skills training program in computer literacy and workplace expectations, 
visits the CareerCenter to learn about new job possibilities, and yet, despite 
her obvious intelligence and work ethic, cannot even find a permanent job 
as a  house keeper. After being told by a potential employer that her lack of a 
ged and advanced computer skills makes her unqualified for a  house keeper 
job, she asked me, “Why do I need a high school degree and advanced com-
puter skills to clean hotel rooms?” At Somali Bantu community meetings, the 
desperate need to find jobs dominated most of the discussions I attended in 
2006–8, when people regularly asked me to tell people in Lewiston that since 
they used to be farmers they are hard workers who can do any kind of physi-
cal labor. At a 2007 meeting with a school administrator, a parent begged the 
school to offer Somali parents simple jobs like grass cutting, but the admin-
istrator responded that the school requires literacy even for gardening. The 
parent explained that, like many others, he had applied for many jobs, but no 
one would hire him because of his lack of En glish and prior work experience 
in America. “How will I ever get a job without prior work experience and 
figure 5.1  Nur Libah at his post in L.L.Bean, 2008. Photograph by Catherine Besteman.
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with only one hour of ell class a day?” he asked, which the Somali translator 
augmented, for clarity, “He’s in a catch-22!” Gesturing at the huge vacant mill 
across the river from his store, the Somali Bantu owner of Aliyow’s store told 
me, “I thought President Obama promised to reopen the workplace if he got 
elected. Well, I’ve been waiting for that factory to reopen. It’s been a year since 
Obama said that and it hasn’t happened. Everyone  here would work there” (a 
sentiment my friend undoubtedly shares with many non- Somali residents).
Addressing the high unemployment rate in the face of evidence that So-
malis are avidly seeking jobs, the dol report and subsequent research by an 
anthropology class at Bates College attempted to define the barriers to em-
ployment specifically faced by Somalis in Lewiston, offering explanations that 
resonate with accounts from career training and job development profession-
als as well as Somali job seekers like Abdiya.20 As one would expect, employers 
say they fear language, cultural, and religious differences, expressing concern 
about the potential for miscommunication and that daily prayers and a differ-
ent conception of time and work expectations will interrupt work schedules. 
CareerCenter director Mary LaFontaine argues that she can train any em-
ployer to work with limited En glish speakers and accommodate things like 
praying, but few employers seem willing to try. Although L.L.Bean regularly 
hires Somalis as seasonal workers, outfitting them with audio devices that 
provide work instructions in Somali, Walmart and other large employers have 
resisted such technologies.21 When in 2009 the city of Lewiston funded a spe-
cial job skills training program for refugees, 180 Somalis (including Abdiya) 
completed 144 hours of training before transitioning to the Work Ready pro-
gram for another seven weeks, after which they  were supposed to be able to 
get jobs.22 But the trainer, Ismail, says, “Even after all this training they still 
 weren’t able to get jobs! Not even entry- level jobs that they are perfectly capable 
of doing, like laundry,  house keeping, warehousing.” He tried to negotiate with 
Walmart for ware house jobs, but the store insisted that Somalis had to start 
as cart pushers, cleaning up and or ga niz ing the shopping carts, and that they 
would only hire a few but not a group. After years of working in Lewiston to 
help Somalis find employment, he eventually abandoned the city in frustration. 
Noting other cities where Somalis have been able to move quickly into entry- 
level jobs, Ismail says, “My biggest frustration [in Lewiston] is with employ-
ers. They set a bar, and I train the workers to meet that bar. At first, they said 
Somalis had to have working En glish to qualify to apply for jobs. Okay. I train 
them to have working En glish. Then employers say they need a ged, or an 
algebra test. They create competencies for us to follow, and we follow it, and 
then they change their expectations. Then they blame Somalis for not wanting 
to work!” Reflecting Ismail’s experience, numerous Somali friends, like Ab-
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diya, believe that ged requirements for  house keeping and custodial jobs are a 
disguised way of rejecting Somali applicants.
After years of training Somalis and Somali Bantus in work- ready pro-
grams, Ismail summarized his frustration with local businesses: “They don’t 
want us  here. They don’t want to hire us. The idea is to frustrate us. It is the 
open secret of hiring  here in Lewiston. They advertise a job, you go and apply, 
and the job disappears, or has new requirements, or they are too busy to deal 
with you, or they aren’t taking applications at that time. The employers are 
resentful that Somalis are trying to get jobs, and they just want them to go 
away.” After working with refugee resettlement in Lewiston, Cheryl Hamilton 
took a job with RefugeeWorks, a nonprofit dedicated to employment training 
and initiatives for resettled refugees.23 She too expresses frustration that the 
orr- mandated path to rapid economic self- sufficiency overlooks racism and 
discrimination and offers local communities and resettled refugees no assis-
tance to confront these barriers. She insists that the relevant question should 
be “How does discrimination affect employment?” rather than “How should 
refugees get more jobs?”
The Bates College study offered suggestions for how local employers could 
be more proactive about hiring Somalis, including hiring translators, offering 
better training programs, scheduling work breaks in conjunction with prayer 
times, offering greater flexibility for family needs, and more. Predictably, their 
report was lambasted in a hostile editorial in the Twin City Times titled “Em-
ployers Should Relax Standards to Hire Somalis,” which mocked the Bates 
study for suggesting “that employers should ignore requirements for speak-
ing En glish, pay for mediators and translators; relax their application pro cess; 
and abandon standard workweek hours to make it easier to hire Somalis.”24 A 
flurry of op- eds, editorials, and conversations that pilloried the Bates study as 
pandering to ungrateful refugees dominated the newspapers and private talk 
for months.
In her coverage of the Advice for America conference, the Lewiston Sun 
Journal’s managing editor expressed similar disgust at the suggestion by con-
ference participants that the problem with Somali employment resulted from 
employer discrimination rather than refugee re sis tance to work:
There was a real focus that businesses must share a greater responsibility 
for integrating the new Mainers into the workforce by providing child-
care, transportation and other amenities to ease the step from welfare to 
work. . . .  There was, at the end of the day, a platform of recommendations 
developed that put the responsibility of peaceful integration at the feet of 
existing communities, not that of newcomers. That, instead of immigrants 
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stepping into this land of opportunity and making their own way as pio-
neers, that there is a great need to develop more networks to cocoon and 
protect immigrants when they arrive and for years afterward.25
While the view that employers should find ways to accommodate Somali 
employees largely failed to gain traction in Lewiston, Somalis found multiple 
ways to earn a living in addition to unskilled wage labor jobs, especially by 
creating new businesses and finding cultural broker, translator, and caseworker 
jobs. Dozens of Somalis started businesses as store and café own ers, butchers, 
truck drivers, and importers, or, informally, as accountants, child care providers, 
caterers, and healers. Those who work as cultural brokers, caseworkers, and 
translators for the local schools, hospitals, and mental health care and so-
cial ser vices agencies often find their opportunities for upward mobility con-
strained, leaving job trainers like Ismail frustrated that with the grant funding 
that came into Lewiston over the 2001–10 de cade in part to support outreach to 
Somali refugees, so little of it was used for capacity building for the refugees 
themselves, who remained caseworkers and translators on an hourly wage: 
“There is no progress in the workplace for Somalis [here]. No upward mobil-
ity,” he complained.26
I watched as the careers of several Somali Bantu friends employed as case-
workers suffered from a combination of no training and what Ismail calls 
“microsupervision.” One bright, ambitious friend was hired as an outreach 
coordinator to do “social marketing” to the refugee community for a com-
munity assistance agency’s programs, but received no training or mentoring 
in agency expectations. With no clear instructions, he interpreted his job to 
mean community caseworking, so he spent his days in an exhausting whirl-
wind, helping refugee families with everything from rent negotiations with 
landlords to parent- teacher meetings about discipline problems at school. An 
older white woman at the agency shook her head as she told me that because 
the agency provided no guidance or training, my friend looked incompetent 
because he was always running around trying to solve daily problems rather 
than building programs of social outreach.
Another quiet, hardworking friend landed his dream job as a caseworker 
at a medical office while he studied nursing at the local college, but became 
increasingly unsettled as his colleagues constantly questioned and challenged 
his interpersonal style. The only male, Muslim, and person of color in his unit, 
he found it difficult to adjust to a work environment where his female col-
leagues went out drinking together after work, talked about their boyfriends 
and what they did with them on the weekends, and “kicked each other in the 
ass” (a phrase he learned from his coworkers). Because he  doesn’t participate 
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in these activities (explaining to them that he is a quiet, religious person who 
 doesn’t drink, is uncomfortable sharing private stories about his wife, and will 
never be able to kick his supervisor in her ass) his colleagues repeatedly filed 
complaints against him for “refusing to be a team player” and for “poor work-
place social skills.” The office eventually fired him for his “inability to integrate 
into office culture.” Other friends tell me about how their supervisors stand 
over them while they type e- mails to ensure they are not attending to personal 
business or gaming. Ismail jokes in frustration, “We’re trying to learn to type, 
not to play FreeCell! We are not the ones they should be watching!”
Idris’s family provides a snapshot of typical employment. In 2010, Isha worked 
as a farmer during the growing months in addition to her informal activities as a 
child care provider and healer. Idris worked as a translator in the hospital, a par-
ent liaison- translator in local schools, and a translator- caseworker for a mental 
health agency while taking classes toward a social work degree at the local col-
lege. Only the caseworker position was salaried; the others  were based on an 
hourly wage and offered no opportunity for further training or career develop-
ment. Idris’s wife Fatuma volunteered at the Somali Bantu Youth Association 
as a mentor. Idris’s younger brother Iman worked eve nings at Tambrands and 
seasonally at L.L.Bean in hourly wage jobs while attending school and volun-
teering in the Somali Bantu community office; another brother, Bashir, worked 
as a community volunteer for the Somali Bantu community office, and cousins 
Garad and Mohamed held hourly wage jobs, respectively, as a cart pusher at 
Walmart and a food ser vices worker at Bowdoin College. The wives of Bashir, 
Garad, and Mohamed cared for their preschool- aged children at home.
The dol report failed adequately to capture the work of women who care 
for small children, some forms of seasonal employment, out- of- town employ-
ment, newly arrived Somalis still completing their ell courses, and Somalis 
in job training programs, high school, and college. It also made no attempt to 
acknowledge the thousands of hours of free and volunteer work like translat-
ing, casework, chauffeuring, child care, or wedding and festival catering that 
Somalis do all the time for each other. It did not include the grant- funded 
projects run by community members through community- based organiza-
tions, nor does it recognize the volunteer time Somali community members 
spend running youth sports programs; holding citizenship, tutoring, and adult 
literacy classes; and staffing the Somali and Somali Bantu community offices 
for troubleshooting and assistance (discussed in chapter 7). The dol report 
also did not include the time Somalis donate to the city, through participating 
in the numerous focus groups of researchers and other organizations, giving 
(uncompensated) pre sen ta tions to local organizations and schools, and vol-
unteering in support of other city projects.
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Aware of the negative ste reo type that the refugee community are welfare 
dependents, Somali Bantu leaders have begun placing ads and articles in the 
local newspapers to showcase their grant- funded and volunteer programs, at-
tempting to counter the insistence that wage labor is the only labor worth 
counting as work and to demonstrate the wide variety of ways in which they 
are working, “giving back,” and participating in civic initiatives. Nevertheless, 
when Robert Macdonald announced in 2011 that he was running for mayor, 
he told the local newspaper that he intended to be aggressive about jobs and 
welfare in his campaign: “Lewiston taxpayers can no longer afford to support 
people who are unable or refuse to support themselves. If you come to Lewis-
ton, come with a job or a sponsor— not with your hand out.”27 Everyone knew 
whom he was talking about.
4 . SOMAL IS  GET FREE  APARTMENTS FROM THE GOVERNMENT.
Fears about housing, along the lines of the often- heard claim that “Somalis 
are taking all the apartments and there won’t be anything left for our people,” 
reflect concerns similar to fears about welfare: that Somalis are illegitimate 
claimants who will use up a scarce resource (either low- rent public housing, 
low- income housing vouchers, or Section 8 assistance) that should be reserved 
for local people. And, like welfare, some people claim that generous Section 8 
housing subsidies lure more Somalis to Lewiston, as mayoral candidate Robert 
Macdonald asserted during a 2011 debate: “Many are unemployable, as they 
are unskilled, illiterate and speak little or no En glish. And what is the response 
from our city leaders? Avoid confrontational issues and encourage more of 
these layabouts to settle  here by providing new and more spacious Section 8 
housing.”28 Four weeks later Macdonald was elected mayor.29
Many Somali refugees do receive housing subsidies, paying rent at the same 
scale as everyone  else. Housing assistance is available in the form of housing 
units that come with a subsidy as well as vouchers that provide rent support 
but allow families to choose where to live. The latter are in great demand and 
the program has maintained a waiting list since before the Somalis arrived. 
The director of Lewiston Housing Authority, Jim Dowling, estimated that in 
2010 Somalis held perhaps a fifth of the available vouchers, noting that the 
pressure in this program is real but primarily due to unpredictable fluctua-
tions in federal funding from year to year. The biggest change in the low- 
income housing scene in Lewiston is in subsidized housing, which never had 
full occupancy until Somalis began moving to town. About the positive ben-
efits of full occupancy, Dowling observed, “A vacant unit collects no subsidy. 
When a family moves in, the subsidy starts to flow, and those funds enter the 
community and circulate.”30
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The director of Trinity Jubilee, Kim Wettlaufer, whose work ensures a de-
tailed knowledge of downtown demographics, offered an additional sugges-
tion in a conversation about why the shift to nearly full occupancy might anger 
local people. Low vacancy rates have hindered the formerly pop u lar practice of 
apartment hopping, whereby some tenants in downtown apartments avoid 
paying rent by falling behind on rent payments while staying in an apartment 
until they receive an eviction notice, then hopping to another apartment to 
do the same thing. Because there was so much available housing, it was an 
easy rent- aversion strategy. So, in a way, the Somali influx has made it more 
difficult for other Lewiston residents to shirk on paying rent.
5 . SOMAL IS  GET FREE  C ARS FROM THE GOVERNMENT.
When I asked Mary LaFontaine, the director of Lewiston’s CareerCenter, about 
rumors she hears most often about Somalis, she immediately responded, “The 
car thing! All the time!” She recounts that she was at a car dealer recently and 
even the dealer was complaining about the Somalis getting free cars. She says 
she told him, “Knock it off! They don’t get free cars! How can you think that?” 
LaFontaine’s observation is echoed by ga director Sue Charron, who similarly 
expressed her exasperation with the per sis tence of this rumor. In response to 
the questions she regularly receives about new cars given to the refugees, Sue 
Charron sometimes says, “Oh, we give the new models to the Americans and 
the used models from last year to the refugees.” People stop and look at her for 
a minute before realizing the joke. “Ask me a stupid question and I’ll give you 
a stupid response,” she says, with an innocent smile.
Even though the myth of free cars seems ridiculous, rumors are rampant 
that the government gives Somalis free cars as well as vouchers for cars, car 
repairs, and gas, and the blogs are filled with comments asking why Soma-
lis have cars if they are refugees and receive welfare. Reports in the paper of 
car accidents involving Somalis always provoke a slew of comments that they 
should not be allowed to drive at all.
Along with their use of cell phones, the visible fact of Somalis driving cars 
inspires enormous ire in people whose comments suggest they believe that refu-
gees either do not have the right to drive cars or should not have the money to 
buy a car. Driving is envisioned as a right of citizenship that should not be 
available to refugees. Cars imply own ership and property, and if Somalis are 
recipients of charity, as the myths insist they are, perhaps they are visibly to 
appear disenfranchised (by walking rather than driving). Since Lewiston has a 
poor public transportation system, car own ership dramatically enhances free-
dom of movement and in de pen dence. Cars imply mobility, which is a form of 
freedom, but also invisibility, which is frightening in an age of terrorism panics.
156 • Chapter 5
Since American culture is car culture, I wonder if Somali car own ership im-
plies that Somalis smuggled themselves into American culture without passing 
through the appropriate stages: citizenship, En glish capability, pulling them-
selves up through poverty to property own ership. Does their car own ership 
make visible their illicit entry through the back door as refugees by an in-
appropriate appropriation of American culture? Is car own ership a material 
signification, a visible indication, of the appropriation of American culture 
by the illegitimate, who are first expected to exhibit gratitude and patriotism?
In 2010, the Sun Journal ran a front- page article, with color photos, about 
the hearing of a Somali Bantu woman who had accidentally hit and badly in-
jured a student in the high school parking lot. Buried inside the paper was 
an article about an arraignment of a local man caught running a meth lab in 
his  house. “Since when does a car accident outrank a meth lab in the middle 
of town?” asked Kim Wettlaufer, answering his own question, “When it’s a 
Somali driver!”
6 . SOMAL IS  ARE  RESPONS IBLE  FOR A R ISE  IN CR IME .
Early in the de cade, concerns about Somali criminality rested on claims that 
since Somalis had destroyed their own country, they would do the same to 
America. By the end of the de cade, the significance of their foreignness as 
a route to criminality seemed to give way to pop u lar associations of black-
ness and crime. A front- page headline in the December 17, 2009, issue of the 
Sun Journal screamed, in huge letters, “Police Investigate Somali Attacks.” The 
article reported a number of assaults on people downtown by Somali boys, 
introducing the word “gang” to describe “the Somali attacks.” Within hours, 
Somali Bantu friends in Lewiston e- mailed and phoned me, upset about the 
allegations in the article, which was followed the next day with an editorial 
that said, “We are angered and disappointed by revelations Wednesday that 
roving bands of Somali youngsters are mugging vulnerable white people in 
the area around Kennedy Park.” The online comments  were, predictably, 
vicious, calling for deportation and insisting that Somalis  were terrorists and 
a threat to national security. When I wrote to the paper’s managing editor 
to complain that no Somalis  were interviewed for the article, that the article 
made no mention of the violence against Somalis (there had been numerous 
cases of assaults and dog attacks on Somalis),31 and that the article was sen-
sationalistic, she responded that people in the city had a right to know “that 
the trend of these Somali youth gangs was real. . . .  If there  were gangs in your 
neighborhood,  wouldn’t you want to know?”32
The language about Somali gangs continued to simmer over the next year, 
resurging in a memo written by an investigator at one of the public housing 
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projects with a high percentage of Somali residents warning that Somali 
“gang” activity was on the rise and listing the individual gang names (gang 
always appeared in caps in the memo). The memo, which was circulated in 
the school system, suggested that the police should be prepared for “some 
type of gang war” in the upcoming months and that schoolteachers should 
be vigilant to report anything suspicious, setting off a wave of panic among 
some of the schoolteachers who did not regularly interact with Somali stu-
dents and who, according to their ell teacher colleagues,  were afraid of So-
mali children.
When Janet Saliba, the woman who ran the after- school tutoring program 
for Trinity Jubilee, saw the memo, she realized that the “gangs” listed in the 
memo  were the names her charges used among themselves, one of which had 
even been adopted for the Somali girls’ soccer team. In a meeting of the com-
munity collaborative mentioned in chapter  4 that included social ser vices 
staff and police officers, Janet challenged the use of the word “gang” to de-
scribe Somali kids who  were, she admitted, engaging in bad behavior. “I know 
these kids, their struggles, what they’ve been through, what their parents have 
been through, how hard they are trying. Most of them don’t have dads. They 
are vulnerable kids trying to be tough, and making some bad choices.” She de-
scribed the derivation of the local “gang” names, explaining that it was kids’ 
play that became something  else entirely when the police and the public 
adopted the culturally symbolic term, stigmatizing the kids by connecting 
them to violent images of gangs in pop u lar culture. Acknowledging that some 
of the kids behaved as bullies and commanded younger kids to do their bid-
ding, she cautioned against using the term “gang” but did not reveal that the 
kids who belonged to the so- called gangs  were the very kids tutored by several 
of the police officers who volunteered in her after- school tutoring program.
One day in 2010 as Janet and I sat chatting in my car outside Trinity while 
kids  were arriving for the after- school program, a Somali Bantu boy wear-
ing a hoodie over an oversized T- shirt came up and pounded on the win-
dow, yelling, “Hey! Whatcha doin’? Open up!” Janet opened the door and 
told him she’d be in soon, to which he responded, “You better! I gonna beat 
you up!” Janet laughed and told him to tell Kim she’d be inside in a minute. 
The boy returned a few minutes later, pounding on the window again while 
yelling, “Kim gonna kill you if you don’t get in  here!” Chuckling at the idea of 
Kim killing anyone, Janet recognized that the boy was eager to connect with 
her after his long day in school. Making sure she was watching him, the boy 
picked up a rock and threw it at a passing school bus, hitting the back bumper. 
As Janet opened the door to tell him to knock it off, he ran into the street to re-
trieve the rock. Janet turned to me and said, “Being the tough kid, throwing a 
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little rock, and then picking it up.” We had just witnessed exactly what she was 
expressing in her cautionary lecture against the use of the word “gang” to 
describe the kids’ antics. She suspects the average white Lewistonian watching 
that kid would not see how hard he was working to look tough on the outside, 
would not see the sweet kid he actually was, would not take note that he threw 
the rock gently and picked it up after it bounced off the bus, but rather would 
likely only see a black youth in a hoodie throwing a rock at the school bus. In 
the community collaborative meeting, Janet was demanding that the police 
officers see through the performative swagger and faux violence to connect 
with kids rather than ste reo type them.
The community resource police officers, in fact,  were extremely receptive to 
Janet’s argument about the symbolic weight of the term “gang” and attempted 
to dampen the semihysterical tone of the warning memo as well as injecting 
common sense into the tendency by some community leaders to see Somali 
youths as inherently dangerous. One officer told me that a top school official 
even asked for a daily police patrol to supervise the sidewalks and parking 
lot of the downtown elementary school when school let out for the day: “He 
talks about the school like it’s a war zone . . .  but it’s just a couple of car keying 
incidents and the fights that break out on the way home. It’s only because they 
walk home in groups and sometimes a few start shoving at each other. The 
school is mostly Somali, so when fighting breaks out it’s mostly Somali kids 
who are fighting, but the reaction is: Oh! The Somali kids are fighting! Like 
it’s something different from other kids who fight.” Another officer agreed. 
“Kids have always fought, but now when Somali kids do it, it’s a catastrophe!”
Although the police attempted to dispel rumors about Somali crime and 
violence, rumors about Somali gangs, terrorism, and crime remained power-
ful even though actual crime statistics tell a totally different story. Overall 
crime rates  were falling during the first de cade of Somali immigration to Lew-
iston, and my scrutiny of county grand jury indictments gave no indication 
that Somalis  were buoying the crime that did occur. While things began to 
change in 2011–12 with the entry of some juveniles into the system, during the 
first de cade fears of Somali criminality  were, like claims about their welfare 
dependence, wildly exaggerated.
7 . SOMAL IS  KEEP  L IVE  CHICKENS IN THE IR  K ITCHEN CUPBOARDS .
People who claim to know people who have seen kitchen cupboards turned 
into chicken coops keep this myth alive. Even though I initially thought this 
myth was too silly to include in our study, Rilwan insisted it was important 
because he heard it so often. This myth resonates with other accusations that 
Somalis are uncivilized, unprepared for life in America, that they sacrifice and 
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butcher animals in their backyards, and that their eating habits are filthy. For 
example, many families  were mystified when a public health nurse who vis-
ited their homes berated them for eating with their hands from a communal 
bowl while sitting on the floor, which is the normal way for Somali families 
to eat together. One concerned father e- mailed me to ask if it is true that, in 
America, sharing food while sitting on the floor will hurt their children.
8 . SOMAL IS  REFUSE  TO LEARN EN GL ISH .
This rumor persists despite the fact that over 1,000 Somali- speaking chil-
dren attend Lewiston schools and that hundreds of them flock to after- school 
homework help programs at Trinity Jubilee, the public library, a public housing 
community center, and in the schools. In their early years in Lewiston, Somali 
parents ran academic summer camps so their kids could continue to study 
En glish during the summer break. Because of the high demand for ell classes 
at Lewiston Adult Education, the program is full and has a waiting list, and 
Somali adults are enrolling in ell programs in neighboring cities. In a 2010 
survey conducted by the community collaborative mentioned in chapter  4, 
100 percent of Somali respondents said learning En glish was their top priority.
I found this myth particularly intriguing as it was often accompanied, in my 
conversations with Lewiston residents, by stories about Franco- American par-
ents and grandparents who struggled with or never learned En glish, even as their 
children  were learning En glish in school. The director of the Museum la remi-
nisced about how Lisbon Street used to be French- speaking because all the major 
stores ensured they had a French- speaking staff for their non- English- speaking 
customers. Many older residents, including Maine’s first Franco- American gov-
ernor, recall attending elementary Catholic schools where the only language 
spoken was French. Governor LePage even successfully fought to be allowed to 
take his entrance exam to a Maine college in French rather than En glish.
9 . SOMAL IS  REFUSE  TO BECOME C IT IZENS .
Refugees can apply for citizenship only after residing in the United States for 
five years, and when they hit the five- year mark many Somalis began pursuing 
the pro cess although no local organizations offered assistance with citizenship 
applications until late in the de cade.33 The Somali Bantu Youth Association 
began offering classes in 2008, which  were soon flooded with aspiring ap-
plicants. By 2010, hundreds of Somalis  were enrolled in citizenship classes of-
fered by three organizations at four different locations in the city. Citizenship 
tests must be taken in En glish, which means a massive amount of preparation 
for people whose English- language skills are poor. By the end of the de cade 
I was always running into Somali Bantu friends shopping downtown while 
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listening through headphones to citizenship questions and answers, muttering 
to themselves things like, “WhoischiefjusticeoftheSupremeCourtJohnRob-
erts” or “Presidentdievicepresidentdiewhorulesspeakerofthe house.”34
Allegations about citizenship are, again, about questioning the legitimacy 
of border crossing as a form of humanitarianism, as well as the fear that So-
malis are not invested in adopting American cultural practices and norms, 
discussed further in myth no. 10.
10 . SOMAL IS  RE JECT AMER IC AN CULTURE AND DO NOT WANT  
TO PART IC IPATE IN COMMUNITY L I FE .
Lewiston’s newly elected mayor, Robert Macdonald, got himself into hot 
water in one of his first major postelection interviews in 2012, when, refer-
ring to Somali immigrants, he told a bbc reporter, “You come and accept our 
culture, and you leave your culture at the door.” He went on to clarify: “Don’t 
try to insert your culture, which obviously isn’t working, into ours, which 
does.”35 As with their response to the Letter a de cade earlier, proimmigrant ac-
tivist groups  were quick to criticize the mayor’s remarks, although the mayor’s 
views captured a sentiment shared by many others in Lewiston. Complaints 
about the lack of Somali participation in American cultural and community 
life range across a wide landscape but seem to focus most acutely on aesthetics, 
assumptions about gender norms, and visible participation in civic life. This 
final myth encapsulates a variety of claims about Somali failures to assimi-
late, evincing what Ismail Ahmed calls “cultural insecurity” produced by fears 
about difference.
Public harassment of Somali women for their dress has declined over the 
de cade, although distress about their continued practice of wearing hijab 
dominated the early years of Somali settlement in Lewiston when passersby 
regularly criticized women out in public. Women initially did not understand 
what people  were yelling at them when they walked their kids to school and 
shopped downtown, but soon learned the meaning of phrases like “Go home!” 
and “Dress like an American!” Remembering her feelings of shock and humili-
ation after being targeted in public during her first few months after moving to 
the United States, Abdiya asked me, “Why did they bring us  here if they don’t 
want us?” The teacher of one young Somali Bantu friend told her that she was 
being “a hater” by wearing a head scarf to school. Almost all the Somali Bantu 
women I know have been yelled at in public because of their dress.
Concerns about women’s dress signal broader unease about Somali gender 
norms, which many non- Somalis assume are patriarchal and sexist. Blog com-
ments state that non- Somali women are afraid of dealing with male Somali 
customers in their workplace or engaging with Somali men if they enter Somali 
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stores. Several female teachers told me that they  were warned by their white 
superiors to expect sexist behavior from male Somali youths, although none 
ever did. Mayor Macdonald stated in one of his news columns what many oth-
ers discussed more privately: “Living in America, the Somalis must conform to 
our culture. Here men and women are equal. In many places of employment, 
women are the boss. Somali men will have to get over it and conform. There 
can only be one dominant central culture: American.”36 Assumptions about 
Somali patriarchy and female submission make the visible difference of Somali 
women’s dress an affront to American sensibilities regarding gender.37
The anger about women’s dress styles, seen as an explicit rejection of Amer-
ican culture and liberal values, gradually shifted to the aesthetics of Somali 
stores, most of which cover their windows with colorful fabrics (including 
women’s clothing) and sell products labeled in languages other than En glish. 
Lisbon Street hosts as many Somali- owned stores as other businesses and 
offices, causing non- Somali residents to grumble that it has become “Little 
Somalia” in a not- quite- hostile takeover. The chamber of commerce is con-
cerned about complaints from Lewiston’s non- Somali residents that they are 
uncomfortable entering or passing the Somali stores because their windows 
are obscured by fabric and their entryways filled with idle men. People say 
things like, “I don’t know what goes on inside those stores,” and “I’m afraid if 
I go into one they’ll harass me.” A 2010 editorial in the Twin City Times decry-
ing Lewiston’s downtown as “an inner- city ghetto of low income, non- working 
residents” asked readers, “Do you stop to peek in one of the ‘New Mainer’ 
shops with their windows completely covered by fabric? No, you hop in your 
car and get the heck out of there!”38 To address the situation, the chamber of 
commerce approached a number of Somali store own ers to ask if they would 
be willing to make changes, such as removing the window coverings and post-
ing photographs of items for sale in order to make their stores more legible to 
non- Somalis and to make Lisbon Street look more like an American shopping 
center. Thus, although store own ership is a robust form of participation in 
civic life, instead many of Lewiston’s residents experienced Somali aesthet-
ics as an unacceptable intrusion of Somali culture into Lewiston’s downtown 
civic and commercial culture.
The small businessman in American po liti cal and economic iconography 
stands as the quintessential American, the hero of the American economic 
story. But if so many Somalis are small business own ers, then are they the 
heroes of the American story? How are they succeeding when so many oth-
ers have failed? The only explanation is that they must be doing something 
illicit in their stores. Concerns about Somali stores spill over into accusations 
that Somalis do not shop at American- owned stores (except for the claims 
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about their full grocery carts at Walmart). As one woman complained during 
a conversation about Somali involvement in civic life, “I don’t see them at our 
restaurants! Where are they eating?”
As with store own ership, there are many indications that Somalis are em-
bracing an active civic role, although perhaps not in ways non- Somalis grasp 
or accept. While Lewiston’s residents complain that Somalis remain isolated 
in their ethnic enclaves and do not attend the signature annual balloon fes-
tival, the Dempsey Challenge bicycle race, or high school sporting events, 
Somali efforts to engage in other civic ventures have faced re sis tance. Even 
though Somalis are perhaps 15–20 percent of the city’s population, at the end 
of their first de cade in Lewiston the city school board still refused to provide 
interpreters for their meetings; the local school district still refused to allow 
the creation of ell teacher- parent support groups despite urgent requests 
from teachers and Somali parents for such groups; and the city council re-
fused to allow the appointment of noncitizen Somalis to city task forces de-
spite their desire to serve (and recall that the federally designated downtown 
urban poverty zone initially refused to fund any grant proposals by Somali 
community action groups even though Somalis made up the majority of resi-
dents in the targeted zone).39 Somalis had valiantly weathered being yelled at 
on public streets, publicly chastised as overconsumers in grocery checkout 
lines, and chased by loose dogs in public parks. They had responded calmly 
when their two mosques faced assaults: one by a disturbed white man who 
flung a frozen pig head into one mosque, and another by a businessman who 
threatened Somali Bantus at their mosque because he was angry about their 
use of his parking lot. They had endured the incredibly nasty comments that 
always accompanied local newspaper articles about Somali residents in Lew-
iston (until the newspaper altered the rules for posting responses). Somalis 
accepted invitations to participate in panel discussions and focus groups 
for city or social ser vices agencies, and, as noted above, many donated count-
less hours to volunteer initiatives run by Somali community organizations. 
While Somalis may not always participate in community life in ways desired 
by other Lewiston residents, by the beginning of their second de cade in Lew-
iston they had finally begun to claim the right to a public po liti cal voice. In 
a striking display of civic engagement, and after staying out of the spotlight 
during the protests over the Letter a de cade earlier, Somalis led the response 
against Mayor Macdonald’s condescending remarks in 2012 about failed So-
mali culture and the need to assimilate by writing letters of complaint in the 
local newspaper, giving interviews to denounce the mayor’s comments, and 
or ga niz ing a protest march down Lisbon Street. Activism is, of course, a mark 
of demo cratic civic engagement.
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On the Role of the Foreigner
In her book Democracy and the Foreigner, Bonnie Honig argues that the point 
of philosophical and pop u lar democracy origin stories involving foreigners 
is to resolve or make sense of the tensions and contradictions of the role of 
the foreigner, where the foreigner both redeems the democracy and threat-
ens it, replenishes the democracy while taking from it. Foreigners appear 
in American demo cratic theory literature as the found ers and renewers of 
America, the backbone of American exceptionalism as a nation based on 
consent, individualism, and liberty. In this literature, Honig writes, America 
needs foreigner- immigrants, who fulfill important roles in the pop u lar ver-
sions of America’s origin myths, including the myth of capitalist success, in 
which the foreigner- immigrant outworks everyone  else as a devoted entre-
preneur, affirming the possibility of upward mobility for others; the com-
munitarian myth, in which the foreigner models community solidarity for 
those alienated by the predations of capitalism; the patriarchal family myth, 
in which immigrants renew traditional family values and gender roles; and 
the myth of liberalism, confirmed by the desire of the foreigner- immigrant 
to live in America. The four myths each contain within them threats as well: 
that the capitalist immigrant is an instrumentalist taker, only out for himself; 
that the communitarian immigrant self- isolates in an ethnic enclave; that the 
patriarchal immigrant imports illiberal traditional backward values; and that 
“their” naturalization threatens to overwhelm “us.”40
If Honig’s insights are right, then perhaps the myths about Somalis make 
sense if they emerge, in part, from a fear that Somalis are the renewing force 
that will displace those rendered impotent, disempowered, and atomized 
by Lewiston’s long years of economic decline and marginalization. The very 
things for which Somalis are chastised— opening stores, buying cars, creating 
community organizations, trying to serve on task forces and participate in 
community meetings, demanding and demonstrating for their civil rights— 
suggest their potential power as the force of renewal and backbone of a new 
community. The myths then become a way to denounce Somalis as potential 
renewers by insisting on their status as guests, and specifically as recipients of 
charity, burdened by the gift of humanitarianism.
The myths promote hostility about allegations that Somali refugees are un-
grateful beneficiaries of charity who refuse to fulfill the proper role of char-
ity recipients. The contradictions created by the hostile resentment against 
 Somalis for receiving charity because they are refugees, the hostile suspicion 
that Somali refugees do not want to participate in community life in the ways 
in which they are expected, and the hostile response to Somali efforts to 
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participate in community life on their own terms only makes sense if Soma-
lis are, in fact, behaving as ingrates while receiving substantial charity.41 For 
the myths to resonate, Somalis must be seen as receiving charity rather than 
benefits to which they are legally and legitimately entitled as full commu-
nity members. Situating Somalis as charity recipients enables a community- 
wide response of what Derrida has called “hostipitality,”42 the hostility that is 
always contained within hospitality, where, as Michael Herzfeld has shown, 
hospitality is an act of othering that implies a moral indebtedness on the part 
of the recipient and the expectation of eventual reciprocity.43 Positioning So-
malis as foreign, disempowered refugees burdens them as unworthy recipi-
ents of hospitality because dispossessed refugees are presumed to be unable to 
reciprocate.44 Additionally, in return for charity, humanitarianism demands 
silence, dependence, and the renunciation of civic and po liti cal rights, an ex-
pectation that extends from the refugee camps to the new homes of resettled 
refugees, where their welcome demands an apo liti cal life of silence, docility, 
conformity, and unending gratitude.45
This is more than just conjecture. Somali failures to conform to American 
standards of etiquette, civility, and gratitude are a steady topic of complaint. 
A common question from the audience at public pre sen ta tions offered by So-
malis to explain their history is, “Are you grateful to be  here?” People have 
suggested to me that Somalis should publish thank- you letters in the local 
newspapers to let other Lewiston residents know how grateful they are. The 
repeated failure of Somalis to participate in the annual Dempsey Challenge 
bicycle race and the balloon festival is interpreted as ingratitude to the host 
community (although bloggers express outrage that Somalis hold their own 
in de pen dence day celebration, but on Somali and not American in de pen-
dence day). Constant expressions of appreciation, including the ubiquitous 
use of words like “please” and “thank you” are abnormal in Somali speech, 
which heightens the perception that Somalis do not express their apprecia-
tion properly or enthusiastically enough. In Somali, Somalis say, “Give me 
that,” a matter- of- fact command that relies on clarity rather than some formu-
lation like “Could you please pass me that?,” which to many Somalis sounds 
oddly and unnecessarily obsequious. That Somalis in stores or ser vice centers 
sound demanding rather than gracious feeds talk about Somali pushiness 
and aggression in making demands, most especially the women.46 In one of 
his editorials, Mayor Macdonald asked, “How do submissive Somali women 
turn into obnoxious customers at the grocery store cash register?” (In an 
effort not to appear racist, however, he suggests that “extremist” white liber-
als are to blame, for telling “submissive” Somali women, “Stand up for your 
rights!”)47
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Concerns about standards of etiquette extend to other public spaces as 
well, such as school events, where Somali participants are maligned for talk-
ing during ceremonies and failing to observe cues to be silent. During the 
opening of Museum la’s Rivers of Immigration exhibit, people in the audi-
ence yelled “Shut up!” at the Somali Bantu dance troupe when some troupe 
members  were talking among themselves while another member attempted 
to explain to the audience the meaning of the dance.
As Honig notes, the figure of the foreigner as a central figure for the story 
of American democracy is simultaneously ambivalent and frightening. In 
Lewiston, positioning Somalis as foreigners, in addition to as charity recipi-
ents, partitions them off from the community in another important way. The 
hostile discourses in Lewiston about charity for refugees mirror broader ac-
cusations about welfare in general, but with a slight twist. In Lewiston, the 
complaint about refugee use of welfare is that there will not be enough left 
over for “our people.” The debate in Lewiston is not about whether welfare is 
good or bad; it is about whether or not refugee immigrants should count as 
community members who legitimately qualify for help.48 It is about determin-
ing who belongs to the community, and thus complaining about refugee use 
of state assistance is easier if refugees are denied other forms of community 
membership, such as on task forces or parent school committees. Defining 
refugees as charity recipients thus ensures that they remain outside the com-
munity defined by moral responsibility.
The exclusion of Somalis from the moral community, and thus the commu-
nity of legitimate welfare recipients, is deepened by the ways in which Somali 
support structures are visible to non- Somalis in Lewiston who express resent-
ment and longing for such networks of care and mutual support. A wistful 
discourse has emerged among some of Lewiston’s poorer residents at the sight 
of Somali sociality, which is obvious in public arenas where men gather every 
day on the sidewalks outside Somali shops to talk, and where women always 
shop in groups, care for each other’s children, and constantly gather in each 
other’s apartments. Listening to Somalis talking in an Adult Education class 
about solving a community issue by asking the elders to step in, a local non- 
Somali woman turns to a classmate and says, “I wish we had elders.” A teacher 
in the Adult Education ell program remarks that each new Somali arrival 
in Lewiston is embraced by resident Somalis, who offer help with shopping, 
transport, child care, and the challenges of settling into a new city. Everyone 
 else in the Adult Education classes can see that every new Somali arrival in 
Lewiston instantly “has people,” a display of conviviality that does not include 
them. The teacher wonders if her Somali students might be able to extend 
their welcoming efforts to other, non- Somali newcomers as well.
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Kim Wettlaufer, the director of Trinity day shelter and food pantry, simi-
larly notes the gulf between his Somali and non- Somali clients in their ac-
cess to social support networks. One day when I was visiting Trinity, a very 
young white woman appeared at Kim’s door to ask for help. She explained 
she was struggling to take care of her two special needs children. Apologetic 
and embarrassed about asking for help, she explained that her husband was 
unemployed, repeating several times, “I have no one to help me. I have no 
one.” Kim sees that the strong Somali community support structures offer a 
palpable sense of community that many of his non- Somali clients utterly lack. 
This may be why it is so challenging for people to grasp that the overflow-
ing shopping carts of Somalis represent the careful pooling of resources by 
many families who buy together in bulk and divide the food when they get 
home or that Somali car own ership is often the result of several families com-
bining resources to purchase a car they share.49 Perhaps the apparent vital-
ity of the Somali community suggests something uncomfortable about the 
non- Somali community, provoking a backlash about “their” ability to benefit 
from “our welfare.” Fears of gangs of Somali children relate to fears of being 
outnumbered. Each of the myths I list above speaks to Honig’s four myths of 
the foreigner- renewer of American democracy, by insisting that Somali entre-
preneurialism must be dangerous and related to illegitimate access to public 
resources, that Somali community structures are exclusionary, that Somali 
cultural and aesthetic practices are unacceptably traditional or disgusting, 
and that they did not struggle to get  here and do not want to naturalize.
The fact of Somali physical difference as black people in a white city of-
fers another unmistakable marker of their foreignness, and racist views obvi-
ously pervade the myths, especially in a country where welfare dependence 
and criminality have long been associated with blackness. Racial difference 
is where the unifying story of America as a nation of immigrants falters and 
breaks. African immigration has remained comparatively tiny since the era of 
the slave trade until recent years, which in the racial calculus of the contempo-
rary United States positions Somali refugee immigrants as African Americans 
and not Euro- Americans who will assimilate into mainstream whiteness. Their 
blackness in U.S. racial ideology combined with their identity as “refugees” 
labels them as charity recipients rather than workers, positioning them within 
broader American pop u lar discourses about lazy and criminal black people 
dependent on welfare, refusing to join mainstream (white) American culture.
Honig argues that democracy, like the history of immigration, is all about 
claiming rights, claiming participation, and insisting on voice, and is crafted 
and learned by fighting for voice and rights rather than through things like 
citizenship classes for immigrants.50 She wonders whether myths of the 
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immigrant’s value to the nation can be, in effect, repurposed for the benefit 
of a more expansive democracy rather than to shore up the nation, sharing a 
hopeful vision of demo cratic cosmopolitanism in which immigrants stretch 
po liti cal practice into a form of border- crossing demo cratic practice. Somali 
refugees in Lewiston reject the imposition of a localized subjectivity as charity 
recipients who ought to express gratitude and docility for the right to live in 
Lewiston, insisting, instead, that they have the right as human beings to live 
a decent life and to keep their (transnational) families safe. They argue that 
they are not responsible for the war that destroyed Somalia and do not need 
to be especially grateful to be living in the United States, where they are suffer-
ing and working hard to support families in Lewiston, Kenya, and Somalia. 
Somalis view the right to be mobile as a human right, not a humanitarian 
gift, and contest the idea that resettlement, which they feel they have worked 
very hard for, is a form of charity.
In addition to rejecting the presumption of gratitude, they also fight back 
against the imposition of a narrowly defined understanding of blackness in 
America, as well as the neoliberal calculus that defines economic produc-
tivity as the sole mea sure of human worth and individual autonomy and 
consumption as laudable goals. Through demonstrating alternative modes of 
blackness, alternative models of reciprocity, sharing, and collectivity, and a 
per sis tent insistence on mobility as normal to human life, as part of the largest 
group of African refugees in America, Somali and Somali Bantu refugee im-
migrants may very well begin to stretch demo cratic practice in ways foreseen 
by Honig. We shall return to these points in part III.
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Helpers in the Neoliberal Borderlands
The recipient of hospitality, no less than the re-
cipient of the bureaucrat’s rude rejection, remains 
“other” until the groaning tables can be turned, or 
until both chairs are moved to the same side of  
the desk.
— Michael Herzfeld, The Social Production  
of Indifference
It is a typical Thursday at Trinity Jubilee Center on a winter morning: freez-
ing outside, the kind of bone- rattling Maine cold that makes your eyeballs 
feel frozen and your throat raw. Inside, the large basement room is packed, 
as usual on food pantry Thursdays, with a vast array of people. The long 
food pantry line of refugee moms and kids, old homeless alcoholics, young 
scarred men, middle- aged men and women down on their luck, and very 
young white families with babies in tow snakes from the kitchen to the outer 
room, where people in line compete for space with those sorting through the 
mounds of donated winter clothing piled on the tables on either side of the 
line. Somali women move up and down the line greeting each other, their 
kids trailing behind with mittens dangling, snow boots leaking water, parkas 
partially unzipped, noses running. Everything is muddy today. Many of the 
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Somali women wear sweatpants under their thin dresses and long underwear 
under their sweatpants, although, astonishingly, some continue to wear sandals 
throughout the winter. The center is also a gathering place for people who live 
on the street or in homeless shelters with lockout hours during the day, some 
of whom struggle with substance dependence or mental illness. While the food 
pantry line slowly moves, some of Trinity’s other clients mill about the room 
as they wait for lunch, talking to themselves, humming, chatting with each 
other, watching tv, looking at the wall, gently rocking. A few munch on the 
free doughnuts available at a side table. The director, Kim Wettlaufer, perches 
on his stool at his usual place, struggling to keep order in the food pantry line 
as women continually abandon their spots to talk to friends and as people in 
line push against people sorting through clothing. When an unstable man be-
gins yelling his suspicions that Somali women are cutting in line in the course 
of greeting each other, a couple of the Somali women try to engage with him, 
saying in a way they intend to be friendly, “Sorry my friend” and “What’s 
your problem?” while other Somali women giggle at their attempts to speak 
En glish. Other men kindly invite young Somali moms with toddlers to move 
ahead of them in line. Patsy, a Trinity regular who once accused Kim of favor-
ing the refugees over his other clients, is busy pointing out nice things in the 
donated clothing pile to a Somali woman.
Kim asks me to take over monitoring the line while he attends to some 
office chores. I shiver as I climb onto the stool, placed in front of the room’s 
only entrance, which is constantly opening as people stream in and out. Kim 
notices my shivering and confides that he is never not cold during the win-
ter at Trinity because the door is rarely closed for long. The kitchen is busy 
preparing the day’s free lunch, and the smell of good food mingles with the 
rancid smell of the buckets used to mop the old linoleum floors. At noon, as 
the food pantry line winds down, the man in charge of the hot lunch program 
tells everyone to stand and gives a short rousing prayer before the lunch line 
opens. A skinny older white woman wearing a fringed faux leather jacket says 
to the man in front of her, “I’m too drunk to pay attention.”
Despite, or maybe because of, the mingling of bodies, voices, smells, and 
stuff, Trinity always has a relaxed feel, even when women in the line are fight-
ing over a spot, even when a young man high on drugs begins causing trou-
ble and is quietly ejected by Kim, even when the woman who responds to 
voices only she can hear starts talking out loud, even with the tv blaring, the 
phone ringing, the kitchen staff hollering to each other, the little kids squeal-
ing, the door constantly flapping open, and the anthropologist trying out her 
rusty Somali on her old friends. Trinity’s uniqueness is its universal welcome, 
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where visitors are subject to no expectations or demands other than mutual 
consideration.
This chapter looks at people like Kim who work in the wholly or partially 
state- funded neoliberal borderlands to patch together a fraying safety net for 
those living in economic precarity and social marginality, including impov-
erished refugees. Neoliberal borderlands are fraught, contested spaces, where 
the provision of assistance by the welfare state to those living in precarity 
confronts neoliberal reforms and rhetoric that pillories those who receive as-
sistance for their dependence on “government handouts.” As the welfare state 
contracts with curtailments in food stamps, tanf, General Assistance, unem-
ployment assistance, Head Start, and public funding for education, and the 
extension of some social ser vices shifts to nonprofits and other agencies that 
compete for shrinking government support, people like Kim network with 
each other and with public employees in the schools, hospitals, courts, and 
welfare offices to pick up the pieces by trying to provide assistance to those 
who need it. My years of fieldwork in Lewiston ensured I spent a lot of time in 
the neoliberal borderlands as well, volunteering in Trinity’s food pantry and 
in ell classes at local public schools, serving on statewide boards concerned 
with multiculturalism in state agencies and the provision of legal ser vices 
and advocacy for immigrants and refugees, and joining committees with local 
caseworkers, social workers, mental health counselors, health care workers, 
and teachers to discuss how better to extend educational, social ser vices, and 
health care support for “New Mainers.”1 This chapter explores what is hap-
pening in the neoliberal borderlands where people who are being crushed by 
some combination of poverty, homelessness, mental illness, illness, racism, 
and xenophobia go to seek help and support, and where frontline social ser-
vice providers in schools, hospitals, police, and social welfare agencies engage 
them. This interface is the location of a third narrative about Lewiston’s expe-
rience with Somali refugees, a narrative that sees the offer of assistance to 
refugees as a component of community responsibility for assisting the poor 
and the marginalized.
Many studies of social support agencies that operate in the neoliberal 
borderlands reveal the ways in which case workers, social workers, and street- 
level bureaucrats are often forced to operate as agents of neoliberal reform, 
mandating expectations such as work requirements and obedient subjection 
to state surveillance (for substance use,  house hold membership, unreported 
income), and more. These studies make sense of how the “helping profes-
sions” simultaneously help and police, offer care and cruelty.2 Somali refugees 
fully recognize the ways in which they are regulated and monitored by the 
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agencies that offer them help. My field notes are filled with examples: rumors 
about families in danger of losing their children to the state because of one 
infraction or another; fears that shoplifting by little kids could result in de-
portation; a Somali man at a cultural orientation meeting offered by Catholic 
Charities in Lewiston elegantly voicing his experience: “In Africa children 
listened to and respected adults. In Africa I was the head of the  house hold, 
with my wife beside me, and the children listened to me. Not  here. Back home 
the government  wasn’t involved in the families but  here the government is the 
head of the family.” He and others describe the ways in which caseworkers 
scrutinize family life, observing interactions between parents and children, 
policing parental discipline, imposing standards for hygiene and domes-
tic cleanliness, recording births, deaths, marriages, divorces, and any other 
changes in  house hold membership, monitoring wages gained and lost, and 
conducting regular inspections of family homes in public housing projects. 
Talking about the treatment of newly resettled Somali Bantu families in Lew-
iston, a Somali social worker ranted to me one day about the government 
surveillance that accompanies public assistance:
Public assistance allows people to come in and inspect and question every-
thing about your private life. My private life is nobody’s business! All the 
people who are on welfare are brutalized by it. They are just beaten down 
by it. It is punishing, and demeaning, and makes them dependent and un-
able to make a decision on their own. If anything happens in my life I’m 
not going to have a caseworker coming down the hallway to inspect my 
 house, interview my children. Housing agents have their own keys and can 
come in whenever they want! They claim that they are inspecting things, 
that there are bed bugs. They tell a poor Somali Bantu guy that he has to 
throw away all his mattresses and bedding and rugs and everything! What 
is he supposed to do! Oh! it makes me cry!
Resettled refugees who depend on social ser vices and publicly funded pro-
grams during their adjustment to life in the United States are utterly exposed 
to the surveillance of government authorities in their lives.
But in addition to discipline, judgment, surveillance, and control, the en-
counter between those seeking assistance and those employed to offer assistance 
might also be characterized by care, mutuality, affection, and respect. This 
chapter draws attention to those who work in publicly funded neoliberal bor-
der zones, like public school ell programs, social ser vices agencies, welfare 
offices, and day shelters, who see themselves as struggling, alongside their 
clients, against the marginalizing forces of xenophobia, racism, and neolib-
eral reforms to welfare. The pressures in the state- funded neoliberal border-
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lands are acute in Maine, where the current governor (Paul LePage) ran for 
office on a promise to reduce the number of people receiving welfare, disabil-
ity, unemployment, and MaineCare (the state’s public assistance program for 
health care), to put state employees in the unemployment line themselves, 
to deny many noncitizen immigrants access to welfare assistance, to reduce 
state funding for public schools (expressing his desire to close down the state’s 
Department of Education), to break the remaining vestiges of  union power, and 
to deregulate everything that hinders business. Even though he won his first 
term with only 38 percent of the vote, his policies and rhetoric demand compli-
ance from state employees, many of whom are horrified about the proposed and 
intended cuts to public support programs.3 As funding for welfare programs, 
public housing, and public schools repeatedly comes under attack, and as 
the rhetoric from some of the city’s and state’s leading politicians per sis tently 
identifies immigrants as a problem to be eradicated, those who work in the 
social ser vices sector with immigrants and the poor feel acutely the unstable, 
insecure provision of assistance to people living in economic precarity and so-
cial marginality. People whose career choices  were motivated by a belief that 
those who need help should get it, yet who work in an environment where 
people who seek public assistance are negatively judged for their failure to 
achieve self- sufficiency, responsibility, and autonomy, are also being crushed.
Focusing on those derided by Lewiston’s Mayor Macdonald as “boo- hoo 
white do- gooders” and by the city newspaper’s managing editor as out- of- 
touch “insulated” social workers and educators, this chapter offers short pro-
files of people who, through their jobs and personal philosophies, contest the 
xenophobic discourses described in chapter  5.4 The people described  here 
extend care and support to immigrants and poor people through poorly com-
pensated work that is often challenging, depressing, subject to bureaucratic 
assessment pressures, and met with hostility by those opposed to the provision 
of social ser vices to the poor and those perceived as foreign. Many live ma-
terially modest lives and some live in the same neighborhoods as the Somali 
immigrants with whom they work. My focus  here is not on their economic 
circumstances as employees, but rather on the affect they bring to the neolib-
eral borderland where they extend help and care to resettled refugees. Watch-
ing them try to locate sources of economic assistance for people unable to 
pay their utility bills, to provide extra child care for toddlers to mothers with 
many other children to care for, to connect hungry families to food pantry 
provisions, to offer extra educational support to children whose language and 
family background stymie their progress in school, to guarantee safety and 
security and trust in the law, I was repeatedly struck by their insistent devo-
tion to an expansive understanding of community and to the provision of 
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professional ser vices to people stigmatized as eco nom ically unproductive, in 
a social and work context where neoliberal rhetoric blames their clients for 
their poverty and marginalization and pillories them for complicity in welfare 
dependence. The profiles below try to explain why they do this work and what 
they struggle against to extend help and care.
A conversation in 2010 with a local welfare supervisor opened my eyes 
to the professional pride that I highlight  here. After several years of bureau-
cratic confusion in Lewiston’s welfare office about the rights of immigrants 
and refugees to welfare assistance, this man volunteered to take on the extra 
responsibility for overseeing and coordinating benefits for refugees in the 
Lewiston- Auburn area. He explained to me his special interest in working 
with refugees: “You don’t want to have the reputation of not being able to give 
people the assistance they are eligible for. These people have experienced a 
lot of stress and we don’t want to give them any more. This is very rewarding 
work, seeing the hardships these people have gone through lessen because of 
this agency [dhhs]. I get a lot of joy out of it.”5 While attending every diversity 
training offered by his department and educating himself about the benefit 
structure available to refugees, he was upset to see, early in the first de cade of 
Somali immigration, “clients coming in and not getting assistance for benefits 
they are eligible for and just breaking down. That  can’t happen. I take pride in 
this. I take pride in making sure they’re not left out or excluded, because they 
are part of the community.” Reflecting on his thirty years of work in welfare 
assistance, he explained that as “a die- hard Demo crat” he really believes in 
the safety net and the responsibility of the government to help people in need, 
expressing frustration at people who say, “If they don’t have a job, cut them 
off!” “Look around!” he tells me in response. “Look at the unemployment  here! 
Look at the businesses closing! If the government  doesn’t help out- of- work 
people, what will happen to them? If your neighbor loses his job, are you going 
to take in his family, give them shelter and food? You better be glad we have a 
government who offers support, who ensures a safety net for people who run 
into hardships. If the state  doesn’t help who will?” He is infuriated at the un-
founded complaints about Somali welfare fraud and unworthiness, remarking 
that in his long history of home visits, he never once visited a family whom 
he believed to be fraudulently requesting assistance. And yet he faces, daily, 
accusations from other citizens and from the state’s politicians that his clients 
are undeserving, that their benefits are negatively impacting the benefits of 
“real” Mainers, and that he is complicit in supporting people making illegiti-
mate claims to assistance.
I found echoes of the welfare officer’s insistence that people who need 
assistance deserve assistance in the frustration I heard from some of the 
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publicly funded job skills and CareerCenter counselors I knew, who expressed 
far more irritation with close- minded or racist employers than with job seek-
ers, as discussed in chapter 5. In standing up for the people they assist, sev-
eral city, state, and federal employees who work in welfare, employment, and 
public housing offices clearly articulated to me, over numerous interviews, 
their views about deleterious effects on poor people of bud get cuts to critical 
social programs, especially in the face of tax cuts for the rich and special state- 
supported financial benefits for corporations. As professionals who work to 
alleviate poverty through the provision of welfare support and job training, 
these ser vice providers insist on an understanding of community that situ-
ates the refugee newcomers as equally legitimate and deserving recipients of 
support, a sometimes exhausting position to hold in the face of constant as-
sertions to the contrary.
In short, while the ethnographic accounts of how the helping professions 
police and discipline refugee subjects are undoubtedly true, of equal impor-
tance are those in the helping professions who, feeling the weight of injustice 
and exclusion deep in their hearts and souls, work to subvert and maneuver 
within a system that constrains them just as it constrains the refugees. Those 
caseworkers and public employees who hold those jobs because they believe 
strongly in the value of a welfare state rather than because they see themselves 
as the shock troops of neoliberal reform are fighting such reforms, alongside 
their clients, every step of the way. Often they struggle against colleagues who do 
not share their view, and sometimes they work in environments where they 
are lone voices of re sis tance, but that does not make their actions or philo-
sophical orientations marginal or unimportant. Recognizing the emotional 
lives and personal philosophies of teachers, welfare officers, police, and other 
social ser vices providers is important because, as part of the bureaucratic 
machinery that reproduces social hierarchies, patterns of exclusion, and the 
governmental production of subjectivity, their subjectivity is often erased in 
accounts of bureaucratic racism and the imposition of neoliberal reforms.
The snapshots below highlight three dimensions of the attitudes and 
motivations of those profiled  here: professionalism, an expansive and future- 
oriented understanding of community, and reflexive mutuality. Some people 
mentioned  here, like the welfare officer, explain their orientation as a commit-
ment to professionalism defined by the belief that the state exists to provide for 
and protect those who need help, that those who need welfare or extra school-
ing or health care should get it, and that their job is to ensure everyone gets ac-
cess to the support they need. They are proud of their ability to solve problems 
and ensure access to food, housing, diapers, health care, security, or quality 
education. Some people, like Kim Wettlaufer and former Mayor Gilbert, are 
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clearly motivated by a profound sense of responsibility for those marginalized 
by mainstream society, a compassionate orientation that they feel particularly 
acutely for refugee immigrants struggling to adjust. Defining “community” as 
inclusive of difference and alterity offers a very different vision of Lewiston’s 
future than the one presented in chapter 5.
Finally, some of those profiled  here emphasize how they have grown per-
sonally through their relationships with refugees and meaningful engagements 
with difference. Their motivation emerges from a sense of mutual human con-
nection through which they are creating a new self. When Cheryl Hamilton 
says, “Refugees saved my spirit,” or Janet Saliba describes her commitment to her 
community work by saying, “This isn’t a job. It’s a lifestyle,” they are express-
ing an alternative understanding of personhood, engagement, and commu-
nity to the one pressing in from broader discourses of self- help, in de pen dence, 
autonomy, and xenophobia. They are trying to work toward a community in 
which diversity is not something to accommodate but is, rather, at the heart 
of community life, where Somali immigrants are fellow community members 
rather than needy clients or guests and where engaging alterity is about 
mutuality rather than difference.
Glimpses of their moments of despair also appear in the profiles below, when 
their compassion, desire for professionalism, and experiences of mutuality are 
squashed by the hostility, denigration, or re sis tance of their colleagues or by 
the mechanisms of accommodation that enforce hierarchies of human value. 
Fragile and earnest people get bruised, including not only the refugees but 
others who define their lives in tandem with them.
The Day Shelter Director, 2009–2010
The tone at Trinity is set by its director, Kim Wettlaufer, a kind, gentle man who 
admires and respects the people he serves. For years, Trinity, located in the 
basement of an Episcopal church but maintaining a nonreligious identity, has 
provided assistance with life’s necessities and challenges to Lewiston’s down-
town population, offering a welcoming place to hang out during the day, a free 
hot lunch, (pre- owned) clothing and toys, and free caseworker assistance with 
landlords, the courts, lawyers, the police, schools, utility companies, bills, doc-
tors, counselors, and more. When the refugees began moving in downtown, 
Kim went door to door to meet the new arrivals, hired Somali- speaking case-
workers to ensure the center’s ser vices  were accessible and available to them, 
and started the city’s first after- school homework help program for Somali- 
speaking kids. The tiny Trinity staff, which for years included Janet Saliba, a 
feisty Bates college student, and Jama Mahmood, a Somali Bantu refugee and 
founding member of sbyam, along with a few other Somali and non- Somali 
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staff and volunteers, act as counselors, job skills trainers, translators, listeners, 
drivers, advocates, scribes, tutors, mentors, and friends. During the day a con-
stant stream of people passes through Trinity seeking help with everything 
from reading mail to paying bills to responding to a legal summons to asking 
for money to cover a shortfall. Kim regularly opens his wallet to offer small 
loans, proudly noting the full repayment rate of his clients. Trinity is usually 
the first stop for other ngos and city institutions seeking to make contacts 
with the refugee population. Coaches at the city’s schools depend on Trinity 
to make sure the Somali kids have completed their physicals before the start 
of each athletic season; school principals call Trinity when Somali kids are in 
trouble and for help meeting with Somali parents; social ser vices staff from 
local agencies shadow Kim to meet the city’s downtown Somali residents and 
use Trinity’s interpreters; the public health authorities use Trinity to give vac-
cines and public health information; local businesses with goods to donate 
(mattresses, shoes, food, electronics) go through Trinity to manage the distri-
bution; and the juvenile justice staff depend on Trinity to shepherd families 
through the system when their kids get arrested. While many other organiza-
tions in the city dithered about how to extend their ser vices to Somalis, Kim 
spent little time making plans but rather just said yes to things if he thought 
they would help his constituency. His attitude seems to be one of generous 
faith that good intentions will work. For example, one day a local physician 
dropped by while I was at Trinity to ask if she could open a public clinic in 
Trinity’s basement room for the downtown population. After resigning her 
position at the short- lived downtown International Clinic in frustration over 
management issues, she hoped to start a new free medical clinic. Surveying 
the modestly sized space, Kim answered “Sure” without hesitation, as I looked 
around with uncertainty about where the clinic would be located. Although 
their meeting lasted less than half an hour, it was a stunning departure from 
the many meetings I had witnessed elsewhere in Lewiston in which partici-
pants’ worries about logistical, legal, social, linguistic, and economic challenges 
repeatedly derailed new refugee- oriented program suggestions. The medical 
clinic was up and running within months.
A typical Thursday begins with the lineup for the food pantry as up to three 
hundred people file through to collect what ever is on offer that week. Dona-
tions determine much of what is available, which may vary from hundreds of 
pounds of rapidly thawing potatoes one week to hundreds of jars of peaches in 
syrup the next, along with diapers, canned foods, occasional vegetables, and, 
sometimes, hotel- sized body products. There is often an abundance of things 
like canned sauerkraut and bottled salad dressings in uncommon flavors (blue-
berry ginger, pomegranate, chipotle ranch). When I volunteered at Trinity in 
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2009–10, staff members Janet and Erica usually worked the pantry, along with 
the occasional Somali student volunteering during school vacations, greeting 
each client by name with hugs, handshakes, and smiles, and using the moment 
to check in about recent or upcoming doctor’s appointments, kids who might 
be old enough to qualify for Head Start, school paperwork to be signed, or other 
pending matters. Working the pantry was exhausting— individualized social-
izing across language barriers combined with the physical monotony of four 
hours of turning, bending, lifting, handing, turning, bending, lifting, handing. 
Janet and Erica seemed to love it.
While the food pantry line weaves through the basement and the kitchen, 
another line forms for the hot lunch served at midday. After school the room 
fills with up to a hundred kids, along with the volunteers who help them with 
homework, while women sort through the donated clothing and Kim runs 
errands for his clients— taking food to a sick mother, taking a young man 
for his driver’s test, seeing a lawyer about a recalcitrant landlord, visiting 
people in the hospital and in jail, tracking down a kid whose worried mother 
 can’t find him, attending sporting events and citizenship ceremonies of his 
clients. Over the course of an hour- long conversation with Kim in the office, 
his phone might ring a half dozen times and over a dozen people will peek 
through the door to ask for his help, while students working on homework 
line up to use the computer or borrow office supplies. Attendees at the Advice 
for America conference  were asked to name the most important organiza-
tions in Lewiston for supporting the refugee population, and Trinity topped 
the list, a sentiment repeated in a 2010 meeting with Somali Bantu teenagers 
who immediately said “Trinity” and “Kim” when they  were asked to name the 
best things in Lewiston.
The staff at Trinity actively rejects the myths reviewed in chapter 5 that 
castigate foreigners as the enemy within. In addition to standing against xe-
nophobia, Trinity stands with the poor more generally by rejecting neolib-
eral discourses that equate poverty with laziness and irresponsibility. In Kim’s 
view, the new refugees and Lewiston’s historically impoverished population 
have much in common because of the social and economic calculus of mar-
ginality that bundles together and stigmatizes the poor, minorities, and for-
eigners as marginal and threatening to national security. While some of Kim’s 
non- Somali clients occasionally grumble that the refugees get undeserved 
special treatment, during my days at Trinity I noticed many small moments 
of mutuality. One day, for example, I chatted with Lucien, a crusty old Trin-
ity regular, as he watched Xawo’s little grandson, decked out in a tiny denim 
jacket dotted with sequins that spelled out “Pretty Girl” in looping script, play-
ing hide and seek between the racks of donated clothing. Smiling— Lucien is 
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always smiling—he said to me, “All kids are alike, aren’t they?” After a pause 
to chuckle at the boy’s antics, he continued, “Underneath this [skin and cloth-
ing]  we’re all the same, that’s what I say. I came  here from Canada; they came 
 here from Somalia; but  we’re all alike.” Lucien has lived in Lewiston nearly 
all his life, mostly in the downtown neighborhood. “I hear the others say bad 
things about the Somalis,” he confided. “They call them the Salamies, and I tell 
them to stop it. I tell them, if you don’t want the Somalis  here, then you don’t 
want me  here either. We’re all the same. If you treat them bad, then you’re 
treating me bad. We’re all the same.” Lucien’s jovial attitude is infectious. Shift-
ing his attention from Xawo’s grandson to an el derly Asian American woman, 
another Trinity regular, he grins and propositions her. She laughs. Then he 
flirts with me and I laugh.
Kim agrees with Lucien that all the families living downtown “have a lot in 
common,” listing the issues that arrest the lives of all the people with whom 
he works— extreme poverty, fragmented families, illiteracy or little education, 
poor health, economic and emotional instability, children getting into trouble— 
and noting that Trinity is the only place in the city, apart from Walmart, where 
adult white Lewistonians and Somalis come together every single day. Because 
of their poverty, Kim says, “These folks, on a day- to- day basis, are the exact 
same way. Their biggest barrier with each other is communication.”6
Kim’s job at Trinity is really more like his life. Along with his small staff of 
caseworkers, he is always on call, running errands or meeting with clients 
until late in the eve ning and on weekends. After I’d known him several years, 
I asked Kim to explain why he does the work he does. He became the full- time 
director at Trinity after almost twenty years as a successful businessman, 
trading a routine working day for a 24/7 job with people struggling with some 
of life’s greatest trials. Looking away, he knitted his eyebrows and responded, 
“Hmm. No one has ever asked me that before.” The next week he recounted 
his path to Trinity, which began with volunteer work at a local hospice, then 
delivering food to el derly people, and then learning about Trinity and joining 
the board, volunteering a few hours a week, which grew to a few days a week, 
which became a full- time job when he agreed to step in as director and com-
mitted to running Trinity seven days a week as a day shelter. When he began 
to spend time in the homes of some of the first Somali arrivals in the down-
town neighborhood, he was deeply moved by their resilience in the face of 
enormous pain, physical ailments, and huge cultural and linguistic barriers. 
He offered special support to one refugee mother, whose loving care and af-
fection for her severely disabled wheelchair- bound child particularly touched 
him. “Some of the things  we’ve seen are just amazing. And to be treated as 
part of the family . . .” he broke off, emotional. “To say it changed my life is 
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an understatement.” Kim’s work, and routine involvement with car accidents, 
injuries, arrests, violence, psychological breakdowns, evictions, and other life 
catastrophes, has inoculated him against crisis: “Now I don’t sweat the small 
stuff. The little things that used to upset me, like my basement flooding or 
something wrong with my car, are put into perspective. It makes you realize 
how lucky you are. When you hear the stories and know what people have 
been through, it puts things in perspective. Not just the refugee population, 
but everyone I work with at Trinity.”
While Trinity offers a model of collaborative, inclusive community build-
ing, Kim is unable to extend this practice into a more activist form of poli-
tics because Trinity is dependent on public and private funding for its tiny 
bud get. After Trinity helped to or ga nize the public meeting where refugee 
parents yelled at school authorities, Kim experienced enough of a backlash 
from those authorities to convince him that Trinity must steer clear of ac-
tivist politics and, instead, continue to maintain its public profile as model-
ing a preference for the poor. In this sense Kim’s orientation is more reactive 
rather than proactive; he ensures Trinity is able to offer support and advocacy 
(with landlords, for example), but he does not define himself as an activist. As 
a space of refuge and nonjudgmental care based on a fundamental commit-
ment to compassion, Trinity can offer a buffer but not a solution to poverty 
and precarity.
The Mayor, 2007–2011
During his two terms as Lewiston’s mayor (2007–2011), former chief of po-
lice Larry Gilbert maintained an insistently positive attitude about Lewiston’s 
transformation by the arrival of Somali immigrants, in stark contrast to the 
mayors who preceded and followed him (Mayor Raymond of the Letter fame 
and “leave your culture at the door” Mayor Macdonald). Mayor Gilbert used 
his regular column in the Twin City Times to express support and admira-
tion for Lewiston’s newest immigrants, to decry “corporate welfare,” corporate 
greed, and tax cuts for the prosperous, to promote progressive immigration 
reform, and to offer expansive definitions of community.7 Mayor Gilbert ex-
plained to me that his attitude emerged from two formative dimensions of his 
life: his immigrant ancestry and his Catholicism.
I see so many similarities to Franco- Americans and people get upset with 
me for saying that. Francos came  here to work. Somalis came  here out of 
necessity and to feel safe. They are both good family people. The num-
ber one thing they’ll say about choosing Lewiston is safety. They fled a 
civil war. Terrible things happened to them, and then they fled the gangs 
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and drugs of the cities where they  were first settled in the U.S. By word of 
mouth they learned it’s nice here— the people are good; the education is 
good; and it’s safe. They came from an area where, when the police come 
to get you, you’re never seen again. Here the police are working with them 
on community issues. When they came  here, after getting their kids into 
schools, the first thing they wanted to do was build a mosque. What was 
the first thing the Catholics did?8
The answer, of course, is that they built a church. Noting that the Ku Klux Klan 
in Maine targeted Catholic Irish and Franco- American immigrants, Mayor 
Gilbert argues that each new immigrant group experiences xenophobic  hatred 
despite all the values they hold in common with previous arrivals. In his 
newspaper columns, Mayor Gilbert was clear that the real problems are not 
immigrants and the differences they bring, but rather state- supported cor-
porate greed and its withering effect on communities, a po liti cal perspective 
he actively promotes in his vigorous public and online presence and po liti cal 
activism. The role of government, according to Gilbert, is to lead, which he 
understands to mean fighting in e qual ity, caring for those who need help, and 
promoting an inclusive definition of community.
During his tenure with the police department, Gilbert inaugurated a 
cultural training program that emphasized the commonalities shared by 
people who, despite their different cultural backgrounds, care about similar 
community- oriented issues like family, safety, religion, education, and decent 
jobs. “We’re all one humanity. If people would just take time and communi-
cate! Communication is critical,” he explains, regularly chastising complain-
ing constituents who acknowledged to him they had never actually talked 
with a Somali immigrant before making generalized character judgments 
about the newcomers. One day he recounted to me his dismay when, the pre-
vious Sunday, his priest asked in Mass for a show of hands by congregants 
who had spoken with a new immigrant during the previous week. Gilbert’s 
was the sole raised hand. During his campaign and after assuming office, he 
made a point of getting to know as many Somali residents as possible, plac-
ing Somalis on his advisory boards, greeting Somalis in Somali in public, and 
finding in their life stories and hopes and dreams for the future resonances 
with his own background in a French- speaking working- class immigrant 
family. In one conversation about his background, he told me his memory 
of watching his mother, a shoe stitcher, walking to the bus station in the dark 
every morning to go to work, where despite her skill she always struggled to 
master new patterns, knowing she stuck with it to provide for her family. “I 
see that they [Somali immigrants] are doing the same thing and we are all 
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God’s children. . . .  I believe in God and I believe in life after death and that 
you will meet your maker one day and it’s all going to depend on how you live 
your life. When God asks you, “I sent my children to live among you and how 
did you treat them?,’ you had better know how to answer that question.”
Mayor Gilbert’s stance contains a religious philosophy of mutual humanity 
and care as well as a belief that Lewiston’s future, as was its past, is intimately 
bound with immigrant participation. Because of his belief in an expansive 
notion of community and collaboration, inflected with compassion, empathy, 
and an ethic of social justice toward all of Lewiston’s poor, Gilbert shares with 
Kim Wettlaufer the conviction that communities must provide for their poor-
est members and that the role of government is to offer assistance and care 
rather than exclusion and judgment.
In a searing editorial denouncing the claims of a local newspaper editor 
that Lewiston’s immigrants and poor are welfare cheats who are destroying the 
city, Maine’s Roman Catholic bishop, Richard Malone, supported the alterna-
tive vision promoted in Mayor Gilbert’s newspaper columns. Bishop Malone’s 
editorial articulated an understanding of community based in an effort to cre-
ate a “just and compassionate humanity” in the midst of an economic reces-
sion and growing in e qual ity, noting that the answer is not gentrification to 
displace Lewiston’s poor, as the newspaper argued, but rather “a recommit-
ment to the principle of the common good that is at the heart of Catholic so-
cial teaching.” Rejecting the newspaper’s call for a residency requirement for 
welfare assistance, Bishop Malone promoted instead a “covenant of caring” 
that offers assistance to those in need regardless of their length of residence 
in the community.9 While no one would suggest Catholic churches have been 
particularly proactive in connecting with Lewiston’s newest immigrants, these 
men have used their positions of leadership to promote an image of collabora-
tive community based in their religious understandings of shared humanity.10 
Theirs is a moral statement about community building as expansive and in-
clusive of the eco nom ically and socially marginalized, and about who should 
benefit from the welfare state (the poor and not the rich).
Mayor Gilbert’s vigorous battle against the anti- immigrant rhetoric analyzed 
in chapter 5 remains tough: he was followed in public office by the right- wing 
Mayor Macdonald, whose campaign rhetoric denounced immigrants. When 
Mayor Gilbert decided to run in 2013 against Mayor Macdonald in the latter’s 
bid for a second term, voters indicated whose views on immigration they 
support. Mayor Gilbert lost, 39 percent to 61 percent.
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The Police, 2010
In light of concerns about possible criminality in the heavily Somali- populated 
neighborhoods, in 2010 Lewiston’s police department created a special sub-
station downtown staffed by community resource officers. Prior to its cre-
ation, pop u lar attitudes among the Somali Bantu refugee population toward 
the police  were negative at best: at community meetings people complained 
that the police typically protected white Lewistonians but not black Somali 
immigrants. The new community resource officers had a lot to prove.
Police lieutenant Marc Robitaille, the freshly appointed leader of the sub-
station, shared Bishop Malone’s “covenant of caring” in his approach to build-
ing the community resource police squad. His officers began their tenure by 
taking Somali language classes (to the consternation of online commenta-
tors to the local newspaper’s story about the new substation), tutoring kids 
in Trinity’s after- school program, going door to door to meet refugee families 
and learn names, and partnering with sbyam and Trinity’s Janet Saliba to pro-
vide informational programs for parents and youths. Allowing the kids to call 
them by their first names (although, appropriately, they called Lt. Robitaille 
“Baldy”) and appearing at events both in and out of uniform, the officers tried 
to “police from the heart,” in Lt. Robitaille’s words.
For Lt. Robitaille, policing from the heart meant developing a relationship 
of mutuality and community building with the population they  were serv-
ing. In a conversation at the substation, he shared a story about one of his 
first experiences in a Somali home in response to a midnight call about a vi-
cious rat attack on a baby in one of the downtown tenement buildings. After 
tunneling through the wall to capture the huge rat and calming the horrified 
parents, Lt. Robitaille and his partner returned to the police station, where 
the baby’s father showed up at 2 am, on foot, to return the flashlight the of-
ficers had inadvertently left behind. For him, the gesture symbolized the kind 
of relationship he wants with his community, where policing from the heart 
is about loving his community and demonstrating a commitment to a shared 
future. “Lewiston is my town and the Somalis are part of my town,” he told 
me. “The future of Lewiston is tied into how Somalis manage  here.”11 He be-
lieves it is his responsibility as a community police officer to facilitate that 
pro cess. (During this conversation, one of his officers interjected, laughing, 
“And now I’ve become a social worker!”) To enhance community involve-
ment, he placed his officers in the schools, at parent meetings, on bicycles 
peddling the streets, and in community action groups, where they worked 
long hours that regularly extended beyond the normal workday. One of his 
officers told me, “I could be working all day at the muffler factory where I’d 
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be demanding overtime pay for any extra hours and going out of my mind. 
But  here, I love this.”
While a primary purpose of the community resource team was outreach to 
the Somali community and to overcome antipolice prejudice (“so they know 
 we’re not thugs or taking bribes,” one officer explained), the officers also talk 
about how their work forges new interpersonal connections. One officer who 
spent a lot of time in an el derly housing complex near the downtown with 
many Franco- American residents became frustrated with the anti- Somali 
grumblings in the building. He recounted to me his response: “One time this 
old lady goes off on the Somalis. I said to her, ‘Get in the car.’ I take her down-
town, take her to the Somali café for lunch. I take her for some Somali tea. I take 
her to two shops. About an hour later I drop her off at home and she has her 
bags of purchases, spices and some fabric, and she’s telling everyone she got 
these things in Somali stores. Now Mohamed has nine el derly people [from 
that housing complex] coming in to buy things!” Drawing on a local ste reo type 
(despite the disapproving look from Lt. Robitaille) to make his point about 
how to change people’s minds about Somalis, he joked, “There are three forms 
of communication: telephone, e- mail, and an old French woman.” Another of-
ficer interjected, “Not only is it people we bring on a daily basis to meet mem-
bers of the Somali community, but it has also stemmed into the family dynamic 
too.” He described bringing Somali food home to his wife and introducing her 
to his Somali professional acquaintances at the grocery store. “You’re educating 
people in your own family as you’re educating yourself! I can see that change.” 
The officers’ point is that such small acts— taking someone to buy spices at a 
Somali store, introducing a family member to a Somali colleague at the grocery 
store— are the incremental changes that will transform Lewiston.
The community resource officers worked hard to build trust and confront 
ste reo types. One of Lt. Robitaille’s officers schooled me one day on this very 
point. Hearing that he was the newly assigned high school resource officer, I 
offered my congratulations and joked with him, “Ooh! You get the new class 
of ninth graders!,” an allusion to the general school consensus that the ris-
ing ell ninth graders came with particularly acute behavioral challenges. He 
smiled and gently reminded me, “They’re not bad. I know them all. There are 
a few who make some problems, but they’re all good kids.” Viewing all resi-
dents, regardless of citizenship status or origin, as equally entitled to policing 
with compassion and protection from ste reo types, and understanding that 
community building rather than bracketing is a fundamental component of 
community security has produced, for these officers, a strong sense of police 
professionalism and rewarding personal journeys.
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And yet, their efforts remain challenged, as Somali youths in focus groups 
name “the police” and “the schools” as their primary antagonists, and as some 
city leaders demand that the police take a hardline attitude against Somali ju-
venile misbehavior. When other officers arrest Somali youths, or when another 
officer promotes the idea that Somali kids have formed dangerous criminal 
gangs, or when ice (U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement) raids a 
Somali- owned store for undisclosed reasons, all police are blamed as the 
enemy.12 Building trust in an environment of mistrust, legal insecurity, terror-
ism panics, and ice raids conducted with no advance warning means the com-
munity resource officers are constantly fighting an uphill battle. The officers are 
also stuck between policing with compassion and their professional obligation 
to hold people accountable who commit crimes, including the refugee youths 
they are attempting to befriend. Despite their initial obvious excitement 
and the success of their collaborations with sbyam to reach out to refugee par-
ents (described in chapter 7), by 2013 all had left the substation for other jobs.
The Social Worker, 2009
Beth, a young woman from southern Maine with an advanced degree in child 
studies and training in Africa, found her dream job in Lewiston with an 
agency that assigned her to work on child development with Somali refu-
gee families with many small children. Her position was brokered by Kim 
Wettlaufer, who wanted to connect early childhood development specialists 
with newly arrived Somali- speaking parents with large families. Kim matched 
Beth with twelve Somali- speaking families, where her role was to work with 
one preschool child in each family, introducing games that parents could play 
with their preschoolers to nurture cognitive development and prepare them 
for the classroom environment. Although her focus was to be with one child 
in each family, she was quickly overwhelmed with the pressing concerns of 
the families themselves, who, between them, included seventy- two children, 
although few families included fathers who lived with the mother and chil-
dren. When she began visiting the families at home, she learned that some 
lived in apartments with no heat, no screens on upper- floor windows, leaking 
or collapsing ceilings, or stairwells in such disrepair that they  were danger-
ous to navigate. Some of the children she worked with had skin rashes from 
bedbugs, cockroaches, and rats, had no winter clothing at all, or had blood 
tests for lead that  were extremely high but whose siblings had never been 
tested.13 One of the families with whom she worked lived in a tenement where 
doorways  were boarded up with plywood sprayed with warnings: “High Lead 
Levels.” One week, invading rats mauled a baby in one of the families with 
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whom she worked. Although her job was to play for one hour per week with 
one preschool child in each family, she was quickly swamped with requests 
for all kinds of help: reading mail, paying bills, talking with landlords, inter-
acting with schools, calling doctors, understanding unfamiliar cleaning sup-
plies, and more. Because the social ser vices agency that employed her would 
not offer additional support, she appealed to Kim for caseworker assistance 
to ensure the families received follow-up care from doctors, proper repairs 
from landlords, appropriate winter clothing, pest control, assistance with util-
ity companies that  were constantly threatening to turn off heat and electricity, 
and help with interacting with the schools about the children. Trinity funded 
the translator and caseworker.
During her first two years on the job, Beth’s horror grew at a social system 
that offered so little care to struggling refugee immigrants. The mothers with 
whom she worked regularly broke down telling her about their exhaustion 
and frustration trying to parent many children in a new country with little 
support. On many of her weekly visits, she found moms critically depressed 
about the difficulties their older children  were facing with school suspensions. 
“They had thought life would be better  here,” she says, with sympathetic anger. 
“I keep thinking, this week I’m going to meet a group who has a plan. They’ve 
been  here long enough that there must be some system. But there’s no system! 
They’re being discriminated against, badly. I’m really angry about their treat-
ment. The lack of understanding about why they’re  here. What they’ve been 
through. The lack of understanding at every level. People you would expect 
to have understanding and compassion don’t. How is this allowed to go on?” 
Beth remembered that when she accepted the job, her friends predicted she 
would experience a huge culture shock, but, she told me, “My greatest culture 
shock  wasn’t my clients. It was my coworkers. I’ve never worked with people 
with such a limited worldview.” At work, she endured the anti- immigrant 
remarks of her social ser vices colleagues while fantasizing about creating a 
wraparound clinic that would provide coordinated care, ensuring each family 
access to a parent- school coordinator, health care workers, literacy volunteers, 
and caseworkers. Like Kim, she saw how the struggles of her clients related to 
the struggles of other poor people in Lewiston: “What the refugee population 
teaches us is what aspects of our system don’t work. I would hope we could 
learn. It’s glaringly obvious when we look at refugee populations, but these are 
problems for mainstream people also.”
Although her job afforded her weekly debriefings, she still found that her 
on- the- job experiences radically altered her sense of a normal life, as, like Kim, 
she reconstructed her expectations: “I  can’t do baby showers anymore, or even 
weddings . . .  realizing how little you need to live and be happy. Something 
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horrible might happen to me, but I realize it’s really nothing. Sometimes I 
feel childish when I’m with one of the families because of what they’ve been 
through. I’m aware of my privilege. I’m aware of how resourceful and resil-
ient they are. Their humor! I really appreciate that they laugh and joke around: 
that after all they’ve been through they can still do that. Now I have very little 
patience for people who complain.”
Hoping to contribute to building a community of wraparound ser vices, 
Beth was instrumental in forming and leading the community collaborative 
mentioned in chapter 4, the goal of which was to ensure equal access to health 
care and education for New Mainers. But after the public meeting when par-
ents yelled at school administrators, the collaborative’s appetite dimmed for 
activist or advocacy work that might be impolitic, because so many in the 
group, like Kim and Beth,  were employed by organizations that depended 
on city, state, or federal funding. Like Kim, Beth also realized the limits of 
advocacy work by organizations that depend on the support of local leaders.
The Teachers, 2008–2011
One of the ongoing concerns of the collaborative was the situation faced by 
refugee ell students in school.14 To comply with the 2006 agreement with 
the U.S. Department of Justice, the school system had to build an ell program 
that reflected the growth of the district’s ell demographic from 1 percent of the 
student body in 2000 to 20 percent by 2010 and that complied with curricu-
lar and testing expectations set by No Child Left Behind. Rapid transforma-
tion was a tall order. For school administrators, as we saw in chapter 4, top 
priorities  were control and management of the new population, compliance 
with federal and state requirements for testing and provision of ell classes, 
containing parent complaints, and ensuring loyalty from staff during the chal-
lenging period of program building. But for some teachers and staff, an ad-
ditional set of goals emerged as priorities because they felt their ability to do 
their jobs well was compromised by the lack of useful training about ell and 
diversity for all faculty and staff, by the lack of focused, informed, directed, 
culturally appropriate support for ell students, and by the lack of meaningful 
engagement with parents. These deficits produced, in the eyes of distressed 
teachers, community workers, and parents alike, an escalating spiral of pun-
ishment and misbehavior precipitated by cultural misunderstandings, frus-
tration, and the unacknowledged effects of trauma in some children from 
refugee families. Over the course of the first de cade of Somali settlement in 
Lewiston, suspension rates for Somali children relative to non- Somali chil-
dren skyrocketed, despite valiant efforts by some of the ell teachers to shield 
children, protest suspensions, reach out to parents, and seek support from 
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nonprofit agencies that work with children. As one school employee told me, 
in distress, “It’s easy to kick kids out of school. It’s harder to deal with them.”
After hearing parent and teacher worries about suspension practices in the 
schools, it dawned on me that every time I visited a Somali Bantu friend in 
Lewiston, there was a child at home who had been suspended. Somali friends 
 were quick to note that all Somali- speaking children  were subject to high 
suspension rates. Anecdotal observations gathered over the course of a few 
weeks included a wide range of infractions. A friend’s child who had gone to 
tell a group of boys on the playground to hurry into the classroom at the end 
of recess was suspended along with the entire group for their tardy return. The 
child, a serious student at the top of her class, was so devastated and humili-
ated that her grades suffered and her parents sought psychological support. 
A middle school child was suspended for failing to wear his winter coat to 
recess. The five- year- old son of a friend was suspended for a week for say-
ing, in a language he does not yet understand, “I will kill you.” Another child 
received a three- day suspension for failing to serve an office detention and 
then immediately an additional ten- day suspension for failing to put away his 
iPod and for “giving attitude.” A daughter of a friend was suspended for two 
days for writing a song in math class rather than attending to her math assign-
ment. I heard of one parent who was so mortified by her child’s suspension 
that she decided to stop sending her child to school in an effort to avoid any 
future suspensions. A teacher mentioned parent- teacher conferences where 
the parents just sat and cried in embarrassment, apologizing for their child’s 
behavior and their shortcomings as parents. In my conversations with par-
ents, many struggled to understand the significance of so many suspensions: 
Are their children terrible? Are they failures as parents? Or is the problem 
with the school?
Wondering about the actual facts, I filed a Freedom of Information Act 
request from the Maine Department of Education to obtain suspension sta-
tistics. They are grim. In the 2007–8 school year, Somalis  were 9 percent of 
high school students and had 20 percent of suspensions, 14 percent of middle 
school students (grades six– eight) and 24 percent of suspensions, and 16 per-
cent of elementary school students and 24 percent of suspensions. The next 
year, numbers in the middle and elementary schools shot up even higher: 
Somalis  were 15  percent of the student body in the middle school but had 
70 percent of the suspensions,15 and 18 percent of the elementary student body 
but 65 percent of the suspensions. By 2010–11, schools began recording num-
ber of suspension incidents as well as number of total days suspended, and 
the numbers continued to be bleak. That year, Somalis  were 13 percent of high 
school students but had 38 percent of total suspension incidents and 45 per-
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cent of total days, in the middle school Somalis  were 19 percent of students 
but had 37 percent of incidents and 40 percent of days, and in the elementary 
school Somalis  were 21 percent of students but had 53 percent of incidents 
and 45 percent of days.16
The ell teachers, who have the most contact with Somali children in the 
school system, expressed constant distress about the number of suspen-
sions meted out to ell students by their colleagues and the impact of suspen-
sions on their students. Suspensions  were most frequently for infractions like 
disobeying, fighting, and displaying inappropriate attitudes like threats and in-
timidation. “Throughout the United States, schools tend disproportionately 
to punish the students who have the greatest academic, social, economic, and 
emotional needs,” writes education scholar Pedro Noguera. Noting that mi-
nority students in par tic u lar are disproportionately disciplined for minor in-
fractions and behaviors identified as disrespectful, and that students of color, 
boys, and low- achieving students are disproportionately suspended, expelled, 
or removed from the classroom, he continues, “In many schools, it is com-
mon for the neediest students to be disciplined and for the needs driving their 
misbehavior to be ignored.” Yet, he argues, research suggests that such forms 
of discipline only further alienate students and rarely contribute to improved 
behaviors, including among students who are not often suspended, because 
high suspension rates suggest more pervasive problems in the school between 
adults and students.17
Only after I spent time in ell classrooms did I really understand how the 
bodily discipline required at school posed severe challenges to some students 
unaccustomed to such an environment in ways that vigilant teachers uncer-
tain about engaging with ell students marked as black and foreign might find 
cause for suspension. For example, one day a new child joined the lowest- 
level ell class. He had never attended school before and absolutely could not 
sit in his seat. The Somali tutor followed him as he moved throughout the 
classroom during the lessons, constantly shifting between standing, squatting, 
kneeling on his seat, lying across his desk, and pacing. Despite the tutor’s quiet 
efforts to get him back to his desk, it was clearly beyond his physical abilities. 
(As one ell teacher to whom I told this story reminded me, “Simply learn-
ing to be in a classroom is not intuitive.” She likened the physical discipline 
of school to her experience with a Japa nese host family, where she constantly 
fidgeted during long meals while family members sat on the floor with their 
legs neatly tucked under them.) While the ell teacher in class that day, famil-
iar with this issue, was willing to accommodate the child while he adjusted, a 
staff member in a non- ell setting might not be, a suspicion corroborated by 
the stories of many ell teachers who believe that some mainstream teachers 
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and staff are far too quick to dole out suspensions for bodily indiscipline in 
Somali students. “The ell teachers are great,” one Somali tutor told me. “It’s 
with the other teachers where the problems start.”
The ell teachers recognize how difficult it can be for a child who has never 
been to school to learn to conform to the bodily requirements for school: to 
walk and never run, to raise your hand and wait to speak until called on, to obey 
the precise time requirements for each activity, to sit still for an entire class pe-
riod, to obey shouted instructions in the lunchroom, hallways, or playground 
in a language one barely understands. Everything about school is physically 
and intellectually hard for many children who have never experienced school, 
and children who fail to follow the rules get suspended. The ell teachers con-
cerned about high suspension rates tried to protect their students in the zones 
where mainstream teachers  were inclined to distribute suspension slips, like 
hallways and playgrounds, while protesting what appeared to be an almost 
arbitrary pattern of suspension because of the lack of clear documentation 
about the relationship between actions and consequences.
But of course not all suspensions  were for new students who broke rules of 
bodily control; even the most sympathetic ell teachers knew that some students 
acted out to get attention, primarily because of things that the counselors, 
social workers, and ell teachers identified as related to frustration, trauma, 
and racism but that other teachers and administrators treated as disciplinary 
problems to be punished rather than as evidence of the need for support and 
intervention. I witnessed boys arriving late to class with attitude and swagger, 
dropping books loudly on their desks, or offering a running background com-
mentary sprinkled with curses or offensive language as the teacher tried to 
teach. Some of the girls teased, giggled, and provoked each other into argu-
ments. Some students simply withdrew altogether, refusing to engage, talk, 
or attend to their work. While such behaviors meant a challenging teaching 
environment, many ell teachers developed a range of strategies for managing 
disruptive students that rarely resulted in suspensions, treating them as frus-
trated, needy, or emotional adolescents rather than “bad” kids. One dedicated 
teacher who is beloved by her students resorted to yelling on occasion in one 
particularly difficult class, for which she felt terrible, but the students consis-
tently remarked on how nice and kind she was. She felt she was anything but 
nice, and told them she felt bad about yelling: “When I hear other teachers 
yelling, it’s definitely not nice!” She told me that her students responded, “But 
you don’t call us names. You don’t insult us. Other teachers say, ‘You Somalis 
are all blank blank blank’ or ‘You people always blank blank blank.’ ”
Stereotyping is an insidious way to malign an entire category of students as 
a problem, and its destructive nature is recognized by ell teachers and staff 
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as well as parents and the counselors with whom some of them work. The 
ell teachers felt that the ell wings of local schools  were treated as completely 
separate zones, avoided by mainstream teachers, mysterious (or even fright-
ening) to others in the school who never engaged with the ell program, and 
disarticulated from broader school activities, expressing frustration that non- 
ell teachers and staff repeatedly came to the ell teachers to demand, “Tell the 
Somalis X, Y, or Z,” rather than learning how to work with the ell students 
themselves. Some Somali staff members are frustrated by a school adminis-
trator responsible for discipline at one school who tells Somali kids, “In this 
country we don’t behave this way,” which implies that swearing, disrespect, 
or disruptive behavior would be acceptable in African schools. The Somali 
staff understand that telling kids, in effect, “You come from somewhere  else 
where this is allowed— you don’t belong  here and you don’t know the rules 
 here,” alienates them by placing them outside local culture and within some 
other, uncivilized culture, which reinforces problem behavior. When the school 
loudspeaker squawks, “Will the following Somali boys report to the princi-
pal’s office,” or when teachers make blanket remarks about Somalis taking 
away jobs from more deserving Americans, or when a high school social stud-
ies teacher screens the film Black Hawk Down, pausing the projection to point 
out the actor portraying the dead soldier from the Lewiston area while offer-
ing no guidance for how the class of white and Somali students are to discuss 
this incident, Somali students feel held up to public scrutiny and condemned. 
Not surprisingly, the education literature is clear that students who feel their 
cultural backgrounds are validated rather than ignored or denigrated in school 
are more successful.18
Even though a new discipline policy was supposedly launched in 2011–12, 
the suspension statistics remained high that year and ell teachers struggled 
with classes where as many as half of their students  were absent on any given 
day because of suspensions. At the end of 2012, a normally quiet and con-
tained leader in the Somali community sent me an e- mail message screaming 
in frustration: “Many kids are suspended and expelled from school. i don’t 
know what to do about this suspension/expulsion.”
THWARTED EFFORTS
The ell teachers, of course, knew exactly what would make a difference, and 
many with whom I talked about these issues easily drew up a list: extended day 
and more one- on- one tutoring for ell students to help them catch up, greater 
involvement of parents, more staff training about ell and the background of 
Somali kids (which, for most of the period of fieldwork, consisted of about 1.5 
hours of training as part of the orientation for new teachers, described by 
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several teachers with whom I spoke as based on the deficit model),19 valida-
tion of Somali culture in school, and allowing ell students to participate in 
school sports. Some teachers felt the testing regime used by the school kept 
students in ell classes too long, which frustrated them and ensured some 
would age out before attaining enough credits for graduation because only 
mainstream classes counted toward graduation.
In 2008 a few teachers tried to search for grant funding that would enable 
them to offer extended- day programming, devoting hours of personal time 
to researching models developed elsewhere for refugee kids who enter school 
with limited En glish, literacy, and previous experience with schooling. The 
teachers pulled together a series of meetings with enthusiastic local advocates, 
social ser vices providers, and others to develop a grant proposal for the Office 
of Refugee Resettlement to fund an extended- day program. Their efforts de-
railed when the group was informed that the school system would not pursue 
grants targeted solely or primarily at refugee children, but would only seek 
funding for programs accessible to all students.
The following year, the schools received a major grant of nearly $1.2 million to 
develop evidence- based programs focused on violence prevention, substance 
abuse prevention, behavioral support, mental health ser vices, and early child-
hood development. Although the grant was a great coup for the school, it 
left the par tic u lar needs of the ell students— almost 20 percent of the student 
body—to the discretion of contractors who submitted bids for the different 
programs to decide how to include them, if at all. Frustrated Somali transla-
tors and caseworkers found some of the programs and models implemented 
by contractors inaccessible to Somali- speaking students and their parents. Al-
though ell teachers are clear that some of the school counselors tried very 
hard to work with Somali- speaking students, in the absence of substantive 
and thorough antiracism and cultural competency training for school coun-
selors, many floundered, leaving the ell teachers poorly supported in their 
efforts to manage the emotional and psychological issues of their students.
But in a discussion about better cross- cultural training for school counsel-
ors, one school official reminded me, “Schools are for education. That is our 
mission. We aren’t  here to provide mental health ser vices.” Despite the focus 
on behavioral and mental health programs financed by the major external 
grant, this is a valid point. While schools struggle under the twin burdens 
of reduced funding and heightened requirements for standardized testing, 
managing the emotional and psychological difficulties that students bring to 
school may be an unfair expectation. Nevertheless, ell teachers devoted to 
supporting students from Somali families fought to be able to build construc-
tive ways better to engage with Somali parents, even after being forbidden 
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from doing so, because they believed so strongly that better relations with 
parents could only help struggling students. One teacher drew up a list of par-
ents who could be invited to an inaugural parent- teacher support group, to be 
held just after the distribution of report cards, with the initial goal of review-
ing the system of grades and the online system for tracking student progress 
as well as to discuss homework. Parents  were eager, but the school canceled the 
meeting with the stiff reminder that after the experience of the large parent 
meeting the previous year, there would be no further such meetings hosted 
outside the school attended by teachers. The reprimand explained that teach-
ers cannot handpick parents to participate, and because parents come to 
meetings with a variety of issues to discuss it is impossible to control what 
happens, and teachers with no sense of local politics cannot be put in such 
positions.20 A school administrator canceled another eve ning event planned 
by ell teachers for ell students to share poetry and essays with their parents 
over fears that the inclusion of poems in Af- Maay Maay, one of the languages 
spoken by a minority of Somalis, might be overly po liti cal. Concerns about 
language politics relate to more general concerns that meetings with Somali 
parents might become riven with tribalism and internal community politics.
While protesting the profligate use of suspensions, exclusionary treatment, 
and barriers to better parent outreach, ell teachers are also subject to the 
hegemony of standardized testing, which is required of all students no matter 
how long they have been in the United States or whether or not they speak 
En glish. Thus ell teachers must ensure their classes are oriented toward stan-
dardized test materials and formats, an absurdity captured by one ell teacher 
in a blog post worth quoting in full:
Whether you sat for your O- Levels and A- Levels, took the sat or act, 
the dreaded Bac, or perhaps some other equivalent rite- of- educational- 
passage, one of the concepts you absolutely had to know and fully under-
stand was how to compare and contrast. You might have faced a question 
that asked you to compare and contrast the lives of Juliette and Madame 
Bovary. Alternatively you could have been asked to compare and con-
trast gneiss and shale perhaps. In any event the concept of compare and 
contrast was one you had become very familiar with. Amongst teachers 
of En glish Language in the school and college settings today this is known 
as “academic language.” If you sit in the sat examination hall for 4 hours 
and don’t know this concept you are well and truly lost. In our classrooms 
we aren’t teaching every day speech, such as, “How are you? It is so nice to 
meet you.” Nor are we teaching the skills required to drive a car and read 
road signs, nor the vocabulary necessary to purchase groceries or get a job. 
194 • Chapter 6
We are teaching students to compete in the academic world, to strive to bet-
ter themselves through the educational arena, to engage in scholastic and 
intellectual discourse. For many refugees this is a monumental challenge, 
but it is a challenge worth making. Our students have had little or no back-
ground to prepare them for the daunting task that awaits them. On May 
1st in Maine all high school ju niors (Year 11 students) will spend a Saturday 
morning struggling with tests that  were developed to mea sure their ability 
to do well in an academic college setting. No matter if you have only been 
in an En glish speaking country for 12 months, no matter if you had no les-
sons in literacy prior to your arrival, you will take the 4- hour test along with 
everyone  else. Compare and contrast, describe, explain, elaborate. It makes 
as much sense as the Red Queen and the White Queen in “Alice Through 
the Looking Glass” when they  were testing Alice’s ability to do Subtraction:
“Take a bone from a dog: what remains?” Alice considered. “The bone 
 wouldn’t remain, of course, if I took it— and the dog  wouldn’t remain: it 
would come to bite me— and I’m sure I shouldn’t remain!” . . .  “Wrong, as 
usual,” said the Red Queen: “the dog’s temper would remain.”
Our perceptions, our cultural background, our linguistic competence 
are all at variance with each other. We lack so many commonalities, and 
 we’re constantly striving to close the gaps. Poor Alice, she tried so hard.21
Lewiston schools must teach to the test because test results have impli-
cations for how schools are evaluated. When schools failed to demonstrate 
adequate progress, letters to inform parents of the schools’ failure mentioned 
the poor test per for mance of ell students, upsetting some ell teachers, 
Somali staff, and Somali students and parents because of the implication that 
they  were the problem. In classes I witnessed how hard ell teachers worked to 
encourage and embolden their students facing the severity of standardized 
tests and the constant messages that they are the problem. One day when I 
arrived in a high school ell En glish class, for example, the teacher was beam-
ing with affection and encouragement to her hard- working students, telling 
them that they are smart, that by following the instructions carefully they can 
figure things out on their own as she took them through exercises to identify 
which terms in a list (protagonist, climax, rising action, theme, genre) pertain 
to each in a list of sentences and phrases. The lesson ended with a tutorial 
on irony and a reminder that this is the kind of material they must master to 
enter mainstream classes and perform well on standardized tests. Trying to 
build their self- confidence, she insisted, “You can do this! I believe in you!”
As suspensions continued unabated at the end of the de cade and the ef-
forts of some teachers to reach out to the parents of their Somali students 
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remained blocked, several turned to local activists, community workers, and 
social workers for help. Several area therapists with Somali clients joined the 
conversation because their clients’ mental health challenges  were exacerbated 
by concerns about the experiences of their children in school. After the com-
munity collaborative chaired by Beth pulled back from advocacy on parent- 
school relations, a nonprofit or ga ni za tion dedicated to health care access for 
poor or marginalized community members stepped into the breach to try 
to figure out ways to bridge the yawning gap between parents and schools 
around the issue of behavior by brokering help from a nonprofit parent ad-
vocacy or ga ni za tion. A series of meetings and small efforts emerged over the 
next couple years, as these “helpers” (social and community workers) worked 
under the auspices of the collaborative to talk about how to better support 
Somali parents and their kids in their engagements with the schools.
THE COLLABORATIVE ’S  EFFORTS , 2010–2012
At one of the first meetings between the helpers and the parent advocacy 
representative, frustration boiled over during a discussion about school hos-
tility to better parental outreach and reformed approaches to working with 
behavioral issues of kids from refugee families. “Do you mean, when these 
people are brought  here as refugees, they aren’t given any resources? Any 
help? They’re brought  here from a war, they’re traumatized and grieving, 
and they’re just dumped and abandoned? They’ve been  here ten years and 
there’s nothing being done to help them adjust?” the incredulous parent ad-
vocacy representative asked. She persisted with further questions: why hadn’t 
the schools instilled any kind of substantive cultural orientation for teachers 
and guidance counselors, put sufficient programs in place to handle trauma 
among the kids, or engineered effective opportunities to involve parents? 
Social workers from other agencies chimed in to ask why, during the first de-
cade of Somali immigration, didn’t the schools, hospitals, Catholic Charities, 
or other large agencies come up with an overall plan for extra outreach and 
assistance for children entering school for the first time and their parents, en-
hancing ell education with extracurricular programs, developing coherent 
approaches to assisting families making the transition to life in America, or 
developing culturally appropriate forms of support for immigrants struggling 
with mental health challenges? We  were seeing, in the suspension practices 
for children and mental health challenges of parents, the staggering effects of 
a business- as- usual approach on children who found ered and floundered in 
school for a de cade.
A grief counselor from a local nonprofit who was allowed to run one after- 
school program for ten boys from refugee families who had lost a loved one 
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described the distress he read in the children with whom he worked: fear, 
insecurity, anger, uncertainty about their future, and instability. His ten- week 
program of weekly hour- long meetings, based on a model pioneered in Port-
land schools, helped the participating boys develop strategies for managing 
their emotions and especially their anger, and was coupled with home vis-
its to meet the families and involve the parents in the program. Because the 
Lewiston school system does not allow ell students to participate in school 
sports, the counselor was particularly attentive to the kids’ lives after school: 
“At home they’re so bored! There’s nothing to do after school. They have no 
activities, no programs, nowhere to go.” Shaking his head, says, “I  can’t believe 
that ten years after they started arriving, there are still so few programs for 
them! Only the homework help programs at the library, middle school, 
and  Trinity.” Even though at the request of ell teachers he offered to add 
more groups, school administrators refused, with the excuse that they needed 
more evidence- based assessments of his program in Lewiston.
The reason why no comprehensive approach emerged to support refugees 
struggling to adjust to school is the spotty and competitive approach to pro-
viding assistance for refugee support and the school administration’s priori-
ties. The extra funds made available by the federal government to support the 
ell program are minimal, and funding for anything additional like extended 
day, special tutoring, or special parental outreach either comes from the over-
all bud get or has to be sought elsewhere. The school administrators  were un-
willing to prioritize the needs of ell students over others in the allocation of 
internal funds for programs, and they  were also unwilling, on principle, to go 
in search of extra grant funding that would exclusively target ell students. 
By the end of the de cade, several teachers had left the school system for other 
schools that offered an approach to ell students that more closely reflected 
their own values, and the elementary school with the highest enrollment of 
ell students was reor ga nized under the federal government’s “failed schools” 
program because so many of the ell children had failed to make adequate 
progress. If schools offer a window into community politics, many of Lewis-
ton’s ell teachers tried hard to model an inclusive school community where 
ell students are full members rather than outsiders, problems to be managed, 
or failures who compromise school quality.
A second reason why no comprehensive approach emerged was the piece-
meal approach to refugee assistance adopted by each small nonprofit. Each 
nonprofit that attempted to engage with refugee families had a specific area 
of focus: preparing preschool children for school, monitoring lead levels in 
children, offering grief counseling for children who had lost a parent. Catho-
lic Charities offered very limited programs that reflected priorities for the fed-
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eral government, such as basic job skills training. Catholic Charities’ tiny staff of 
caseworkers and the few caseworkers employed by Trinity attempted to stitch 
together a set of ser vices to help people manage on a daily basis, but no single 
entity had the funding or the vision to build a comprehensive, wraparound 
system for supporting refugees in an economic environment characterized by 
austere funding for education, job skills, employer training, and basic family 
support. After attending meetings of the collaborative for two years, I realized 
that, for all its good intentions, the group could make little progress because 
of concerns about partnering across different agencies, reluctance to share 
resources and information, and, as described previously, fears about angering 
school or city authorities by overtly challenging exclusionary practices. For 
these and other reasons, the collaborative struggled to attract regular partici-
pation by members of the Somali and Somali Bantu communities, who  were 
working on a different set of initiatives to support their communities. I turn 
to their initiatives in chapter 7.
Conclusion
The people described in this chapter are trying to push back against the insidi-
ous myths presented in chapter 5, myths that equate poverty with irresponsi-
bility and turn attention away from economic policies that produce insecurity 
and impoverishment and cause harm to the people with whom they work. 
As neoliberal assessments of human value and the dismantling of the welfare 
state make poor people a target of public derision and moral disparagement, 
poor immigrants come under par tic u lar scrutiny as unworthy foreigners who 
impose even more illegitimate burdens on public resources. Those who work 
in the neoliberal borderlands to help both the native and foreign- born poor 
are finding it increasingly difficult to promote a philosophy that values diver-
sity and public support for the poor in the midst of pop u lar discourses that 
conjoin in e qual ity, economic insecurity, and xenophobia and blame the poor 
for their failures.22 They join anthropologist David Haines, who asks why 
“the most common mea sure of progress in resettlement is employment” and 
economic self- sufficiency rather than education, the ability of parents to stay 
home with their kids while raising them, or ensuring resettled refugees are 
healthy and emotionally stable.
The creation of the welfare state in the United States and Eu rope offered 
the hope of an expanded definition of the commons and a broadened sense 
of community. Tracking its dismantlement through neoliberal reforms that 
prioritize privatization, the merits of competition, the narrative of self- help 
and individual responsibility, autonomy, individualism, and self- sufficiency, 
scholars cata log emergent discourses that scapegoat foreigners and the poor 
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as eco nom ically unproductive and dependent, exacerbating xenophobia and 
narrowing the boundaries of who qualifies as worthy citizens. Upset and sur-
prised by the racist and xenophobic turn in multicultural advanced capital-
ist countries, progressive scholars struggle to explain a resurgent biopolitics 
that brackets rather than dissolves categories of people, targeting some— the 
poor, the racialized, the foreign— for exclusionary intervention. Although the 
myths in chapter  5 make the visibly different foreigner a con ve nient target 
as the source of insecurity and economic disintegration, fostering nationalist 
sentiments that obscure the policy engines of in e qual ity and consolidate loy-
alty for regimes of exclusion, the people featured in this chapter are quick to 
note that those targeted by xenophobic myths are not alone in their exclusion. 
The hostile treatment of refugees reveals much about the hostile treatment of 
others in the neoliberal borderlands who struggle with idealized requirements 
for economic self- sufficiency and identities marked by cultural or racial dif-
ference. “It often seems as if everyone hates the poor,” write po liti cal phi los-
o phers Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, who suggest that the poor and the 
racialized are often viewed as one and the same: “One should also remember 
how often hatred of the poor serves as a mask for racism. . . .  Everywhere there 
is hatred for the poor there is likely to be racial fear and hatred lurking some-
where nearby.”23 The people profiled  here would agree: one of their consistent 
observations was that the treatment of newly arrived refugees mirrored the 
treatment of the poor more generally. Grasping the relationship between xe-
nophobia and racism and hierarchies of legitimacy, Lewiston activist Ismail 
Ahmed tells me, “We can no longer talk about refugees in Lewiston but rather 
must talk about the marginalized poor.”
We saw in part I that the humanitarianism of the international refugee re-
gime is about containment and that containment is about sovereignty, nativ-
ism, and racism. It is about the question of who can legally cross borders, who 
belongs, who is worthy, who fits in, and who gets to make choices about their 
future. The nativism and racism lodged within humanitarianism are visible 
in the technology of refugee camps in the form of border controls, authori-
tarian camp management, and expectations of refugee docility and apo liti cal 
innocence. This and chapter 5 explored how the nativism and racism lodged 
within humanitarianism emerge again when refugees who are allowed to 
cross borders become unwanted neighbors. The specter of unwanted refugees 
moving in next door has provoked city protests against volag- based refu-
gee resettlement in several U.S. cities and a call by city administrators across 
the country for the right of cities to reject refugees contracted to volags for 
resettlement.
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In Lewiston, antirefugee racist and nativist sentiments emerged in public 
forums (such as open public meetings run by city officials and the Center for 
the Prevention of Hate Violence, Mayor Macdonald’s anti- immigrant rhetoric, 
people yelling “Go Home!” and “Dress like an American!” in the street), in pri-
vate conversation (in stories repeated among friends and family about chickens 
in the kitchen, government- provided cars, welfare support, and more), and in 
vitriolic commentary (both signed and anonymous) in the local newspapers. 
Does humanitarianism only “work” when it is carried out far away, on anon-
ymous people who can easily be portrayed as helpless, docile, and grateful? 
When the objects of humanitarianism show up next door and begin receiv-
ing public assistance, driving cars, expressing opinions, and agitating for their 
rights, humanitarianism is confronted with its internal nativism and racism, 
especially in a context of economic insecurity and neoliberal rhetoric.
Racism uses neoliberalism as a rhetorical smokescreen, turning xenophobia 
and fear of foreignness or difference into an economic argument. Neoliberalism 
also makes use of racism: colonizing it for its own purposes, namely, stripping 
poor people of assistance and support. By utilizing the slippage between poor 
people and people of color, neoliberalism taps into racist fears to push eco-
nomic reforms that hurt all of the poor in the name of worthiness.
While much has been written about the surge in pop u lar and po liti cal rhet-
oric that vilifies the poor, anthropologists have begun paying attention to “a 
new structure of feeling that privileges empathy, care, and compassion” within 
neoliberal economies of in e qual ity.24 Calling attention to such forms of “affec-
tive labor” as forms of productive citizenship, Andrea Muehlenbach notes, 
“Affective labor remedies not material poverty, but collective relational crisis. 
It restores not economic wealth but the foundations of public morality.”25 
Taking affective labor seriously as productive of social relations and moral 
communities, as holding “an enormous potential for autonomous circuits of 
valorization, and perhaps for liberation” means validating the work of people 
like those profiled  here as symbolically greater than their modest accomplish-
ments might suggest.26 When anthropologist Elizabeth Povinelli suggests, 
“Rather than argue with neoliberals that social welfare was or was not a 
failure, we might ask what the conditions of failure  were such that welfare and 
multiculturalism failed,” she urges her readers to reject the neoliberal calculus 
“that bodies and values are stakes in individual games of chance and that any 
collective agency (other than the corporation) is an impediment to the produc-
tion of value.”27 Rather, she asks, in tandem with those profiled  here, why not 
emphasize instead how welfare alleviates suffering and enhances life, even if it 
has not produced financial in de pen dence or self- sufficiency?
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The reaction to the arrival of refugees by some citizens and officials in Lew-
iston demonstrates how the rhetoric of economics trumps all other concerns 
and eviscerates arguments about the extension of care and the benefits of di-
versity. Even though the facts show that the presence of refugees has brought 
economic resources and vitality into the area (including, for example, at least 
$9 million in grant funding from 2001 to 2010 and about eigh teen new stores 
downtown owned and operated by Somalis),28 concern about how much the 
refugees cost the city continues to dominate public discourse. Talking about 
money allows people who are unhappy about black refugees in their city 
to avoid accusations of racism and silences dissenting voices as out- of- touch 
softies and tax- and- spend liberals.
Musing about the polarizing perspective in neoliberalist attacks on the 
welfare state, in which people are either eco nom ically self- sufficient through 
waged employment (and thus responsible) or social leeches, Povinelli asks,
Why did welfare suddenly seem not to work? Here would be one answer: 
because within a neoliberal state, any social investment that does not have a 
clear end— a projectable moment when input values (money, ser vices, care) 
can be replaced by output value— fails eco nom ically and morally. And a 
social investment is an economic and moral failure whether or not the in-
vestment is life enhancing. Even if one could demonstrate that social welfare 
enhanced the lives of the poor, if one could not also show that social wel-
fare moved people from de pen dency to in de pen dence, as narrowly defined, 
welfare would be deemed a failure. Again, this is not some general condition 
of failure but the specific condition of failure in a world where social de pen-
dency has been cast as the moral opposite of individual responsibility.29
Those profiled  here are deeply involved in fighting for a different calculus 
of success and human value. When Cheryl Hamilton says, “Refugee resettle-
ment is about life,” she means it is about creating a healthy community where 
people feel safe, hopeful, and capable. Everyone profiled  here brings an affective 
disposition to their work that privileges empathy, care, compassion, and 
mutuality. Through the everyday struggles of teaching children to read, ad-
dressing depression caused by war- related trauma and the loss of family 
members, challenging recalcitrant landlords, attending court hearings for 
kids caught shoplifting, and ensuring refugees receive welfare assistance that 
will enable them to eat, pay rent, and cover their utility bills, a fight is being 
waged in the neoliberal borderlands. Those whose work to provide ser vices 
is based in an ethic of professional pride at providing help to those who need 
it and expanding the boundaries of community to all residents regardless of 
income, culture, language, origin, or ability to be self- sufficient are challenging 
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the policies that shrink the provision of support to those in precarity. They 
may be losing the current battle, but not without offering alternative under-
standings to predominant discourses that chastise the poor and insist that 
economic self- sufficiency is the definition of worthiness. It is in these spaces 
that the affect of community building and mutuality pushes back against neo-
liberalism, where solidarity predicated on sharing life in a par tic u lar place 
together produces efforts to build a better version of the city.
In conclusion, those profiled  here are working in the neoliberal border-
lands to model inclusive community and compassion, while avoiding local ac-
tivism because activism perceived as confrontational might disrupt the public 
funding that pays their salaries and modest grants.30 They are engaged in the 
sort of affective work that attempts to buffer the blows of racism, xenophobia, 
and neoliberal demands for economic in de pen dence, self- sufficiency, auton-
omy, and self- help, and through their work they are modeling a professionalism 
shot through with compassion, mutuality, and love for an inclusive vision 
of community. They see their work helping Somali immigrants as saving and 
renewing the city. The cost of loving one’s way to social change is that change 
is incredibly incremental, more often personal than public, and emotionally 
costly as well as fulfilling. But many of those profiled  here do not see any other 
way toward a future they want to live in.
This page intentionally left blank
PART III  Refuge
This page intentionally left blank
Introduction
A Visit, 2011
Jama and I arrive for a visit at Abdiya’s new apartment in the public housing 
complex on the edge of town, where she has recently relocated from her hor-
rible downtown tenement, with its screaming tenants in the apartment above 
her, domestic violence incidents next door, and racist hostilities from other 
neighbors. Abdiya  couldn’t wait to qualify for the public housing complex.
At her front door we are met by one, no, two, no, three, no . . .  four little kids 
running into the entry from the adjacent room. No adults in sight. As we call 
for Abdiya, we hear footsteps on the second floor, then the stairs, and finally 
thirteen- year- old Nur appears. He has been left home with all the little kids, 
who we can now see number seven. Abdiya is on her way home from running 
errands with her husband and grown daughter, Nunnay, so while we wait I 
ask Nur about school. He tells me he loves En glish and has been working on 
expository writing and persuasive essays, and track, admitting, with a sheepish 
smile, “I’m slow.” “Well, you’re only a freshman,” I offer. “Yes,” he grins. I tell 
him I’ll look for him next year at the track and maybe he’ll even recognize 
me, referencing our interaction this past spring at a track meet when he was 
flustered by my greeting, unable to recognize me in the unexpected context.
Nur is one of the most soft- spoken boys I know. I recall his reaction when I 
gave him photographs of his father, whom he does not remember, and grand-
father, whom he never knew. As he studied the photographs, he gently ran his 
fingers over his ears, forehead, eyes, nose, and chin, tracing his facial contours 
while comparing his features with theirs. His grandfather died in 1988 during 
our stay in the village; his father went crazy in the refugee camp and never 
made it to America.
Nur’s middle school years  were punctuated by suspensions for a variety of 
supposed infractions, some so unlikely that at one point an exasperated social 
worker intervened with school authorities on his behalf. Abdiya had returned 
over and over again to the school to advocate for her son, finally throwing up 
her hands and telling me, “I  can’t wait to get him out of there!” I noted with 
relief that he seemed to be adjusting well to high school.
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Abdiya and her crew arrive in two vans, emerging with another baby, more 
little kids, her husband, and her adult daughter Nunnay. Because polygyny 
(marriage between one man and more than one woman) is illegal in the United 
States, Abdiya was initially resettled separately from her husband and cowife 
until they all relocated to live near each other again in Lewiston, where Abdiya 
babysits her cowife’s kids while the cowife attends school. Abdiya and Nunnay 
settle onto the rug, which is covered in potato scraps and lots of small broken 
pieces of plastic, while Abdiya’s husband makes himself comfortable on the 
huge U- shaped velour couch, as do Jama and I. The kids, who now number 
perhaps a dozen, play between the two rooms that together constitute the 
apartment’s first floor, cuddling in laps and then dashing off, giggling and 
reaching for the photos Abdiya wants to share with me.
Abdiya and Jama have just come back from their first return visit to the 
Kenyan refugee camp, where Abdiya’s son, Abdullahi, the baby she had when 
we knew her in Banta as a young divorcée, still lives since being rejected for 
resettlement. She had to leave him behind when she came to the United States 
with her younger children. The photos show a handsome young man standing 
in front of the small shop and tailor operation that he runs with the money 
she sends to support him. She recounts the wonderful visit they had, but also 
her shock at how much money she spent because everyone there is so desper-
ate for help. Nearly frantic to find a way to make more money so she can send 
more to her son, Abdiya attends every job- training program she can find and 
applies for jobs everywhere but has not been able to find steady work. Her 
En glish is spotty; she lacks formal education; and she cannot replace the front 
teeth she lost in a car accident because she has no money for a dentist. I sus-
pect employers reject her for these reasons, without bothering to recognize 
her intelligence and competence.
Jama tells me that something is terribly wrong with Nunnay. When Jama 
and Abdiya  were in Kenya, Nunnay, who was home taking care of all the kids, 
had a breakdown. The older kids and other relatives repeatedly phoned them 
to report Nunnay’s problems: she  couldn’t take care of the kids, was unable to 
control herself, was constantly breaking down in crying fits, leaving the apart-
ment, wandering off, running away. “How many kids does Nunnay have?” I 
ask. This is the first time I’ve met her because she moved to Lewiston shortly 
before Abdiya left for her visit to Kenya. She looks so young— she  can’t be 
more than twenty- four, twenty- five at the most. “She has seven kids and a 
husband but he’s not . . .  supportive,” Jama delicately chooses the word. “He’s 
a bad husband?” I ask, bluntly. Yes, Jama nods, he’s a bad husband. Keeping 
things together for a bad husband, five little brothers and sisters, and seven 
little kids of her own was just too much.
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It quickly becomes apparent that Nunnay is really a mess. She was hospital-
ized for a month after Abdiya’s return while mental health professionals tried 
to stabilize her. Many refugees are uncertain about whether Western therapy 
can help with Somali problems, like jinn and possessing spirits, but some try 
anyhow when things get really desperate. As we look through Abdiya’s photo-
graphs from her trip, a photo appears of Abdiya shaking the hand of an older 
man. It is the father of Abdullahi and Nunnay, whom Abdiya encountered 
in the refugee camp for the first time in almost two de cades. Abdiya starts 
laughing, describing his formality at shaking her hand, but Nunnay bursts 
into tears. Jama says this happens all the time now, and they cannot figure out 
how to make her better. Abdiya had told me that after her husband in the 
camps went crazy, he beat her so badly that as a consequence she is partially 
blind in one eye, and I cannot help but wonder about Nunnay’s childhood in 
the camps, living with a brute. As Nunnay sobs, life continues around her. 
Abdiya tends to the little kids, who are now hungry, settling a few of them into 
sleeping positions in the middle of the rug for an afternoon nap after their 
snack. A few won’t quiet down, and she silences them with a rapid, threaten-
ing hand motion. Jama says quietly to me, “She is managing a lot. She takes 
care of everyone— all her kids, all her daughter’s kids, her mentally ill daugh-
ter, her cowife’s kids, her husband.” On top of her stressful life in Lewiston, she 
scrapes together money from occasional jobs and babysitting to support her 
son and his family in the camps. The burden seems unmanageable.
Once all the kids are more or less quietly resting, our conversation shifts 
to Abdiya’s citizenship test. She spent months studying. When I dropped by 
her apartment several months earlier to quiz her, I saw how carefully she was 
preparing by writing out all the answers over and over again in scrawling long-
hand to commit them to memory. To gain citizenship, refugees must be able 
to answer all the questions in En glish, which means that to prepare for the 
test Abdiya learned how to write in En glish and memorize all one hundred 
possible questions in En glish. I know that her desire for a job and to be able to 
visit her son fueled her determined approach to gaining citizenship. Resettled 
refugees are not allowed to leave the United States until they pass their citi-
zenship test, which they can attempt only after living  here for five years. Ev-
eryone I know is studying to gain citizenship so they can travel to the camps 
to visit relatives left behind.
Abdiya reports that the citizenship interviewer asked her six questions, 
which she gleefully and robotically repeats: “The Louisiana Purchase!” I have 
no idea what that means, but Jama intervenes to explain: “It’s the answer to 
the question: what did the U.S. buy from France?” Abdiya continues to list the 
other questions, still committed to memory months after she passed the test: 
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“Who is the current president? What is the ocean to the east of the U.S.? John 
Roberts!,” which Jama translates as, “Who is the justice of the Supreme Court?” 
The final question is “Who is the father of our nation?,” which I ask her to repeat, 
astonished at the patriarchal framing.
Abdiya and Jama report that life in Kenya and Somalia is now worse than 
ever because of the terrorist group Al- Shabaab, which has taken control of 
southern Somalia.1 Al- Shabaab soldiers do not want anyone to leave Somalia 
and threaten those they catch on the road from the Jubba Valley to Kenya with 
beheadings. “They are cutting off people’s heads, like animals!” Jama says, in 
outrage. “Cutting off hands, legs, cutting out eyeballs. Why? It isn’t the religion. 
I know I’m not a mullah, but I know it’s not the religion.” A few days previ-
ously, when I was visiting Sadiq, his brother phoned to say he was recently 
arrested and briefly incarcerated by an Al- Shabaab member who disliked his 
cell phone’s ringtone. He was trying to figure out how to flee, as was Sadiq’s 
mother. She had tried to escape to Kenya but was caught and held by an Al- 
Shabaab member for three days. Her captor told her that if she tried to escape 
again he would behead her. Al- Shabaab is trying to use the local civilian popu-
lation as shields and threatens everyone with beheadings if they try to escape.
Jama says those trying to escape now have to go north, nearly to the Ethi-
opian border, before heading west to get to Kenya since Al- Shabaab men 
started to heavily patrol the route from Banta. “I  can’t understand why the 
rest of the world just lets this happen!” he says. “Somalia has so few people, 
just a few million. So many women and children are being hurt. Why  doesn’t 
the rest of the world just step in and stop the madness?” Abdiya nods her head 
emphatically. I try to give a serious answer, mumbling something about the 
lesson from Black Hawk Down and how the United States does not want to 
intervene anymore. But, he protests, there  were united opposition forces fight-
ing then. There  were armies then. Now it is just a bunch of kids with guns. They 
could stop it, easily. As the napping kids start to stir and we gather our things 
to leave, Nunnay is still sobbing.
The visit captures several dimensions of the lives of Somali Bantu refugees 
in Lewiston: the difficulty finding a job; the enormous challenges for women 
struggling to care for many children and husbands who do not contribute to do-
mestic chores; the worries about children repeatedly suspended from school; 
the debilitating burden of traumatic memories; the overwhelming need to 
come up with enough money to support large families in Lewiston and be-
loved family members in the camps; the desire for citizenship in order to be 
mobile; the ongoing worry about relatives in the land of Al- Shabaab kids with 
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guns; the great care and effort that people exert to support each other, such as 
Jama for his relative and close friend Abdiya, Abdiya for her married daughter’s 
mental health and her son’s financial health in the camps, Nunnay for Abdiya’s 
desire to spend a month with her son in Kenya, Abdiya for her cowife so she 
can attend school. Worry pervades home life and distracts already distracted 
parents, some of whom retreat into depression and withdraw from their chil-
dren. Parental distraction means some boys gain greater freedom to slip out of 
the  house and lose themselves in the street, and some daughters become over-
burdened with the domestic chores abandoned by their exhausted mothers. 
Marriages fray under the pressures of new chores, new expectations for gender 
roles, poverty, and new structures of family life. For someone like Abdiya, what 
do self- sufficiency and integration look like? How do Somali Bantu refugees 
in Lewiston define these two tenets of the U.S. refugee resettlement program?
Making Refuge
The Somali and Somali Bantu refugees appear in the previous three chapters 
as either unexpected, needy problems to be managed and accommodated with 
as little disruption to the host community as possible (chapter 4), as illegitimate 
welfare beneficiaries and security threats who do not belong (chapter 5), or as 
fellow community members to be supported as the face of Lewiston’s future 
(chapter  6). A central question weaving through these different versions is 
whether their presence is welcome or detrimental. During my interviews 
and fieldwork, I was struck by how rarely those whose voices are recorded in 
part II acknowledged the ways in which the refugees themselves  were or ga-
niz ing community- based initiatives, advocating for themselves, and defining 
what self- sufficiency and integration should look like. This is not a critique of 
those who worked to assist resettlement or in the helping professions; rather, 
it is a suggestion that non- Somalis and Somalis remained distinct groups, al-
though internally divided, with very narrow points of engagement during 
the first de cade of resettlement.
In 2009, a city administrator told me, “It’s about time one of the refugee 
groups stepped up and started helping people. . . .  It’s really needed.” Somali 
immigrants had in fact established several ngos in the early years of the de-
cade, mostly focused on business interests and professional networking. But 
the Somali Bantus, because of their greater rates of illiteracy and lower rates 
of En glish competency and education, desired different forms of advocacy 
during their first years in Lewiston. This section shifts our focus to the ways 
in which Somali Bantus (like the Somalis before them) worked to make their 
own refuge. In their version of Lewiston’s story, Somali Bantus challenged rac-
ism and discrimination, learned to advocate for things they wanted, and figured 
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out how to gain a foothold in American civic life while attempting to protect 
community values and cultural integrity.
Alongside efforts to take charge of their own affairs and narrate their own 
story, the Somali Bantu community in Lewiston is wrestling with internal de-
bates about new cultural values and practices made accessible by the move 
to America, especially regarding family dynamics. When I ask friends from 
Banta what they most remember from their cultural orientation classes in 
Kakuma refugee camp, they quickly list a common set of lessons, startling in 
their focus on reconfigured family relationships and responsibilities: No po-
lygyny. No arranged marriages. No marriage before age sixteen. No hitting 
your spouse. No swatting your kids for discipline. No female circumcision. 
No traditional healing practices (which often rely on the involvement of fam-
ily members to cure the ill). There is a reason why these  were the lessons 
most seared into people’s consciousness: they  were learning that many of their 
normal practices for managing marriage, family, and domestic life would be 
wrong and illegal in their new country.
Village life in prewar Somalia was based largely on relationships within 
families and kin groups and with neighbors, governed by clear lines of author-
ity that assigned more power to elders than youths, made parental authority 
unquestionable, and gave older men power over community politics and 
married women power in the realms of domestic life, parenting, and some 
forms of spiritual healing. People’s identities  were constituted through their 
relationships to other people in their extended family and kin group: as moth-
ers, sisters, wives, husbands, fathers, daughters, sons, and so forth. Each role 
carried par tic u lar collectively understood responsibilities, expectations, and 
obligations, and village life afforded little room for contesting the pa ram e ters 
of expectations for people whose subjectivities  were defined by their social 
embeddedness.
Extended families often lived together in compounds of several huts en-
circling an open space for eating, working, and relaxing, and family life was 
quite public because most people spent the majority of time outdoors, either 
in their fields or in the open areas of their compounds. I remember retreating 
into my tiny hut on occasions when I felt ill or overwhelmed, and within the 
hour my door would fly open to admit neighbors who settled onto the floor 
mats to chat, concerned that I was alone inside, suffering. In a rural village 
like Banta, neighbors overheard your conversations and commented on your 
cooking, your children’s antics, your appearance, your heaps of stored corn 
or containers of sesame oil, your treatment of your spouse, and much more. 
Overheard conversations  were repeated from compound to compound, and 
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anyone who wished could see where everyone  else was and what they  were 
doing. Villages held communal rituals for healing and worship and treated 
marriage and raising children as a collective responsibility. Privacy, individual 
autonomy, and individualism  were not pop u lar concepts.
In Banta, children played freely throughout the entire village during their 
early childhood, supervised if necessary by any nearby adults, before taking 
greater responsibilities on family farms and with domestic chores as they grew 
up. Parents expected obedience to their commands, but otherwise demanded 
little of their children. Childhood in Somali Bantu families was not an or-
chestrated, structured experience with intimate parental involvement; to the 
contrary, children  were often left to play on their own with little to no parental 
attention. Visiting Somali Bantu friends in their apartments in Lewiston or 
hosting them at my  house, I see how the open approach to childhood that So-
mali Bantu parents held in prewar Somalia has persisted. One day when Idris 
and his family  were coming to lunch at my  house, he phoned in the morn-
ing to say that another cousin and his family wanted to come too. When the 
vans pulled up in our driveway, fifteen people poured out, including ten chil-
dren under the age of five who occupied themselves during lunch playing our 
musical instruments, drawing pictures, doing puzzles, dancing, and running 
while the five adults ate and talked. During lunch, Idris mentioned the high 
volume as the kids banged, squealed, giggled, shrieked, played video games, 
and ran from room to room. When I asked if it was too noisy for them, they all 
laughed at the absurd question, responding, “Not for us! We  were worried 
about you!” Lots of children energetically playing, occupying themselves as 
parents attend to other matters, is a staple feature of Somali Bantu home life.
In Banta, boys  were circumcised at birth; girls at the age of eight or nine, 
when they began to take on the domestic tasks expected of women. Arranged 
marriages negotiated through extended family networks married girls at the 
age of fourteen and boys before they turned twenty. Newlyweds often lived 
with one of the couple’s parents, ensuring lots of child care as grandmothers 
took over child- rearing responsibilities. As a family grew in size and gained 
greater access to farmland, a man might marry another wife or two. Jealousy 
and antagonism sometimes erupted between cowives who chose to live sepa-
rately, but often cowives lived together, sharing child care and domestic respon-
sibilities, sometimes having closer relationships with each other than with 
their husband. A swift slap on the bottom with an open hand or a thin stick 
constituted the most extensive sort of physical parental discipline I witnessed 
during my residence in Banta, and over the course of that year I knew of three 
incidents of spousal violence— two by husbands against wives and one by a 
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wife against her husband. Neighbors quickly intervened in all three cases, 
which  were mediated by local religious authorities who levied fines against 
the perpetrators. Local midwives, healers, and religious specialists handled 
illnesses, using a range of techniques that included burning small holes in the 
skin to cure pain, cupping, medicinal herbs, amulets, prayer, and spirit pos-
session and exorcism ceremonies.
But in America, many basic dimensions of Somali Bantu family life and 
rituals of cohesion, community, solidarity, and support are defined as pathol-
ogies that are either criminal (female circumcision, arranged early marriages, 
polygyny, healing practices like burning, socially controlled physical violence 
to maintain discipline and authority); negligent (low parental supervision of 
children, curing through prayer or exorcism); or unhealthy (eating from com-
munal bowls, eating with hands rather than utensils, sleeping and sitting on 
the floor rather than on furniture). As Somali Bantu families whose lives  were 
upended in the war attempt to rebuild their fractured community in Lewis-
ton, they face the enormous challenge of doing so according to totally new 
and barely understood rules for social life.
The following chapters show how they are attempting to navigate the twin 
expectations of self- sufficiency and integration in their new home. For people 
who prioritize community life and social networks over individualism, self- 
sufficiency means community in de pen dence rather than individual economic 
autonomy, and integration does not mean abandoning their values in a bid to 
become American. Their first de cade in Lewiston brought massive challenges 
as Somali Bantu refugees tried to prioritize mutual social responsibility and 
strong diasporic connections to loved ones left behind in Africa while living 
in the land of individual autonomy and making a home in the par tic u lar lo-
cality of Lewiston, all while adjusting to living in extreme poverty in the land 
of plenty and as black people in a white society.
They began by contesting the presumption that they  were objects of policy 
rather than architects and that their integration was to be effected through 
the efforts of local institutions and the helpers who managed their engage-
ments with mainstream society. Instead, Somali Bantu refugees created their 
own bodies of po liti cal and civic activity to manage internal community mat-
ters and relationships between community members and other city residents, 
bodies through which refugee immigrants sought to define new collective 
norms and internal support structures relevant in the United States. It has 
been a fraught, painful, challenging pro cess as gender roles, parental author-
ity, and youth culture opened for debate under the influence of American val-
ues, pop u lar culture, and the pressures of racism. Their story, of course, is still 
unfolding, but their experiences during their first de cade in Lewiston show 
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how indigent refugees work to make their own refuge with spare assistance, 
how assimilation goes both ways by changing not only immigrants but also 
the cities to which they move, and how transnational and diasporic connec-
tions intersect with the par tic u lar places where resettled refugees make new 
homes.
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chapter 7
Making Refuge
We expected more democracy in America.
— Refugee immigrant in Lewiston
After arriving in Lewiston, Somali Bantu community elders faced the imme-
diate task of figuring out how to insert their perspectives and viewpoints into 
local po liti cal and civic arenas, which initially only enabled their participation 
in highly orchestrated and contained ways such as through focus groups and 
meetings called by authorities with agendas defined by them. In addition to 
claiming the right to speak out about issues of concern to their community, 
Somali Bantu leaders also wished to distinguish themselves from the Somali 
community that had preceded them to Lewiston by, in par tic u lar, denouncing 
the racism they experienced from Somalis in Somalia and the Kenyan refugee 
camps. They faced barriers in both arenas because local bureaucratic authori-
ties did not always view them as competent decision makers, and fellow So-
malis resisted their allegations of historic discrimination. Many of their early 
initiatives pushed back against their bureaucratic containment and silencing.
Somali Bantu po liti cal culture is profoundly demo cratic, which was formerly 
possible in small villages where everyone worked on the same time schedule. 
Villagers discussed matters of mutual concern in large meetings in open out-
door gathering spots where everyone had the right to speak and share their 
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views, and women, normally occupied with domestic chores and child care, 
 were able to participate as children played together within view just beyond 
the meeting grounds. Inequalities existed, of course: men had more power 
than women, and their occasional use of violence to maintain authority was 
carefully policed and mediated by elders and family members; elders (men 
and women) had more power than youths and expected respect and compli-
ance with their wishes. Authority was vested in certain elders, who made deci-
sions for the community after listening to all sides, and whose decisions  were 
(usually, in my experience) respected because of their se niority and publicly 
acknowledged wisdom.
In the transition to life in Lewiston, Somali Bantu expectations of demo-
cratic, transparent, and vetted decision- making pro cesses ran aground on the 
reality that local institutions and authorities viewed them not as decision mak-
ers but rather as unschooled objects of policy (echoing their experience in 
the refugee camps). Refugee elders tried to respond appropriately in the 
new context, learning bureaucratic languages, attending workshops, and 
transforming their style of po liti cal practice and decision making to match 
American expectations for clear leaders who speak on behalf of a community 
and hierarchical or gan i za tional structures that ascribe more power and public 
recognition to some than to others. This proved to be a challenging adjustment, 
as the former practice of deliberative decision making regarding internal 
community issues ran up against the challenges of time constraints due to 
dramatically different work schedules and transportation barriers, the inability 
of women to participate because of their child care responsibilities in isolated 
apartments, the demand by outsiders for quick decisions in some contexts, the 
expectation by city leaders or institutions for one representative to speak on 
behalf of the community, and struggles over authority as the elders lost power 
to members of the English- speaking and literate younger generation.
Somali Bantus learned early on that democracy works differently in U.S. 
bureaucratic culture, where the institutions with which they engage most 
intensely— schools, hospitals, social ser vices authorities—do not need to be 
responsive to their concerns or desires despite their expectation to be in-
volved through translators of their choice. The ire about schools in par tic u lar 
ran deep, as Somali Bantu parents told me over and over how they experi-
enced the ell program as a paramount example of top- down administration 
and exclusion even though the program consisted largely of their children. 
The Department of Justice memorandum said nothing about mandating pa-
rental involvement in the ell program, and school administrators  were thus 
free to limit parental involvement to annual parent- teacher conferences while 
refusing teacher efforts to create parent- teacher groups or a regular ell parent 
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advisory committee during the first de cade (see chapter 6). In one meeting 
I attended about parental concerns with the ell program, a refugee father 
complained to a school administrator that the school made policy and called 
parents to a meeting to inform them about policies affecting their children 
but never asked parents for their views or responses. Other parents in the con-
versation nodded their agreement, and one noted that the way the school sys-
tem treats refugee parents is just like the way Americans intervene in African 
villages, such as when a humanitarian group shows up and announces, “We 
are bringing you a well!” when what the village really wants is a school. There 
is no discussion— just the Americans telling the villagers what they are doing 
with the expectation that the villagers should accept it and be happy about it. 
Pointedly, he emphasized that this does not make for a successful relationship.
That par tic u lar meeting concluded peacefully, although the parents left 
without having achieved any of their objectives (employment for refugee par-
ents as groundskeepers, demarcated prayer time in school, extended- day ell 
classes, and extra tutoring for ell students to allow their children to catch up 
more quickly to their American peers). But the meeting demonstrated what I 
heard over and over from Somali Bantu parents: “We expected more democ-
racy in America,” as one man put it, summarizing collective frustration about 
constantly being told what they could and could not talk about in meetings, 
feeling silenced about how schools handled their children, and realizing that 
school, city, and hospital administrators did not feel compelled to respect their 
priorities and objectives about education, health care, translation ser vices, or 
other forms of social engagement. What Somali Bantus understood as demo-
cratic practice— namely, their right to speak out about matters that concerned 
them— American administrators saw as the refugees’ bureaucratic incompe-
tence. A few more examples reveal why.
“We Can’t Invite People and Then Cut Them Off Before  
They Are Finished”
A few organizations tried to engage with the refugee population through the 
use of focus groups, a pop u lar form of contained data production for or gan i-
za tional use, arranged through Somali and Somali Bantu cultural brokers who 
are put in charge of gathering community members to talk about issues of 
interest to the convening agency. (One refugee caseworker joked that the expe-
rience of Somali immigrants in Lewiston is “Move to Lewiston! Join a focus 
group!”) A significant component of the cultural broker job is to ensure that 
agency goals govern focus group outreach, placing cultural brokers between 
the expectations of the agencies that employ them and the community mem-
bers they are employed to attract to meetings. Whereas in Somali po liti cal 
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culture, meetings are open to anyone who wishes to attend and those who attend 
expect to be able to speak about any issue of concern to them and for as long as 
they wish, agencies conducting focus groups predetermine the specific topics to 
be discussed, the length of the meeting, and the participants. Time and again, 
agencies felt focus group discussions veered too far from the topic; focus group 
participants felt their concerns went unheard; and refugee cultural brokers 
got caught in between.1 For example, the expectation by ngos that the same 
participants will come to each meeting for qualitative and statistical continu-
ity is an impossible expectation because Somali and Somali Bantu community 
members view participation in focus groups and other programs as something 
to be shared. If one group of people hoards the opportunity to participate in a 
focus group or program training, especially when they are compensated for at-
tendance, or if the cultural broker bars the door to community members in the 
interest of consistent participation, other community members accuse them 
of selfishly hogging an opportunity. Exclusivity is a sure route to tension and 
accusations, and everyone in the refugee community understands that it is 
far more demo cratic to ensure that everyone who wishes can participate.
The theme of control permeated many meetings I attended at social ser-
vices agencies that  were discussing how to reach out to New Mainers, leaving 
cultural brokers to explain how difficult it is to invite people to a meeting and 
then tell them what they can and cannot talk about. “We  can’t invite people 
and then cut them off before they are finished,” cautioned refugee cultural 
brokers over and over again at planning meetings. After a meeting or ga nized 
by a housing authority where women began screaming at each other as the 
convener tried to intervene to force them to talk about the topic selected by 
the organizers rather than the issue about which the women  were upset, a 
cultural broker familiar with such scenes told me, “Sometimes ser vice provid-
ers invite parents and want them to talk about a specific thing, but the parents 
want to talk about something  else. The ser vice providers try to make the par-
ents only talk about the thing they want to focus on, but the parents have to 
be able to address the thing they want to address too.”
The unruliness that Somali and Somali Bantu parents sometimes exhibit 
about obeying the rules for theme and time in focus group discussions orches-
trated by ser vice providers is easily interpreted as bureaucratic incompetence, 
which can be challenging for even the most well- meaning ser vice providers. 
Ser vice providers do not know what to do when immigrant participants talk for 
too long at meetings, talk about things unrelated to the meeting agenda, do 
not follow rules for participation, and then get frustrated that they are invited 
to participate in a meeting where their concerns are being ignored. The inability 
to control the conversation is precisely why schools do not want to have par-
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ent committees and wish to bar teachers from meeting autonomously with 
parents. Focus groups constrain refugee voices and focus refugee involvement 
on only those topics of concern to the agencies, whether or not the refugees 
share those concerns. When a mental health agency calls a focus group to 
learn about mental health concerns from parents, and all parents want to talk 
about is their experience of exclusion from the local schools, or when the 
housing authority convenes a group to talk about creating a community self- 
help group and the participants want to talk about their anger at each other’s 
misbehaving children, the convening agencies are frustrated that participants 
do not stay on topic, and refugees are frustrated that what they see as their 
premier concern— worry about their children—is unheard.
Adventures in Capacity Building
One way host communities can try to avoid the intercultural challenges posed 
by troublesome refugees is to encourage refugee self- help organizations to take 
over the responsibilities of acculturation and community support. The fed-
eral refugee resettlement program promotes refugee self- sufficiency in part 
through the creation of ethnic- based community organizations (ebcos) to 
undertake self- help projects that, in theory, will take primary responsibility 
for caring for refugee community members. Such associations must adhere to 
the bureaucratic logic of American nonprofits, obligating community members 
to participate in capacity- building and leadership development initiatives 
(often followed by grant- writing workshops) to prepare them to run their 
own ethnic- based nonprofits.
The Somali Bantu community was among the groups selected for training 
when the state of Maine received a half- million- dollar orr grant to develop 
leadership and or gan i za tional capacity in its refugee communities to enable 
them to create ebcos.2 Several representatives from the Somali Bantu com-
munity attended the first of the four required workshops but failed to return 
to the second, which prompted the annoyed project administrator to phone me 
to complain and ask me to pressure them to attend the third meeting. After 
I dutifully made some phone calls, I learned that the location of the second 
meeting had been changed from Lewiston to Portland at the last minute, mak-
ing transportation impossible for some of the participants, and that those who 
had provided child care for the participants in the first meeting had not re-
ceived the promised compensation from the project. Even though I thought 
their absence justified under the circumstances, I offered to join them for the 
third workshop, located in Portland, partly to make sure they returned to the 
program to salvage their reputation with the project administrator, who held 
an important position in the state.
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The leaders for the workshop  were two well- meaning middle- aged white 
women with a long history of professional leadership development and capac-
ity building but with little apparent experience with refugees or non- native 
En glish speakers. We began about an hour late, with an introduction by the lead 
facilitator who provided a complicated explanation about the importance of set-
ting goals, prefacing her remarks with comments about the wonderful new di-
versity that the refugees had brought to Maine: “It’s wonderful,” she told them, 
“to see different skin colors and clothing styles in Maine!” As she talked, her 
associate handed out colored cards that participants could hold up when they 
heard an unfamiliar word. Cards immediately started going up: anthropology 
(in response to my introduction), solid, homogeneous. The facilitator carried 
on with a technical discussion of goal achievement that included so many diffi-
cult words that we could not progress through the flurry of cards. “Framework.” 
She drew a tree on the board and said, “This tree is like your framework, your 
structure.” Another card. Then she drew things hanging off the tree and said, 
“These are your objectives”— another card— “your goals, but that’s also part of the 
mission statement, so we’ll get to objectives and goals tomorrow. The tree is a 
meta phor,” she explained, provoking another card to go up.
By now I was pretty confused as well. Goals and objectives are different, or 
the same? Since the facilitators provided no examples by way of illustration 
and solicited no responses from the participants, it was impossible to gauge 
what the audience was grasping. The second facilitator took over and talked 
for another twenty minutes, the use of cards flagging as the lecture went on. Fi-
nally the participants reanimated as the introductory section concluded with a 
lengthy discussion about when to stop for the day, since there was a competing 
multicultural event that many of the participants planned to attend. We agreed 
to end at lunchtime.
After an orienting activity involving postcards of art by Eu ro pean masters, 
we  were broken into small groups and sent to separate rooms to write a prac-
tice mission statement and a practice vision statement. Our group included 
representatives from a Somali and a Somali Bantu or ga ni za tion along with 
the project administrator for the grant. In response to directions to choose 
a facilitator, a scribe, and a reporter, we chose a young Somali Bantu man to 
facilitate, but the project administrator intervened to say that since he had not 
attended the last meeting he could not facilitate. The role went to a woman 
from the other Somali or ga ni za tion. The scribe was also a woman from the 
Somali or ga ni za tion, who tried valiantly to record the comments despite lim-
ited literacy skills. By the end of our session, our statement reflected the com-
ments from the Somali group about children’s needs but somehow none of the 
suggestions offered by the Somali Bantu participants— housing, adult literacy, 
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jobs, intercommunity trust— were incorporated. I  couldn’t help pointing this 
out, so the administrator added the word “adults” to our pretend mission state-
ment. After reconvening with the other groups to share our final statements 
with each other, the day concluded with an exercise called plus/minus, where 
participants listed positive and negative aspects of the day’s experience. Posi-
tives included the flexibility to end at noon, rather than 4 pm. Negatives  were 
more numerous: the lateness of some participants, to which one of the Somali 
Bantu women responded, calmly, “You don’t know the situation some people 
faced in trying to get  here. Some people came from far away and had some 
troubles getting  here.” The project administrator intervened to reprimand her, 
stating that no one is supposed to respond to plus/minus comments; all are 
just supposed to listen. Another participant offered as a minus the fact that 
the workshop was scheduled at the same time as another major multicultural 
event in the city, to which the administrator, ignoring the previous directive, 
responded with frustration that everyone in the room should have been aware 
of the competing events and thus the scheduling mishap was their fault.
I knew that the Somali Bantu man who had coordinated his community’s 
participation had worked an eleven- hour night shift— from 4 pm until 3 am 
the previous night—as a janitor in a fast- food restaurant. After three hours of 
sleep, he began assembling other community members to get them down to 
Portland for the early meeting, which required finding an available car and 
circling the city to pick everyone up before the hour- long drive south. The 
group was chastised for arriving late, told they could not take an active role 
because of their absence from the previous meeting, ignored when they did 
try to contribute, silenced when they explained the reasons for their late ar-
rival, and told they  were lucky to be allowed to participate. After their hour- long 
drive home, the man who or ga nized the Somali Bantu participation returned 
directly to work for his next eleven- hour shift. They did not return for the 
next meeting, nor did I intervene again to encourage them.
But such failures by Somali Bantu participants to meet the expectations set 
for them by institutional administrators are damaging, as agencies attempting 
to make a connection become frustrated that Somali Bantus are not playing 
their parts correctly. Their roles are scripted as focus group participants who 
respond to questions but do not make demands, as new residents who should 
be grateful to be invited to meetings, as objects of policy who do not contrib-
ute to making policy, and as po liti cal neophytes who need to be taught about 
leadership, capacity building, and decision making. Talking about the frustra-
tion with Catholic Charities that many local agencies felt, a social worker told 
me, “We all suffer from high expectations. We want the best for the newcom-
ers so we want the providers to do everything to the best of their ability.” But 
222 • Chapter 7
then she added, “And we expect the best behavior from our clients,” noting 
how hard it is when the refugees do not behave in ways desired or expected 
by providers. In the incidents described above, refugees  were “the problem” 
because of their failure to follow the rules and do what they  were told. For 
the refugees, the only solution was to take control of their public presence in 
formats they controlled, to learn how to make their desires clearly understood 
by policy makers, and to or ga nize their own programs to meet needs they 
defined for themselves.
“Learning How Things Work Here”
While Lewiston’s civic organizations  were cautiously figuring out how to ex-
tend themselves toward the refugee community through focus group meet-
ings and discussions in the collaborative, Somali Bantus had taken note that 
the ebco model would allow them to create a public presence, manage their 
internal affairs, and compete for grants to offer caseworker assistance, trans-
lation, conflict mediation, and so forth. Several Somali Bantu community 
members worked diligently throughout 2006 to create a Somali Bantu com-
munity association ebco (hereafter called “the association”), seeking help 
from ser vice providers, anthropologist allies, lawyers, the irs, and a profes-
sional website designer. As instructed, they held community meetings to elect 
a board, write a mission statement and bylaws, and begin planning the proj-
ects for which they hoped to receive grant support.
Things started well. The community identified several priorities, begin-
ning with a soccer program for young adults and a summer program for their 
elementary school children in response to parental worries that their older 
children had no activities and their younger children  were not progressing 
out of ell classes fast enough. Alongside these efforts, board members also 
embarked on a public education campaign with schools, ser vice providers, 
hospitals, and city leaders to teach their American neighbors about why they 
are called Somali Bantus rather than simply Somalis and to convince their 
audiences of the need for Somali Bantu (rather than Somali) casework-
ers and translators to ensure adequate and trustworthy repre sen ta tion. Sadiq, 
the community spokesperson, accepted invitations all over southern Maine to 
talk about Somali Bantu identity and history, a task he undertook with remark-
able commitment. On one occasion, for example, Sadiq and I  were invited to 
give an early morning breakfast pre sen ta tion to the Waterville Rotary club 
about the refugee community in Lewiston. Unusually, he was a bit late arriv-
ing, whispering an apology as he slipped into a seat next to me at the breakfast 
table, saying that he was late because he had just come from Syracuse. Isha 
and some other women  were driving from Lewiston to Syracuse the previous 
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afternoon for a wedding and their van broke down on the highway in Massa-
chusetts. They phoned him for help, so he drove to Massachusetts, picked them 
up, took them to Syracuse, and then immediately turned around to return to 
Maine so he could be in time for our pre sen ta tion. In other words, he had 
just driven fifteen hours straight and had not slept in two days. “You should 
have phoned me to cancel!” I whispered, horrified. “Why would I do that?” he 
asked, surprised.
Sadiq proved to be a whiz at information management. As we sat together 
at the 2009 Lewiston High School graduation, I noticed he was filling his 
program with notes and asked what he was doing. “I’m gathering informa-
tion!” he responded. As part of his quest for useful knowledge to pass on to com-
munity members and because, as he once explained to me, “I don’t know how 
things work  here,” he always attended graduation ceremonies, whether or not 
he knew any of the graduates, to gather information about scholarship oppor-
tunities, awards, donors, and college destinations of local graduates. Gathering 
information also motivated him to publicize his community’s achievements by 
asking the local newspaper to cover things like his college graduation, when 
he became the first Somali Bantu to gain a college degree in Maine, the 2009 
high school graduation of the first four Somali Bantus to graduate in Maine, 
the soccer program and summer camp, clothing distributions at the associa-
tion’s office, and other community initiatives. He promoted refugee success 
and achievement rather than sending thank- you letters to the newspaper.
Demanding Self- Representation
The point of all the public outreach and information gathering by the Somali 
Bantu community association leadership was to insert themselves into spaces 
of opportunity and to explain why their identity differed from the city’s So-
mali population in order to demand separate repre sen ta tion through Somali 
Bantu (rather than Somali) caseworkers and translators. When first arriving 
in the United States, many Somali Bantus felt uncomfortable allowing So-
malis to translate for them partly because they feared mistranslation caused 
by differences in language and dialect, but also because many did not trust 
Somalis with information about their health, income, children, and other 
intimate details.3 But retelling stories about their marginalization and dis-
crimination in Somalia in order to make their case met animated opposition 
from some members of Lewiston’s Somali community, who protested that the 
Somali Bantu label is little more than a strategic marketing campaign based 
in fictional renditions of history and entrepreneurial motivations. The ensu-
ing fights over Somali Bantu self- representation occupied many Somali Bantu 
community leaders during their first years in Lewiston.
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Sadiq was furious that some Somalis brought their racism with them to 
Lewiston, wielding it against Somali Bantus by trying to deny their memories 
of injustice while simultaneously humiliating them with racist epithets. Somali 
Bantu friends recount story after story about the racist incidents they experi-
enced in Lewiston from fellow Somalis: a Somali man at a barber shop insist-
ing that the barber change the razor after clipping the hair of Somali Bantu cus-
tomers before using it on a Somali; a Somali man urinating on a photograph 
in the newspaper of a Somali Bantu teenage soccer star; high school students 
who regularly hear the saying, “Jareer are the same whether in Chicago or 
Jilib” (the Somali version of “You can take them out of the bush but you  can’t 
take the bush out of them”); local community college students whose Somali 
classmates tease them about their inability to function in class before noon in 
reference to another common saying that the brains of jareer only work in the 
afternoon; Somali women taunting Somali Bantu women that Somali Bantu 
men want to marry Somali women but no Somali men would want Somali 
Bantu women.
Sadiq will never forgive racism. As a young man, he watched armed So-
malis invade his town to demand food, girls, and the belongings of others. 
He witnessed the massacred men from Duqiyow in their death embrace, 
roped together around the trunk of the largest mango tree in the area. He fled 
to Banta to escape the militias who had taken over his hometown of Bu’aale, 
eventually fleeing Banta for Kenya with the girl who later became his wife, 
leaving behind their families. In the refugee camp, he became the second So-
mali Bantu to graduate from high school, enduring the taunts of his Somali 
schoolmates who refused to sit near him or study with him. He encouraged 
younger Somali Bantus to stay in school, eventually becoming their teacher 
after the move to Kakuma. His sense of self was forged by the cruelty and 
racism directed against villagers by Somali pastoralists and in the camps where 
Somali classmates angry about his intelligence and academic success called him 
derogatory and mocking names. Although one normally empathetic ser vice 
provider argues that in Lewiston, “Somali Bantus will simply have to get over” 
their memories of past discrimination, Sadiq is certain that he will never lose 
his rage against racism.4
After becoming the spokesperson of the Somali Bantu community associa-
tion, Sadiq represented the community in a multitude of public events with a 
relentless message: “We will not accept discrimination. In Somalia we expe-
rienced discrimination because of our ancestry, and our communities  were 
destroyed and families killed because of it. Here, in the U.S., we are free and we 
will never come under Somalis again.”5 Whereas the Somali leaders who had 
arrived before him in Lewiston wanted to present a united community voice, 
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arguing that in America no one cares about internal Somali differences and 
that all Somalis are perceived as just black, Sadiq refused to comply with the 
message of unity, insisting on narrating the Somali Bantu story of poverty, mar-
ginalization, and discrimination in order to ensure that Somali Bantus could 
represent themselves to city officials, ser vice providers, and funders. “Somalis 
 were trying to colonize us and that is what I was trying to avoid,” he explained 
about his determined advocacy of Somali Bantu rights to self- representation 
and resources, including competing for translation contracts at hospitals rather 
than working for the already established Somali- owned agencies.
Somali Bantus’ per sis tence led to reprisals from some Somalis who viewed 
their efforts as an attempt to wield the Somali Bantu moniker solely to ac-
cess resources by relentlessly promoting an old narrative no longer relevant 
in Lewiston’s context.6 The desire to claim a united face for the entire Somali 
community is understandable. After all, when Somalis first started moving 
to Lewiston, city administrators told them that they would only listen to one 
leader to represent the community because it was too confusing to hear dif-
ferent sides from different Somali networks and factions. Somali friends laugh 
when they recount how several city administrators upset about the Letter told 
Somalis that the mayor  doesn’t speak for the city, leading some to wonder why 
the city government can be internally divided but not Somalis.
But in addition to forging legibility through singular repre sen ta tion, the 
Somali backlash against Somali Bantu claims is, sadly, also about racism and 
ignorance. Somalis from northern Somalia may have never encountered jar-
eer Somalis or heard about Somalia’s history of slavery, and some may simply 
have been unaware of the impact on jareer Somalis of their constant experi-
ences of racist discrimination. One Somali man who works in the Lewiston 
public schools took me aside one day to tell me, privately, that he has learned 
so much about his country from hearing about the experiences of his Somali 
Bantu colleagues in the United States. He said that although he hears his So-
mali peers denounce the claims of Somali Bantus, he now understands that 
the claims of racism and discrimination are valid. Other Somalis are angry 
that Somali Bantu claims appear to construct a hierarchy of victimization that 
overvalorizes the suffering of Somali Bantus, arguing, instead, that all who 
came to the United States fled for their lives.
But, of course, struggles over limited resources and the perception of a 
zero- sum game in the world of social ser vices play an important role in the 
denial of a separate Somali Bantu identity by other Somalis. When they ar-
rived in Lewiston, many Somali Bantu adults  were completely dependent on 
interpreters and cultural brokers for assistance with medical care, the schools, 
social ser vices providers, and government offices. At that time, educated 
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Somalis with several years of residence in the city held all the translator and 
cultural broker positions. While some of these translators worked very hard 
on behalf of newly arrived Somali Bantu refugees, Somali Bantus  were also 
working hard to develop skills as cultural brokers and translators in order to 
represent themselves. The desire by Somali Bantus to be represented by those 
Somali Bantus with competent En glish meant that Somalis would lose control 
over coveted cultural brokerage and translation jobs.
“We Paid You to Dig Our Toilets!”
Since the entire refugee resettlement program is based on competing for 
scarce federal, state, and private resources in the form of grants to fund criti-
cally important social support work, the system is set up to promote com-
petition. In Lewiston the unavoidable result was rivalry within and between 
ebcos to obtain grants, in part because for many refugees they offered the 
best opportunities for employment. Thus the emphasis on self- help as a route 
to refugee self- sufficiency and integration also had the effect of promoting 
ethnic differences as a form of competition.7
Lewiston’s ser vice providers struggled with a response to the demand for 
separate repre sen ta tion by the Somali Bantu leadership, which some inter-
preted as unappreciative whininess. One hospital administrator in charge of 
translation policy or ga nized a panel pre sen ta tion in 2007 for Somali Bantus to 
make their case about separate translation to physicians and hospital staff. At 
the conclusion of the pre sen ta tion, a doctor in the audience stood up, bright 
red in the face and shaking with emotion, to shout that his parents came from 
Canada with nothing and no one helped them, they  were poor, they suffered, 
they didn’t speak En glish, and they neither asked for nor received special 
assistance. Furthermore, he continued, stories of Somali history and victim-
ization  were not relevant to his work as a doctor and he objected to this use of 
his time. As soon as he finished speaking, Sadiq jumped to his feet applauding 
loudly, thanking the doctor for making such an important point. When I asked 
Sadiq afterward about his reaction— I had thought the doctor was chastising 
the group for asking for special treatment—he responded that it was obvious 
the doctor was extremely upset and Sadiq agreed with his argument that trans-
lation issues should not be his concern as a doctor, but rather should be effec-
tively handled by the hospital administration.
The association leadership or ga nized another panel for a large conference 
of social ser vice providers in 2007 about cultural and linguistic competency, 
where they spoke to a packed auditorium about their background and need 
for separate translators, emphasizing their distrust of the people who dis-
criminated against them back in Somalia. They took turns describing things 
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that they experienced in Somalia and in the camps to justify their claims. Sadiq 
mentioned that even in the refugee camps, Somali Bantus still did all the menial 
tasks like digging latrines. By talking in such a public place about their griev-
ances, the Somali Bantu panel at the conference set off an explosion among 
translators, caseworkers, and the broader Somali and Somali Bantu commu-
nities. After the panel discussion, a Somali caseworker for one of the social 
ser vices agencies accosted Sadiq, yelling: “We paid you to dig our toilets!” He 
responded, furiously, “Yes, sometimes, but why  were Somali Bantus the only 
people doing those horrible jobs?” A Somali activist friend who thinks that 
everyone in the broader Somali community should be working toward unity and 
togetherness, not division and difference, identifies this panel pre sen ta tion as 
the start of the major fights in Lewiston about Somali Bantu identity claims and 
self- help efforts. But then, without irony, he says that he tells the Somali chil-
dren who call Somali Bantu children ooji (slave) on the playground that they 
should not do that because it is bad and hurtful. It was precisely to confront the 
everyday normalness of such racist acts that the association leadership chose 
to talk in public about their historic experiences and to make a case for in de-
pen dent repre sen ta tion.
While fighting for its community members to be hired as translators, the 
association began applying for grants, eventually renting an office on Lisbon 
Street staffed by community members to help people with everything from 
rides to negotiating with utility companies about ser vice suspensions, or ga-
niz ing community collections for family emergencies, translating for medical 
appointments, and mediating marital disputes. They initially targeted small 
grants in the range of a few thousand dollars for short- term projects and basic 
office support. Some years they received no funding; in other years they  were 
more successful, gaining $10,000 or more. But although the launch of the as-
sociation seemed like a wonderful culmination of collective hard work, com-
munity unity, and self- help, before long the competitive model for meeting 
community needs through grant- driven “self- empowerment” undertaken by 
an exclusive board of leaders challenged Somali Bantu understandings of nor-
mal po liti cal practice in ways that fractured the fragile community.
“In Africa We Have Time”
Within a year of its creation, tensions emerged between board members about 
the allocation of the or ga ni za tion’s paltry funds and the structure of decision 
making, and community members began expressing their suspicions that 
board members  were inaccurately representing the community to outsiders 
or  were pocketing grants intended for the  whole community. Making the 
rocky transition from a village context where wealth and access to resources 
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 were publicly assessed and mediated to one where board members could deal 
privately in cash, checks, and bank accounts enabled accusations against com-
munity leaders of operating in the name of the community but for personal 
gain: making deals and getting kickbacks, engaging in secret conversations 
with authorities and funders and attending conferences where their actions 
and words  were unknown to community members, or involving commu-
nity members in public appearances (like panel discussions) while keeping 
(usually only imagined) stipends for themselves. As one angry (non- English- 
speaking) community member told me, “We want to go to conferences too!” 
By 2009, every invitation for a (normally pro bono) public pre sen ta tion or 
dance per for mance caused organizers to discuss how to handle suspicions 
that they had been paid, while other community members gossiped that pay-
ments had been secretly negotiated and pocketed by the organizers. When 
we  were planning the dance per for mance for the opening of the Museum la 
exhibition, one of the women involved said, sighing, “It  doesn’t matter that 
we don’t get paid, but everyone will believe that we did.”8 The jealousies and 
suspicions that emerged in Lewiston reflected just how few members of the 
community had points of engagement with other organizations and institu-
tions in Lewiston and how dependent community members  were on the few 
adults who spoke En glish and could participate in the world of grant makers 
and other local authorities.
“The community is broken,” Sadiq told me in 2008, lamenting the dissolu-
tion of community bonds into accusations and allegations of corruption as 
different factions split and realigned over and over along lines of language, vil-
lage membership back in Somalia, or even Somali clan affiliation. In Somalia, 
such community breakdowns would have occasioned days of lengthy discus-
sions, an approach to problem solving impossible in the American context 
of unpredictable and nonaligned work schedules, poor public transportation, 
and so many more responsibilities that everyone has to attend to that get in 
the way of attending lengthy community meetings. Somali Bantus understand 
that the fast and simple “majority rules” solution fails as a practice of demo-
cratic decision making because the losers get nothing, which usually means 
ongoing dissatisfaction. “In Africa we have time,” says Congolese musician 
Lokua Kanza, a claim echoed by one of the Somali Bantu interpreters, who 
says, “In Somalia we would stay until everyone has had the chance to speak, 
even if it takes all night” to mend a community rift.9 But in the United States, 
or gan i za tional bylaws give more weight to some (board members) than others 
(community members) and contrasting work schedules make perfect collec-
tive attendance at meetings impossible, which means people end up feeling 
left out. The requirement for a spokesperson or identifiable leader for grants 
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and for interaction with institutions is an impossible challenge in a community 
that expects everyone to have a say. Spokespeople and leaders, who have full- 
time jobs, school careers, and large families, simply cannot canvass the com-
munity each time they must make a statement or represent the community to 
a city official or prospective donor.
The profound restructuring of daily life in the United States has made old 
patterns of decision making obsolete or unworkable, and the transition to paid 
employment has ruptured the universal daily schedule of a community depen-
dent on farming. “Now if you try to schedule a community meeting at 4 pm, 
for example, half the adults are at their jobs, the others are at appointments, at 
school, and in class, at interviews,” one man tells me. “No one has time to come 
together anymore. In the  U.S. everything is about money. You need money 
for everything! In Africa you didn’t really need money— rent, utilities, car, car 
insurance. Everyone is running after money, and it goes out as soon as it comes 
in! Plus we have to send money home.” A system that relies on competition to 
access money, as the grant structure for ebcos requires, means that the com-
munity becomes infected with an understanding of resources as things to be 
fought over rather than shared, resulting in jealousy and rumors.
As factions broke off and then negotiated a peaceful reunion, only to break 
off again a few months later, other frustrations with the ser vices provided by 
the or ga ni za tion grew. During the days I spent in the office on Lisbon Street, I 
witnessed the limitless array of requests from community members for rides, 
help with utility bills, complaints about family disputes that needed mediation, 
help with translation at the hospital or the court, questions about green card 
or driver’s license applications, and more. The En glish speakers in the or ga-
ni za tion  were trying to fulfill the demands placed on them by the claims of 
community leaders that Somali Bantus only wanted translation ser vices and 
assistance from other Somali Bantus and not from Somalis. But the tiny num-
ber of En glish speakers, every single one of whom was also attending school, 
working, and parenting, could not possibly meet the vast, pressing, and con-
stant needs of hundreds of non- English- speaking community members for 
translation and other ser vices. When translators began missing appointments, 
double- booking translation jobs, keeping poor accounting rec ords, or rushing 
through client appointments, a few Somali Bantus began using Somali transla-
tors again because of ongoing frustrations with their own community’s inabil-
ity to meet everyone’s needs. As the self- help systems broke down and it be-
came apparent that the few Somali Bantu translators could not meet the high 
demand for help, one of the community leaders who had forcefully advocated 
on behalf of community- selected translators told me about their “failure”: “I 
am so embarrassed. I have never been so embarrassed in my entire life.”
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“Our problem is that we lack management skills,” Sadiq told me, in dis-
appointment about the association’s inability to meet the huge demand for 
translation ser vices while simultaneously operating as informal caseworkers, 
community volunteers, students, and parents. He may be right, but it is also 
true that the task they set for themselves and, indeed, the expectation of com-
munity self- sufficiency through self- help initiatives, was simply impossible to 
achieve. “We are tying the rope at one end, but it is unraveling from behind,” he 
lamented, reflecting on how the association followed all the bureaucratic steps 
to create their or ga ni za tion, gain recognition, negotiate translation contracts, 
and open their own office, only to have things unravel because of poor time 
management, overwork, and infighting. By 2009 I had become worried about 
the health of people like Sadiq and Idris, two of the most active translators 
and caseworkers, who  were expected to fulfill every role imaginable by their 
own community members and by social ser vices agencies who depended on 
them as cultural brokers, while each attended school full time, worked nearly 
full time, raised their families, and constantly attempted to mediate intercom-
munity disputes over leadership and repre sen ta tion.
The neoliberal model of austere support, available through competition, to 
refugee communities facing widespread poverty, illiteracy, racism, commu-
nication barriers, and trauma expects them to solve their problems through 
“self- help initiatives.” When they fail, which seems inevitable given the reality 
of their situation in the United States as indigent non- English- speaking illiter-
ate newcomers, the systemic structure implies failure is their fault. It is hard 
to find a better example of bad faith assistance. There is also something oddly 
awry in a system that awards millions of dollars in orr grants to organiza-
tions like volags that offer short- term, basic, occasional ser vices to refugees 
while absorbing part of the grants as administrative overhead. For instance, in 
2008, orr provided half a million dollars in grant funding to the local volag 
and the State of Maine Multicultural Affairs Office for refugee assistance, while 
Trinity’s total 2008 annual bud get was about $150,000 and the Somali Bantu 
association’s bud get was under $10,000.
“The Elders Are So Lost”
Frustrated and upset by the constant bickering of their elders, a group of So-
mali Bantu young adults led by Idris decided to split from the association to 
create their own or ga ni za tion in 2008. Many Somali Bantu women expressed 
their disgust at the infighting as well (while also wondering aloud whether 
the male board members  were secretly hoarding community money), in part 
because the fighting among the men sometimes spilled over into the domestic 
arena as one weapon became rumor- mongering about each other’s wives. In 
Making Refuge • 231
2010, the board tried to strengthen its integrity by ejecting several members who 
 were failing to fulfill their duties as defined in the bylaws (attending meet-
ings and volunteering), prompting those dismissed to try to form another 
separate breakaway or ga ni za tion, to file a court case contesting the terms of 
their dismissal, and to send a letter signed by ten people to all the relevant 
funding agencies, including orr, accusing the association of nepotism, cor-
ruption, and fraud. Sadiq bore the brunt of the accusations because of his role 
as spokesperson for the or ga ni za tion. Someone broke through the wall of his 
apartment with knives, forcing him to take out a restraining order against one 
of his accusers.
The accusers faced consistent setbacks because none could match Sadiq’s 
level of or gan i za tional, cultural, and linguistic competency as well as com-
munity commitment. The court threw out the charge against Sadiq for the 
dismissal of board members with a reprimand about filing “frivolous charges,” 
and the police offered protection to Sadiq’s family. When the letter was inves-
tigated, it turned out that half of those who signed could not read and did not 
fully understand what they  were signing. Accusations flew about who was to 
blame for the misunderstanding, as counteraccusations  were made that the 
letter writers  were colluding with Somali spoilers motivated by a desire to de-
stroy the Somali Bantu community association, although the leaders of other 
Somali self- help organizations  were furious at those who wrote the letter be-
cause it compromised the reputation of all Somali organizations in the city. 
In the fallout from the scandal, Somali Bantu community leaders from other 
cities, including Sheikh Axmed Nur’s son from Syracuse, came to Lewiston 
weekend after weekend, trying to mend the breach, and even I was asked to 
try to act as a neutral broker for reconciliation.
The intercommunity fractures reveal all the complexity that lies behind 
but is elided by the neat label “Somali Bantu.” In the new context of identity 
politics in Lewiston predicated on ethnic competition for scarce resources and 
centralized leadership, the salience of Somali Bantu identity comes in and 
out of focus depending, in part, on whether people think they will get better 
ser vices and more resources from claiming that identity or from allying with 
Somalis. When identity negotiations intersect with the inadequate fit between, 
on the one hand, the hierarchical model of institutional structure and decision 
making in America and, on the other, long- held understandings of demo cratic 
practice from Somalia, fighting erupts.
Some of the Somali Bantu elders in the breakaway faction  were clearly 
upset about their loss of authority and status, feeling relegated to the margins 
rather than occupying positions of leadership. In one of the meetings I medi-
ated, one of the oldest men in the breakaway faction explained, “It must be 
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the elders who should decide things. The youth  can’t do it because they don’t 
know anything. The elders will always check the chair to make sure it’s not 
broken before sitting; youth will just sit without checking.” He was frustrated 
that the “youth,” by which he meant Sadiq and other English- speaking board 
members in their thirties and forties who are the backbone of the association, 
 were failing to attend to those issues he saw as the preeminent community 
problems: “Our children are out of control; our wives are out of control; and 
we need a new leadership to deal with it.” The elders are men who should 
be assuming the position of leadership in their communities, but their lack of 
En glish means they cannot represent themselves or the community; they have 
lost their land and thus their control over family resources; their wives often 
control more resources than they do because of tanf and women’s rotating 
credit associations; they feel their wives and children no longer respect their 
authority; they are making scant progress in limited En glish classes; and if 
they have jobs at all, they are degrading, minimum wage jobs with no hope 
of improvement. All they have left to claim are paltry resources from modest 
grants and the insistence that they, not the English- speaking younger adults, 
should be making decisions and representing the community. Instead, they 
are aware that they have become the least rather than the most capable.10 “The 
elders are so lost,” a community member observed to me about the failure of 
the community’s elders to cope with life in America. Gesturing in frustration 
to the young English- speaking man from his home village in Somalia who ac-
companies him to meetings, one of the elders involved in the internal conflicts 
over repre sen ta tion and resources grumbled, “I am an elder, but I have to take 
this young man with me everywhere I go. I cannot speak for myself.”
Domestic Disharmony
The struggles for control of the emerging hierarchical po liti cal structures of 
community repre sen ta tion and decision making recounted  here occurred 
alongside the dissolution of hierarchies of another sort. Life in America intro-
duced dramatic transformations to the domestic realm, laying siege to the old 
family order predicated on hierarchies of age and gender. Women began con-
testing male power; children resisted parental authority; parents felt under-
mined by government intervention in their lives; and the enormous challenges 
of poverty, language, loss, racism, and trauma burdened men and women who 
had been holding things together over two de cades of displacement. During 
their first years in Maine, family dramas shook the refugee community as men 
and women began fighting over things like chores, affairs, divorces, domestic 
violence accusations, and money. The Somali Bantu association leaders tried 
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to offer traditional counseling to solve these new problems while also running 
interference with authorities like police and lawyers who operate according to 
a different set of rules. As women made more demands on men for help with 
domestic chores, and men tried to figure out how to translate their authority 
from former models based on the threat of violence and the practice of po-
lygyny to the new context, marital relations shuddered and cracked.
A male friend tells me, “In Somalia, men lead the family, but  here women 
do.” Women raise the children, run the  house hold, and manage the money 
that they obtain through tanf, food stamps, and women’s rotating credit 
associations, all of which undermine men’s understandings of their roles as 
 house hold heads.11 Women in polygynous marriages register paternity with 
the state, ensuring that the government rather than the father determines and 
ensures child support payments.12 One young man explains, “Women are so 
liberated  here. They are growing so much. But for men there’s hardly anything 
to embrace  here.” Perhaps the loss of the right to use violence, even if they 
only did so rarely, has been devastating to their sense of power, control, pride, 
responsibility, and obligations, he suggests.
During a visit with Garad and his wife Halima, the talk turned, as it often 
did in the early years, to their efforts to adjust to a culture where men and 
women are “the same.” “Sometimes we struggle with our wives because the 
wives  here are totally different,” Garad tells me, as his wife sits next to him nod-
ding. “The women  here watch American wives. Here men serve themselves 
and have to cook. In Somalia men did the outside jobs, but  here everyone helps 
each other [in the home]. Here I come home from work [as a cart pusher at 
Walmart] and my wife tells me to change the baby’s diaper or to make her tea. 
I never had to mop the floor before! We’ve lived together for fifteen years, and 
 we’ve never had the struggles we have now about this. I want to help my wife, 
but I want to do the man’s jobs, not the woman’s jobs.” His wife is laughing as 
she listens. “But  can’t you work together?” I ask. “We do do things together,” he 
responds. “If she wants me to cook tea for her, I do. If she feels sick and wants 
me to wash the dishes, I do it. But I’m always hearing about these struggles 
in the families now. Some men won’t change diapers or wash dishes.”
Our conversation made me realize how many more domestic chores there 
are in the United States. There never used to be diapers to change, dishes to wash, 
floors to mop. Couples farmed and brought home food from their fields to 
prepare. Women hauled water, ground corn, and cooked porridge, sharing the 
labor among cowives, mothers, and daughters, or with neighbors. Now, liv-
ing in isolated separate apartments rather than extended family compounds, 
women face shopping, garbage hauling, cleaning, washing dishes, laundry, 
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watching children, and more in a lonely social environment. There is a vast 
array of things women have to do outside the home as well to take care of their 
large families: interacting with doctors, schools, caseworkers, social workers, 
landlords, and utility companies. There is a ton of paper— identity documents, 
bills, school forms, medical rec ords, paychecks, car insurance, benefits forms, 
citizenship paperwork—to manage and save. Husbands and wives are strug-
gling over how to divide all these new tasks, all of which come under the general 
category of domestic labor and thus should be considered women’s work.
Life in Lewiston can feel utterly isolating for women stuck inside small 
apartments with six, seven, eight kids, next to neighbors who are fighting or 
who have blaring tvs. Heading outside in winter is an exhausting affair, with 
all the layers for the kids, the long walk downstairs to the street, the lack of 
public transportation, the misery of the freezing air, slippery sidewalks, and 
long gray shadows. Some women become overwhelmed, their children lin-
gering late after school to avoid having to go home to chores or babysitting. 
When some wives began making demands on their husbands for more help 
with child care, diaper changing, shopping, and cleaning, astonished men who 
had never participated in these chores before and lack the skills conferred 
about what to do. Some of “the helpers,” like Beth, intervened to try to convince 
the husbands of their clients to help out more around the  house. Some husbands, 
like Garad, obliged. Others, aghast, refused.13
Frustrated women began circulating rumors about what men  were doing 
all day long while women  were stuck at home with the kids. Unlike Banta, 
where life was publicly lived, Lewiston offers plenty of opportunity for secrecy, 
and women became increasingly upset about how much time their husbands 
spent away from home, either working or mired in the community politics 
described above. To reinforce their demands for more of their husbands’ time, 
some women began trying to bar the door against their husbands’ departure, 
jumping on their backs to force them to stay home or throwing lamps and 
cooking pots to block their passage to the door. Husbands responded in fury 
at their wives’ efforts to control their movements. When women called 911 and 
husbands  were arrested, wives scored points but then did not want to press 
charges because they had already demonstrated their power. During their first 
few years in Lewiston, the  whole community was talking about the fighting 
and 911 calls. “The women are crazy!” one young unmarried male friend told 
me, “and the police are crazy too because they take the side of the wife.”
While many of the fights started because women felt abandoned by hus-
bands who  were gone for hours, several friends acknowledged that men  were 
beginning to marry second wives in secret, provoking some of the first wives 
to act out aggressively against their husbands. In the best cases, cowives live 
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near each other, depend on each other for child care, cooking, shopping, and 
other chores, and enjoy each other’s company. This is particularly the case for 
women who  were cowives in Kenya and relocated to Lewiston to live near 
each other again after being separated in the resettlement pro cess. Some wives, 
like Abdiya, will take on child care duties so the cowife can pursue a job, or the 
wives will watch each other’s children while they take turns attending En glish 
classes. Many cowives spend every day together, maintaining the built-in sup-
port system that characterized many polygynous marriages in Somalia. But 
when a cowife joins a marriage in secret or against the first wife’s will, trouble 
brews.
Angry wives know their husbands will not call 911 when they get violent, one 
man tells me, “because the husbands know their wives will be arrested and they 
don’t want that! They don’t want to be left to care for all the kids, and their wives 
will never trust them again and will leave them.” The rumor mill augments the 
fighting, and the large number of single mothers makes secret marriage an easy 
possibility for men. One woman, a mother of six, broke her husband’s car wind-
shield, slashed his tires, and was arrested twice for trying to throw her husband 
out of their apartment because she suspected him of infidelity. When she got 
the divorce she was demanding, men lined up to offer marriage, and she chose 
the youn gest unmarried man of the bunch, whom she does not intend to share 
with another wife.
Men tried to justify their reluctant use of violence against their wives as 
necessary to assert their right to leave the apartment or to marry a second 
wife. At a wedding feast, one of the younger adults broke into a conversa-
tion about changing expectations for marriage to propose his theory about 
polygyny. He currently had one wife but was eager to figure out a way to have 
another while still adhering to American law. “Here in the U.S. it’s common 
for American men to have a wife and a girlfriend on the side,” he reasoned, 
suggesting that since Somali Bantus are allowed to have four wives accord-
ing to Islam, they should be allowed to have one wife and other girlfriends 
to adhere to American law while still “practicing their traditions.” “Isn’t this 
what many Americans do anyhow?” he asked. I explained that while adultery 
in the United States might in fact be common, it is still considered wrong and 
grounds for divorce. He responded that he thought it would be a workable 
solution for Somali Bantu men who want to marry according to U.S. law but 
also practice polygyny, and that women would be in agreement because such 
an arrangement would be in accordance with Islam and cultural tradition. Ev-
eryone wins! “I think you should ask the women in the room what they think,” 
I suggested. When asked, all the assembled women responded, emphatically, 
“Absolutely not.”
236 • Chapter 7
As fights to redefine the rules of marriage and domestic life raged within 
the community, I had many long conversations with friends about alternatives 
to violence when husbands and wives are furious with each other. Commu-
nity leaders  were upset that some of the helpers became involved with do-
mestic violence incidents, bringing in lawyers and official mediators, because 
they felt their community elders should be the ones doing the mediating. As 
John Holtzman has described for Sudanese refugees, domestic violence within 
a Somali Bantu marriage can sometimes be a call for community involvement 
to mediate a resolution to maintain the marriage and not an indication that the 
marriage is broken, which is often the American response.14 Whereas American 
authorities pressure accusers to pursue their claims in court or with lawyers, 
community mediators intervene to listen to the problems, negotiate a solution, 
and levy a fine on the misbehaving spouse. The Somali Bantu association 
mediators spent a lot of time during the early years of resettlement interced-
ing in accusations of infidelity, abandonment, loss of trust, and lack of support 
while trying to explain to American lawyers and police that their traditional 
counseling practices of mediation and levying fines would solve domestic prob-
lems better than the court system.
It took several years for the marital fighting and secret marriages to 
settle down, for some men to take on new domestic chores, and for women to 
assume more control of their lives within and outside the home. Men recognize 
they will never regain the kind of automatic authority they once held, and many 
are fully supportive of the association’s new women’s empowerment programs 
that teach women to drive, provide assistance for job applications, support a 
basket- weaving cooperative, and offer women a space they control to medi-
ate conflicts among themselves. The association recognized that women need 
collectively acknowledged time and space to come together to talk about 
their concerns, solve their problems, and share their worries. Women have 
kept alive the critically important rotating credit associations, through which 
members each receive periodic infusions of cash, the funerary association 
that ensures help for funeral costs, and cooperative shopping, which enables 
families to pool their resources to buy in bulk. These healthy structures of 
mutual support and solidarity counterbalance the tensions between women 
over men and between women and men, while also providing an alternative 
economic model to non- Somalis in Lewiston.
The Value of  Wage Work
In today’s world of security concerns and the ascendance of a neoliberal defi-
nition of personhood (where one’s worth is mea sured by one’s wages), we have 
seen how humanitarianism and charity are subject to a moral economy that 
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assesses worthiness on the basis of quiescent apo liti cal victimhood or citizen-
ship claims based on a history of economic productivity. In this logic, the only 
worthy recipients are those defined by abject innocent victimization in refu-
gee camps or American community members defined by citizenship and eco-
nomic productivity. We have seen how those in refugee camps try to conform 
to the former image, whereas in the ideology that informs the U.S. refugee 
resettlement program, new arrivals must immediately get to work to become 
eco nom ically self- sufficient. The implication is that community membership 
is gained only through economic productivity, conformity, and gratitude.
But Somali Bantus bring a different understanding to the world of paid 
employment, pushing back against the expectations in a neoliberal economy 
that one’s value is determined by one’s economic productivity and that paid 
employment takes pre ce dence over all other aspects of life. When Sadiq’s 
refugee resettlement assistance ended and he realized that he would have to 
sacrifice his dream of education for an hourly job, he quit his job to be able to 
pursue a college degree, and his family applied for welfare assistance instead. 
He could not accept the American insistence that monotonous, demeaning, 
dead- end wage work is more important than a college education for very poor 
people. He eagerly returned to a job after finishing his degree but, like many 
other Somali Bantu friends, struggled against a logic that placed work ahead of 
family. Because Somali Bantus have large families, it is not unusual for parents 
to have to make time to take a child to a doctor’s appointment or to address 
a problem at school. But surprised Somali Bantu friends realized that em-
ployers may be reluctant to grant time off to attend to a sick family member, 
which to them seemed utterly inhumane. One friend who received a phone call 
at work that his child was admitted to the emergency room left his job in a rush 
after informing his immediate supervisor, but returned to work the next day 
to a reprimand from his boss for leaving work early. His boss explained that he 
should have waited until the end of the workday to go to the hospital. My friend 
was so distressed by such logic that he quit his job on the spot, incensed that 
an employer would put a few hours at a job ahead of a sick child. Although 
this par tic u lar employer is a social ser vices agency trying to make connections 
with the Somali community, every single Somali hired by the agency over 
the past de cade has quit because of such microsupervising.
In addition to family, many Somali employees refuse to relinquish faith 
practices to conform to work schedules. In one incident, a group of Somali 
employees at a local factory had negotiated with their supervisor to coordinate 
break times with appropriate prayer times, but when that supervisor left for 
a new job, his replacement refused to honor the agreement, insisting instead 
on a different break schedule that was not in accordance with Muslim prayer 
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times. Indignant, the Somali employees quit. As the story was recounted to 
me by an involved official, state mediators intervened to resynchronize break 
and prayer times because the employees had written on their job applications 
that they needed to be able to pray at work, which obligated an accommoda-
tion from the employer. Everyone returned to work, having demonstrated a 
public point about the relative importance of faith and wage work.
Other Somali values, like loyalty and dignity, sometimes clash with work-
place hierarchies. When a local business fired a white supervisor whom all 
the Somali employees admired and trusted, they quit en masse, explaining to 
the local newspapers that their loyalty to her superseded their loyalty to the 
job. The Somalis all returned to work after the embarrassed employer rehired 
the supervisor, having provided a demonstration of loyalty that was approv-
ingly covered in local newspapers. A friend quit his cashier job at a local big- 
box store when his supervisor assigned him the additional task of cleaning the 
bathrooms. Protesting that he was hired for a job that required a professional 
appearance (and a new wardrobe), my friend chose dignity over a minimum 
wage.15 Somali Bantus and Somalis want jobs and explain with pride their 
strong work ethic and eagerness to work, but they do not subscribe to a perspec-
tive that insists that human worth is mea sured by income, that economic self- 
sufficiency is the highest value, or that minimum wage jobs trump family, 
loyalty, faith, and dignity. These first experiences with work in America show 
their re sis tance to an all- encompassing definition of belonging and personhood 
that reduces people to their earning power.
Conclusion
Despite the fractures of factionalization, the struggles within the association 
over self- representation, leadership status, and internal decision making prac-
tices are evidence, for many community members, of their success at creating 
a new life in America. Their identity assertions gained traction, their leaders 
gained recognition and invitations to conferences, and (very modest) grants 
flowed into the association, which became the first Somali Bantu ebco in the 
country to have its own office. In this version of Lewiston’s story, the refugees 
made claims about their rights, built a public presence, and commandeered re-
sources for the benefit of their community, which sustained itself through self- 
help initiatives and a resounding spirit of volunteerism. The fighting is about 
how to transform internal community politics from a Somali- style model of 
broad, inclusive democracy to an American- style model of hierarchical de-
mocracy. The fighting is about who gets to be on top of the new hierarchy.
Through their efforts to build their own or ga ni za tion and maintain their own 
structures of support and solidarity, Somali Bantu leaders  were defining self- 
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sufficiency and integration for themselves. To them, self- sufficiency means 
competing for grants to provide programs and casework for community 
members rather than depending on the helpers, and shielding community 
members from interventions of local authorities by trying to solve problems 
through traditional counseling rather than the courts. Self- sufficiency thus 
means cultural autonomy to handle matters within their own community, but 
not necessarily economic autonomy, which is a strange concept in a commu-
nity that insists that resources are things to be shared rather than individu-
ally acquired (and where, in any event, resources are scarcely available). I was 
reminded of the pervasive ethic of sharing one night when I went out to din-
ner with Idris and Abdirisak. When I asked for the check, Abdirisak said he 
had already paid, and when I got out my wallet to cover my portion, they both 
started laughing at my breach of Somali cultural etiquette. “We don’t ever do 
that!” Abdirisak chided me, recounting his astonishment during his first meal 
at Denny’s the previous week, when he watched in amazement as the four 
white people at the table next to him tallied up their portions of the bill using 
their cell phone calculators, counting down to the penny. Shaking their heads 
at such bean counting, they reminded me that whoever has money pays for the 
 whole group, which they find to be a very equitable and fair way to handle 
money. Like sharing cars, offering to  house friends and relatives dislocated by 
moving or fires, contributing constantly toward each other’s wedding, funeral, 
and other expenses, pooling money to buy food in bulk, and knowing that one 
income will support entire extended families in Lewiston, Kenya, and So-
malia, pooling and sharing resources remains a fundamentally important 
Somali Bantu cultural value and one that does not mandate constant expres-
sions of gratitude.
Integration, to Somali Bantu refugees, means equality, not assimilation. It 
means the ability to speak for themselves, have their opinions heard, partici-
pate in decisions that affect them, assert their desires, and participate in public 
pre sen ta tions as equal community members with a right to voice their views. 
It means participating in American po liti cal, civic, and economic arenas on 
their own terms, with their cultural values of family, faith, and dignity intact.
Since refugee communities like the Somali Bantus have a history of in de pen-
dent self- management and a strong ethic of intracommunity support, the model 
of competitive funding for refugee self- sufficiency seems, at first glance, like 
a good one, allowing refugees to manage their own lives, handle their problems 
and challenges, and resuture their community ties. There are many indications 
that this is happening— despite the per sis tent flare- ups, in 2014 the associa-
tion office was still an important base for the community, mediating family 
disputes and providing caseworker support on a shoestring bud get. When the 
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pregnant wife of a man involved in challenges to the association was tragically 
killed in an automobile accident, the association led the fund- raising efforts 
to support the nine children she left behind. When the younger community 
members broke from the association to form their own youth- focused or ga-
ni za tion (see chapter 8), Sadiq helped them acquire nonprofit status. Some of 
those who signed the letter denouncing the association now volunteer in the 
association’s office.
And yet a reliance on ebcos enhances community isolation and shifts 
the responsibility for self- sufficiency and integration onto the shoulders of 
refugee communities, who have the least access to resources, further burden-
ing the structures of community support that are already groaning under the 
weight of adjusting to life in America. As certain people are empowered as 
leaders who receive training in leadership capacity and public recognition, 
one paradoxical result is increased insularity and isolation, as community mem-
bers value intracommunity communication over intercommunity communi-
cation. Those who emerge as leaders because of their positions as cultural 
brokers or ebco board members must constantly balance their positions as 
the public face of their community to granting agencies, local authorities, and 
the media against the desire by other, usually older, community members 
who wish to retain pre- resettlement forms of authority and decision making 
as time- proven structures of community solidarity and mutual support.16 
figure 7.1  “Lewiston Is Better Than This,” protesters marching down Lisbon Street 
against Mayor Macdonald’s remarks to the bbc, 2012. Photograph by Russ Dilling-
ham / Sun Journal.
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Thus for many Somali Bantus, the story of their first de cade of resettlement is 
bound up with struggles to retain some po liti cal and cultural autonomy while 
adjusting to structures of decision making and hierarchy in their new context. 
Seen from this perspective, refuge is something that Somali Bantu refugees 
believe they actively fought for, fought over, and forged through struggle and 
debate. Refuge is an ongoing pro cess of po liti cal and cultural negotiation and 
not a geo graph i cal state given to refugees lacking agency.
By the end of their first de cade in Lewiston, Somali Bantus had won the 
right to self- representation and in de pen dent translation, gained the respect 
and recognition of city authorities, had their first community member join 
the city’s school board, and founded their own mosque. Their insistent re-
fusal to tolerate Somali racism shifted intercommunity discourse in the city 
toward greater collaboration between equals and, currently, Somali and So-
mali Bantu ebcos are working toward more collaboration on projects of mu-
tual interest. When Mayor Macdonald condemned Somali immigrants to the 
bbc in racist, derogatory language, Somalis and Somali Bantus marched to-
gether down Lisbon Street to protest his remarks. Holding hand- lettered signs 
that read, “lewiston is better than this,” “Carpetbaggers: That’s White 
Supremacist- Speak! Translation: Anti- Racist,” “Lewiston Welcomes Culture 
and Diversity,” and, most significantly, “it’s our city too!!! all- american 
city,” Somali and Somali Bantu immigrants are making claims to participatory 
citizenship on the basis of residence and forging a collective vision of a future 
city they are (re)making, through constant struggle, together.
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chapter 8
These Are Our Kids
We moved  here to save our lives. We didn’t choose 
to come to America. We are refugees. We came 
 here to find safety, so we could save the lives of 
our children, so our children could be safe. But our 
children are not safe  here. We are terribly worried 
about them.
— Somali Bantu father in Lewiston
After one meeting where some of the younger community members and I 
attempted, unsuccessfully, to mediate with the breakaway faction respon-
sible for the letter accusing the association of corruption, the young adults 
emerged frustrated and angry. One announced that he wanted nothing more 
to do with internal community politics, saying that the elders  were behav-
ing badly, incapable of good leadership, wasting everyone’s time, and tearing 
things apart. He was walking away for good. But Idris responded, “There are 
so many people who really need help! We  can’t just leave it like this. We have 
to try to make it better and find a solution.”
While the community association waged its campaign for self- representation 
and traditional counseling to mediate marital disputes, the En glish speakers 
in Idris’s generation who worked as translators in the local schools and at 
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Trinity had a front- row seat to the challenges faced by children arriving from 
Kakuma and entering public schools in Lewiston. They saw firsthand their tra-
jectories of adjusting to life in America— fashioning new identities relevant to 
the American context and traversing the vast cultural territory between their 
home lives and their school lives. They saw that the community elders utterly 
lacked the capacity to help their children navigate this new world.
Realizing that they  were in the best position to work with youth, Idris and 
his peers created a new ebco, the Somali Bantu Youth Association of Maine 
(sbyam), to focus on youth development. As the Somali Bantu community as-
sociation did previously, they started with a soccer program for young teens as 
well as a homework help program for older students, trying to fill afternoons 
and weekends with activities for Somali- speaking kids shut out of other op-
tions. One of their earliest objectives was to encourage a commitment to educa-
tion, especially for girls. Concerned that not a single Somali Bantu student had 
graduated from high school by 2008 and that girls  were routinely dropping 
out of high school to get married, sbyam began in 2008–9 with meetings to 
encourage youths to focus on their studies and develop a life plan. One of their 
earliest meetings brought two dozen Somali Bantu teenage girls together for 
a discussion about the importance of setting career goals, delaying marriage 
until after high school, and resisting the allure of social media for connecting 
with boys. The board members all spoke earnestly about their willingness to in-
tervene with parents who might be pressuring the girls to marry before graduat-
ing from high school. The meeting was both serious and hilarious, as the young 
male sbyam presenter humorously warned about the ways in which boys try 
to get girls’ attention through Myspace, Facebook, and texting: “He’ll say, ‘I love 
you, you are my everything!’ So much sweet talk! ‘Oooh, my sweetheart.’ . . . 
He’ll promise you everything!” The assembled girls dissolved into giggles while 
sharing their experiences with precisely that sort of teenage seduction. Turning 
serious, the presenter implored them to understand the dangers of social media 
and the longer- term consequences of ignoring schoolwork in favor of flirting 
on Myspace and Facebook. Everyone started laughing all over again when one 
of the young male board members interjected to say he knew the girls spent all 
their time on social media because that was how he contacted them to invite 
them to this meeting.
As the straddling generation of their community, acknowledging the wis-
dom of their elders while recognizing the challenges to their leadership in 
the new context of life in America, sbyam board members  were walking a 
very fine line between respecting their elders while subverting their authority 
by resisting early marriage, insisting that girls finish school, taking on public 
positions of leadership in the community, and refusing to be drawn into petty 
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skirmishes over identity politics. In 2009–10, as sbyam members began bro-
kering the yawning cultural gap between non- English- speaking parents and 
their school- age children, refugee parents asked them for help with their chil-
dren’s behavior; other youth- oriented organizations sought them out for col-
laboration; and Somali and Somali Bantu adults alike began turning to them 
for help with gaining competency in American society. This chapter traces the 
terrain of parenting challenges, children’s identity struggles, encounters between 
children and the juvenile justice system, racism, and culture change that the 
young adults who formed sbyam attempted to mediate from 2009 to 2014.
“These Are Our Kids”
One June day in 2009, a group of seven sbyam board members drove up to 
my  house to work on a grant proposal. We sat around my dining room table 
for hours to hammer out a proposal to fund their soccer program and start 
a dance program. Trying to maintain their pop u lar soccer program even when 
they  were denied access to playing fields in Lewiston (because the fields had 
to rest or  were claimed by other city sports leagues who received prior-
ity), they had rented an indoor soccer space at a facility near Portland the 
previous weekend at a cost of $300 per hour, which they paid for themselves. 
They hoped a grant might bring in funds to offset the personal contributions 
they  were each making to keep their programs afloat. We discussed the bud get 
at length, with some board members wanting to ask for the maximum while 
others insisted that as a young or ga ni za tion with no track record, they should 
ask for the minimum and then prove themselves. As we debated the appro-
priate language, the board members spoke with ease about leveraging their 
programs, maximizing their impact, developing cultural competency, and fol-
lowing standard protocols for accounting, assessment, and outcomes. Notic-
ing the photograph on my dining room wall of several young children clad in 
raggedy shorts dashing through the center of Banta in 1988, Abdirisak inter-
rupted our discussion to exclaim, “Look at Banta!” As we all studied the pho-
tograph, he asked, “Is one of those little children Idris?” Several of the young 
men and women at the table, including Idris,  were small children in Banta 
when I lived there, and we interrupted our work to reflect on the trajectory 
that brought them to my dining room table to talk in bureaucratic language 
about assessment, accountability, and outcomes.
A month later they learned they did not get the grant, a decision that was 
reversed in response to protests that the Lewiston- based or ga ni za tion had not 
funded any grant proposals submitted by local refugee ebcos. The grant aug-
mented other small amounts they had received for the homework help program 
and an outreach program about h1n1. As we reviewed sbyam’s growing track 
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record with grants and program development later that year, I noticed Idris’s 
obvious exhaustion and asked about his schedule. He was still working full 
time as a translator at a local public school, taking four courses toward his 
degree in social work at the local community college, doing the internship 
required by his degree program, directing sbyam, and running the weekend 
sbyam soccer and homework help programs, all while raising his three children 
and mentoring his two younger siblings. He was sleeping about five hours a 
night. Concerned about his deteriorating health, I suggested he take fewer 
courses or cut back his work hours, but learned that his job at the school was 
on an hourly wage, not a salary, which meant he was not paid for snow days, 
vacation days, or during the summer months. Supporting his siblings back in 
the refugee camp as well as his family in Lewiston and feeling the pressure to 
finish school quickly to get a full- time salaried job, he felt he had to be working 
every minute to keep his goals on track.
But he also felt growing anxiety about how to keep Somali Bantu kids on 
track in school and in life. As I watched sbyam develop its programs from 
2009 to 2014, I was repeatedly struck by the leaders’ sense of having no time to 
lose. When the accusations about “gangs” exploded, when suspension rates 
skyrocketed, when police began apprehending small children shoplifting in 
local stores, and, after 2012, when Somali Bantu kids ended up in the juve-
nile detention center, sbyam leaders felt increasing pressure to develop more 
youth programs because, as Idris gravely explained, “These are our kids.” They 
 were simultaneously working against the demonization of Somali Bantu kids 
as troublemakers and facing the reality that some Somali Bantu kids  were 
beginning to misbehave because of their repeated failure in school and their 
parents’ confusion about how to parent in America.
Knowing that they  were the best- qualified people in town to translate the 
norms of U.S. society to confounded refugee parents and act as role models 
for youth, sbyam began or ga niz ing discussions and workshops in response 
to concerns about youth misbehavior. Parents and youths alike trusted them 
because of their work history as translators and caseworkers in schools and 
at Trinity. These jobs gave them the firmest footholds in American society of 
anyone in the Somali Bantu community and enabled them to arrange meetings 
where parents and children could talk with police officers, social workers, and 
juvenile justice authorities in a safe space or ga nized by people they trusted.
Parenting in America
The refugee resettlement program resettled individual families, not commu-
nities, so when Somali Bantus from the Banta area relocated to live with each 
other again in Lewiston, they  were trying to resuscitate the structures of mutual 
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support that had allowed them to survive a de cade of war and displacement 
in refugee camps. But parents expecting peace and autonomy found they had 
few defenses against American values and norms that penetrated and desta-
bilized their families. Those families who received welfare assistance, partici-
pated in home visit programs, or lived in public housing learned that they 
had to submit to the surveillance of caseworkers and housing inspectors who 
monitored  house hold residents, changes in income, parenting practices, and 
cleanliness. Somali cultural brokers bemoaned the erosion of parental author-
ity that accompanied such monitoring because parents are so afraid of making 
a mistake that might lead to deportation or losing their children to the state.
In addition to the perception that government (including school) authori-
ties usurp the power of refugee parents by scrutinizing their behavior, many 
young adults also point to the novel dimensions of American pop u lar cul-
ture that parents have never before encountered. To be sure, many American 
parents struggle with the impact of pop u lar culture’s glorification of sex and 
violence, youth autonomy and in de pen dence, and consumption, but Somali 
Bantu parents arrived with far fewer tools for confronting and deflecting 
these cultural influences. As their children quickly became proficient in new 
technology like tv and the Internet, non- English- speaking parents remained 
ignorant of what their kids  were doing and watching. With no idea how to 
navigate the new technological and cultural terrain, parents did not know 
how to intervene, explain, contextualize, or denounce the grotesque aspects of 
pop u lar culture being consumed by kids fascinated with violent or sexualized 
video games and music videos or how to help their children define themselves 
in relation to it, an especially fraught situation in a community recovering 
from a de cade of violence and endemic rape.
One day I took Abdiya’s seven- year- old daughter shopping to buy a toy 
promised in return for a short essay, an experience that revealed to me what 
mainstream American pop u lar culture aimed at children might feel like to 
refugee parents. We arrived at Walmart and excitedly headed for the girls’ toy 
aisle. I knew that she really wanted a Hannah Montana doll, but the only dolls 
on display  were rock star models in skimpy clothing: one in a bikini, another 
sporting a midriff top, mini skirt, and go-go boots. Looking in disappointment 
over the options, we agreed that these dolls  were not what she was looking for. 
Her eyes wandered to the play makeup— eye shadow, rouge, and lipstick in 
various colors— but I knew I could not take her home with makeup. Moving 
on to the jewelry aisle, she spotted huge silver hoop earrings that said “Han-
nah” in fancy script and pulled them off the rack hopefully, but, knowing her 
mother would be unhappy about their enormous size, I gently coaxed her 
keep looking. At last, an hour later, we chose a Hannah Montana watch and 
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small hoop earrings, and I left the store appalled at how difficult it was to find 
a toy of a young female teenage pop u lar culture icon appropriate for a modest 
young girl.
Somali Bantu parents had little experience with navigating the American 
culture of consumption, where you are what you buy. Their children  were 
subjected to a constant barrage of things to desire, reasons to desire those 
things, and assurances that they needed those things to be relevant, modern, 
and American. One school principal whose population is over half Somali 
Bantu emphasized to me that, more than anything, the Somali Bantu students 
desperately wanted to be just like everyone  else. They quickly abandoned their 
plastic sandals from Kenya for high- tops and platform wedges and, for boys, 
the baggy pants and baseball caps of their American peers. Some children 
began lying to their parents to get consumer items, claiming that their teach-
ers required them to have an iPod or Nike shoes. In their early years in Lewis-
ton, mystified parents pooled and borrowed money to provide these supposed 
necessities until Somali caseworkers intervened to dispel the deceptions.
Thus, sbyam is trying to teach parents how to differentiate among con-
sumption demands, how to be relevant in their kids’ lives when they do not 
understand American culture, how to interact with school authorities, how to 
adopt American approaches to parental discipline, and how to embrace posi-
tive aspects of American culture while rejecting the rest. It has been a hard job.
“We Have Freedom Here and You Don’t Have to  
Listen to Your Parents!”
Abdirisak recounted a conversation he overheard between two children at the 
elementary school when he was dropping off his child. A Somali Bantu boy 
was describing to a white classmate how much fun he had running around 
the neighborhood until late at night. The white boy responded that his parents 
would never let him do that because it was not safe and his parents wanted 
him home at night so they knew where he was. Abdirisak said the Somali 
Bantu child explained, “We are living in America! We have freedom  here, and 
you don’t have to listen to your parents! That means we can do what ever we 
want and go wherever we want. Just tell your parents that!” The interchange 
made a big impression on Abdirisak, leaving him to wonder why Somali 
Bantu parents  were failing to have the kind of control over their children that 
white parents seemed to have. “Is it because Somali Bantu parents don’t know 
about things like kids getting stolen and that it can be dangerous at night?” 
he wondered. He, like many other young adults with young children of their 
own, watched with alarm the waning authority over their children of older 
refugee parents, trying to piece together the factors that chipped away at 
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family integrity for many Somali Bantu families in Lewiston over their first 
de cade.
Somali Bantu parents arriving in America heard over and over again that 
physical discipline would be punishable by arrest or deportation and that 
their children had the right to call 911 to report abuse. Even though par-
ents seldom employed harsh forms of physical discipline in prewar Somalia, 
newly arrived parents quickly became terrified to exert any form of discipline 
at all over children who threatened to call 911 if their parents asserted author-
ity against their wishes. Holding the threat of violence in the background 
even if it was rarely employed meant, in Somalia and Kenya, full parental 
control. Losing that right without having any suitable replacement, in a con-
text where children gained linguistic and cultural skills much more rapidly 
than their parents, meant a lot of confused parents and a lot of freewheeling 
kids.
The stakes  were different for girls and boys. When the relaxed approach 
to parenting young children translated to city life in Lewiston, boys gained 
greater freedom to run around unsupervised while girls came under increas-
ing scrutiny to behave respectably as parents attempted to protect them from 
America’s public sexual culture in the only way they knew how: early arranged 
marriage and lots of responsibilities for domestic tasks. During their first de-
cade in Lewiston, as some boys headed toward criminal mischief and some 
girls chafed at parental control, both genders defined the lessons they learned 
in school about American freedom and individualism as freedom from parental 
authority. Living in a culture that celebrates youth and disparages age, where 
children are given constant lessons that “to be an individual is good,” “to make 
choices for yourself is good,” how can parents who utterly lack American lin-
guistic and cultural competency possibly compete with these narratives for 
respect and parental authority?
Chores formerly assigned to boys— farm work, weeding, watching for birds, 
and harvesting—no longer exist in Lewiston, but girls are expected to contrib-
ute more to  house hold chores than ever before. “Here the girls still do all the 
 house hold chores, but the boys don’t have any farm work so they are totally 
free to run around,” Idris explained to a group of social workers who  were 
interested in providing support to refugee parents. In a different conversation, 
Sadiq told me, in frustration, “Parents don’t require their sons to do anything! 
They don’t help at home, and the parents don’t set rules for them.” He de-
scribed the common experience of visiting friends when a teenage son returns 
late at night, “and the mom just says, ‘There’s food in the kitchen if you’re 
hungry.’ The son  doesn’t talk to her and she  doesn’t ask where he’s been or 
what he’s been doing.”
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By 2010, as boys began getting in trouble in the streets at night and as parents 
unable to control their sons became increasingly alarmed by their misbehav-
ior, sbyam, the community association, parents, police, and social workers 
opened discussions about how to engage boys who have no after- school pro-
grams or home responsibilities. At a meeting or ga nized by Idris with social 
workers and community resource police officers to ask for advice about par-
enting strategies for boys, a female Somali caseworker asked about the kinds 
of chores American boys do in Lewiston. When the assembled non- Somali 
social workers suggested cooking, babysitting, sweeping, vacuuming, or 
cleaning the bathroom, the Somali caseworker and Idris looked at each other 
dubiously before the woman responded, “Somali culture is so traditional and 
women and men have such different roles. Men do absolutely no  house work or 
work with the kids. Never.” She acknowledged that she has noticed that Somali 
Bantu men do more  house hold chores than Somali men, especially when the 
wife is sick or has a new baby, but also emphasized that women and girls are as 
intent on maintaining distinct gender roles as men: “Girls want to be seen as 
competent in the  house hold. They want to prove they can do all the  house hold 
chores. Nothing is expected of boys until they’re eigh teen, when they’re sup-
posed to get a job.” Managing all the  house work is important to a girl’s self- 
identity and self- worth, and overwhelmed mothers rely heavily on their daugh-
ters to keep their  house holds running. While Somali Bantu boys are released 
from  house hold responsibilities and some begin to become unmoored, some 
girls begin to chafe at the roles assigned to them. The following two sections 
offer short vignettes to describe what is at issue for girls and boys adjusting 
to life with refugee parents in Lewiston.
Raising Girls
“THE WORST THING I  HAVE SEEN IN MY WHOLE L I FE”
During a visit to the apartment of Garad and his wife, Halima, the conversa-
tion turns, as it often did during 2008–12, to parenting girls. With the ever- 
popular World Wrestling Entertainment channel on mute in the background 
and their kids leaping off the couch and wrestling with each other on the floor 
to imitate the wrestlers, Garad tells me, “If my daughter was in Somalia now 
at age fourteen, she would be married, but  here she has to be eigh teen. Here 
girls watch American girls and behave outside of their religion. In Somalia 
this would never happen. American girls have boyfriends. They are hugging 
and kissing in public. This would never happen in Somalia.” His wife, who has 
been playing with their youn gest daughter while we talk, interjects, “Our cul-
ture is being challenged in America. The worst possible thing is when people 
see a girl walking with a boy who is not related to her, talking closely. It’s very 
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shameful. That’s what made us [have early marriage] in Somalia because we 
 couldn’t watch our daughters being with boys. It’s just so shameful! Here in 
the U.S., when people see girls on the street talking with boys, they will call the 
mother and tell on them, and it’s awful. Here everyone is very, very worried 
about their daughters but they are also very scared to confront and control 
their daughters because the daughters can call the police.” I ask, “So . . .  how do 
you control your daughters?” She throws up her hands and says, “We don’t!”
Her husband agrees. “That’s the worst thing I have seen in my  whole life. Par-
ents  can’t control their kids.” He tells me that he understands that his children 
will grow up in a different culture than his culture and will decide for them-
selves how they will live, but for the moment he and his wife, among the most 
loving couples and parents I know, worry about protecting their daughters 
while trying to guide them toward a life path in a radically different cultural 
environment.
“DO YOU THINK YOU’LL  SEE  A  SOMAL I  B ANTU GIRL  
GOING TO COLLEGE?”
Roqiya and Sacadiya, both fourteen,  were debating the merits of having a baby 
during a homework help session. Roqiya proclaimed her disinterest in babies 
because they require too much work and keep you up all night, to which 
Sacadiya responded with incredulity, “But you have to have a baby! How can 
you not have a baby?” A non- Somali tutor who overheard their conversa-
tion broke in to suggest that girls don’t have to have babies, and in any event can 
wait until they finish high school to have babies, but Roqiya explained that 
her parents  were insisting that she get married soon rather than attend high 
school. “My father is very old and he wants to see my babies before he dies, 
and my mother says I  can’t go to high school because I have to get married,” 
she explained. She knew it would likely be only a few years before she was 
up all night with her first baby.
The pressure on young Somali Bantu girls to get married early was intense 
during their first de cade in the United States. Iman, one of the first four So-
mali Bantus to graduate from high school, watched most of his female peers 
drop out to get married. “All the daughters hear is that their mothers married 
at their age and had babies a year later. That’s what they know. Do you think 
you’ll see a Somali Bantu girl going to college in the next eight years?” he 
asked me. “Sure,” I responded, but he emphatically disagreed. “No! All they 
know is their moms  were married at fourteen, their sisters married early, and 
they will be married early. It’s not like the Somalis— most of those girls go to 
college. We don’t.” Iman considered dropping out of high school himself when 
a female friend left school for an arranged marriage, but Idris convinced him 
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to graduate and pursue college. Somali Bantu boys know that parents looking 
for good mates for their daughters do not choose students, so the pressure to 
marry girls early to young men with jobs also compels young men to leave 
school in search of work.
To be a good parent means ensuring that your daughter is married to 
someone you choose or approve of, fulfilling your responsibility to provide 
her with a spouse. The pressure from relatives in Somalia and in the Kenyan 
refugee camps to marry daughters early is powerful, and parents in Lewiston 
find themselves stuck between the insistence by distant relatives to arrange 
a daughter’s marriage and the daughter’s desire to stay in school. “They are 
trying to control the culture from Kenya!” one father tells me, about his at-
tempts by his mother, still living in Somalia, to arrange the marriage for his 
fourteen- year- old daughter in Lewiston. His daughter now refuses to talk on 
the phone when his mother calls from Somalia because she is so upset about 
her grandmother’s focus on planning her engagement. Phone calls zip back 
and forth between Lewiston, Kenya, Somalia, and other American cities as 
families negotiate potential partners, terms, and dates. For many parents, early 
marriage is the key to safety, stability, and security for their daughters, but it 
is also a public demonstration and confirmation of community life. Marriage 
sits at the intersection of two moral ideologies and support structures: family 
responsibility and the moral circulation of money through extended family 
networks that link people across time and space. When arranged marriages are 
negotiated between family networks that extend across the United States and 
into Kenya and Somalia, the monetary exchanges that accompany marriage 
make their way along these networks to implicate a broad range of people in 
the success of the match. And weddings themselves are community affairs; 
people routinely travel hundreds or thousands of miles to attend weddings, 
which last for days and are open to anyone who wishes to attend. When Idris 
got married in Portland, Oregon, his entire family from Lewiston, most of the 
sbyam board members, and the sbyam soccer team flew to Oregon to support 
him and join the festivities, which included a soccer tournament with teams 
from Portland and Seattle and multiple feasts. Weddings are so important to 
community life that some people, like Sadiq, have started to wonder if they are 
a problem because people drop everything— their homework, a good night 
of sleep for the next day’s soccer game, jobs, volunteer responsibilities—to at-
tend weddings. But many parents fear that if weddings become individualized 
affairs arranged between the young couple for guests only of their choice, a 
linchpin of community life will be lost.
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“THE CELL  PHONE I S  THE RUMOR L INE ! ”
“Snitches!” say the group of Somali Bantu high school girls at an sbyam meet-
ing when I ask about the worst parts of life in Lewiston. All the girls talk at 
once, describing the barrage of phone calls that fly between parents reporting 
to each other on the perceived misdeeds of each other’s daughters. “The cell 
phone is the rumor line!” Xawo complains. Fatuma tells a story about a man 
who phoned her mother to report that she had left a school event with a group 
of fellow students and did not go where she was supposed to. She got in terrible 
trouble with her mother when she returned home, and in a rage she went to the 
police station the next day to report the man for spying on her. The other girls 
all tell similar tales about people calling their parents with stories about their 
behavior and how completely watched and policed they feel. “We are a very 
snitching community!” Xawo concludes, sadly.
In addition to its importance for community cohesion and transnational 
connection, early marriage is also about sex. Marrying girls as soon as they can 
be sexually active ensures that pregnancy happens only in a sanctioned relation-
ship. But as the value of education gains traction, parents are stuck between 
protecting their daughters from the possibility of out- of- wedlock births and the 
desire to allow their daughters to finish high school. Girls are trying to balance 
their new life possibilities in Lewiston and the pressures from diasporic networks 
and parental concerns about the possibility of sexual impropriety.
It is obvious that girls are under significant stress. Everyone is watching 
and monitoring and gossiping about their behavior, and Somali Bantu girls are 
chafing at the burden. “They are carry ing the weight of their culture,” an ell 
teacher observes. When I talk with Somali Bantu high school girls about mar-
riage, I hear the same thing over and over: “I want to be a good daughter.” “I 
want to follow my parent’s wishes.” “I want to make my parents happy.” Some 
girls are very worried about their overburdened mothers’ precarious mental 
health and do not wish to cause them any more stress. But many of the same 
girls are also working maniacally in school to demonstrate to their parents the 
value of their education in order to offer a stronger case against leaving school 
to get married. Some girls came up with a strategy to promise themselves to 
a boy of their choosing, approved by their parents, if their parents would let 
them finish school. Thus their parents feel assured that a good match has been 
made and that they can monitor their daughter’s behavior with the chosen boy 
until marriage after high school. They want the respect, family honor, and so-
cial status that comes with being a good daughter, but it is clear that they also 
want to have fun in high school without being constantly monitored, reported 
on, and yelled at by worried parents anxious to protect them.
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“ IN THE U.S . YOU DON’T  NEED A FATHER TO HAVE A B ABY”
“It’s now well accepted that girls should marry after high school,” Sadiq tells 
me, acknowledging that when girls marry in high school they are unlikely to 
continue their education because of the demands of family life. But then he 
acknowledges that nevertheless some parents still feel compelled to arrange 
marriages for daughters in high school because of fears of out- of- wedlock 
pregnancy, “the worst possible thing that can happen to a family.” Families 
face social ostracism if a daughter becomes pregnant before marriage, even 
to the point where people would cross the street to avoid having to greet the 
father of a pregnant, unmarried girl. “It’s not fair that there are no repercus-
sions for the boy,” Sadiq acknowledges, but unmarried pregnant girls usually 
refuse to name the father anyhow.
As if to fulfill their parents’ greatest fears, young teenagers  were indeed 
beginning to become sexually active, and by 2012 several girls  were pregnant 
before getting married. A social worker who interacts daily with many young 
teens and carries a great deal of anger about the ways in which Somali Bantu 
youths  were shut out of programs at school that might have helped them when 
they first arrived in Lewiston, reflected, “Teenage pregnancy is not about sex. 
It’s about having no hope, no plan for the future.” Some parents are even start-
ing to talk about abortion, as news of unexpected pregnancies shoots through 
the community like lightning. No one knows what to do, and parents start 
having the same debates one hears in other American communities about 
providing birth control to unmarried teenagers: will accessible birth control 
effectively control pregnancy at the cost of encouraging even more teenag-
ers to have sex before marriage? In confusion, some parents begin pulling 
away from well- meaning social workers who provide information about birth 
control to unmarried girls, while other parents promote the idea that making 
birth control available is the only reasonable thing to do.
Families try to work out the lines of responsibility for children born to 
unmarried girls: Should the couple be forced to marry? Should the father, 
if the girl reveals his name, be registered with dhhs to ensure child support 
payments? Should the parents of the boy pay some sort of compensation? 
Iman tells me, “In the U.S. you don’t need a father to have a baby. In American 
culture, they don’t care if the baby has a father. I see [non- Somali] girls all the 
time getting pregnant and there is no father, and no one cares. We think there 
has to be a father. A father has to pay money if you have a baby. In America 
they don’t mind. They’re on their own. But you have to have a father! You have 
to get help from the father. You  can’t do everything on your own.” Just that 
morning, the newspaper had reported that over 40 percent of the babies born 
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in the United States in 2007  were born to single women. Iman’s insistence thus 
carried the fear of what might happen if Somali Bantu girls started behaving 
like American girls, and fathers became dispensable.
“WE ARE REALLY F IGHTING ABOUT THIS  IN THE COMMUNITY”
In addition to the desire to protect their daughters and ensure that pregnancy 
happens only within marriage, everyone recognizes that marriages are also 
about money exchanges. Marriages occasion donations from friends and 
neighbors and the transfer of wealth from the groom’s family to the bride’s. In 
a context of economic deprivation, the temptation to find a match for one’s 
daughter before she can elope or become pregnant is great because the latter 
would likely mean forgoing the customary marriage payment. By ensuring 
the flow of money throughout the community, marriage provides an impor-
tant economy of support, but when the urgency to marry a daughter runs up 
against her desire to finish high school, the result can be incredibly stressful 
for young women who are trying to be good daughters while also achieving 
academically.
Some girls try to escape altogether by hurriedly eloping with boys of their 
choice earlier than they would have had to get married, just to ensure they 
marry someone of their choice rather than someone chosen by their parents 
they may not like. Several girls have fled the state to avoid arranged marriages, 
seeking help from other family members or “boyfriends” in other cities. Some 
girls call 911 to threaten suicide in protest against their parents’ plans for their 
arranged marriage. Parents talk constantly about what to do in cases like these 
and how to stay within the law while still pursuing arranged marriages as a form 
of protection for their daughters and economic exchange. Girls know that flee-
ing or calling 911 might mean an irreparable break from their family support 
structure. It is an option of desperation.
At a wedding feast in Lewiston in 2007 for one of Sheikh Axmed Nur’s 
grandsons, as the assembled guests sat on mats and pillows eating from plat-
ters of roasted goat, corn cakes, cardamom rice, salad, and the bananas pres-
ent at every meal, a teenage boy arrived home and dutifully circled the room 
greeting his elders and shaking hands before disappearing into a back bed-
room. While many of the elder men wore sarongs and prayer caps, the teen-
ager sported a huge sagging backpack, enormous baggy pants that exposed 
almost all of his underwear, an oversized sports jersey, gold chains, a sideways 
baseball cap, and earbuds snaking from his neck to his backpack. Greeting 
his elders with appropriate Somali phrases, he switched to En glish when he 
got to me, asking, “How’s it going?” In response I asked how he was, which 
earned me a grin and the pop u lar rejoinder, “Just chillin’.” As I watched him 
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leave, thinking about the relationship between his home life and his school 
life, the conversation turned to concerns about the changes that  were infiltrat-
ing  family life and the new seductions available to the youths. Sheikh Axmed 
Nur’s daughter mentioned that young Somali Bantu men in Syracuse  were 
starting to drink alcohol: they would gather in someone’s apartment and 
drink beer and wine and get very drunk. Lots of discussion ensued about how 
to handle living in a country where people routinely drink. Then someone 
turned the conversation toward the ubiquitous theme of marriage. A recent 
case provided the fodder: a young couple fell in love and went to a sheikh to be 
secretly engaged in the presence of a witness. The girl’s parents had promised 
her to a different boy, from whom they had received money, and  were furious 
about the deception. They relentlessly pressured her to rescind her promise 
and agree to marry the boy of their choice, which she eventually did. The 
wedding guests debated this sequence of events at length: Should the couple 
have secretly engaged? Should the witness have informed the mother? Should 
the sheikh have sanctioned the secret engagement? Should the mother have 
tried to intervene, since the engagement already happened in the presence of 
the sheikh? Should the girl be allowed to change her mind after promising to 
marry the boy of her choice? Everyone in the room had a different opinion 
about the conduct of all the parties, arguing about what tradition and Islam 
do and do not allow, about the extent to which girls should have the freedom 
to choose their marriage partners, and about the ongoing propriety of ar-
ranged marriages in America. Everyone is confused about the moral course 
of action for protecting daughters, following the rules of customary economic 
exchanges that cement marital ties, and recognizing the new cultural context 
of extended educational opportunities for girls.
Some Somali cultural brokers have adamant feelings about culture change. 
A Somali caseworker told me that she tells her friends who phone her to come 
celebrate a young daughter’s wedding, “No! I cannot come celebrate this!” 
She cautions her friends about their daughters, “When you marry and have a 
baby you are set back five years,” trying to convince her community that early 
marriage is destructive rather than protective of girls. “We are really fighting 
about this in the community,” she tells me. Although sbyam tries to disrupt 
the practice by encouraging girls to resist the pressures from their parents 
to marry before finishing high school, they realize that it can be very hard 
for a girl to go against parental wishes and that standing between girls and 
their parents might undermine the efforts they are making in other areas to 
strengthen waning parental authority. They are stuck between helping girls 
pursue education and convincing parents whose authority they are working 
to bolster to refrain from using that authority to arrange early marriages.1
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Reflecting on the new strategies girls are pursuing to avoid arranged mar-
riages, Sadiq tells me, “We must stop doing this. We cannot make girls marry 
against their will, and they cannot keep marrying so young. The problem is 
that as soon as a parent sees their daughter talking to a boy they assume the 
worst and arrange the marriage. But talking to a boy  doesn’t mean anything!” 
While sbyam is working to offer support to girls to finish high school before 
marriage, Sadiq hopes the community association’s women’s empowerment 
program can finally open a space for women to address their concerns about 
their daughters in ways that allow for outcomes other than early marriage.
A Somali politician and activist known for her anti- Islam pronouncements, 
Ayaan Hirsi Ali, writes in her autobiography about the patriarchal abuses of 
Muslim Somali culture, posing the Somali confrontation with the West as di-
chotomous and Manichean.2 But sbyam advocates schooling for girls, cautions 
parents against early marriage, and helps girls to negotiate around unwanted 
arranged marriages. The young adults involved in sbyam are trying to teach 
against an American orientation of instant gratification, immodesty, and chil-
dren who order their parents around while demonstrating respect for some 
American values, like education for girls, alongside Somali and Muslim values, 
like respect for adults, modesty, and an orientation toward family. The efforts 
by sbyam and other Somali and Somali Bantu leaders to promote girls’ educa-
tion and stop early marriage show that Islam and Somali culture in Lewiston is 
not the Islam and Somali culture of Hirsi Ali’s memory. They are trying to show 
how Somali culture is adaptable to rather than replaceable by life in America.
Raising Boys
“THEY ’RE  FA IL ING EVERY MINUTE OF EVERY DAY”
The first thefts by Somali Bantu boys occurred in 2009, when young kids 
stole a few things from visitors at Trinity that Kim easily recovered. When the 
panic about “gangs” hit the news, it was apparent to Idris and many others 
that kids becoming disarticulated from parental authority and emotionally 
battered at school  were going to be in trouble. “We are sitting on a time bomb,” 
a worried social worker observed to me about the dual impact of waning pa-
rental authority and school alienation. Sadiq warned, “Some parents are raising 
their children  here just like they did in Africa. They just run around, play freely, 
coming home to eat when they feel like it. But  here there are so many dangers. 
The parents don’t really even grasp the dangers.”
But what are the dangers? In a conversation with a social worker friend 
one day, she predicted dire difficulties ahead for Somali Bantu boys who take 
to the streets because they are bored at home and ignored by parents who 
are busy with so many other children, work, classes, and appointments. In 
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response I played dev il’s advocate, telling her that I always ran around my 
neighborhood as a kid and my parents never knew where I was or what I 
was doing. It  wasn’t a problem, just an old- fashioned American childhood. 
Why was it a problem for these kids? She hesitated, then said, “I don’t want 
this to come out wrong, but the issue is, they’re black. They are black kids in 
America. They are perceived as a problem in public and they’re labeled that 
way.” I think about the panic precipitated by the gang memo, how quick 
the newspaper was to promote the image of “Somali youths attacking vul-
nerable white people,” the demand that the police target Somali kids walking 
home from school as troublemakers, the high suspension rates, and agree that 
she is right.3 The social worker believes that black children running around 
the downtown provoke fears and insecurities in authorities who treat those 
children like criminals, which the boys then internalize as part of their emerg-
ing Americanized identities.
A Somali activist explains another consequence: “Our kids have no defenses 
and our parents don’t understand what’s at stake, what their kids are being ex-
posed to. We are seeing it and learning about it all at once, and our kids are so 
vulnerable to getting sucked in.” She wants to be clear that there are many good 
things about American culture— she names technology, women’s reproduc-
tive health, education— but that the bad things, such as consumerism, youth-
ful disrespect and misogyny in pop u lar culture, the valorization of exaggerated 
“ghetto” per for mance in music videos, explicit images of sex and violence on 
the Internet, are all new things for them with which parents have no experience.
Her point is affirmed by ell teachers, who notice the power of pop u lar 
culture’s black urban ghetto aesthetic for Somali Bantu boys, although not 
for the girls, who seem more invested in their parents’ culture. “I see it in the 
register,” one teacher says. “Some want to be American so badly they adopt 
the register of black rap talk.” She describes how she intervenes to require 
them to use “classroom language,” because she believes some young people 
still learning En glish really do not understand the difference in registers and 
need her to tell them. Many teachers and social workers affirm that Somali 
boys do not really identify with African American culture as portrayed in the 
media, but Somali Bantu boys do. In contrast to Somali boys, Somali Bantu 
boys “know they’re black,” the social worker says. “They  were the lower caste 
in Somalia and they are  here in America too. They adopt the look, the attitude, 
the swagger, the swearing.” It’s a pose, like trying on an identity. Teachers and 
police concerned about escalating aggressive behavior of some of their Somali 
Bantu male students attribute it to the violence they absorb from video games, 
music videos, the Internet, and which surrounds them in downtown life. One 
frustrated teacher remarks that dealing with aggressive behavior through sus-
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pensions and expulsions rather than positive school interventions solves no 
problems and only produces a self- perpetuating cycle.
Another worried teacher tells me, “Kids [from refugee families] are getting 
extremely frustrated with their rate of failure. They’re failing every minute of 
every day.” The girls can still find validation in their  house hold skills, but the 
boys, most especially those who cannot participate in sports because they are 
still in ell classes, have nothing. Sports make a huge difference for Somali 
Bantu boys, many teachers tell me, because it provides one arena in which 
they are not failing and where they are equal with their peers. An ell teacher 
explains, “They know they’re not good in the classroom. They know they’re 
not equal, but they can be equal on the soccer field. They can excel on the soc-
cer field.” That so many ell students cannot join sports teams is one more 
experience of alienation.
“UNIVERSAL SH IT  STORM”
By 2009, parents, and especially single mothers,  were beginning to grasp the 
dangers and turned to Idris for advice about how to control their boys who 
 were staying out all night. Parents tried to keep their sons safely at home by 
buying things like computers, tvs, dvd players, Xbox games, and cell phones, 
but some  were still disappearing for hours or even days with their phones 
turned off. A sympathetic community resource police officer told me, “The 
parents are just breaking down. They don’t know what to do.”
Mothers overwhelmed by many children and not enough help who  were 
losing touch with their children became a constant topic of discussion among 
social workers in the collaborative, who worried that the emotional and phys-
ical history of trauma carried by many refugee women interfered with their 
ability to feel connected to their children. As some of the mothers lost con-
trol of their sons, their expectations that life would be better  here evaporated 
into the reality of living “a worrisome life,” as one Somali Bantu father put it. 
While maintaining confidentiality, mental health counselors in the collabora-
tive who worked with refugee women reported that their overwhelming topic 
of concern was their children. A Somali Bantu caseworker told me, “Women 
do not want to talk about their rapes and the violence they experienced in the 
camps. Instead they want things to go well for their children. That is what will 
make them feel better.” A mental health counselor said her worried refugee 
clients  were navigating a “universal shit storm” of life in America, assaulted by 
one thing after another: poverty, sickness, trauma, many kids, exhaustion, con-
fusion, illiteracy, demands for home visits by social workers, and, of course, 
the weather. Having a child suspended or arrested pushes them right to the 
edge.4
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In response to appeals from parents caught in the universal shit storm and 
afraid of losing their children, Idris began or ga niz ing confidential meetings 
between parents, community police resource officers, community worker 
Janet Saliba, and social workers from the collaborative to create a safe space 
where parents could ask questions, get help, and feel supported. Unlike the 
focus groups or school meetings where parents  were supposed to respond to 
agendas set by the organizers, these meetings belonged to the parents. Idris, 
Janet, the officers, and the social workers offered simply to listen to the parents 
and brainstorm about ideas for helping them regain their authority as they 
figured out how to parent in America.
“OUR CHILDREN ARE NOT SAFE  HERE”
The first meeting Idris or ga nized (in 2010) included ten parents whose chil-
dren  were in the most trouble at school and with the law. Unsurprisingly, sus-
pensions topped the list of concerns articulated by stressed parents. One after 
another, the parents asked, “Why are our kids the ones in trouble?” “When you 
see kids in trouble, it’s always Somali, Somali Bantu, Somali, Somali Bantu. 
Why is that?” “Why have we come  here to have our children always in trou-
ble? Does the school hate our children? Do they want us to leave?” One 
father asked, pointedly, “Is it because  we’re black?” The parents shared example 
after example of suspensions and their failed efforts to communicate with the 
schools. As different parents broke down, crying and clearly in great distress, 
other parents comforted them as Idris and the others affirmed their stories 
and listened, quietly, to story after story. One woman started sobbing as she ex-
plained her confusion about why her sons  were always suspended even though 
she could not understand why. “What is happening?” she asked. “Why is this 
happening to us?”
After social workers offered to go to the schools with the parents to ask 
about suspensions, several parents wanted to talk about the gang allega-
tions against their children. “Gangs are something new!” one parent explained. 
“We don’t know what they are. We don’t know if our children are involved.” 
One parent begged the police to talk to the parents of children who  were in-
volved because “no one knows anything about this.” The assembled parents 
nodded their agreement when one parent explained, in the passage quoted in 
this chapter’s epigraph: “We moved  here to save our lives. We didn’t choose to 
come to America. We are refugees. We came  here to find safety, so we could 
save the lives of our children, so our children could be safe. But our children 
are not safe  here. We are terribly worried about them.”
The police calmed the parents by explaining that despite the newspaper 
reports, their children  were not forming gangs. A few older kids had collared 
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a few younger kids to do their bidding— stealing small things, taunting other 
children, and so forth— but the police had identified the older instigators and 
 were working with them, assuring the assembled parents that their children 
could be “redirected to more positive activities.” The officers, Janet, and social 
workers offered the parents lots of suggestions about precisely the amount 
of physical force a parent can wield with a misbehaving child and described 
strategies used by American parents to exert discipline by taking away privi-
leges or offering small rewards for good behavior. The mood lightened a bit 
when one parent asked the police to make sure her son  wasn’t kissing girls 
in the park, which elicited approval from the parents, laughter from the po-
liceman, and a lengthy discussion about the limits of police authority and the 
worrisome turn to public romance by teenagers. For parents who have never 
witnessed young people kissing in public, it is hard to differentiate between 
appropriate and inappropriate displays of affection according to American 
standards. All public kissing is shocking.
In a later conversation, one of the resource officers reflected, “The parents 
have bought their kids all these American things that the kids demand: cell 
phones, Xboxes, electronics, and the parents don’t know they can take these 
things away. There’s a certain dynamic that the parents just don’t know about, 
that you have the right as a parent to take away stuff and privileges. That if your 
child takes off out of anger, it’s not a bad reflection on you, and you should call 
the police for help. We’re educating the parents to talk to each other and give 
each other support. The kids are irritated about it, but the parents are starting 
to regain control now. We’re seeing a difference. The kids are behaving better 
and now there’s more fear of getting in trouble and getting caught.”
A few weeks later, the first Somali Bantu children  were arrested and sent to 
the juvenile detention facility on a charge of assault, and the news flew through 
the community like a shock wave. Then another child stole money from his 
parents that he distributed to his friends, many of whom promptly went shop-
ping. Idris, Janet, and Kim tracked down the story, pulled all the implicated 
boys and their parents into a meeting with the police, and remained in the 
room together until the boys accounted for every penny. The items  were gath-
ered and returned and the money reimbursed. For many of the boys involved 
and their parents, this meeting was a turning point because the children saw 
their parents as competently allied with the police and other adults in moni-
toring their behavior and holding them accountable. Everyone agreed that the 
following summer was one of the quietest yet as the community resource of-
ficers, sbyam members, and parents worked together to better supervise and 
monitor the children’s behavior. Through Idris’s meetings, parents learned they 
could ask the officers for help without being labeled bad parents, and the kids 
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learned they could not pull the wool over their parents’ eyes any longer with 
threats of calling 911 or claims about their freedoms in America.
“The Youth Are in a Different Culture”
And yet intergenerational gaps grew wider. In 2010, Idris asked me to help 
or ga nize a history project for Somali Bantu teenagers, who  were asking him 
about why they  were in America and why they  were called Somali Bantus. 
I thought back to a conversation with Abdiya’s nine- year- old son the previ-
ous year. Looking at photographs I had brought to the family’s apartment of 
Abdiya as a young woman in Banta and of his late grandfather, the little boy 
asked, “Why did we come  here?” I told him there was a war and his mother 
had to leave her village to keep her family safe. “Why was there a war?” he 
persisted. “Did white people come and attack us?” Idris was concerned that 
young people had no idea about their history and suggested that a project for 
youths to interview their parents and grandparents about their lives in Soma-
lia before the war and about the war itself might be a wonderful opportunity 
to teach Somali Bantu teenagers about their history while fostering intergen-
erational communication. We secured a small grant to cover expenses and 
held meetings with interested teenagers to develop a basic set of questions. 
The teenagers set out to begin their interviews, but we quickly discovered that 
the young people could not understand their parents’ stories recounted in 
Somali or Maay Maay. The language was too hard, the cadence unfamiliar, the 
vocabulary too complex. Surprised, we regrouped and decided that sbyam 
board members would participate as translators in each interview, assisting 
the parents and their children to talk with each other. The extent of the inter-
generational communication breakdown was a revelation.
By 2013, sbyam leaders  were trying different kinds of projects to help par-
ents and children learn to talk to each other. At one meeting, Ahmed taught 
elementary school children to tell their parents about school when they got 
home before going out to play. “Tell your parents something about your school 
day every single day,” he suggested. “Show them your report card and what it 
means. Bring your parents to school and introduce them to your teacher. Try 
hard to communicate with your parents by telling them when you are leav-
ing the  house, where you are going, and who you will be with. Tell them, 
‘I’m going to the park! I’m going to Abdi’s  house!’ ” He reminded them that 
because their parents didn’t speak En glish, they had to put in the effort to keep 
communication open. “Make little private jokes with your mom so you can 
laugh and have fun together,” he advised.
While encouraging kids to be more conversant with their parents, sbyam 
leaders  were also teaching parents what questions to ask their kids. When 
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Ahmed suggested to one parent that she could ask her child about school 
when he got home, the mom responded in confusion, “But what is there to 
ask?” Having never been to school, she had no conception of what she might 
talk about. The sad result, noticed by sbyam leaders and social workers alike, 
is that some Somali Bantu children think their parents do not care about 
them. They see their parents consumed by the demands of managing life in 
Lewiston with very large families, and when they get home from school, par-
ents rarely have time to sit and talk. Girls arrive home from school to be put in 
charge of babysitting younger siblings or cooking dinner; boys drop off their 
backpacks and immediately dash back outside again. The communication gap 
widens as the children become increasingly fluent in En glish and abandon So-
mali. One mother tells me that her two youn gest children only speak En glish, 
not Somali, and since she cannot speak En glish, they never communicate.
One young friend described overhearing how some white parents talk to 
their kids when they drop them off at school, saying loving things, hugging 
them, and telling them, “Have a nice day, honey.” He tells me that he wants his 
mom to talk to him like that too, but, instead, “She yells at me like I’m a two- 
year- old.” A white social worker who works closely with Somali Bantu children 
says, “These kids think they don’t need their parents. They take care of them-
selves. They don’t think their parents love them. I  can’t tell you the number 
of kids who say their parents don’t care about them. The girls say their moms 
want them to get married so they don’t cause shame, not because they care 
about whether or not they are happy. Parents don’t talk to their kids, never pay 
attention to them, never ask them anything. They don’t know how.”
But sbyam leaders know parents are trying to show their love. Arrang-
ing a safe marriage is a form of love; cooking and ensuring food is available 
whenever your child comes home is love; overcoming your fear to talk with 
police about how to parent in America is love; attending parent meetings to 
rage about suspension practices is love; buying electronics in an effort to keep 
your children playing at home rather than in the street is love. I think back to 
village life in prewar Somalia, when parents and kids worked together during 
the day and relaxed together in the eve nings, telling stories and jokes. I don’t 
remember parents ever asking, “What did you do today?” or “How are you 
feeling today?” Kids played and helped in the fields and listened to parents’ 
stories and advice, but no one ever asked children to explain what they  were 
doing or feeling. But  here, in America, young people live in totally different 
worlds than their parents. “There is no family life,” a Somali caseworker la-
ments. “There is no connection. In America everyone is busy on different time 
schedules. Parents and older siblings are working different hours. Everyone 
comes and goes in de pen dently. No one talks to each other.” One parent tells 
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me about the intergenerational breakdown in communication: “The youth are 
in a different culture.”
Drug Dealers in the Park
In 2013, a Somali Bantu friend whose office window overlooked the down-
town park began to realize that drug dealers from other cities  were coming to 
Lewiston, using the park as a distribution center, and roping in young chil-
dren from the refugee community as runners. Shocked about this recent turn 
of events, my friend began calling parents to come get their children. But the 
drug dealers  were so intimidating that the moms who came to collect their 
children ended up going home alone. My friend said, “The men are telling the 
women to control their children, and the women are yelling at the men, ‘What 
do you know? You just sit out there under a tree all day long and don’t know 
anything about the kids.’ ” I asked my friend, “Well, why aren’t the men taking 
responsibility for the kids and keeping them away from the drug dealers?” He 
looked at me like I was clueless and said, “What can the men do? Their kids 
don’t even know them. They try to call their kid over and the kid ignores them 
like they don’t even know them. The kids don’t have anything to do with their 
dads. The dads  can’t stand up to the drug dealers, besides.” A social worker 
tells me that she thinks Lewiston will become the next major drug distribution 
center in the state because the drug dealers are beginning to figure out that 
they can control the children of refugee parents. This disturbing story reso-
nates with many other stories I was hearing about the severed connection be-
tween fathers and their children, as older refugee men’s authority waned both 
with their children and their wives.
Men’s relationships with their children are one dimension of their overall 
loss of authority, as described in chapter 7. Attempting to maintain disciplinary 
control in an environment where children claim freedom and autonomy from 
parents has forced some men into inflexible and authoritarian expressions of 
parental authority that are increasingly simply ignored by their children. “The 
relationship is broken because the dads don’t know how to talk to their kids,” a 
Somali Bantu social worker tells me. He recounts an example of working with 
a father whose son was struggling with behavioral problems. The father was 
attempting to parent by issuing demands and orders, setting rigid boundaries 
for the child. My friend suggested that the father should try talking with his 
child rather than setting strict rules: “If there is something big to discuss, like 
moving apartments, taking a trip, or another family decision, talk it over with 
your child and involve him in your decision making.” The father was mysti-
fied about what it might mean to involve his child in his decision making, a 
totally foreign concept to him. Listening to this story, I thought of a recent 
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conversation with Sadiq, who told me in astonishment, “The other day I was 
discussing with my wife our plans for a vacation this summer, and my daugh-
ter came into the conversation telling us what we should and shouldn’t do for 
vacation!” His daughter had overheard friends at school talking about Hawaii, 
so she was insisting that the family should visit Hawaii for their vacation. “I’ve 
never even heard of Hawaii!” Sadiq says, laughing. He is proud of his daughter 
for developing into an assertive young woman, but nonetheless finds the at-
titude challenging, telling me, “In Somalia, the home was like a dictatorship, 
but  here it’s a democracy.” Children who have been taught never to look an 
adult in the eye while talking to them learn at school always to look adults in 
the eye, disturbing parents who experience direct eye contact as disrespectful. 
Like direct eye contact, involving one’s children in one’s decision making is 
something completely new. While Somali Bantu community members strug-
gle to replace their participatory and demo cratic po liti cal decision- making 
practices with a more exclusive, representative, and hierarchical American 
model, they are similarly challenged to replace their model of hierarchical 
family structure based on absolute parental authority with a more demo cratic 
approach to parenting that grants children far more power in the  house hold 
than ever before. It is this style of American parenting, involving negotiation, 
dialogue, collaborative decision making, and the management of privileges 
that sbyam is attempting to make available to parents.
Somali Bantu American Youth Identity
One day when Somali and Somali Bantu high school students  were looking 
over my photographs from Somalia, a few began debating whether the photo-
graphs depicted Somali life or only Somali Bantu life. When one of the young 
Somali Bantu boys asked, “What’s the difference?” a Somali girl said, “You are 
different. You have bigger noses and different dances,” a statement that sev-
eral other Somali Bantu students challenged as incorrect. Such questions and 
confusions prompted Idris’s desire to create the oral history project for young 
teenagers who  were asking him, “Why are we called Somali Bantu?” In our 
first meeting with the teenagers, they spoke heatedly about the ways in which 
their Somali peers used the term “jareer” to distinguish and denigrate them. 
Fatuma complained that her Somali classmates used the term all the time, but 
only in a derogatory way, which so enraged her that she actually fought the 
girls who taunted her with it. She and the other girls described how Somali girls 
sometimes snatched off their headscarves in the school bathrooms to get a 
look at jareer hair, provoking physical fights. Everyone in the meeting agreed 
that whereas “jileec” is used to describe all kinds of soft things such as fabric 
and paper, “jareer” is only used to describe people and only in a bad way.
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Some of the sbyam board members at the meeting brought up a Bollywood 
film dubbed in Somali that they had watched together the previous weekend: 
“We  were really enjoying it—it was such a nice love story. But then the bad guy 
was described as jareer! We  couldn’t believe it! We rewound the sound to listen 
over and over and yes, it was true, the Somali translation used the word ‘jareer’ 
to describe the bad guy. The movie was ruined.” The teenagers all agreed that, 
as one girl put it, “Whenever you hear ‘jareer,’ it’s only in a bad way.” Fatuma 
shared her dismay that when she phones the Line of Seduction, a Somali so-
cial networking phone line that people can call to join any one of a number of 
simultaneous conversations about a wide variety of topics, someone always asks 
her whether she is jareer or jileec. She knows and resents the fact that identify-
ing herself as jareer puts her in an inferior category. While their older siblings 
and the young adults in the community express pride in their identity as Somali 
Bantus, finding it personally meaningful and instrumentally useful, teenagers 
are much more interested in tossing out the Somali Bantu label altogether 
because they experience it in youth culture as uniformly pejorative.
Idris opened one of the history project meetings by asking the teenagers, 
“Why did we come to America?” No one knew. “People died so we could come 
 here. Do you know about that?” he asked. Everyone shook their heads. One 
teenager responded with a question: “Why  were we selected to come  here, and 
why are we called minorities?” This prompted an outpouring of other ques-
tions: “Where did the word ‘Somali Bantu’ come from?” “Why do Somali Ban-
tus speak three different languages?” “Why isn’t there a Somali Bantu language 
if there is a Somali Bantu group?” “What’s the relationship of Somali Bantus to 
Reer Shabelles? To Mushungulis? To Bantus?” “What’s the difference between 
jareer and ooji?” The questions expanded as Fatuma asked, “What’s the rela-
tionship between qabil [clan] and village?” Xawo added, “And what is qabil 
anyway? I am so confused!” It became apparent that while the teenagers  were 
interested to learn about these parts of their history, they did not expect the 
names would be significant to them in America. And it was particularly clear 
that they had no interest in maintaining an identity as Somali Bantus.
Some of the English- speaking young adults worry about what will replace 
Somali Bantu identity, as they watch their younger siblings adopting the ste-
reo types of black identity presented in pop u lar culture, which is the predomi-
nant experience Somali Bantu children have with African Americans. Young 
adults who remember life in Kakuma and who arrived in the United States 
with enough En glish to graduate from high school try to model values based 
in Somali culture and Muslim faith while seeking success through education, 
American style, by trying to replace exaggerated pop u lar iconography of ghetto 
culture with alternative models of how to be black, Muslim Somali Americans. 
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One college student who graduated from Lewiston’s high school, Abdi, says, 
“When we got to Kakuma, we saw that our people who  were well educated 
got jobs. They  were our teachers. They could buy bicycles. They worked hard 
and got jobs because of it. We knew about the limitations in Somalia because 
our parents talked about it, so we began to understand the importance of 
education.” Their self- confidence and self- worth  were forged, in part, by seeing 
people in the older generation, like Sadiq, achieve success as teachers and lead-
ers. But they fear that because their younger siblings growing up in America do 
not have the experience they had in Kakuma, they are not as directed and are 
more susceptible to the derailing threats of consumerism, sex, drugs, crime, 
and negative repre sen ta tions of blackness in the media. Ahmed, the eldest of 
five brothers with a single mother, interjects, “We feel really responsible for our 
younger brothers. It is only me to help my brothers make good decisions. Here 
there are so many choices and you have to always make sure you are making 
good decisions.” Abdi and Ahmed call their younger brothers and sisters “the 
in- between generation,” not fully American but also not Somali. Like Garad 
and Halima, they are uncomfortable seeing younger teens kissing and hold-
ing hands in public, changing their dress styles to mimic ghetto aesthetics, and 
becoming detached from Muslim practice. Ahmed talks about the experience 
of living in a Muslim soundscape in the refugee camp, where days  were punctu-
ated by the call to prayer over loudspeakers and sheikhs in the street paused to 
give children advice or blessings. Alienated from parents and school, lacking an 
enveloping sensory Muslim environment, losing the Somali language, learning 
to kiss and hold hands in public, adopting an aesthetic of street toughs, being 
viewed as problems in school and on the streets: these are the things that really 
worry Ahmed, Abdi, Idris, and the other young sbyam leaders as they try to 
provide alternative role models for how to be black and Muslim in America.
Assimilation?
Ideas about immigrant assimilation based on the experiences of Eu ro pean 
immigrants to the United States that predict that each generation will be more 
assimilated (to mainstream, white American society) than their parents ig-
nore the very different terrain of incorporation and integration navigated by 
immigrants of color. Studies in the 1990s offered more nuanced models of 
integration that attended to factors like racism, discrimination, poverty, so-
cial capital, family support, class status, and spatial geography.5 These studies 
suggested that immigrants of color who experience poverty, racism and dis-
crimination in schools and the job market, a breakdown in intergenerational 
communication, the loss of parental authority, and demographic ghettoiza-
tion may experience downward mobility, “dissonant acculturation” in which 
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children and their parents are acculturating at different rates, or “segmented 
assimilation” in which the second generation assimilates to minority, “adver-
sarial,” or “oppositional” American culture.6 “Children of immigrants expe-
riencing the most difficult economic and social conditions are more prone 
to see themselves as part of undifferentiated American minorities,” write two 
scholars who conducted much of the early work on race and acculturation.7 In 
her 1994 review of the new research of these and other scholars on the signifi-
cance of race for integration, sociologist Mary Waters summarized, “The sec-
ond generation that casts their lot with America’s minority groups will most 
likely be at risk of downward social mobility.”8
A de cade later, scholars again nuanced these models of downward mobility 
and assimilation to oppositional American culture. Sociologist Philip Kasinitz 
noted that those who believe assimilation is harmful to immigrants of color 
because assimilation will mean downward mobility “point to the destructive 
effects of racialization into ‘ghetto’ or ‘underclass’ culture. But the aspects of 
culture they point to— individualism, nihilism, materialism, the high rate of 
marital breakup, the low rate of saving, the low value it places on education, 
the high degree of penetration by mass media— are hardly unique to any real 
or imagined ‘culture of poverty.’ They are precisely the supposed aspects of 
‘ghetto’ life that most closely approximate, albeit in extreme form, the ways 
of the broader society.”9
Kasinitz and other scholars warn against assuming that the adoption of any 
of these cultural practices is by definition an indication of downward mobility 
or oppositional acculturation: “ghetto” style may be sartorial and not substan-
tive; “ghettoized” ethnic enclaves may provide a structure of social buffering 
that nurtures community networks, support structures, and entrepreneurial 
initiatives; the second generation may develop a much more fluid identity that 
embraces some aspects of American culture alongside values inherited from 
their parents; assimilation might mean embracing civil rights projects of so-
cial transformation rather than simply negatively expressed oppositional cul-
ture; and ongoing transnational and diasporic networks might counter racism 
and provide, instead, globalized networks of belonging and affirmation.10
The small but growing literature on Somali youth in the diaspora expresses 
concerns about the challenges Somali American youth face from racism and 
discrimination and the likelihood that they will experience dissonant accul-
turation because of poor intergenerational communication, loss of parental 
authority, family fragmentation, and identity crises, leading them to “adopt 
the mantle of [North American] blackness” and oppositional culture.11 Acknowl-
edging the newness of Somali immigration to the United States, Kapteijns 
and Arman suggest dissonant acculturation is already “rampant” in Somali 
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refugee communities but express hope that a strong sense of ethnic pride, 
enduring cultural values, and a coherent community identity (which together 
constitute “Soomaalinimo” or “Somaliness”) can provide a buffer for Somali 
American youth to maintain connections to their parents and Islam while 
also forming relationships with people in mainstream society.12 Other schol-
ars note the importance of participation in diasporic networks for Somali 
youth in the diaspora, maintained through phone calls, the Internet, the cir-
culation of dvds and videos, phone chat rooms, and so forth, through which 
youths simultaneously forge “three or more different kinds of identity” (trans-
national Somali, transnational Muslim, and localized).13 One study of Somali 
American youth in Boston suggests that youths are playing with American 
pop u lar culture hip- hop swagger without losing their connection to Somali 
cultural identity and values, noting that, for the youths in the study, “acting 
like an American was not equated with becoming an American” because of So-
mali re sis tance to racism, strong Muslim identification, and an “internal moral 
compass as Somalis.”14
But Somali Bantu children are in a slightly different position than Somali 
children because they experience racism as black people in America but also 
from their Somali peers. The emerging response of Somali Bantu youths in 
Lewiston embraces their sense of “Somaliness” while rejecting the racism 
that accompanies the Somali Bantu moniker and adapts, perhaps with more 
enthusiasm than their Somali peers, aspects of American hip- hop sartorial 
culture. I am wary of arguing that this means Somali Bantu youths are “in 
between” cultures or culturally fragmented because fragmentation or in- 
betweenness implies another state that is “ whole,” which is never the case. 
Somali Bantu American kids are used to having identities or subjectivities 
that emerge from their many social relations because of fluid family struc-
tures and extended kinship networks. Their subjective orientation to the world 
is not as distinct individuals passing through, negotiating different cultural 
realms, but as people constituted by their associations and relations in all 
these realms simultaneously.15 “Wholeness” is a presumption that Henrietta 
Moore calls a “pretheoretical commitment,” a state that is assumed as normal 
when in fact it is imagined, but which then becomes the norm in contrast 
to which some people are imagined as fragmented.16 But there is no  whole 
Lewiston culture, no  whole African American culture, and no  whole Somali 
Bantu culture. The first encompasses the xenophobes and the helpers, racism 
and welcome, nasty and compelling values promoted in pop u lar culture. The 
second includes mainstream role models like Barack Obama and gangsta rap 
stars. The third is constituted through debates about the historical legacy of dif-
ference, a full embrace of Somaliness, Islam, and changing cultural practices. 
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The Somali Bantu youths I know are drawing on attachments to teachers, 
parents, extended family members, sheikhs, pop u lar culture icons, young 
adult role models, white and Somali peers, and those with whom they interact 
on international Muslim websites and phone chat rooms.17
While the experiences of Somali Bantu youths fashioning lives in Lewiston 
may be more extreme, many youths behave differently in school and in 
public than at home, and all kids creatively make youth culture with their 
peer group that draws on a selected pop u lar culture styles, bodily and sar-
torial practices, technology, language, and more. Somali Bantu youths may 
have more disparate possibilities from which to choose, but they are constitut-
ing themselves across an array of possibilities and choices, which is different 
than saying they are fragmented and thus confused. Because they are in their 
first de cade of playing with and making meaningful the values and per for-
mances that constitute their identity, they are not yet finished (and, of course, 
will never be). What matters is which associations and per for mances receive 
positive validation and which get them into trouble. The leaders of sbyam are 
trying to make sure that they, as role models, are part of the conversation, in-
serting positive values of parental engagement, adherence to Islam, respect for 
authority, ser vice to the community, prioritizing education, maintaining trans-
national family and cultural connections, and being proud of their identity as 
Africans. They offer soccer programs and African dance sessions, homework 
help and prayer as part of their open  house events. Through videos, dvds, 
and YouTube they follow and practice the latest dance moves from Kenya, and 
through Islamic Internet sites they address questions of romance, dating, love, 
interpersonal relationships, and making ethical Muslim choices in a Christian 
context. They bolster parental authority while also helping parents embrace 
new cultural outlooks and practices. They recognize that the real challenges for 
Somali Bantu American kids are poverty and racism, so they fight racist ste reo-
types about gangs while also strengthening the community bonds that give 
Somali Bantu refugees resilience and offering points of contact with mainstream 
society to help youths craft successful life trajectories of their own design.
In this way, sbyam is trying to ensure that Somali values of sharing, mutu-
ality, faith, family, and parental authority remain strong, that personal iden-
tities constituted through the social rather than the material remain in place, 
and that destructive popular- culture caricatures of blackness do not gain 
hegemony, trying, instead, to construct blackness as rooted in a Somali and 
Muslim value system and a cultural diasporic consciousness. Idris explains 
that a central part of sbyam’s mission is to show kids how to live in the face 
of racism without letting it define them and provoke a constantly reactionary 
stance. “Words like the ‘n’ word and ‘adoon’ are words and they aren’t going 
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away,” he says. Thus, sbyam focuses its efforts on teaching young people to 
live as black Somali Bantus in a world where such words exist.
Like immigrants before them, Somali Bantu refugees face economic penury 
in a context of assumptions about the moral imperatives of self- help initiatives, 
xenophobia and racism, exclusion, and tolerance as the highest form of ac cep-
tance. Like immigrants before them, they rely on support from kin and ethnic 
enclaves. Like immigrants before them, their family structures and cultural 
practices morph under the protective and invasive intervention of legal au-
thorities and social ser vices providers. Like immigrants before them, they face 
intergenerational chasms, arguments about the morality of culture change, and 
language loss. Like immigrants before them, they are building their own civic 
institutions, demanding civil rights, and exerting their own forms of po liti cal 
engagement. Among the many things that are par tic u lar to their experience is 
their blackness in a country of dichotomous race, their religion in a country 
that fears Islam, their strong and technologically enhanced diasporic ties, their 
minority status within the broader Somali diaspora, and their cultural comfort 
with mobility. How these dimensions of their identities will unfold as they start 
their second de cade in the United States is unclear. Will they be able to blur the 
race line and confound the categories? Will they be able to normalize Islam as 
another mainstream American religion? Will their diasporic belongings and 
mobilities shape youth culture in novel ways in the future?
Toward Advocacy
When a few Somali Bantu children started getting arrested after 2010, sbyam 
added workshops on the juvenile justice system to their roster of activities, 
hoping to teach children and their parents about what happens when you 
break the law and have to go to court. For these workshops, sbyam gathered a 
panel of authorities including police officers, a judge, a court- appointed advo-
cate, and others who work with youths in the justice system to help kids and 
their parents understand the consequences of arrest. These meetings  were fas-
cinating moments of engagement between the white Lewiston establishment 
and Somali Bantu kids and parents, where everyone had to work to overcome 
language barriers and learn how to communicate effectively. A description of 
one of the juvenile justice panels shows why.
Each panelist was asked to speak for five minutes about his or her role in 
the juvenile justice system, after which parents and children in the audience 
could ask questions. It was immediately apparent which panelists  were accus-
tomed to speaking through translators and which  were having a brand- new 
experience. The community resource police officer, who had worked with 
sbyam in the parent meetings described above, knew just how long to talk 
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before pausing for the interpreter to translate, producing a seamless, balanced 
pattern of En glish, Somali translation, En glish, Somali translation. Those who 
had never spoken through translators failed to pause for translation, forc-
ing the translator to interrupt when the flow of En glish stretched beyond the 
boundaries of adequate translation and then cutting back in to begin talking 
in En glish again before the translator finished speaking.
Once the panelists and their translators  were finished, parents and chil-
dren in the audience  were invited to ask questions, and new communication 
difficulties became clear as the meta phors used by speakers sounded outra-
geous in translation. In response to the query of one child who asked, “How 
do you become a police officer?” the chief of police answered, “Stay in school 
[several kids chimed in, dutifully, ‘Yes, we know, stay in school!’] and keep 
your nose clean.” The kids all looked at the translator and grabbed their noses 
in confusion as he explained, after clarifying with the police chief the signifi-
cance of a clean nose.
The discussion continued with questions from parents about the long- term 
implications of having a police record and how to force their children to obey 
the law, and from kids about what the fbi is for and what defines a misde-
meanor. A shy boy raised his hand, timidly asking, “Judge, can you explain 
that thing hanging over our head?” Earlier in the program, the judge, straight- 
faced, somber, and intimidating, had explained that juveniles do not always go 
to jail for every crime, but for minor offenses like curfew infractions, tobacco 
use, and alcohol use they might be sentenced to parole without any jail time. 
“But you’ll still have this hanging over your head,” he had cautioned, sternly, 
“and if you screw up you might have to go to jail.” The shy boy asked his ques-
tion holding his hand parallel to the crown of his head as other audience mem-
bers nodded their agreement with the question. As the judge grasped the literal 
interpretation, he finally cracked a smile before explaining what it means to 
have something hanging over your head.
These sorts of meetings  were carefully coordinated moments of engage-
ment, where sbyam board members distributed themselves throughout the 
audience to maintain order while ensuring all those who had questions had 
the opportunity to ask them. As their success with such meetings grew, they 
continued to expand their programming by adding citizenship classes for 
adults and, eventually, literacy classes as well. Having established themselves 
as knowledgeable, trustworthy, capable, and fluent in American society, many 
Somali speakers who avoided such classes run by white people finally felt able 
to take on these new challenges of life in America. The sbyam citizenship classes 
boasted a 100 percent passing rate. Board members taught all the classes with 
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curricula they designed themselves, and relied on volunteers from the refugee 
community and Bates College for additional help.
By 2010 their roster was consistently packed with activities. At one sbyam 
board meeting I attended in March of that year, the six members present or ga-
nized their plans for the upcoming weekend: Jama was participating in weekly 
young police officer training on Thursday; all board members  were obligated 
to participate in training on race and violence with cphv on Friday; over 
the weekend four Somali Bantu high school students and one board member 
chaperone  were supposed to attend a youth leadership conference in Wash-
ington, DC, which Abdirisak agreed to chaperone since Jama had chaperoned 
a youth trip to Boston the previous weekend; Ahmed was supposed to join 
the Washington trip but could not because he was also invited to a democracy 
workshop for young leaders in Maine the same weekend; Jama and Khadija 
agreed to attend leadership training led by a local or ga ni za tion scheduled 
for all day Saturday and Sunday in Portland; Nur would be working with a 
group of high school students all day Saturday and Sunday on an sbyam- 
supported video project; and Idris, Rahima, and another board member  were 
being interviewed on Saturday by a possible donor. That left the citizenship 
classes on Saturday and Sunday unstaffed. Ibrahim volunteered to take over 
the citizenship program for the weekend, and Idris would join him as soon 
figure 8.1  Celebrating after a U.S. citizenship ceremony, Portland, Maine, 2012.  
Photograph by Jorge Acero.
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as the interview concluded. Then they began looking ahead to the following 
weekend, which included a conference pre sen ta tion at Harvard, among other 
commitments.
In its first five years, sbyam had managed to free itself of intracommunity 
tensions and build strong links to city institutions that engage with refugees. 
During those years, sbyam established itself as a capable or ga ni za tion in the 
eyes of funders and as offering a safe place for community members to ask 
questions about living in America in meetings between white authorities and 
Somali Bantu community members, where Somali Bantu community mem-
bers rather than white authorities set the agenda. Their workshops  were help-
ing parents regain disciplinary control over their kids, and fewer girls  were 
dropping out of high school to get married. Several Somali Bantu high school 
graduates  were attending college; many board members had completed com-
munity college degrees; a few  were enrolled in ba and ma programs; and, in 
an exciting first, Jama joined the Lewiston school board in 2014.
But the effort it took to achieve so much cannot be underestimated: board 
members devoted countless hours over many years to planning, volunteering, 
and working incredibly hard to turn small grants into meaningful programs 
that would make a difference for their community. Their newest program, adult 
literacy classes, included almost a hundred adult Somali students. The urgency 
Idris and his cohort felt for kids a few years ago is now directed at their parents.
While orchestrating literacy and citizenship classes for adults, sbyam pur-
sued another strategy to bridge the world of white institutions and refugee 
community members. With the help of a local white social worker, sbyam 
became a state- recognized caseworker agency that could receive payment 
through MaineCare (Maine’s public medical care program) for working with 
clients who  were referred for casework assistance because they  were receiv-
ing mental health ser vices or involved in the juvenile justice system. Several 
board members became certified as caseworkers, and the agency hired a white 
caseworker and Somali caseworkers, the first time in the city that a white per-
son or a Somali worked for a Somali Bantu employer.
The addition of formal caseworker ser vices meant that the or ga ni za tion’s 
staff became legally empowered as advocates for their clients rather than sim-
ply cultural brokers and information mediators. As caseworkers, they are in 
a position to establish requirements for schools to follow when one of their 
clients is suspended or expelled, and they can make demands of agencies that 
are supposed to be providing ser vices to their clients but whose treatment of 
their clients is culturally incompetent, inadequate, or racist. Because many of 
sbyam’s caseworkers had previously worked for mental health agencies and 
in the hospitals and schools, they understand how those systems work, what 
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ser vices are available, and how to work their way up through the manage-
ment to demand ser vices for their clients. Rather than throwing a child with 
behavioral problems right back into ell classes after a suspension and brush 
with the law, for example, an sbyam caseworker can require that the child re-
ceive special education ser vices, which obligates different (and better) forms 
of engagement with the child and the family than are available through only 
the ell program.
As it dawned on me what the addition of caseworker ser vices meant, I real-
ized the long road that Idris had taken to position himself and his or ga ni za tion 
as advocates for their community. Watching kids get suspended over and over 
and be disciplined without the benefit of cross- cultural counseling competen-
cies or special education ser vices for children who might qualify, watching par-
ents emotionally withdraw under the mounting pressures of life in Lewiston, 
and feeling increasing urgency to learn how to advocate, Idris got a ba in social 
work, entered an ma program, got training through his jobs in the hospitals, 
schools, and a mental health agency, registered as a 501c3 nonprofit or ga ni za-
tion, learned the bureaucracy to become certified as a MaineCare- supported 
agency, hired a staff, and took on clients. It took him a less than de cade to 
figure all of this out, and now he and his staff are in a strong position to advo-
cate for their clients because they have a complete understanding of how the 
systems work that intervene in and interrupt the lives of Somali Bantu com-
munity members and they have the authority to demand changes. They are in 
a position not only to encourage Somali Bantu youths to stay in school but also 
to push for changes in school culture that will more effectively mitigate harm.
But of course, the catch is that Idris and his agency can only do casework 
for those people who have a mental health diagnosis (primarily ptsd, depres-
sion, and anxiety disorders) or for children who get arrested. And  here we 
confront the greatest irony of all. A sink- or- swim definition of refuge means 
that the best opportunity for help for some impoverished, exhausted refugees 
only comes if they receive a diagnosis of mental illness or commit a criminal 
act. Turning refugees into the sick and the criminal is, for those so labeled, a 
catastrophic form of refuge.
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Migrations are acts of settlement and of habitation 
in a world where the divide between origin and 
destination is no longer a divide of Otherness, a world 
in which borders no longer separate human realities.
— Saskia Sassen, Guests and Aliens
In his June 2012 Enough Is Enough column in the Twin City Times, Lewiston 
mayor Robert Macdonald railed against the “rude behavior of teenagers, immi-
grants, and unproductive parents” for talking on their cell phones at the high 
school’s recent graduation ceremony in the huge Lewiston Colisée. His complaints 
quickly narrowed to only the immigrant attendees, those “from oppressive ref-
ugee camps, which harbor crime, disease, and hunger” to whom “Lewiston 
residents have opened our city.” While acknowledging that some immigrants are 
properly appreciative, he chastised those who “take advantage of our generosity 
and act like we owe them,” concluding his article with these words:
During the singing of our National Anthem, these ingrates chose to sit 
talking to each other or talking on the phone. They need to be reminded 
that when the “Star Spangled Banner” is played, they are expected to show 
it the same respect and courtesy that U.S. citizens show it.
Conclusion
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They are guests  here, and they are expected to adapt to our culture. If 
this is too much to ask, then perhaps it’s time [for them] to leave.1
The online responses to this article included forty comments. Twenty- two 
agreed, some emphatically so, with the mayor, many employing the same sort 
of rhetoric described in chapter 5 (calling the immigrants “bottom- dwellers,” 
“greedy and inconsiderate,” “rude and unappreciative,” who “stink up the place,” 
“need to learn our language so we can fucking understand them” and 
are “reward[ed] . . .  for their barbaric behavior”). But fifteen of the comments, 
many from self- identified local teachers, chastised the mayor and the negative 
commenters for their racist, ignorant, bigoted comments, suggesting that they 
might wish to compare their anti- immigrant allegations with those wielded 
in earlier generations by the kkk against their French Canadian and Irish 
immigrant ancestors and asking why the rude behavior of white people was 
so quickly overlooked in favor of blaming immigrants as a category.
Barbara McManus, a Lewiston ell teacher, wrote, “The exuberance dem-
onstrated by our new citizens is due in part, to the realization that miracu-
lously, someone in that family has attained a level of education that seemed 
impossible. They too, are proud parents, relatives, of some of the graduates. 
Some call Africa so that the entire family can hear the ceremony, right  here 
and over there. Imagine for a moment, a dozen or two people gathered around 
a cell phone in Africa, trying to hear what is going on in America, and the tear-
ful and meager celebration that follows.” Others wrote, “Somalis are among 
my most appreciative parents,” whose presence in Lewiston “has softened the 
impact of the recession, the housing bust, and school bud get cutbacks,” remind-
ing the mayor that as an elected official, he is supposed to represent all of the 
city’s residents. One commenter asked, “Seriously, what kind of Mayor would 
write something like this?”
These comments capture in stark form the ongoing debates among Lewis-
ton’s residents about civic belonging. Although some, like Mayor Macdonald, 
continue to champion the view that Somali immigrants are guests who are 
expected to demonstrate gratitude and appreciation while self- consciously 
striving to assimilate, others challenge such boundary making by emphasizing 
residence rather than citizenship as the meaningful mea sure of belonging, ad-
vocating for the right of immigrants to demonstrate their sense of belonging 
by, among other things, exuberantly phoning relatives in Africa during a high 
school graduation ceremony. Although many Somalis are gaining citizenship 
and, of course, children born in the United States are automatically citizens, it 
is residence rather than citizenship that stimulates people like Kim Wettlaufer, 
Mayor Gilbert, Lt. Robitaille, Barbara McManus, and other non- Somali resi-
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dents of Lewiston to speak out in support of the civic rights of Somalis who 
share their city to be viewed as neighbors rather than guests.
“Welcome to Maine: The Way Life Should Be” reads the sign at Maine’s state 
border. Somali and Somali Bantu immigrants heartily embraced this message 
of promise and possibility to make their refuge in Lewiston through dedicat-
ing themselves to creating their own structures of solidarity and mutual sup-
port, networking with social workers, teachers, police, and other professionals 
to establish points of contact with the mainstream community, defining for 
themselves what self- sufficiency and integration should look like, demanding 
accommodations and respect for their values and practices, and engaging in 
vigorous internal debates about how to repair ruptured cultural understand-
ings of marriage, gender norms, authority, discipline, and parenting in ways 
relevant to their new context and reflective of community values. Their efforts 
to create the way life should be have been fraught, contested, hard, and some-
times damaging, but throughout their pro cess of adjustment they are insistent 
on their own agency to make decisions for themselves.
The rhetoric of assimilation posits that change works in only one direction— 
through the self- transformation of the immigrant who strives to join the 
mainstream host society. In 2008, the federal Office of Refugee Resettlement 
funded a national conference for representatives from Somali Bantu commu-
nities from throughout the country to come together in Lexington, Kentucky, 
for a day of workshops and discussions about their first years in America. In 
his formal pre sen ta tion, one of the speakers from the orr office lectured his 
Somali Bantu audience about the importance of change and assimilation, em-
phasizing that they will have to leave tribalism and the steady Africa- centric 
grip of tradition behind and embrace change in order to adapt to American 
life. As he spoke, I looked out over his audience of young men and women 
whose lives had been utterly transformed, shattered and rebuilt; people who 
moved from small farming villages in Africa where lions and hippos are daily 
threats to cities in America where they face threats of an entirely different 
sort, from mud and grass huts where life is public and cooperative to isolated 
apartments in American cities where they are assaulted by their neighbors, 
from cooking with charcoal and bathing in rivers to using electricity and run-
ning water, from farming with short- handled hoes with a hope for rain to 
working the night shift as cleaners at Dunkin’ Donuts. I wondered how many 
people in his audience, on their journeys from Somalia to Kenya and Dadaab 
to Kakuma, witnessed the deaths of family members from militia attacks, 
starvation, and dehydration, how many experienced rape, how many made 
the terrible choice to leave behind family members who could not make the 
trip to America. Many in the audience learned Swahili in the refugee camps 
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and En glish in America, and all the men  were wearing suits rather than sa-
rongs or qamis. Throughout the day, attendees shared e- mail contacts and 
cell phone numbers during breaks and posted photographs of the conference 
from their cell phones on Facebook. Nothing about their lives has been stable, 
unchanging, or resistant to change; their very presence in that auditorium 
meant they had embraced change every chance they got.
The speaker’s emphasis on the need of those in his audience to change and 
assimilate echoes, of course, the autobiographical American story about im-
migrant integration noted in chapter 8 and evidenced in the words of Mayor 
Macdonald and his supporters and the ubiquitous insistence on conformity 
by the bloggers and other Lewiston residents introduced in chapter 5. But such 
a flat view of assimilation rests on two faulty assumptions. The first is that 
assimilation and integration are about  wholeness and assimilating to some 
other, already existing culture. The second is that assimilation only works in 
one direction: the immigrant assimilates to the host society and not the other 
way around.
The story of Somali and Somali Bantu refugee immigrants in Lewiston 
challenges both assumptions. Chapter 8 noted the problem of a “pretheoreti-
cal commitment” to the idea of  wholeness, which implies Somalis in the grip 
of cultural change are somehow in between or fragmented while they recon-
stitute a new  whole through culture change and gaining citizenship. But their 
devotion to diasporic connections suggests that  wholeness for Somali Ameri-
cans includes both the experience of emplacement in Lewiston and ongoing 
transnational connections, an embrace of many aspects of American culture 
(education, cars and other forms of technology, Western medicine, changing 
gender roles, and more) and subjective membership in a global Somali Is-
lamic community (and a value system that prioritizes faith, mobility, family, a 
par tic u lar aesthetic, and resource sharing as a normal expectation rather than 
a commendable act). Presumptions of  wholeness obscure not only emergent 
Somali American cultural formations but also the ways in which many do-
mains of social life in Lewiston are changing for the city’s non- Somali residents 
as well because of the presence of Somali American residents. Lewiston’s story 
shows that assimilation goes both ways: immigrants change, adapt, and hybrid-
ize, but also transform the host community.
Citizenship, Mobility, and Diaspora
At the annual 2011 sbyam soccer tournament, parents gathered along the 
sidelines for the final match as the two best teams in the league faced off. The 
talk continually turned to everyone’s worry about their relatives in East Africa 
because yet another upsurge in violence in southern Somalia sent people 
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fleeing across the border into Dadaab to seek safety from Al- Shabaab atroci-
ties and famine. Several Somali Bantu men from Lewiston visiting Kenya for 
the first time since their resettlement phoned to report that life in the camps 
was worse than ever and they planned to return early to Lewiston. People 
 were starving to death.
A constant experience during my years of conversations, meals, and meet-
ings with Somali Bantus in Lewiston is the incessant ringing of cell phones 
with calls from the Kenyan refugee camps and Somalia. People talk daily with 
their distant relatives, checking in about news, safety, movements, threats, 
and health. One day in the back office of Aliyow’s store when I was looking at 
the Somali Bantu Experience website with a group of Somali Bantu acquain-
tances, there appeared a photo of Khalar, who was the youth community health 
worker and our frequent companion during our residence in Banta. Khalar 
stayed behind in Somalia when others fled the second time, living off his 
farms and, now, remittances from friends and relatives in Lewiston. Abkow 
pulled out his cell phone and said, “Let’s call him!” Within a few minutes he 
reached someone in Banta with a cell phone, who located Khalar, and sud-
denly his still- familiar voice was on the line asking about Jorge and the baby 
I was carry ing when I lived in Banta. I asked about his news and learned that 
his family of seven was barely surviving because of drought and insecurity 
due to robberies by Al- Shabaab militia. There was no food and his children 
 were starving. I knew Abkow was sending him money every month, and I 
promised to send additional money that afternoon.
As Khalar and I talked, Sadiq’s phone rang. It was his brother from Somalia 
calling to ask for money. That morning when I was visiting Iman, his phone 
rang with a call from his older brother in Somalia, asking for money. The 
brother was fleeing Mogadishu because of the upsurge in violence between 
government forces and Al- Shabaab and was not yet sure where he would 
end up. He was phoning to ask Iman’s family to be prepared to send him ad-
ditional money when he found someplace safe. Isha, Idris, and Idris’s older 
brother  were supporting Ciise, Rabaca’s family, and now Ambiya’s family as 
well. The combination of Al- Shabaab threats and drought sent Ambiya from 
Somalia to Dadaab with her husband— the man who abducted her at gun-
point in Banta— and their children, from where she was able to reconnect by 
phone with Isha. In one of war’s many ironies, the man who stole Ambiya is 
now surviving on the remittances sent by his wife’s family to support them.
In 2011–12, everyone was anxiously worried about their relatives in Somalia 
trying to live through or escape from the predations of Al- Shabaab. Debates 
about escape routes and deteriorating life in the refugee camps dominated 
conversation. People returning from visiting Dadaab reported that the most 
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recent wave of refugees from Somalia’s ongoing violence included young men 
who grew up in a lawless country, and, intimately familiar with murder and 
robbery,  were now wielding violence in the camps to steal and rape. Abkow 
reported that thugs burned down the markets in two of the camps and life 
there is “totally horrible. The extremists are trying to use the camps as a battle-
ground.” And perils of a different nature have emerged as well: some of my So-
mali Bantu friends are receiving death threats if they return to Kenya because 
of their prominence and activism on behalf of Somali Bantus in the United 
States. Somali Internet sites keep readers well apprised of people’s po liti cal 
activities in the United States, Eu rope, and Africa.
Everyone has dozens of close relatives who are desperate for help. The owner 
of Aliyow’s store, who travels back and forth to East Africa for his business, asks 
me, in distress, “Who do you choose to help?” Everyone I know agrees: their 
resources are spread so thin between covering their expenses in Lewiston and 
sending as much money as they possibly can to extended families in Dadaab, 
Kakuma, and Somalia, and they know that relatives who receive remittances 
are surrounded by starving and desperate people who do not. Concerned that 
the millions of dollars in remittances sent to East Africa every month might be 
redirected to support Al- Shabaab, the U.S. government announced its intent 
to shut down the money transfer operations used by Somalis, provoking panic 
in Lewiston as everyone tried to send as much money as possible before the 
network closed to hold their relatives over until a new channel opened.2
And yet, despite the danger and fear, as soon as Somali Bantu refugees be-
came eligible to apply for citizenship after the mandatory five- year waiting 
period, sbyam’s citizenship classes filled with students avidly memorizing the 
questions in En glish so they could gain U.S. citizenship in order to visit their 
relatives in Kenya. Citizenship brings greater security against deportation, but 
the primary draw is the right to travel across international borders, which 
is prohibited during the probationary five years after resettlement.3 Tutors 
in sbyam’s citizenship classes pose as citizenship test interviewers, asking 
questions from the list of official test questions, which people learn to answer 
by rote memorization. A joke circulates in the community: one person asks 
another, pretending to be the citizenship interviewer, “Why do you want to 
become an American citizen?” The applicant answers, “So I can travel to 
Africa!” At that everyone cracks up and yells, “Wrong answer!” While appli-
cants recognize the need to claim nationalist patriotism as part of their citizen-
ship interview, for many people citizenship is about transnational mobility 
and diasporic linkages.
Citizenship deepens diasporic identity and participation through enabling 
mobility, even if emotional connections to Somalia remain conflicted for So-
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mali Bantu refugee immigrants. Some, like Jama, renounce any attachment to 
Somalia. After gaining citizenship, he proudly showed me that his passport 
card listed his nationality as United States, although he is irked that the card 
also indicates Somalia as his country of birth because he feels no allegiance to 
Somalia and, to the contrary, says he is ashamed to be from such a destruc-
tive place. Although he was born there, he fled with his family at the age of six, 
returning during the repatriation in 1995, when life in the Jubba Valley was 
terrible, before fleeing again. When I ask about his memories from the second 
short stay, his grave face says more than his words. He recounts a few instances 
from his memory of that year— his uncle attempting to guard his mature crops 
from Somali invaders who aimed their guns at him and told him they would 
blow him away if he took one more step. “And we knew they would,” Jama said. 
“They  were killing anyone who tried to protect their farm. It was the same 
shit.” He refuses to talk about his memories from the second flight across the 
desert to Dadaab. He wishes his passport card listed his country of origin as 
Kenya, where he came of age, began attending school, and learned En glish, and 
from where he departed to the United States.
Like Jama, many young people in Lewiston claim stronger personal attach-
ments to Kenya than Somalia, naming Kenya as their place of origin and ongo-
ing cultural connection through their ties to family and friends there as well 
as their consumption of Kenyan music and dance styles. Ahmed, who is often 
called to speak at city and state events as a Somali Bantu youth leader, talks 
about wanting to find a way to help his country of birth, but other young 
adults disagree, saying they will help their relatives but have given up on So-
malia. Ahmed is not so sure, explaining, “The U.S. gave me an intellectual life, 
but Somalia gave me life. I was born there; my ancestors are from there; my 
relatives still live there.” He struggles with the implication that becoming a U.S. 
citizen would obligate him to renounce his attachments to Kenya and Somalia, 
explaining that for him, being Somali and being American are intimately con-
nected: “If I  wasn’t Somali I  wouldn’t be  here. I’m  here in America because I’m 
Somali.” Ahmed holds a complex approach to describing an identity forged 
through mobility. Another student, already a U.S. citizen, says, “It’s just adding 
something. I want citizenship so I can check on job applications that I’m a citi-
zen, but I didn’t renounce anything. It’s just an addition. It’s a resource for me. I 
don’t deny where I’m from, but really I don’t know anything about Somalia. . . . 
Citizenship is just a document.” It is a document that he needs to return to the 
camps to visit his mother, who was not included in the resettlement program.
Many immigrants to the United States in earlier generations maintained 
transnational linkages, identities, and relationships despite the emphasis on 
assimilation in American nationalist lore, but Somalis and Somali Bantus may 
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be distinguished as among the most transnational. Mobility is at the heart of 
Somali culture and experience, an expectation and norm shared by Somali 
Bantus despite their more sedentary background. Citizenship status, for the 
Somali Bantus I know, means the legal right to mobility as a physical dimension 
of diasporic belonging and global networks maintained through technology. 
Citizenship enables enhanced diasporic connections, through allowing travel 
and the hope for greater access to resources in the United States (through 
employment) that can be used to support relatives abroad. But if citizenship 
for many is about mobility, diasporic participation, and belonging, what is 
the relationship between diaspora and locality? What does living in Lewiston 
actually mean to the Somali Bantu refugee immigrants who live there?
Somali Bantu diasporic self- consciousness is based in a sense of cultural 
integrity rooted in Islam, a shared place of origin and historic experience, and 
per sis tent global networks, but also is shaped in constant dialogues about how 
to live Somali Muslim values in the United States. It is not a barricaded dias-
pora identity, holding onto traditional practice; rather, it is a constantly evolv-
ing identity that morphs and shifts in dialogue with encounters with other 
practices and beliefs. As we have seen, young people debate the significance 
of clan, racialized difference, status, tribalism, gender norms, religious funda-
mentalism, history, and Islamic practice in a Western context, in person and 
on vibrant and lively Internet sites, Facebook pages, and phone chat lines. My 
young Somali Bantu friends regularly post quotes from the Quran on Facebook 
(as well as words of wisdom remembered from Cali Osman), engage in debates 
about identity and Islam on Somali Bantu websites and Facebook pages, share 
homemade videos about changing cultural practices in the diaspora (youth 
romance, parent- child relations, making good choices), and consume videos 
about youth culture in Africa.4 Diaspora scholarship has challenged the focus 
on immigrant assimilation by introducing important perspectives on hy-
bridity, creativity, and creolization, but how does the experience and imagina-
tion of diaspora also intersect with emplacement, with the physical reality of 
living in a par tic u lar place?5
For good reasons, Somalis (and, by association, Somali Bantus) are often 
described as quintessential models of flexible mobility whose home is located 
in kinship networks and social groups rather than physical locations. “Trans-
national nomads” is one apt description.6 But even the globally mobile, like 
Somali and Somali Bantu refugee immigrants, inhabit par tic u lar places and 
must face the ideological and physical constructions of “home” required of 
all human beings. In his book Insiders and Outsiders: Citizenship and Xeno-
phobia in Contemporary South Africa, anthropologist Francis Nyamnjoh criti-
cizes the fascination with deterritorialization in the literature on mobility and 
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identity: “No amount of questioning by scholars, human rights advocates and 
immigrants immersed in the reality of flexible mobility seems adequate to 
de- essentialise the growing global fixation with an ‘authentic’ place called home. 
Thus trapped in cosmopolitan spaces in a context where states and their 
hierarchy of ‘privileged’ citizens believe in the coercive illusion of fixed and 
bounded locations, immigrants, diasporas, ethnic minorities and others who 
straddle borders are bound to feel like travelers in permanent transit.”7 When 
Somali Bantus in Lewiston give public pre sen ta tions about their experiences 
of mobility and immigration, even when their pre sen ta tions stress their ex-
periences of discrimination and violence, there are inevitably two questions 
from the audience: Do you want to go home? Would you return home if you 
had the chance? The presumption, of course, is that Somalia is home. Somali 
Bantus respond by stressing that Lewiston is their future, while acknowl-
edging their ongoing emotional connections to the people— parents, children, 
siblings, and grandchildren— still living in East Africa. (At one such event, one 
Somali Bantu friend answered the per sis tent question with a proverb, “When 
you look at a pile of ashes take care because it might still produce fire,” before 
explaining that he would return only to visit his mother, whom he has not 
seen in a de cade.) Somali Bantus are trying to explain that while their dia-
sporic belongings and transnational connections are fundamental dimensions 
of their being- in- the- world, Lewiston is now home. And Lewiston, in turn, is 
transformed by the dynamic presence of diasporic Somali and Somali Bantu 
immigrants.
Mutual Transformation
“Is there a universal orientation within liberalism that allows an open engage-
ment with the difference in other cultures, or does its method of incorporating 
otherness revolve around its particularistic viewpoint so that the relationship 
with difference is always a form of blurred domestication?” asks Nikos Papas-
terdiadis.8 But some forms of “domestication” are essential, because immi-
grants have to learn to navigate a new society, which means understanding 
laws, attending school, knowing “how things work  here,” and so forth. The 
interesting question is how those being domesticated respond by both seeking 
help and shaping new subjectivities through adapting while simultaneously 
encouraging their new neighbors to adapt to them. While Somali Bantu 
immigrants are changing gender roles, finding new approaches to arranged 
marriages, learning new parenting strategies, navigating new po liti cal bu-
reaucracies, trying new forms of medical intervention, and crafting new sub-
jectivities as U.S. citizens and diaspora members, other residents in Lewiston 
cannot help but be changed as well by their presence and engagement in the 
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local arena. In short, everyone is adapting. Some adaptations are small and quo-
tidian: a judge learns how to talk through a translator; an “old French woman” 
learns how to buy spices in a Somali- owned shop; a Franco- American mu-
seum director learns to love sambusas; white kids on the playground begin 
speaking to their friends in Somali; Somali girls at a high school track meet 
pray in Arabic for the success of the white high jumper who is in their math 
class; white locals wish they had elders.
But other changes are far- reaching. The “boo- hoo white do- gooders and 
their carpetbagger friends” know that city institutions, schools, workplaces, 
and local culture must change to adapt to Somali immigrants. They are among 
the architects of change, from Cheryl Hamilton and CareerCenter director 
Mary LaFontaine, who want to train employers to work with New Mainers; 
to the ell teachers fighting to change school culture; to Kim Wettlaufer, who 
helps his clients come to recognize their similarities and form solidarities; to 
the police department that creates a special community resource substation 
to engage with Somali immigrants. Their efforts are augmented by those of 
Somali and Somali Bantu cultural brokers who work in social ser vices agen-
cies and medical facilities teaching non- Somalis about Somali perspectives 
on faith, family, and more, translating Somali practices and beliefs along with 
words to non- Somalis.
In its second de cade of Somali immigration, Lewiston now has two mosques, 
and Fridays bring hundreds of men and boys to the street in qamis on their 
way to pray. Thousands of women and girls in hijab move through public 
spaces daily, and hardly anyone yells, “Go home!” or “Dress like an Ameri-
can!” any longer. People praying at appropriate times is now normal in schools 
and in some of the larger workplaces. Mental health professionals are meeting 
with imams and traditional healers to learn more about Somali conceptions 
of sanity and possession. Somali and Somali Bantu community organizations 
are intervening more in the civic life of the city, by, as we have seen, march-
ing down Lisbon Street proclaiming “lewiston is our city too,” arguing 
with school authorities, writing op- eds and letters to the editor, and running 
for the school board. The situation in the refugee camps penetrates Lewiston 
as those returning from distressing visits alert the local newspaper and pro-
vide interviews about the dire situation in Dadaab and Somalia. Prompted by 
the worry that their students carry into school from distracted parents, local 
ell teachers spearhead fund- raising initiatives for grassroots organizations 
in the camps. Despite the xenophobes and racists, Lewiston is a success story 
because ideas about mutual responsibility, cultural values, po liti cal practice, 
and civic engagement jostle and bump and are transformed in the arenas 
of public discourse and personal reflection. It is precisely in small locales 
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like Lewiston where new versions of “America” are being forged as mobile 
immigrants and long- term locals create new forms of sociality, understanding, 
and collaboration.
The helpers are pushing back, alongside the immigrants, against local 
discourses fed by pop u lar national rhetoric that distinguish between the “de-
serving poor” (white citizens who worked in the mills and feel abandoned by 
their city’s economic downturn) and the “undeserving poor” (“unproductive 
parents” and black refugees who came to the United States as objects of hu-
manitarian charity). They reject the hierarchies of legitimacy that define some 
people but not others as acceptable beneficiaries of assistance by insisting on 
a society that offers care to those who need it on the basis of coresidence, re-
gardless of race, origin, citizenship status, or religion. The ell teachers, some 
of the police, former mayor Gilbert, and many others see the immigrant refu-
gees as part of their community and thus part of their responsibility as human 
beings living together in a par tic u lar place. While their definitions of suc-
cess may eventually include economic self- sufficiency, their more immediate 
definition of success prioritizes health, security, education, safe housing, and 
other quality- of- life factors rather than economic productivity. Integration, 
for the helpers and immigrants alike, is about feeling safe and taking care 
of each other, not about neoliberal conceptions of personal responsibility or 
conformity to mainstream American norms and values (of individualism, con-
sumption, a monetary assessment of personal value). To the contrary, many of 
the helpers express their admiration for Somali values that they see as desir-
able and waning in American life: strong community bonds, nonmaterialist 
values, sharing and cooperation, humor in the face of hardship.
Progressive scholars theorize about how to create a sense of the commons 
(by which they mean the public good, the social community) that is inclusive, 
border crossing, and nonhierarchical, offering portraits of po liti cal action 
that confront biopo liti cal exclusions (based on socially constructed categories 
like race, foreignness, citizenship status, and so forth) in par tic u lar localities 
and that forge connections and networks that transcend par tic u lar localities.9 
Bonnie Honig sees the potential to repurpose immigrant activism to forge a 
new demo cratic cosmopolitanism that crosses borders. If immigrants make 
democracy through fighting for their rights and insisting on being heard, then, 
she says, “We have a story  here of illegitimate demands made by people with 
no standing to make them, a story of people so far outside the circle of who 
‘counts’ that they cannot make claims within the existing frames of claim mak-
ing. They make room for themselves by staging non ex is tent rights, and by 
way of such stagings, sometimes, new rights, powers, and visions come into 
being.”10 Immigrants can stretch po liti cal practice into a form of demo cratic 
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practice that works across borders, not just in the interest of the nation, she 
theorizes, thus raising the question of whether the transborder networks and 
commitments held by Somali and Somali Bantu refugee immigrants might 
redefine the commons in Lewiston to also include others outside the local 
community. Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri offer an argument about the 
forms of re sis tance they call “altermodernities,” which are created through a 
pro cess of people coming together to imagine and enact alternative futures 
based on emerging understandings of historic practice and tradition across 
time and space.11 They offer as examples the Zapatistas in Chiapas and Boliv-
ian resisters to the privatization of water access. These sorts of re sis tances do 
not produce reified identities based in claims to authenticity or re sis tances 
based on assimilationist trajectories, but rather entirely new forms of sociality 
in which people are constantly remaking their world in dialogues with re sis-
tances, ruptures, novelties, and the imagination. This vision of altermodernity 
captures the efforts of the Somali Bantu community association and sbyam to 
experiment thoughtfully with new forms of subjectivity in conjunction with 
rethinking and transforming more traditional forms of practice and subjectiv-
ity (of community repre sen ta tion, po liti cal hierarchy, gender expectations, 
youth identities, and so forth). They are in the pro cess of shaping and becom-
ing not assimilated Americans, but something new, and they are doing so 
by forging solidarities and networks with a wide range of collaborators who 
themselves are transforming their understanding of community through these 
engagements.
Suzanne Hall raises the question of how to “re- orientate the politics of 
diversity and belonging when there is a large and affective apparatus that 
contrives and maintains prejudice.”12 How will people in Lewiston confront 
racism and xenophobia? Hall points to the importance of the welfare state for 
protecting the vulnerable (although the shrinking welfare state is creating vul-
nerabilities as well), moving beyond assimilation “towards an acknowledgement 
of allegiances as a multiple rather than a singular coherence” (as is the case 
with the simultaneous experience of emplacement and diasporic belonging), 
collaboration on common projects in which contributions and participation 
of diverse populations are made visible (such as with the Museum la exhibi-
tion and sbyam’s citizenship classes), and new forms of empowerment (such 
as sbyam’s development as a caseworker or ga ni za tion).13 These stories and 
possibilities begin a second de cade of transformation, and we do not yet know 
how the story will unfold.
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The Way Life Should Be
While anthropologists and others have been fascinated over the past few de-
cades with the speedy movement of people, money, and ideas through glo-
balization, with globe- spanning diasporic connections and transnational 
networks, with theories about cosmopolitanism as a future alternative to con-
temporary regimes of multiculturalism and the xenophobia they confront, 
this story has placed us at the intersection of mobility and emplacement, 
diaspora and locality. Such intersections are where border crossings of a specific 
sort take place, where slow globalization shifts and blurs boundaries as ideas, 
cultural practices, relationships, and demographics morph, grow, and slowly 
become transformative.14 The slow globalization of refugees and migrants 
whose movement is relentless even when temporarily constrained means local 
worlds will be constantly changing as mobility intersects with emplacement and 
migrants transform local places through their presence. Often (mis)charac-
terized as sites of clashes and crashes, such intersections are more often sites 
of negotiation, learning, self- reflection, and social change.
Anthropologists have long since abandoned the bounded conception of 
culture that undergirds images of clashing and crashing, replacing it with 
a fascination with emergence and becoming, constructions of lived experi-
ence that emphasize the imagination, creativity, and dynamism of human life. 
Subjectivities that are emergent and becoming, rather than fully formed and 
bounded, are an attractive way to think about the dynamic intersection of 
mobility and emplacement, about what happens in par tic u lar localities when 
immigrants move in. And yet, anthropologists must also be mindful to see and 
record the cultural value systems, beliefs, and practices that those who pass 
through that intersection bring to it. Locality and emplacement are the other 
side of emergence and becoming, and we should not avoid trying to document 
the cultural terrain of par tic u lar places in our desire to showcase mobility and 
emergence.
Pundits and pop u lar discourse continue to use the culture concept, although 
in ways that make anthropologists suspicious and unhappy: as deterministic, 
essentializing, and exotic.15 Anthropologists must mind the gap  here. How 
do those of us who continue to find value in the culture concept talk about 
it in ways that redirect its definition from the pop u lar, essentialized version 
while still recognizing the sedimentation of meaning and practice that en-
ables groups to recognize and cohere around collectively held values? We do 
so by describing how such groups debate their values in dialogue with those 
who hold different values and shift their practice through such engagements, 
but as groups and not just individuals. Difference is constantly emergent, 
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constantly renegotiated, constantly revalued, but continues to contain group-
ness over time. Groupness is maintained by socially constructed racial differ-
ence, racism, linguistic repertoires, diaspora identifications, and the diasporic 
networks within which people, ideas, talk, and money flow. The dialogues, 
debates, and negotiations in Lewiston cohere around the question of the way 
life should be.
For the past two de cades, Lewiston’s immigrants have been refuting the 
humanitarian presumption that people displaced by war should be forced to 
abide by paternalistic and neo co lo nial rules and borders that constrain their 
ability to seek safety. That is not the way life should be. They have been refut-
ing the presumption that immigrants must assimilate by leaving their culture 
at the door in their new places of residence. That is not the way life should 
be. They and their advocates malign a government that abandons resettled 
refugees upon arrival by refusing substantive and meaningful assistance for 
education, job skills, and other support while they adjust, promoting instead a 
starkly neoliberal understanding of human worth as equal to a paycheck. That 
is not the way life should be.
During a conversation with Ahmed and Abdi about their simultaneous 
connections to the transnational and the local, Abdi recounted a recent ex-
perience at a local gas station. As he was filling his car, he overheard the loud 
conversation of two white men in another vehicle. One of the men told the 
other, gesturing to Abdi, “And now they’re 50 percent of the population!” Abdi 
chuckled to himself, thinking, “No,  we’re not.” But one can imagine that they 
will be. And Sadiq, Idris, Abdiya, Ahmed, Abdi, and their peers, alongside 
Kim, Beth, Larry Gilbert, the ell teachers, and their colleagues, will continue 
working to create the best version of Lewiston that they can imagine, striving 
to find the way life should be.
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identity as verifiable through physical characteristics when a representative of the 
Australian government asked me to analyze photographs of Somali Bantus apply-
ing for asylum and provide an authoritative statement about whether or not they 
 were Somali Bantu based on their physical appearance. Instead I sent him a copy 
of “American Anthropological Association Statement on ‘Race,’ ” (May 17, 1998, 
http:// www . aaanet . org / stmts / racepp . htm).
 28. Van Lehman and Eno 2003.
 29. Dan Van Lehman, personal communication, March 1, 2007.
 30. Reported in Briggs 2005. According to the article, after the mother arrived in 
Burlington, Vermont, she was able to pursue the case through dna testing, which 
proved the family relationship.
 31. Sanders and Zucchino 2006.
 32. Peter Nyers (2006) and Peter Gatrell (2013) analyze the use of images of nameless 
refugees to depict destitution and de pen dency by humanitarian agencies, insights 
that could be enhanced by research on the public audiences to whom these im-
ages appeal.
II. Introduction
 1. Images of Somalis uneasily confronting an escalator have become a meme. The 
scene in the film Rain in a Dry Land showing a Somali Bantu family arrayed 
at the base of the escalator in the airport after arriving for the first time in the 
United States makes a dramatic impression on viewers. At one large meeting of 
social ser vices providers I attended in Portland, Maine, participants described this 
scene as the most impactful moment in the film for them. A YouTube video made 
in Sweden of two Somali women poised at the top of an escalator in a shopping 
mall, unable to screw up the courage to step onto the stairs as other shoppers 
pass by them, has been reposted on Facebook and Somali and racist websites, 
generating hundreds of comments from people either sympathetic to the women’s 
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uncertainty, making fun of their own parents for their fear of escalators, or nastily 
castigating Somalis as intellectually and culturally inferior and unfit to live in 
modern society.
 2. Stated in “2012/13 State of Maine orr Funded Programs,” Office of Refugee 
Resettlement, November 28, 2012, http:// www . acf . hhs . gov / programs / orr / resource 
/ ffy - 2012 - 13 - state - of - maine - orr - funded - programs.
 3. Sudanese “lost boy” Valentino Achek Deng, in his autobiography written with the 
assistance of David Eggers, poignantly recollects his dashed hopes for education 
under the burden of working in the back room of a furniture showroom: “The 
job kept me in the back of the store, among the fabric samples. I should not feel 
shame about this, but somehow I do: my job was to retrieve fabric samples for the 
designers, and then file them again when they  were returned. I did this for almost 
two years. The thought of all that time wasted, so much time sitting on that 
wooden stool, cata loguing, smiling, thanking, filing— all while I should have been 
in school—is still too much for me to contemplate” (Eggers 2007: 20).
 4. U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations 2010.
 5. Haines 2010: 163. Haines notes that the reductions in refugee assistance that 
began in the 1980s in response to concerns about “refugee dependence” resulted 
in “limited overall improvement in the economic situation of Southeast Asian 
refugees” during 1982–85 (2010: 162). The extension of direct assistance to refugees 
has continued to decline since then.
 6. In 2000, Mary Waters wrote that immigration scholars had been slow to draw 
on scholarship about race in their analyses of immigrant experience, reflect-
ing an uncertainty about how to analyze the sometimes tense relations between 
native- born and immigrant people of color. Philip Kasinitz (2004) and Nancy 
Foner (2005) are among the scholars now investigating the relationship between 
immigrants of color and native- born African Americans.
 7. Nadeau 2011.
 8. From 2006 to 2010 I spent one to four days a week (and in 2011–12 several days a 
month) in Lewiston doing participant observation, conducting interviews, volun-
teering in schools and social ser vices agencies, attending committee meetings for 
local ngos and community organizations, and engaging in advocacy and public 
education projects with local activists and refugee community members. In addi-
tion to traditional participant observation (afternoons visiting refugee friends in 
their apartments, sharing tea with friends in the Somali café or in their commu-
nity offices), my research in Lewiston included oral history interviews with refu-
gees (chapters 1 and 3); formal interviews with officials and staff in city and state 
government, local schools, ngos, medical offices, and other agencies charged with 
assisting and building programs for refugees from 2001 to 2006 (chapter 4); infor-
mal conversations with a wide spectrum of Lewiston’s non- Somali residents in fo-
rums ranging from stores to office waiting rooms to community meetings where 
residents shared their concerns about changes in their city (chapter 5); advocacy 
work with activist and community networks and ngo boards from 2006 to 2011 
(chapters 4 and 6); and participation in public outreach projects in collaboration 
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with Somali and Somali Bantu community leaders and local organizations (such 
as public panel discussions and an exhibit at Museum la) (part III). Besteman 
2010 provides additional information about my field research, methodology, and 
advocacy activities.
 9. Macdonald 2012a.
4. We Have Responded Valiantly
 1. I often use “refugee” and “immigrant” interchangeably in this chapter and the 
next because as secondary migrants Somalis  were both refugees and immigrants. 
Many of the professional leaders of the Somali community preferred the term 
“immigrants,” which they felt more accurately captured their social status in 
Lewiston.
 2. Unlike many other states, Maine has allowed people, including noncitizen refugee 
immigrants and asylum seekers, to request ga help the day they arrive. This form 
of welfare support is under attack by Governor LePage, who claims it attracts 
welfare dependents.
 3. A new concern with immigrant integration is reflected in the production of policy 
documents and how-to manuals, such as gcir 2006.
 4. Phil Nadeau, interview, January 14, 2010. Also see Nadeau 2005, 2011.
 5. Nadeau 2005: 120.
 6. “A Letter to the Somali Community,” ImmigrationsHumanCost . org, October 1, 
2002, http:// www . immigrationshumancost . org / text / raymond . html. The Letter is 
also the subject of a documentary film called The Letter (Hamzeh 2003).
 7. These stories and others are collected in Somalis in Maine Archive, Scholarly 
 Communication and Research at Bates, http:// scarab . bates . edu / somalis _ in 
_ maine / .
 8. See interviews in the film The Letter (Hamzeh 2003). Nadeau (2005) shows that 
the percentage of the local share of property taxes that went to support immigrant 
and refugee programs was .97 percent in 2003 and the total cost to the city of ga 
for immigrants and refugees was $145, 979.
 9. Phil Nadeau, interview, January 14, 2010.
 10. Nadeau credits Mark Grey (2000) for inspiring this phrase.
 11. These estimates are from an informal census conducted in 2010 by the Somali 
Bantu Community Mutual Assistance Association.
 12. Another particularly notable exception to the business- as- usual attitude was the 
New American Sustainable Agriculture Project created after the arrival of Somali 
Bantus by a local nonprofit, Coastal Enterprises. Through this project, dozens of 
Somali Bantu men and women began cultivating small plots, selling their produce 
to farmers’ markets and local restaurants. The project was later absorbed by a 
local nonprofit called Cultivating Community (accessed February 26, 2014, http:// 
www . cultivatingcommunity . org).
 13. Nadeau 2007: appendix D.
 14. News articles reported similar complaints in Boston (Vaznis 2009), Pittsburgh 
(Smydo 2006), and Springfield, MA (Glater 2006).
 15. Interview, May 6, 2010.
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 16. According to Nadeau’s 2007 report to Maine’s congressional delegation, “nclb 
[No Child Left Behind] states that students must be tested and held to the same 
standards in math as their En glish speaking peers as soon as they enter the county. 
In reading there is a one year grace period. Thus, if a 12 year old, comes to us from 
another country with no prior schooling, after one year, he/she is expected to 
meet the same standards as En glish speaking peers in reading, writing and  
science” (2007: 18). The report also notes that because of Maine’s comparatively 
high standards, many ell students are “failing” who would be passing in other 
states.
 17. The high school principal weathered complaints that some students washed their 
feet in the lavatory basins at prayer time, informing concerned parents that ac-
cording to the school nurse, foot washing is not a health hazard. Several teachers 
laughed in conversations with me at their recollection that he told them, privately, 
that he wished more students would wash their feet.
 18. Pollock 2004.
 19. Brown 2006: 13.
 20. Brown 2006: 46.
 21. Ellison 2009.
 22. See Gilbert 2011; Jones- Correa 2011.
 23. On the history of refuge, see Rabben 2011.
 24. Jacklet 2004. See also Manning 2004; Wagner 2003.
 25. Povinelli 2011.
 26. For example, Govenor LePage introduced in his 2012 bud get a sixty- month cap 
on benefits, identifying immigrants dependent on benefits as one of his targets. 
People who reach the sixty- month cutoff but still need help could seek it through 
the ga programs in their local cities, but in 2014 Governor LePage instituted a 
new rule that ga staff could no longer provide assistance to immigrants who had 
not yet achieved citizenship (including asylum seekers). The governor also at-
tempted to scale back the amount of state aid provided to cities for ga. Some cit-
ies, such as Portland, refused to obey the new rule, and community action groups 
throughout the state protested it. As of this writing the rule is being reviewed in 
court. Lewiston’s Mayor Macdonald staunchly supported the governor’s actions.
5. Strangers in Our Midst
 1. Since the myths encompass both Somali and Somali Bantu immigrants, in this 
chapter I use “Somali” to include both groups.
 2. Meyer 2010.
 3. Ellison 2009; Jones 2004.
 4. See Ellison 2009.
 5. The cphv prepared a myth- busting memo to use in their community dialogues 
and school programs that challenged claims that local schools provided Somalis 
with a separate prayer room, removed pork from school lunches out of deference 
to Islam, and distributed money to Somali families. The superintendent of schools 
told me that he had also written a myth- busting letter in response to parental 
complaints about unfair special privileges for refugees.
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 6. In an article about resurgent public expressions of racism in Britain and their 
iterative presence in the online arena, Paul Gilroy (2012) addresses the impor-
tance of social media— blogs, Facebook, YouTube videos—as a space of public 
commentary and interpretation for which researchers have yet to fully develop 
adequate interpretive tools. He is particularly interested in the resonance between 
such expressions and the public statements about multiculturalism and race by 
British politicians. In Lewiston, I was struck by how often people critical of the 
immigrant Somali population cited online comments posted in response to news 
articles about Somalis as the basis for their “facts.”
 7. This chapter departs from the more chronological structure of the previous 
chapters to capture the reigning sentiments of confusion, insecurity, and racism 
that characterized some conversations, editorials, and blogs in Lewiston from 
2006 to 2011. My discussion is not intended to ste reo type residents who are 
hostile to the presence of refugees— all of whom remain anonymous  here with 
the exception of public figures and those who identified themselves by name 
in their published comments in the newspaper— but rather aims to highlight 
resonances between localized concerns in Lewiston and broader concerns in 
American pop u lar and po liti cal culture about insecurities introduced by im-
migrants. The story I tell  here shows how the current American mythology of 
dangerous immigrants gains par tic u lar footholds in Lewiston’s cultural and 
economic context.
 8. Ahmed, Besteman, and Osman 2010; Besteman and Ahmed 2010.
 9. Staff Sergeant Thomas Field was from neighboring Lisbon, Maine. Master Ser-
geant Gary Gordon, of Lincoln, Maine, was also killed in the battle.
 10. Macdonald 2012a. This sentiment appears regularly in local editorials. A few 
random selections from editorials in spring 2010 include the following: Roland 
Morin wrote, “As a Franco, I find the comparison insulting! The people from 
Quebec came  here to work— not to live off welfare!” (Twin City Times, March 18, 
2010); Jacqueline Smith wrote, “The only comparison between the French- 
Canadians and the Somali is that neither is native to this country. Don’t try to 
excuse one by down- grading the other” (Twin City Times, April 8, 2010).
 11. Rachel Desgrosseilliers and Karla Rider, interview, June 17, 2010.
 12. Besteman and Ahmed 2010; Cullen 2011; Goad 2002.
 13. Because I used the dhhs category “noncitizen residents,” the number could in-
clude some non- Somalis as well. The figures would not include Somalis who have 
naturalized, although the pro cess of applying for citizenship in the Somali popula-
tion was just beginning in 2009. I am grateful to David Maclean in Lewiston’s 
dhhs office for his kind assistance.
 14. Since Governor LePage assumed office, the link to “The Real Facts” on the dhhs 
website has been removed.
 15. Rector 2008.
 16. Nadeau 2008.
 17. Mary LaFontaine, interview, May 20, 2010.
 18. After providing seasonal employment in Lewiston for several years, in 2009 
the wreath- making company failed to return because it lost its contract 
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with L.L.Bean, although 150 Somalis put their names on the sign-up sheet just in 
case they decided to hire again.
 19. Mamgain with Collins 2003.
 20. Bates College Department of Anthropology 2008.
 21. L.L.Bean accommodates non- English- speaking immigrants to meet the com-
pany’s need for seasonal labor. Workers can pray during break time, use the 
bathroom sinks to wash their feet before prayers, and wear what ever clothing they 
prefer so long as it is safe, according to refugees who have worked there; see Toner 
and Hough 2011.
 22. Work Ready job training programs require an eighth- grade diploma, which 
prohibits most adult Somalis even though local teachers tell me off the record that 
they suspect many white Lewistonians in the Work Ready program cannot read at 
an eighth- grade level.
 23. In May 2012, the RefugeeWorks website announced a transition to a new or ga ni-
za tion called Higher, which would focus on “supporting businesses in developing 
workforce solutions and by creating welcoming workplaces through on- site cul-
tural competence training.” See RefugeeWorks, May 17, 2012, http:// refugeeworks 
. blogspot . it.
 24. Seele 2009: 3.
 25. Meyer 2010.
 26. Supervisors at the social ser vices agencies with whom I spoke about this problem 
complained that the local schools and community colleges  were failing to ensure 
that Somali refugees graduated with writing skills adequate for in de pen dent report 
writing. They noted that their slim bud gets made it difficult to support extra 
training.
 27. Twin City Times 2011.
 28. Taylor 2011.
 29. Because Mayor Macdonald won his first term by the slimmest of margins against 
a man who died days before the election, friends in Lewiston unhappy about 
Macdonald’s policies cheer each other up by saying, “Remember, he barely beat a 
dead man!”
 30. Jim Dowling, interview, June 7, 2010.
 31. Shortly after moving to Lewiston, Isha and her youn gest son  were chased through 
the city park by a dog whose owner stood laughing and urging the dog on as, 
panicked, they tried to outrun it. Later, the police arrested four Somali boys after 
they fought back against a white man whose unleashed dog chased them in the 
park. Kim Wettlaufer, who witnessed both incidents, was furious, wondering why 
the men with the illegally unleashed dog  were not arrested.
 32. Personal communication, December 18, 2009.
 33. Gilbert 2009.
 34. But the price of citizenship is nearly prohibitive. In one of his many op- eds de-
signed to rebut pernicious myths, Mayor Larry Gilbert wrote about the rising cost 
of citizenship to help Lewiston residents realize just how expensive the pro cess is. 
In 2010, the cost of a green card was $985; the naturalization test cost $675; and 
the fingerprinting and biometric data tests cost $85.
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 35. bbc News 2012.
 36. Macdonald 2012a.
 37. One conversation I overheard in the courtyard of Trinity’s day shelter offered a 
slightly different angle from non- Somalis on Somali gender norms. As I walked 
past a small group, a woman gesturing furiously exclaimed to her interlocutors, 
“That shit’s illegal  here!” A man in the group responded, “Yeah, four wives to one 
man! Four hens in the kitchen! Who needs that?”
 38. Seele 2010.
 39. Lauren Gilbert (2009) reports the refusal of the city council to allow Ismail 
Ahmed to serve on the Downtown Task Force after the mayor appointed him 
because he was not a citizen, an account confirmed by Ismail.
 40. Honig 2001: 76.
 41. Echoing the desire for gratitude as a response to the (perceived) extension of 
charity, Achille Mbembe mimics a pop u lar view of immigrants in France in a 
passage from which this chapter’s epigraph is taken: “These people are in France 
for personal gain; they treat the French state like one ‘big insurance company.’ The 
republic undertakes enormous sacrifices and receives in return only hatred and 
jeers. Herein lies their radical difference, the demonstration that they have never 
been, and never will be, a part of us” (2011: 109).
 42. Derrida and Dufourmantelle 2000; see also Khosravi 2010; Nyers 2006.
 43. Herzfeld 1993: 171.
 44. Katerina Rozakou (2012) describes an interesting case of a group of activists in 
Greece who attempted to assist refugees squatting in urban areas by positioning 
themselves as guests, thus making the refugees into hosts as a form of po liti cal 
activism and refugee empowerment.
 45. About the extension of hospitality to the refugee foreigner, a practice that “has 
existed since the beginning of civilization,” Paul Ricouer says the refugee “assumes 
the role of ‘beggar’ in relation to the host society” (2010: 44, 41).
 46. Lidwien Kapteijns and Abukar Arman (2004: 19) note that Somalis’ “distinctly 
assertive culture” can be challenging to host communities who expect quiescence 
and conformity.
 47. Macdonald 2012a.
 48. Jonathan Xavier Inda (2006) analyzes the pop u lar and po liti cal repre sen ta tions of 
illegal immigrants as ethically irresponsible, criminals, job takers, and consumers 
of public resources not meant for them. See also Ho and Loucky 2012.
 49. A scene in the documentary film Rain in a Dry Land (Makepeace 2006) shows 
several Somali Bantu families dividing their food purchases in the driveway of 
their Springfield, Massachusetts, apartment building while other residents watch 
and comment that they would like to be able to share and work together like the 
Somali Bantus do.
 50. Honig 2001: 102.
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6. Helpers in the Neoliberal Borderlands
 1. None of this work took the form of fieldwork oriented toward the production 
of an ethnography of schools or social ser vices agencies, but rather followed the 
tradition of action anthropology in which volunteer and advocacy work is a logi-
cal extension of ethnographic participant observation, especially with marginal-
ized or vulnerable communities. Although this is not the place to discuss action 
anthropology, some of my works discuss my engagement as a researcher- advocate 
(Besteman 2010, 2014). My volunteer work also meant close involvement with the 
development and activities of the Somali Bantu community association, sbyam, 
and Somali activists, about whom I write in chapter 7.
 2. The neoliberal borderlands, of course, are also, in a way, the neoliberal front 
lines. In this chapter I employ the term “borderlands” because of my focus on the 
collaborative struggles shared by those who provide assistance and those who 
seek assistance. Those studies that illuminate the antagonistic struggles include 
Luhrmann 2010 and Kingfisher 2007 on homeless shelters; Collins and Mayer 
2010 on welfare reform and workfare programs; Kingfisher and Goldsmith 2001 
and Kingfisher 1998 on welfare officers; and Ong 1996 and 2003 on social workers 
who work with refugees; also Vertovec 2011; Brodwin 2013.
 3. Halfway through his first term he lambasted state workers, calling them “about as 
corrupt as can be” for withholding enthusiastic support for his reforms (Canfield 
2012).
 4. The people profiled  here are quick to promote the hard work and accomplish-
ments of their staff and colleagues and resist any suggestion that they are some-
how more devoted than others doing the same work.
 5. Interview, February 26, 2010.
 6. Cawo M. Abdi (2012: 98) reports that Somalis in the United States have the high-
est poverty rates of all newcomers, at 51 percent, which is four times that of the 
United States and twice that of African Americans.
 7. Available at http:// larrygilbert . typepad . com (accessed May 26, 2015).
 8. Larry Gilbert, interview, May 20, 2010.
 9. Malone 2010.
 10. See, for comparison, Andrea Muehlenbach (2013a) on what she calls “the moral 
style” of neoliberalism in Lombardy, where a Catholic philosophy shapes local action 
by emphasizing the importance of mutual love, compassion, and ethical behavior 
within the neoliberal economy.
 11. Marc Robitaille, interview, May 20, 2010.
 12. Federal agents raided a Somali- owned butcher and grocer in February 2010 with-
out first informing the local police and without publicly revealing the reason for 
the raid.
 13. Lead levels among Somali Bantu children living downtown  were extremely high, 
prompting a public health investigation into the causes (see Lindkvist 2003a). By 
2013, several tenements  were razed because of excessive lead.
 14. A note on methodology: in 2009–10 I spent time in two local schools as a 
volunteer (and not a researcher). Descriptions of classroom activities are based 
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on my experiences as a volunteer and  were not part of a school- based research 
project. Most of this section is based on the many interviews I conducted outside 
of school with ell teachers, school staff, community members, and other social 
ser vices providers who engaged with schools and agreed to be interviewed for this 
project.
 15. When presented with these statistics, a school official protested that the num-
bers reflected number of incidents rather than number of students, presenting a 
skewed picture by failing to reflect that some students  were repeatedly suspended. 
Their alternative data show that in the middle school that year, Somali students 
 were 35 percent of students suspended.
 16. Bus suspensions also often led to school absences, because someone with a car 
must be located to drive to and from school each day. No one was able to provide 
statistics for bus suspensions, information that is not collected by the state.
 17. Noguera 2008: 132.
 18. Pollock 2008. At a meeting or ga nized by community advocates about the high 
suspension rates of Somali students, the teachers, social workers, and counselors 
noted that what appears to be an effort to assert a zero- tolerance policy regarding 
behavior and the desire to be seen as applying the same disciplinary expecta-
tions and punishments for Somalis as non- Somalis rejects an ac know ledg ment 
that background issues might be relevant to children’s behavior. A woman from 
Maine’s parent advocacy or ga ni za tion pointed out that the language of “no special 
treatment” and “conformity by all” sounds similar to things she heard back in the 
1970s about special needs students and the refusal by many schools to alter their 
normal way of doing things to accommodate difference. “If they fail it’s their 
fault!” she mimics.
 19. For example, the model that presents the background of refugee children as one 
of deficiency (see Foley 2008; Roy and Roxas 2011).
 20. The point was made that the school already partners with the local Adult Educa-
tion program to review grades with parents and teach them about the online 
system, and that a school official had just formed the first ell parent advisory 
committee, with handpicked participants. Hopeful about this news, I asked at 
Adult Education about their program and learned that there was, in fact, no or ga-
nized school- sponsored information session. When I located participants in the 
school- sponsored parent advisory group, I learned that it was discontinued for 
the year after only one meeting.
 21. From Caroline Sample’s private blog, April 15, 2010, quoted with permission.
 22. See, for example, Amin 2013; Besteman and Gusterson 2009; Khosravi 2010; 
Papasterdiadis 2012; Thomas 2009; Weston 2005.
 23. Hardt and Negri 2009: 45, 49.
 24. Muehlenbach 2013b.
 25. Muehlenbach 2011: 67. Her argument echoes an earlier argument by Hardt that 
affective labor produces “social networks, forms of community, biopower” 
(1999: 96).
 26. Hardt 1999: 100.
 27. Povinelli 2009: 98, 97.
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 28. Ahmed, Besteman, and Osman 2010; Cullen 2011.
 29. Povinelli 2009: 98.
 30. Such tempered advocacy reveals the limits of the welfare state as well, of course. 
But while those profiled  here are reluctant to act locally in ways that might blow 
back on their ability to raise money for their organizations or that might get them 
fired for insubordination, they do exercise the option to lobby the government for 
policy changes. Legislative hearings in January 2014 about proposed changes to 
welfare eligibility that would deny new immigrants access to General Assistance, 
for example, provided an opportunity for about a hundred people to protest the 
proposed reductions (see Billings 2014).
III. Introduction
 1. Al- Shabaab formed from the remnants of the Islamic Courts Union government 
that was ousted by the U.S.- supported Ethiopian invasion of Somalia in 2006. The 
group’s initial mandate was to contest foreign intervention.
7. Making Refuge
 1. An example from a local agency with the mission to make local mental health ser-
vices more accessible to poor and marginalized residents is instructive of the task 
faced by Somali and Somali Bantu cultural brokers. At a meeting where the agency 
decided to hold focus groups with New Mainers to learn about their mental health 
concerns, someone brought up the possibility of also conducting focus groups with 
ser vice providers to hear about their experiences of working with New Mainers. 
The project director suggested this would be problematic because ser vice providers 
are busy and would expect a concrete result from their participation, provoking the 
Somali Bantu caseworker to gently suggest that Somali Bantu focus group partici-
pants also want concrete results from their participation. The project director had 
the good sense to be chagrined about her assumption that immigrants are objects 
of study whose participation does not merit action.
 2. Ironically, the selection pro cess modeled administrative disorder rather than 
precision. A meeting in Lewiston to explain the grant and invite applications 
was announced via e- mail to only a few people a few days beforehand, followed 
by frantic phone calls the morning of the meeting to collect refugee representa-
tives. Two hours after the appointed starting time, the project administrator 
had assembled an audience of about a dozen bewildered people from Lewiston’s 
refugee population, to whom he explained that the program would offer “com-
prehensive capacity building within communities,” “leadership development,” 
“strategic planning and mission development,” “networking opportunities,” 
and training about “the development of or gan i za tional structure to leverage 
support.” At the conclusion of the meeting, the administrator announced that 
the applications, which consisted of five essay questions on or gan i za tional 
goals, projects, successes, and failures, and five or gan i za tional profile questions, 
would be due immediately, that very afternoon. Not an auspicious beginning 
for a project that purported to offer bureaucratic and administrative capacity 
building.
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 3. Over time, many Somali translators and caseworkers developed excellent relation-
ships with their clients. Some Somali translators from Kenya and Ethiopia earned 
special trust from Somali Bantus because, as I was told, “They are innocent.” In-
nocent of what? I asked. “Of crimes. Of abuses. Of killings. They stand with their 
tribe, but they  weren’t there during the war and that makes a big difference. The 
others—we don’t know what they did during the war.”
 4. I asked many friends from Banta about the possibility for a rapprochement 
between Somali Bantus and Somalis in resettlement and was often told that while 
the two groups may live together in the United States, trust will always be an issue 
for Somali Bantus. One man responded, “We cannot forget what happened to us. 
I just look at my hands, where I was stabbed, at the scars from the beatings and 
stabbings, from when I was tied up, and I  can’t forget that. We are different people 
[he put the backs of his hands together and pushed them apart to demonstrate]. 
We  can’t forget what Somalis did to us.”
 5. The extraordinarily busy Somali cyberspace, anchored by several major online 
forums, offers a heartbreaking display of ongoing anti- Bantu racism, where 
discussions about the significance of Somali Bantu identity regularly invoke ugly 
and degrading racist language and ste reo types. Sadiq has been the subject of 
several racist diatribes in these forums, and my use of a pseudonym for him and 
other community leaders is in recognition of the threats that they have received 
through diaspora networks.
 6. Because I worked with Somali Bantu community members on projects of self- 
representation (through creating an informational flyer, a website, museum exhibi-
tions, and panel pre sen ta tions), I was also pilloried for supporting divisiveness. A 
prominent businessman wrote a letter to the ceo of a local hospital denouncing 
the request for Somali Bantu translators and attacking me for my involvement, 
and I received threats because of my collaboration with Somali Bantu leaders.
 7. See McCabe 2010.
 8. A refugee friend suggested to me that such pervasive petty suspicions about 
money started in Kakuma, where En glish speakers got paid jobs translating, 
teaching, or working in the health care sector and everyone  else was jealous that 
the new world of interacting with officials and outsiders meant cultural mediators 
could get resources that they could keep hidden.
 9. Lokua Kanza, remarking ruefully on the thirty- five- minute time slot for his 
portion of the Africa Now! concert at the Apollo Theater, New York, March 16, 
2013.
 10. Drawing on fieldwork in Copenhagen and London, Nauja Kleist (2010) notes 
that Somali men in the diaspora feel their authority has been superseded by the 
welfare state while women have become more empowered, a loss they attempt to 
overcome through deeper engagements in Islam, return visits to Somaliland, and 
community associations.
 11. See also Abdi 2014.
 12. Since polygyny is illegal in the United States, only one wife is recognized as the 
legal wife, and the other will have her children’s paternity registered with the state 
as her assurance of legal recognition.
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 13. One task many women are reluctant to cede is their control over the kitchen. 
Although some men began to take on responsibility for cleaning tasks, nearly 
everyone agrees that men cannot get involved in the kitchen. One man tells me, 
diplomatically, “If I try to do something in the kitchen it will only be a big argu-
ment. I avoid that.” His wife nods emphatically, indicating that he has learned the 
limits of his contribution to domestic life. Even high school students agree: one 
of my most spirited conversations with a group of high school students involved 
rules for men and women in the kitchen. The boys insisted that the Quran says 
men should help their wives, but the girls uniformly dismissed their claims, 
insisting that men have no business in the kitchen.
 14. Holtzman 2000.
 15. Somali understandings of how money should intersect with morality received 
additional public attention when Museum la offered a public program on Islamic 
banking to accompany the Rivers of Immigration exhibition. In the pre sen ta tion 
by a representative from a local bank about the research on Islamic banking she 
undertook with Bates College anthropology students, the assembled non- Somali 
audience members and even the bank representative herself remarked that a 
banking structure with transparent fees rather than interest would be widely 
embraced beyond just the Muslim community.
 16. See Ahmed 2011; Gilbert 2009. Ihotu Ali (2009) expresses concern that Somali 
community associations in Minnesota are oriented toward internal support 
structures and promoting cultural and religious accommodation in schools and 
workplaces rather than integration with the host community, wondering if self- 
isolation will be harmful in the long run.
8. These Are Our Kids
 1. One day Idris told me about a new program called Safe Children, inaugurated 
by the humanitarian agencies that run the Kenyan refugee camps that every-
one was talking about. The program’s mandate is to stop early marriage and ar-
ranged marriage. I was amazed to learn that the agencies in charge of the camps 
 were attempting this sort of social reform on displaced refugees and asked Idris 
what he thought about it. He responded without hesitation, “I think it’s about 
time.”
 2. Ali 2007.
 3. LaFlamme 2009.
 4. Some women struggling with the universal shit storm participate in home visit 
programs from public health or social workers that are intended to provide 
support for overwhelmed parents, but even these programs can introduce stress 
because mothers do not want to appear incompetent in front of authorities. If 
a social worker observes a parent in an unguarded moment slapping a child, the 
social worker is obligated to report it as child abuse, and the news whips around 
the community because so many parents feel so vulnerable in the face of the pos-
sibility of losing their children to the government. At one collaborative meeting, 
Somali and Somali Bantu caseworkers explained to white social workers the 
challenges experienced by Somali and Somali Bantu parents involved in home 
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visit programs. The parents want to model good parenting and demonstrate that 
they are capable by cleaning and preparing for the home visit, but sometimes the 
effort is too great, and a parent cannot pull it together to feel presentable for the 
social worker and cancels the visit at the last minute. Everyone present knew what 
happens next: those who cancel get labeled “treatment resistant” or “noncompli-
ant,” earning another blot on their parenting record.
 5. See Brettell 2007; Foner 2005; Foner and Fredrickson 2004; Foner, Rumbaut, and 
Gold 2000; Itzigsohn 2009; Portes and Rumbaut 1996; Suárez- Orozco et al. 2010; 
Waters 1994; Zhou 1997.
 6. Zhou 1997; Portes and Zhou 1993; Foner 2005.
 7. Portes and Rumbaut 1996.
 8. Waters 1994: 801.
 9. Kasinitz 2004: 287.
 10. See Foner 2005; Itzigsohn 2009.
 11. Forman 2005: 51; Kapteijns and Arman 2004; Samatar 2004.
 12. Kapteijns and Arman 2004: 24; see also Al- Sharmani 2007.
 13. Hammond 2011: n.p.
 14. Shepard 2008: 236, 231.
 15. While this is not the place for a discussion of African conceptions of personhood, 
anthropologists have demonstrated that the Western model of the individual con-
trasts in fundamental ways with the understandings held in many non- Western 
cultures that people are constituted through their relations with others. People, 
as individuals, are thus composites of their social relations. See Besteman 2014; 
Pina- Cabral 2013; Sahlins 2011a, 2011b.
 16. Moore 2004.
 17. See also Kleist 2010.
Conclusion
 1. Macdonald 2012b.
 2. The growing literature on Somali remittances estimates that Somalis remit $1–2 
billion per year (Hammond et al. 2011; Sheikh and Healy 2009), probably making 
Somalia the largest per capita recipient of remittances (Hammond 2010). See also 
Lindley 2010.
 3. Abdirisak experienced this prohibition firsthand. When he drove up to visit 
Idris during the year Idris was in Job Corps in northern Maine, he somehow 
missed the turnoff to the school and drove over the bridge into Canada by 
mistake. He immediately turned around and tried to reenter the United States, 
but since his accidental border crossing violated his probationary status, he 
was jailed for three days while Immigration and Customs Enforcement sorted 
out his story. “I hate jail!” he told me vehemently after he was freed. But three 
days of jail was certainly better than the other possible outcome, which was 
deportation.
 4. Idris uses a recording of his father’s flute music that I made in 1988 as his cell 
phone’s ringtone.
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 5. Anna Amelina and Thomas Faist (2012), Nicolas De Genova (2005), Peggy Levitt 
(2012), and Nina Glick Schiller (2012), among others, discuss how scholars must 
move beyond the binaries of stranger/member, foreigner/citizen, immigrant/resi-
dent, and so forth, to investigate instead spheres of belonging and engagement, 
phenomenologies of emplacement, and special localities as constituted by social 
relations.
 6. Horst 2006.
 7. Nyamnjoh 2006: 230–31.
 8. Papasterdiadis 2012: 402.
 9. Amin 2013; Hall 2013; Hardt and Negri 2009; Honig 2001.
 10. Honig 2001: 101.
 11. Hardt and Negri 2009.
 12. Hall 2013: 51 is discussing Amin 2013.
 13. Hall 2013: 52.
 14. Thanks to Britt Halvorson for this insight.
 15. Besteman and Gusterson 2005.
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